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The Habsburg Monarchy from a Roman Perspective: Potential Insights of the “Nuncial Reports from Germany” for International Historical Research

Abstract: From the very beginning of the edition “Nuncial reports from Germany” in the late nineteenth century, the publication of sources was extended beyond the century of Reformation to the time of the Thirty Years’ War. The fourth series, dedicated to the first half of the seventeenth century, was finished in 2016. There are six substantial volumes which document the core phase (around 1630) of the Thirty Years’ War with its decisive change to the disadvantage of the emperor, the Habsburgs and the Catholic faction of the Holy Roman Empire up to the intensive efforts to make peace, the Peace of Prague in 1635 and the concurrent European extension of the Thirty Years’ War with Sweden’s and France’s entry into the war in 1630/1635. With these volumes, a cohesive documentation of sources of European rank was achieved. 2018 marked the 400th anniversary of the outbreak of the war, thus it is worth looking at this edition as a prime collection of sources of European history, particularly of the Papal–Habsburg relations at the height of the Thirty Years’ War.

Keywords: Thirty Years’ War – Peace of Westphalia – papal diplomacy – Imperial court – Habsburg–Roman relations

In December 1891, Bonn University professor and director of the Preußisches Staatsarchiv, Heinrich von Sybel, wrote down his preface for the first volume of the editorial undertaking “Nuncial reports from Germany”, which had been promoted by the Preußische Historische Station (later to become the Deutsches Historisches Institut) since its foundation in 1888. Even if the first series of the new edition, of which this was the first volume, edited the dispatches of papal nuncios of the time of the Reformation, Sybel was already able to look ahead to the editorial inclusion of the pontificates of Paul V (1605–1621) and Urban VIII (1623–1644). It seems logical to look at the fourth series in

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2 To be precise, the examinations of Paul V are called 'studies', whereas, regarding the pontificate of Urban VIII, there is 'research' by two members of the institute. Ibidem, p. VI.
this article for two reasons: Firstly, the year 2018 marks the 400th anniversary of the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), and its caesura around 1630 is featured with highly interesting sources in this collection. Furthermore we celebrate the 370th anniversary of the Peace Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, twenty years after the great jubilee of peace in 1998 with its many exhibitions and publications.\(^3\) Secondly, the series in question has been finished recently (in 2016) and we can therefore take a concise look at the edited corpus of sources\(^4\).

The fourth series of the edition came to a virtual standstill until 2004 after two volumes on the Barbarini pontificate (1628–1629) had been published towards the end of the nineteenth century and one more – on the early seventeenth century (1603–1606) – on the eve of the First World War.\(^5\) The reasons for this need not concern us here. Seen against the edition’s explicit intentions to cover the pontificates of Paul V and Urban VIII, the currently accomplished results seem modest on the one hand: in a single volume, the seventeenth century before the Thirty Years’ War is only fragmentarily covered and the nunciature at the court of the emperor of the time was given over to the Czechoslovak (now Czech) Historical Institute in Rome. On the other hand, for the central period of the Thirty Years’ War (around 1630), a cohesive and important documentation of European significance was produced in six extensive volumes. These volumes encompass the decisive turn of the war against the emperor, the Habsburg and Catholic factions in the Empire up to the intensified peace efforts, the signing of the Peace of Prague in 1635 and the concurrent European extension of the Thirty Years’ War with the entry into the war of Sweden in 1630 and France in 1635. In this respect, the edition offers more than the instigators of the late nineteenth century had intended (with their views constricted by the nation-state).\(^6\)

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\(^4\) The third series of “Nuncial reports from Germany” (until 1585) is currently under way, edited by Alexander Koller.


Following the Second World War, earlier research and editorial projects were reappraised. Consequently, various considerations from the 1960s and 1970s exist about the significance of the nuncial reports and the potential of the research of nunciatures, which have been refined and adapted to new perspectives in research in the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Some of the contributors in German research I would like to mention (in alphabetical order) are Helmut Goetz, Georg Lutz, Heinrich Lutz, Gerhard Müller and Wolfgang Reinhard. They studied a variety of facets of the nuncial reports and their research; from church history, regional history and European politics to the considerable relevance of nuncial documents as complimentary sources for different fields of research, from infrastructures to linguistics. The fundamental question of the expediency of publishing further editions or the preference of evaluative research were discussed, as well as problems of the extent and methods of these editions. Since the beginning of the editorial work on the main instructions, i.e. the main directives given to the papal ambassadors at the beginning of their missions, this has been accompanied by the question to which extend this species of text was to be preferred to nuncial reports in the narrower sense. At the same time Peter Schmidt offered a very instructive survey of the status of nuncial research in 1998.

This article is not able to achieve such an extensive overview. Rather, it attempts to consider the key aspects, analytical possibilities and prospective findings of the volumes

13 To date, the main instructions for the period 1592–1623 have been edited. The pontificate of Urban VIII until 1644 is currently being edited by Silvano Giordano, OCD.
of the nuncial reports for the years 1630–1635. This comes after a short general survey of nuncial reports and their editions in German historical science was done, in connection with a cursory survey of the central themes of the volumes dedicated to the early 1630s. Special consideration will be given to the Roman-Habsburg relations and the last volume, published in 2016, for historical research on several selected subjects. Against this background, my article will finally make clear the question of the expedience of such editorial efforts, which has already been heavily debated since the 1990s.\footnote{W. REINHARD, Nuntiaturberichte für die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft? As to the principle debate about the expedience of editions at the end of the 1990s, cf. Lothar GALL – Rudolf SCHIEFFER (edd.), Quelleneditionen und kein Ende? Symposium der Monumenta Germaniae Historica und der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. München, 22./23. Mai 1998, München 1999 (= Historische Zeitschrift, Beil. N. F. 28).}

**A look at the body of sources: “Nuncial reports” and their editions as a source of the history of the Roman-Habsburg relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries**

Nuncial reports belong to the “type of sources of periodic ambassadorial reports, which from constant observation [promise to] give insight into the thoughts and action of a host court”, as Rudolf Schieffer said from a medieval perspective in 2008.\footnote{Rudolf SCHIEFFER, Die päpstliche Kurie als internationaler Treffpunkt des Mittelalters, in: Claudia Zey – Claudia Märtl (edd.), Aus der Frühzeit europäischer Diplomatie. Zum geistlichen und weltlichen Gesandtschaftswesen vom 12. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert, Zürich 2008, pp. 23–39, here 38.} The term “nuncial reports” represents, according to Wolfgang Reinhard (1998), an artificial term which is not substantiated by sources. In the nineteenth century, it was initially described as “reports of papal diplomats about the Reformation”; by extension, however, it came to be referred to as “the complete written exchange between ordinary nuncios as well as special envoys (among others, legates) and the Secretariat of State and other Roman authorities (especially congregations), including the initial main directives and jurisdictional powers as well as the final report in some cases”.\footnote{Wolfgang REINHARD, Nuntiaturberichte, in: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, vol. 7, Freiburg 1998\(^3\), col. 948 f., quote 948.} Therefore, the term “nuncial report” has essentially undergone two extensions: a chronological (beyond the sixteenth century) and a factual extension. Concerning the latter, apart from the nuncios as “senders” in their reports, the documents produced by the Curia and directed at the nuncio as “recipient” are subsumed under the term “nuncial reports”.

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The century of the Reformation was the period which the edition of “Nuncial reports from Germany” first addressed.\(^\text{18}\) The initial meaning of the term is significant: The emphasis lay clearly on the reports by the nuncios, not the Roman directives and the central view on German affairs. The editors (and their sponsors, i.e. initially the Prussian state) were first interested to learn from the nuncial reports about Germany or the Empire and particularly about the history of the Reformation. They were not yet seen for what they are to a much greater extent – a significant source about Rome itself.

A change of perspective, that began in the 1990s, has opened this dimension and highlighted the historical-anthropological significance of the nuncial reports.\(^\text{19}\) Due to the status of source editions in early modern research, it is necessary to emphasize that essentially only the nuncial reports offer a first point of contact for the structural historical research of early modern diplomacy and especially the spheres of life and experience of ‘diplomats’ *avant la lettre*.

A particularly full history of written records distinguishes the “German” nunciature, as the papal representation at the emperor’s court called itself in Roman sources of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (even when the emperor resided in Prague and thus “Germany” meant the Holy Roman Empire including Bohemia).\(^\text{20}\) The same holds true for further nunciatures, which had existed since the sixteenth century in greater number...
only in the Empire. No edition of the nuncioal reports of a European country has advanced further than the edition concerning the nunciature at the emperor’s court published by German speaking historical scientists in cooperation with Austrian and Czech researchers.

The extent of edited “Nuncioal reports from Germany” from the foundation of the “German nunciature” by Clement VII (1523–1534) to Gregory XIII (1572–1585) encompasses with its 37 volumes in series I to III until 2012 a total of 22,109 pages, 18,067 of these pages are edited sources and reflect more than a half-century of activities and experience of papal representations in Germany. These include the nunciature of South Germany and the “Fight for Cologne”. Additionally, the nunciatures of Cologne proper and of Graz have been edited separately.

Consequently, conditions are particularly favourable in the case of Germany and the court of the ruler of the Holy Roman Empire, with the best editorial status for the sixteenth century, fewer printed volumes for the seventeenth century and hardly any existing editions for the eighteenth century.

The fourth series of nuncioal reports from Germany is, besides one volume about the Prague nunciature of Giovanni Stefano Ferreri and the Vienna nunciature of Giacomo Sera from the first decade of the seventeenth century, 1603–1606 (edited on the eve of the First World War, in 1913), comprised of six volumes about the time of the decisive


26 In this respect the findings resulting from A. KOLLER, Bibliographie, until 1998 are still valid.
turn of the Thirty Years’ War, which was the result of the active involvement of Sweden 1630 and France 1635. The volumes in question provide the correspondence of Giovanni Battista Pallotto, the nuncio at the emperor’s court in 1628/1629 following Carlo Caraffa. Two volumes with reports of those first years 1628 and 1629 had already been published towards the end of the nineteenth century (1895–1897) by Hans Kiewning, while Rotraud Becker commendably undertook publishing a further four volumes between 2004 and 2016, which completed the Pallotto nunciature and furthermore edited the documents of the ordinary and special nunciatures, as well as the missives of Ciriaco Rocci, Girolamo Grimaldi, Alessandro d’Ales, Malatesta Baglioni and Mario Filonardi (from 1630 to 1635) in an exemplary manner.27

The six volumes representing the years 1628 to 1635 of this now completed series are comprised of almost 4,500 pages (3,997 and CDLVII pages). The edited sources constitute fundamental documents of European politics at the height of the Thirty Years’ War. In this respect, they not only offer insights into the relations between the Curia and the Empire but open a panorama of Central European political problems. The attempts at solving those problems are highly relevant to our present, when experts and politicians look to the conflicts and solutions of the seventeenth century in their considerations of ways for the peaceful resolution of ongoing conflicts, namely in the Middle East.28

Currently, there is a very serious discussion of the question whether the Middle East is living through its Thirty Years’ War with its mix of secular and religious, national and international conflicts, the confrontation of official and non-official or non-sovereign agents or groups; there is a debate whether twenty-first century Aleppo represents seventeenth century Magdeburg, as stated in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (August 18th, 2016).29 Furthermore, it is asked which seventeenth century methods of conflict resolution may be relevant today. These questions are being sincerely discussed from a scientific point of view.30

27 NBD IV, Vols. 4–7.
Besides problems of state and church history, which the papal legates reported to Rome according to their function and mandate, there is a lot to be learned from these edited sources on several aspects: the function of the Papal legation system, the protagonists in foreign relations, their profiles, networking, perception, European interrelations as well as early modern spheres of life and experience.  

The Fourth Series of the “Nuncial Reports from Germany”: What do the sources say to the Habsburg monarchy and to Europe from a Roman perspective? Themes of the latest volumes of the edition

Which themes do the recently published volumes 4 to 7 of the fourth series of “Nuncial Reports from Germany” address? The fourth volume, published in 2009 and edited by Rotraud Becker, offers the correspondence between the nunciature at the emperor’s court and the Roman Curia during the period of change in the Thirty Years’ War, which started in 1630. These were the nunciatures of Giovanni Battista Pallotto and Ciriaco Rocci, in the period between the beginning of January 1630 and the end of August 1631. The time of these reports coincides with Mantuan War of Succession (1628–1631) about the Duchies of Mantua and Monferrat along with the subsequent peace negotiations, as well as the end of the first phase of Thirty Years’ War, which was successful for the Imperial-Catholic side. The turn of the war was chimed in with the Swedish landing in Pomerania and the dismissal of the imperial generalissimo Wallenstein at the Regensburg Diet of Electors in 1630. This was a highly dramatic period in European international and confessional politics. It coincided with the European expansion of the Thirty Years’ War as well as grave existential, social, economic and cultural consequences for large parts of the population in the Empire and beyond.

The fifth volume of the “Nuncial Reports from Germany”, which was published in 2013 and also edited by Rotraud Becker, incorporates the correspondence between the papal diplomats in Vienna and the Roman Curia between September 1631 and May 1633. This

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31 Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the Cardinal Nepots’ correspondence (an important complex of sources for the research of micro-political connections) is not part of the edited nuncial reports; for the potentials of micro-political research cf. Wolfgang REINHARD, Paul V. Borghese (1605–1621). Mikropolitische Papstgeschichte, Stuttgart 2009 (= Päpste und Papsttum 37); Idem, Die Nase der Kleopatra. Geschichte im Lichte mikropolitischer Forschung. Ein Versuch, Historische Zeitschrift 293, 2011, pp. 631–666.

turbulent period of the Thirty Years’ War was distinguished by the seemingly inexorable, triumphant progress of the Swedes, which reached into South Germany and undermined the successes of the previous imperial politics of re-catholicisation. Furthermore, it led to the subsequent re-appointment of Wallenstein and finally the death of the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus II in the Battle of Lützen (1632).

The relations between the emperor and the pope were severely strained during this time. Although the Swedish army, heavily supported by French subsidies, advanced into Franconian bishoprics, into Bavaria, occupied large parts of Catholic Germany, eventually crossed the Rhine into Alsace, the Francophile Pope Urban VIII did not support the Catholic faction financially to any appreciable extent due to his own political interests. The financial support would have strengthened the Habsburg’s rule in Vienna and Madrid, increased their dominance over Europe (especially Italy) and would have limited the influence of the Holy See from the viewpoint of Urban VIII.

What was seen to the papal side as neutrality between the Catholic states and his own position as “Common Father” (padre comune) among the princes of Catholic Europe, was interpreted as partisanship by the emperor and the Spanish. The Spanish remonstrance against Roman politics increased the tensions between the papal court and the emperor’s court in Vienna.

On the other hand, Papal diplomacy aimed at creating a union of Catholic states, which should follow French interests and enable the Most Christian King to sever ties to his Protestant allies. However, this was seen by the Habsburgs as hardly promising. The Curia responded to continuing criticism by sending special nuncios to Vienna, Madrid and Paris, but could not achieve a diplomatic solution.

These considerations turned out to be progressive in as far as a new European order of peace could not be established through direct bilateral negotiations between single powers, but would have to be negotiated at a general, multilateral congress of peace envoys. This

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34 For the relations between the papal and Imperial courts during the pontificate of Urban VIII cf. Irene FOSI – Alexander KOLLER (edd.), Papato e impero nel pontificato di Urbano VIII (1623–1644), Città del Vaticano 2013 (= Collectanea Archivi Vaticani 89).
The sixth volume of the series, recently published by Rotraud Becker (2016), records the correspondence between the Roman Secretariat of State and papal nuncios based in Vienna. The ordinary nuncio at the court of the emperor Ciriaco Rocci and the special nuncio Girolamo Grimaldi communicated during an unsettled and in its tendencies partly contradictory period of the Thirty Years’ War. The added reports of the Capuchin Alessandro d’Ales are valuable. He was equally trusted with diplomatic mandates within the framework of his secret mission. These document prove intense efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution between the Catholic powers.

The aim of Roman-Curial politics was the settlement of conflicts between France and the Habsburgs, which was meant to pave the way to a union of the Catholic princes, thereby rendering obsolete the Protestant ties of the Most Christian King. In its efforts, the Holy See kept close to the French ideas and conditions for negotiating a new order of peace with the Habsburgs. Pope Urban VIII’s attitude towards the latter shows itself to be affected by deep mistrust throughout all the volumes discussed here.

Simultaneously to papal peace efforts, the conflicted relations of France and the Habsburgs led to a renewed expansion of military conflict into an all-European war. Imperial politics focussed on a reconciliation with the Protestant orders in the Empire, which would have given Ferdinand II considerably more scope for influence on the European stage.

The military progress within the Empire was characterized by ever-changing developments and temporarily kept open the question of territorial possession for the various denominations. Ferdinand II observed the tentative warfare of the recalled

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36 Lucien BÉLY – Bertrand HAAN – Stéphane JETTOT (edd.), La paix des Pyrénées (1659) ou le triomphe de la raison politique, Paris 2015 (= Histoire des Temps modernes 3).

37 Ralf-Peter FUCHS, Ein „Medium zum Frieden“. Die Normaljahrsregel und die Beendigung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, München 2010 (= Bibliothek Altes Reich 4).
Wallenstein with growing mistrust, which resulted in his dismissal and execution. But in the aftermath of this leadership crisis, the Imperial troops were successful.

The seventh volume (submitted by Becker in 2004) offers the correspondence between the papal nuncios in Vienna and the Roman Secretariat of State from November 1634 to the end of 1635. This period in the history of the Thirty Years’ War saw the initially successful efforts of Imperial politics achieving peace with the Protestant orders, which led to the signing of the Peace of Prague with Electoral Saxony in May 1635. Conversely, the French declaration of war with Spain in the same month led to a serious expansion of conflicts, to open war against the emperor within the Empire. Apart from neglecting Sweden in the treaty, this contributed to the failure of the Peace of Prague, although the Protestant orders had initially dissociated themselves from Sweden and accepted the treaty. The Thirty Years’ War had become a fully European conflagration with France’s entry into the war.

For those reasons, the Imperial court could not improve its military position permanently, despite a temporary expulsion of the Swedish forces from South Germany. As far as confessional politics were concerned, Ferdinand II had, however, laid an important foundation stone for a future accord with the Protestant orders at the Peace of Westphalia by renunciating the demands of the Edict of Restitution from 1629. In this edict, the emperor had claimed the right to settle the differences created by the various interpretations of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 in a Catholic manner, by way of authentic interpretation from the head of the Empire.

Thus, this volume of the nuncial reports shows, as the volumes documenting the first half of the 1630s do, the concurrence of temporary expansion of conflicts and forward-looking considerations which contribute to a later permanent resolution of conflicts. Through the course of the aggravated conflict, the outlines of innovative strategies for solutions and ideas for a new order in the aftermath of the war became clearer.

During this time, the papal nuncios were unsuccessful in their constant efforts to realise a general peace conference. Despite years of failure in this respect, the idea that a pan-European conflict could only be resolved by multilateral negotiations and the intervention

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38 Christoph KAMPMANN, Reichsrebellion und kaiserliche Acht. Politische Strafjustiz im Dreißigjährigen Krieg und das Verfahren gegen Wallenstein 1634, Münster 1992 (= Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte e. V. 21).
of peace mediators became a conviction and ultimately advanced to an important fund of experience for European diplomacy.\(^{41}\)

Although a settlement of conflicts could not be achieved at this stage in the war, this was not least due to continued indeterminacy of the military outcome, which gave hope of a favourable development of the military situation to all sides. The simultaneous protestations of peace should not be dismissed as dishonest. Instead, they show an already existing awareness that a political resolution of conflicts was inevitable, with the best possible military position in peace negotiations for one's own side. This awareness was the result of the ideal of peace as the perfect normal status of the European society of princes, which excluded the waging of “total war” in early modern times on principle.\(^{42}\)

This tentative position of the princes and their advisers in hope of better military conditions was nevertheless a frequently frustrating experience for the papal nuncios, who were charged with the opening of peace talks, and this is clearly reflected in the edited reports.

**Informational content and scientific perspectives in the nuncial sources from the court of the emperor**

Which information can now be extracted from the edited correspondences? On the one hand, the texts offer an insight into the workings of the Imperial court as a courtly and administrative nucleus as well as the governance and personality of Emperor Ferdinand II (1578–1637, Emperor since 1619) at its centre from the perspective of foreign ambassadors. They further emphasize the role of the Imperial advisers and leading functionaries, e.g. Anton Wolfradt OSB (1582–1639), hailing from Cologne, Bishop of Vienna and president of the Imperial court chamber. They also provide information about the events at the Imperial court, the daily routine, the atmosphere of court life, and illuminate apart from the political the cultural life at court. Thus, Volume 7 offers observations on court etiquette, festivities, hunts, theatrical performances and liturgical ceremonies.

\(^{41}\) For the type of assembly emerging from this, the international congress of envoys cf. Christoph KAMPMANN – Maximilian LANZINNER – Guido BRAUN – Michael ROHRSCHNEIDER (edd.), *L’art de la paix. Kongresswesen und Friedensstiftung im Zeitalter des Westfälischen Friedens*, Münster 2011 (= Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte e. V. 34).

Moreover, the reports of the nuncios demonstrate the importance and the politically charged nature of ceremonial and protocolary questions as an integral part of European political culture in early modern times, particularly in a period of change of the state system and its fundamental ideas of order as it appears to us in the age of the Thirty Years’ War.\textsuperscript{43} These ceremonial and protocolary problems were part of the order, whose definition was heavily debated;\textsuperscript{44} however, they appeared dysfunctional in the handling of other potential political conflicts. In particular, the already tense relations between the emperor and the pope were further poisoned by the prefect dispute regarding the precedence of the Praefectus Urbi to the Imperial ambassador in Rome.\textsuperscript{45}

On the other hand, the edited texts allow deeper insights into the world of the reporters themselves and the recipients of their missives. Into the ideas, world views and cognitive horizons of Roman-Curial officials and diplomats; into the difficulties, tensions and contradictions, which were connected to balancing secular-stately and sacred interests and demands of the Papacy – especially against the Habsburgs and the emperor. They witness the methods and administrative practices of control within a highly sophisticated Papal administrative apparatus, which in itself is one of the most remarkable manifestations of European political culture with a considerable potential for the future.

The tendency to edit full texts in the latest volumes of the fourth series is to be commended. In posing many questions, modern historical science cannot be satisfied with using nuncial reports as a quarry of information or so-called facts as positivistic history of events, which leaves a barren field of potentially crucial insights from these texts. In contrast to the research around 1900, misinformation, unfounded rumours and misunderstandings (which are found in the nuncial reports) are no longer considered less telling or even annoying. This view had led to omissions in or paraphrases of said passages in some of the older nunciature editions.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibidem.
Such misinformation and misunderstandings are potentially more revealing about the perception and actions of the protagonists than genuine information, and therefore historical science has rightly made the category "misunderstanding" an object for research.\footnote{Martin ESPENHORST (ed.), *Unwissen und Missverständnisse im vormodernen Friedensprozess*, Göttingen 2013 (= Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Abteilung für Universalgeschichte, Beiheft 94).}

A deeper understanding of the political, cultural and confessional developments and connections by means of nuncial reports is only possible if the original wording is available, particularly if the reports and instructions are understood as sources for the history of the Roman Curia itself. The genesis of the nuncial reports is a complex process, in which not only the reported matter is processed, but at the same time the cultural conditioning of the reporter as well as the basic norms and expectations of the recipient resonate in it.\footnote{G. BRAUN, *Imagines imperii*.}

To decode this texture, the original wording is needed.

According to the information with which the publishers promote the latest volumes, these editions shed light on German and European history in general, on Southern Europe in particular, as well as cultural history, theology, religious studies and church history of the early modern period. The present survey of the key aspects of the volumes in question shows that there is indeed scientific potential in these nunciature documents.

If these subjects are ordered systematically, a central aspect in the field of political-diplomatic reports emerges. Among these are, if for instance Volume 4 is consulted, diplomatic negotiations in the narrow sense such as the preparation of (general) peace negotiations and peace mediations during the Mantuan War of Succession, Curial politics at the turning point of the Thirty Years’ War such as the Regensburg Diet of Electors in 1630, but also central dynastic events such as the bridal journey of Infanta Maria Anna of Spain (1606–1636) from December 1629 to February 1631 to the Viennese Court for the wedding to the future Emperor Ferdinand III (1608–1657, 1625 King of Hungary, 1627 King of Bohemia, 1636 Roman King, 1637 Emperor).

Furthermore, the edited texts offer insights into the practices of envoys in early modern times: problems of espionage,\footnote{Larger surveys take little regard of the Roman Curia, cf. for instance Wolfgang KRIEGER, *Geschichte der Geheimdienste von den Pharaonen bis zur NSA*, München 2014 (Beck Paperback, 1891).} questions of postal services and the interception of diplomatic correspondence,\footnote{Anne Simone ROUS – Martin MULSW (edd.), *Geheime Post. Kryptologie und Steganographie der diplomatischen Korrespondenz europäischer Höfe während der Frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin 2015 (= Historische Forschungen 106). Particularly in this area of the research of espionage, nuncial reports offer to date largely unraised treasures.} friction between nuncios (e.g. between Baglioni and his predecessor Rocci, who still resided at the Imperial court), the application of knowledge gained in earlier diplomatic missions, such as Pallotto’s employment at the *Propaganda Fide*
congregation with his special field in Bohemian politics. Despite several (older) studies in the history of the Roman-Curial envoys, there is a lack of research in this field. It is well-known that Garrett Mattingly neglected Roman diplomacy in his definitive book on "Renaissance Diplomacy" because it did not correspond with his assumption of forward-looking secular politics detached from an ecclesiastical-religious context. A comparative study of Curial and Venetian diplomacy is still missing, although such a study has been called for several times.

Another important area of the nunciature editions is to be found in confessional-political aspects and church history as well as the re-catholicisation in the Empire, particularly in Bohemia. This includes the disputes concerning the formation of new bishoprics in Bohemia and the salt treaty to enable their financing; the disputes about the possession of benefices and the allocation of monastic properties to former and new owners. Themes of the history of devoutness and religious orders are mentioned, such as the pope’s request for the dissolution of the Institute of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and questions of spiritual jurisdiction of nuncios (particularly in volume 6).

Apart from factual issues, the nuncial reports open a considerable potential for findings relating to the protagonists, primarily the nuncios themselves. Certain details of their biographies are only known through these reports, in one case the existence of Francesco, an officer in the Imperial army, who served under Wallenstein and Matthias Gallas during the summer and autumn 1632; he was the brother of nuncio Girolamo Grimaldi, whose correspondence has been edited in volume 5. The nuncial reports provide insights into the personal characteristics and forms of piety of nuncios and other Curial officials, such as Rocci’s scarce participation in ecclesiastic life during his nunciature. Beyond this, the nuncial documents (accompanied by well-grounded introductions to each volume of the edition) give additional clues as to career paths and patterns of Roman-Curial officials.


52 For the still rudimentary knowledge about the religious side of the nuncios’ everyday lives cf. the studies of everyday life in A. KOLLER, Imperator und Pontifex; also G. BRAUN, Imagines offers insights into the religious environment of nuncios.

53 In correlation to the well-founded introductions of all volumes of the edition, which very often present positively prosopographical studies. This is true namely for the editions of instructions: Klaus JAITNER (ed.), Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens’ VIII. für die Nuntien und Legaten an den europäischen Fürstenhöfen 1592–1605, 2 Vols., Tübingen 1984 (= Instructiones pontificum Romanorum); Idem (ed.), Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV. für die Nuntien und Gesandten an den europäischen Fürstenhöfen
and they show their connections in Rome itself, to other nuncios and at their destined
locations, although the important correspondence with Cardinal-nephews about questions
of offices and benefices, which are necessary for the reconstruction of micro-political
connections, are not part of the edited nuncial documents.

It is to be wished that such prosopographical information is included in data banks, as
Wolfgang Reinhard has already suggested in 1998.\footnote{54} This presumably would yield interesting
results, particularly in the research of members of the Curia who were temporarily at the
emperor’s court or in contact with the Habsburgs. The nuncial documents, however, also
provide the basis for findings which cannot be generated in data banks and therefore still
need edited sources.

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In conclusion, it can be stated that nuncial reports offer considerable source materials with
multiple links on many topics for historical research and related disciplines. From the social
history of the Roman Curia and its elites, the time of change around 1630 with its highly
interesting history of religious confession, to the political culture of Europe, and finally
in questions of historical peace studies. Nevertheless, there are some disappointments
which are founded in the fact that the body of sources has been subjected to inapplicable
questions and narrow perspectives. This is especially true for the relations between Rome
and the Habsburg monarchy, which has excellent sources in the nuncial reports.

It is generally accepted that the nuncial reports offer their highest informational value
for the sixteenth century, which then declines (unlike the amount of the surviving source
material) in the following centuries.\footnote{55} But does this assumption hold true in view of the
developments of the first half of the seventeenth century and namely the 1620s and 1630s?
Or do the reports still offer a considerable informational value – particularly for the relations
between the Empire and the Papacy – and perhaps more so than for the middle of the
sixteenth century? In comparison, in the recently edited nuncial reports from the first half
of the 1630s or the reports of Carafa from the preceding decade, the reporters seem no
worse informed or their reports less profitable than those of the 1550s.\footnote{56} Admittedly, the
rising amount of texts poses editorial difficulties, but a well-chosen selection appears to

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1621–1623, 2 Vols., Tübingen 1997 (= Instructiones pontificum Romanorum); Silvano GIORDANO,
OCD (ed.), Le istruzioni generali di Paolo V ai diplomatici pontifici 1605–1621, 3 Vols., Tübingen 2003 (=
Instructiones pontificum Romanorum).

\footnote{54} W. REINHARD, Nuntiaturberichte für die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft?

\footnote{55} IDEM, Nuntiaturberichte, in: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, vol. 7, Freiburg 1998\textsuperscript{3}, col. 948.

\footnote{56} G. BRAUN, Imagines, about the sixteenth century; for the 1620s: Idem, L’impero nella percezione della
be an expedient alternative to a complete edition, rather than the paraphrases of texts by previous generations of scientists.

Scientists by no means agree as regards to further editions of nuncial reports, final relations or Papal instructions. The fundamental issue here is the balance of editorial effort and potential scientific findings. Wolfgang Reinhard, in his statement of 1998, deemed it preferential to strike new paths in the analysis of the existing editions of sources rather than to further extend the basis of source materials (i.e. to ask questions of the body of sources that have been of little consideration by earlier research). In 2008 Urban Fink preferred main instructions and final relations to nuncial reports.

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that nuncial reports in particular often prove themselves to be much richer sources to arrive at detailed results. Regardless, neither the politics of the Holy See nor the paradigms of Curial officials and envoys can be examined preferentially or even exclusively based on instructions; they are idiosyncratic, highly formal in character and argue in declaratory rather than descriptive or even analytic manner. Neither the course of political negotiations (at the centre of attention for earlier historians), nor processes of perception, questions of the self-image, or the roles of historical agents (which have been recently studied), can be reconstructed from instructions. The consultation of nuncial reports, the accompanying memoranda, and a potential visit to the archive seem absolutely indispensable if editorial work is confined to main instructions.

The effort of publishing further editions should be worthwhile. Even if the exaggerated nineteenth-century expectations of nuncial reports have been disappointed, the assessment of Heinrich Lutz (1965) can still be agreed upon in principle. He stresses: “On the whole we possess no body of sources for this decisive period in German and European history [from 1630 to about 1650] which can rival those nuncial reports for the significance regarding their supra-regional perspective, sharply contoured intellectual and political standards and steady continuity.” Although current historical research partly poses different questions from those seen by Lutz, his statement has not been disproved, but is in fact highly plausible. Putting aside the area of fact, what would we know about the Papal relations to the Habsburg monarchy during the time of the Thirty Years’ War without these nuncial sources?

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57 W. REINHARD, Nuntiaturberichte für die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft?, in particular pp. 213 f.
59 H. LUTZ, Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland, p. 313.
60 I thank Frank Meier for the translation of the present article.
The Ideal Cardinal and the Role of the Papacy in Dell’uffizio del cardinale (1599) by Giovanni Botero

Abstract: The paper aims to highlight the principal topics of Giovanni Botero’s speech Dell’uffizio del cardinale (1599), the first part of it being dedicated to show what cardinals could do to improve Catholicism in the Reformation world, and the second one, known as Discorso intorno allo Stato della Chiesa, is based on the analysis of the papacy as an independent state: a state that was regional but with universal pretensions.

Keywords: Giovanni Botero – cardinal – Eastern Europe – papacy – politics – Reason of state

On 29 May 1599, Giovanni Botero, the famous author of the Ragion di Stato (1589), signed the last page of a treaty about the role of cardinal entitled Dell’uffizio del cardinale, published in Rome by the printer Nicolò Muzio.1 The book is dedicated to Fernando Niño de Guevara, born in Toledo in 1541, from the important family of the marquises of Tejares.

Named a cardinal in 1596 by Pope Clement VIII, Guevara was promoted to the office of General Inquisitor in Spain, in the New World, and in Italy. Reassuming in his person all the qualities that Botero attributed to a perfect cardinal, starting from the prudence of state (prudenza di Stato). In his beautiful portrait realized by El Greco around the year 1600, he looks at us behind the lenses of his black glasses with a truly scrutinizing and enigmatic gaze.2 A modern man, authentic spirit of the Counter-Reformation spirit and a loyal vassal of the King of Spain, Guevara was incarnating the prototype of a protector for the former Jesuit Giovanni Botero.3

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2 The oil on canvas is in New York, at the Metropolitan Museum of Arts.
Dell’uffizio del cardinale is quite well-known among the specialists of history of the Church and it is not a completely original subject. In the same year (1599), Fabio Albergati, another scholar of the entourage of cardinal Federico Borromeo, wrote De cardinale. Other texts like those flourished around specific figures such as Borromeo, Cesare Baronio, Roberto Bellarmino and other cardinals who played a remarkable political role in Rome and in their dioceses. More recently, Dell’uffizio del cardinale has received new attention among the historians of art and literature due to its particular implications in those issues. In it, Botero speaks about religious pictures and architecture: he expresses severe judgement upon Michelangelo and his paintings, not conforming to Botero’s idea of holy images. On the contrary, Botero consecrates Tiziano as excellent, decent, and proper artist.

Less studied is another part of the volume, with the title Discorso intorno allo Stato della Chiesa preso dalla parte dell’opera che non è stampata. Even if it is said that it is not printed, this section was eventually printed and published in the Muzio edition and reprised several times in the numerous editions of the Relazioni universali with the title Relazione dello Stato della Chiesa. In this short article, we will pay attention to particular aspects of Dell’uffizio del cardinale, which are closely related to the politics of re-Catholicization of Eastern Europe, and to the Discorso intorno allo Stato della Chiesa or Relazione dello Stato della Chiesa as political speech. In both of these texts, the idea of service (outlined by Botero) is tightly linked to the concept of universalism and Christianity in the imperial Habsburg world.

7 The Discorso, with the title of Relazione dello Stato della Chiesa, is part of: Giovanni BOTERO (ed. B. A. Raviola), I capitani. Con alcuni discorsi curiosi, Torino 2017, pp. 175–199. I will quote from this edition, translating the most significant sentences into English.
Eastern Europe as land of proselytism.

Firstly, it may be useful to remember that Giovanni Botero, after the *Ragion di Stato* and the treaty *Delle cause della grandezza e magnificenza delle città* (1590), wrote and published his masterpiece, the *Relazioni universali* (1591). More than a geographical description of the known world and more than a moral treaty on the Catholicism around the planet, the opera is a superb contemporary World History. On different levels, the author combines his extraordinary erudition, his devotion and his sharp political thinking. Many scholars have observed in their studies that the topics of economics, politics, ideals of a civilisation, anthropological intuitions, and missionary spirit are so interrelated that it is not easy to select a unique interpretation or dominant viewpoint.

In any case, focusing on Europe, it is clear that, at the end of the sixteenth century, Botero was emphasizing two problems: the dissemination of the Reformation on one hand, and the dynamic interaction among the states. The two issues were linked and gave the Church a mission – they had to stop the Reformation by any means necessary. Botero was more favourable to proselytism than war and knew they had to have a role in any political changes.

If France, with the drama of Huguenots and the ambiguous composition operated by Henry IV, was a world apart; if England and Scotland were afflicted by the plague of schism; if the Holy Roman Empire was still too much fragmented, many countries of the East of Europe could be – in Botero’s view – saved. Even though he did not travel, Botero knew these regions well from the reports of his clergy. He served as secretary to two champions of the Counterreformation in Italy: the Archbishop of Milan, Saint Carlo Borromeo and his nephew, Cardinal Federico. Through them, he was able to reach the highest levels of the Catholic hierarchy. When Carlo died, he wrote a letter in his memory and dedicated it to Andrea Bathory, whom he personally met in Milan in the Borromeo entourage. This attention was additionally promoted by the missions and operas of other important figures.

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10 At the end of the eulogy to Carlo Borromeo, Botero wrote to Bathory: “Resta solo che io prieghi quella che, sendo io privato di un tale et santo padrone o, per dir meglio, padre, mi voglia essa far degno della sua grazia et servìti [It remains for me to pray to Your Excellency that, as I missed such a patron saint, or – better said – a father, you will consider me worthy of his grace and service].” Ibidem, p. 7.
Jesuits such as Petrus Canisius in Southern Germany and Antonio Possevino (from Mantua), author of Moscopia (1586). Reprising the thick pages of the Relazioni universali in which he described the political and religious situation of Poland, Bohemia, Moravia, Moscow and Scandinavia, in his Dell’uffizio del cardinale Botero updates the situation of “Red Russia” and “White Russia” (Belarus) and spend some words more for Poland. In “Red Russia”, dominated by Poland, most people are Orthodox and obey to the Patriarch of Constantinople. Anyway many nobles are catholic and the young sons of the powerful Duke of Ostrog (perhaps Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski: is son Janusz converted to Roman Catholicism in 1579), who is Orthodox, were recently converted as some bishops who visited the Pope Clement VIII: “so we hope that all Red Russia will become catholic very soon”. In “White Russia” they still lived as Orthodox Greeks among “many errors” (“molti errori”), while Poland was in a better condition. “Great” Poland was “cleaner and sane than Little” because Lutheranism, Calvinism and Anabaptism were not too much diffused. The problem, mostly in Lithuania, was the idolatry: “they adore the beasts, the fire, the woods, the sun, the moon, the very high and ancient trees.” In Livonia (Latvia) villains souls still preserved some seeds of Catholicism, but they were affected by ignorance, while in the cities the Lutheranism had more appeal. Prussia was in the grip of heresy, having princes and habitants lost the “catholic truth” and risking the chasm of atheism. There were about 1000 Catholics living in Sweden and Gotland. King Charles IX Vasa, who had just dethroned the King of Poland, Sigismund III, preferred Calvinism. Norway and Denmark were Lutheran kingdoms. Some cities were protectors of Catholicism: Trier, Konstanz, Würzburg (Erbipoli), and Augsburg in Germany; Liège (Luik) in Belgium; and Salzburg and Vienna in Austria. Botero observed a complex situation in Bohemia and Moravia. In Olomouc and some regions under its jurisdiction,

11 A praise of his Cathechismus minimum (1556) is in: G. BOTERO, Dell’uffizio del cardinale, p. 66.
12 As Chabod demonstrated, Moscopia was one of the books copied by Botero in his Relazioni universali (with reference to the new edition of 2017 see: F. CHABOD, Giovanni Botero, pp. 160–170). About the important reportage by Possevino see Giovanni MANISCALCO BASILE, La «Moscovia» di Antonio Possevino SJ. Il resoconto di una missione impossibile, Journal of Edicational, Cultural and Psychological Studies 8, 2013, pp. 305–320.
14 “Onde si spera che tutta Russia rossa debba in breve diventar Cattolica” (G. BOTERO, Dell’uffizio del cardinale, p. 77). About the entourage of Clement VIII see a description written by Botero’s friend Girolamo Frachetta: Artemio Enzo BALDINI, Puntigli spagnoleschi e intrighi politici nella Roma di Clemente VIII. Girolamo Frachetta e la sua relazione del 1603 sui cardinali, Milano 1981.
15 G. BOTERO, Dell’uffizio del cardinale, p. 77.
16 Ibidem.
17 Ibidem: “In più luoghi vi si adorano le bistie, il fuoco, i boschi, il Sole, la Luna, gli alberi di altezza o di vecchiezza notabile.”
18 Ibidem.
there were many people who were Catholic but also those who were Anabaptists. He hoped that Franz Seraph von Dietrichstein, the recently appointed Bishop of Olomouc, would restore the Christianity throughout this land with his “\textit{dexterity, goodness, and value.}”\footnote{Ibidem, p. 85: \textit{Ma sendo stato assunto all'amministrazione di quella Chiesa il signor cardinal Diatristan, si ha ferma opinione che, mediante la sua molta destrezza, bontà, valore, vi debba notabilmente rifiorir la fede e ripullulare ogni virtù Cristiana.}}


Quoting him, Botero once more shows his attention to contemporary history and his ability to analyze political strategies in many different contexts. Prague, in spite of the presence of an important college of the Society of Jesus, was full of Protestants of any kind, and Pressburg (now Bratislava) “more infect than Moravia”\footnote{G. BOTERO, \textit{Dell'uffizio del cardinale}, p. 85.}.

Another crucial space for the European Catholicism was Tirol, with the ecclesiastical principedom of Brixen (in Italian, Bressanone): that region – that linked the empire to Italy during the Council of Trento – was the one to stress to improve the Catholic faith and to contrast not only the Reformation but also the Islam gathering at the doors of Transylvania and Hungary.\footnote{It is well-studied that this was an intense diplomatic canal, strengthened by the aristocratic marriages between Italian and imperial noble families and the cultural circulation of artistic models. For instance, see the case of the House of Lobkowicz, related to some of the most important Italian families and dynasties such as the Gonzaga: Pavel MAREK (ed.), \textit{Svědectví o ztrátě starého světa. Manželská korespondence Zdeňka Vojtěcha Popela z Lobkovic a Polyxeny Lobkovické z Pernštějna}, České Budějovice 2005. And see: Umberto ARTIOLI – Cristina GRAZIOLI (edd.), \textit{I Gonzaga e l’Impero. Itinerari dello spettacolo}, Firenze 2005. About Hungary see: Péter TUSOR, \textit{The Papal Concistories and Hungary in the 15th – 16th Centuries. To the History of the Hungarian Royal Patronage and Supremacy}, Budapest – Rome 2012 (= Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae).}

A solution, according to Botero, was to send more clerics to those lands, because, especially in Moldavia, “\emph{people become heretics more because of the lack of catholic priests than for real inclination to heresy.}”\footnote{\textit{Nella Moldavia […]} i popoli divengono eretici più per mancamento di sacerdoti catolici che per inclinazione che essi si abbiano alleresia.” G. BOTERO, \textit{Dell'uffizio del cardinale}, p. 88.} He suggested other remedies could be increasing charity (“\textit{to see heretics going on the straight way and to go back to the womb of the Church, there is nothing}
better than alms and beneficence”). He encouraged the creating of seminaries, following the example of some local princes:

“Two princes with a small state and few sources, as to say the prince of Transylvania and the one of Wallachia, moved presently against the reason of war, lowed the pride of Turks with courage and weapons […] We should exploit these victories to propagate the faith, and this will happen any time we add the doctrine to the weapons, and the priests to the soldiers.”

The final suggestion to the cardinal was intolerant. If military defeats and theology were missing, the Catholic authorities had to follow the example of Muslims in the Ottoman Empire: they must separate children from their parents and grow them up apart until they lost “the memory of their law and rites.” Another interesting and crucial point, in the phrase, is the typical idea of Botero that the small states could afford any kind of danger with the best result. It is the idea of the “medium” (mezzano) state theorized in the Ragion di Stato: while the Catholic Habsburgs Empires (the Spanish and the Holy Roman Empire) could not afford the enterprise easily, there was a space, in Europe, that could give a political sample, even if in a completely different situation.

Papacy as an Italian and virtually universal state.

The Stato della Chiesa (the papacy) is a paradoxical case in the panorama of the ancient Italian states. Its leader was at the same time the pope and a king: a sovrano pontefice, as Paolo Prodi defined the pope:

‘a sovereign and, at the same time, the main ruler of the Church, with spiritual and temporal power in his hands and with a strategic perception of his regional state, spread through the central part of

24 Ibidem, p. 69.
25 “Due princi di piccolo stato e di poche facoltà, cioè il Transilvano e il Valacco, mossisi a’ tempi nostri contra l’ordinaria ragion di guerra, hanno con l’ardire sgomentato e con l’arme abbassato l’orgoglio degli Ottomani […] Resta che ci sappiamo di tante e gloriose vittorie valere per la propagazione della fede, il che avverrà ogni volta che alle armi si aggiungerà la dottrina e a’ soldati i sacerdoti.” Ibidem, pp. 122–123.
26 Ibidem, p. 123.
Botero understood the potential political power of the pope and the papacy. He had witnessed the conquering of Ferrara in 1598, one of the most successful enterprises of the Church as a territorial dominion. At the end of the XVI century, the papacy was bigger than ever, because it included not only the central part of Italy (Lazio, part of Tuscany, Marche, Umbria) but also this new extension on the Adriatic sea: the lands of the Dukes of Este, the Romagne (Bologna and its surroundings) and the fundamental harbor of Ancona. All these properties permitted to the pope to rule on a large portion of the peninsula. Aside from Rome caput mundi, many cities and towns enriched the territory. In addition to Ferrara, Bononia and Ancona, there were Perugia, Fermo, Ascoli Piceno, Viterbo and Ravenna, Civitavecchia and its port, Comacchio and its fishing activity. The countryside was full of lakes; the most important rivers – Po and Tevere – were rich of water and fishes and they were useful like liquid roads useful to transport men, goods, and troops.

The papal borders inside Italy were quite clear: except for Venice, a historical enemy, the Kingdom of Naples was quiet and loyal. The principal reason was enunciated in the central point of the speech:

“I will not say anything about the authority given by religion; anything about the interest that the other princes have into the preservation of the Ecclesiastical State because, if it ruins, they would ruin too; anything about the protection offered to the Church by the foreign princes, because of ambition of glory or because of reason of State.”

The Relazione dello Stato della Chiesa explores the concept – the Boterian idea of Reason of state – moving from the consideration that the pope had an “infinite authority” and was “the supreme judge of the universe”. Virtually the pope was the most powerful man in the

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31 “Non dico dell’autorità che li [to the pope] arreca la religione; nulla d’interesse che gli altri princi d’Italia hanno della conservazione dello Stato ecclesiastico la cui depressione sarebbe rovina loro; nulla della prontezza con la qual i princi stranieri si moverebbero a prendere la protezione della Chiesa, o per vaghezza di gloria o per ragion di Stato.” G. BOTERO, Relazione dello Stato della Chiesa, pp. 179–180.


33 Ibidem.
world, at least in the Catholic regions. In his extraordinary realism – a peculiar character that helps to fill the theoretical distance between Machiavelli and Botero\textsuperscript{34} – the former Jesuit stated that the principal reason of weakness in the papacy was the threat of Reformation throughout Europe, in the strong presence of other religions in the world and also in some structural gaps. Beyond the main themes of \textit{Relazioni universali}, Botero explains that the pope’s dominion had other difficulties. The first issue was the swamps which were found in the Roman countryside. The remediation of Agro Pontino was indicated by Botero as an essential part of the papacy, due to the increase in hydraulic and technical capabilities.\textsuperscript{35}

A similar intervention was required in the acquired zone of Ferrara, in Romagna, where the region of Polesine was damaged by the floods of Po and the air was unhygienic. The second concern was the economy. It was vital for the papacy to improve trade throughout Italy and the ports of the Mediterranean Sea. The second issue, according to Botero, was economy: the pope had to improve trade all over the peninsula and also in the Mediterranean Sea using its ports. Third aspect: to fortify its cities. The pages dedicated to this argument are really brilliant. Moving from the Machiavellian perspective of inner security and exterior security, Botero demonstrates that, in his opinion, it is better to fortify or strengthen the borders than the “heart”\textsuperscript{36} (the capital) of the state, even if the main city, normally, had its citadel that was a sort of natural protection: “\textit{like nature strengthens some animals with the skull, but also with horns, so the Reason of State and of war encircles these cities with walls and strengthen them with citadels.}”\textsuperscript{37} The city of Rome was in a peculiar position: it was not in the middle of the state and it was very far from Bologna, Ferrara and Ancona. Its city limits were not very strong, and the same could be said about the borders of the state

\textsuperscript{34} Though Botero criticized Machiavelli, (“\textit{quite a brilliant man, but not very Christian}”, he said in the premise of his treaty \textit{De regia sapientia}, 1583) and historiography stressed the difference between their thought and approach, there are common elements in their operas. They both examine the ideas of the greatness of cities and states and had similar concepts regarding their defence. See Luigi FIRPO, \textit{Introduzione alla “Ragion di Stato” di Giovanni Botero}, in: Idem (ed.), Scritti sul pensiero politico del Rinascimento e della Controriforma, Torino 2005, pp. 57–82, Chiara CONTINISIO, \textit{Introduzione} to G. BOTERO, \textit{La ragion di Stato}, Roma 1997 and Romain DESCENDRE, \textit{Introduzione} to G. BOTERO, \textit{La ragion di Stato}, Torino 2016.

\textsuperscript{35} It would have been necessary to “\textit{cut the woods, cult the land, dry the swamps and build big houses […] where peasants could live without getting ill}” (G. BOTERO, \textit{Relazione dello Stato della Chiesa}, pp. 182–183: in original “\textit{non si può altramente rimediare che con tagliar i boschi et ridurla a coltura e con essiccar le paludi e sopra tutto col fabricar ampi casamenti ove la gente possa ripararsi […] che gli difendano dall’impressioni maligne dell’aere}”). It is useful to remember the same point – the notorious “\textit{bonifica dell’Agro Pontino}” – became one of the central goals of fascist propaganda during the regime of Benito Mussolini.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibidem, p. 191.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibidem: “\textit{Si come la natura non solo assicura la testa d’alcuni animali col cranio, ma l’arma ancora con le corna, così la ragione di Stato e di guerra et cinge simili città con muraglia e le rinforza con cittadelle}.”
(The Sack of Rome in 1527 is not mentioned here, while Botero positively mentions the walls fortified by Pope Pius IV).

It may seem that the preoccupation with the diffusion of heresy and the analysis of papacy as an autonomous medium state is contradictory. However, in Botero’s thinking – as in Francesco Guicciardini’s previously – the apparent contradiction is overcome by the strong cultural architecture of his opera. As a universal prince, the pope was required to regulate and preserve his domain to avoid any incursions. Only in the perfect conditions of equilibrium, considering that it was a sort of electoral monarchy, the papacy could project its influence across the world. As the author remarks, at that time:

“The interests of princes do not imply a union against the Church. Princes prefer that the Church keeps its greatness because its weakness could empower any powerful prince. The pope is like a universal father and that the state of the Church could help any other state.”

The help that the papacy could give was economic and political, as the Habsburgs knew in their expeditions against the Turks; but it was also spiritual and devoted to reach the universal unity of Christianity.

**Conclusions**

Though *Dell’uffizio del cardinale* and the *Relazione dello Stato della Chiesa* are complementary texts in the main corpus of Botero’s books, they confirm the political acuteness of their author. They are completely part of his original reflection on religion, state, government and the peculiar interaction among these elements. Read in the context of Botero’s bigger and more ambitious work – the *Relazioni universali* –, the two parts of the speech reveal the constant upgrade of the thinker’s and his genuine passion for what was happening. However, another perspective that should be considered is the perspective of patronage. At the end of the sixteenth century, Giovanni Botero was in search for a commission. As

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38 Ibidem, p. 193: “Gli interessi poi de’ prencipi non comportano unione e lega importante contro la Chiesa perché a tutti sta meglio ch’ella si mantenga nella sua grandezza che la sua depressione aggiunga qualche potenza a qualche prencipe per sé potente, conciosia che, si come il papa è padre universale, così pare che lo Stato della Chiesa sia quasi Stato da cui ogniuno possa promettersi aiuto.”

former Jesuit and, at that time, as Oblate, he was very well known in the ambience of Rome. So he could still get protection inside the Church or, as he would have preferred, in the Spanish Habsburg monarchy. In the dedication to Cardinal Guevara, he flattered him by declaring that Spain was jealous of him and, during his stage in Italy, the court and the country wanted him back; as other signals show, Botero too would have liked to move from Italy to the Iberian Peninsula. 

As the biographers tell us, things went differently. Botero would have reached the court of Philip III not serving the king, nor Cardinal Guevara, but becoming tutor of the sons of the Duke of Savoy, Charles Emmanuel I. To him, it was the occasion to live in Spain for three years and deep in the reflection about power and religion. According to his Counterreformation vision of the world, proselytism and conversion were the right means; but the Realpolitik was overwhelming. Drastic alterations (alterazioni) were influencing changes to many established political assets. In the last part of the Relazioni universali, written around 1611, the section dedicated to Hungary, Bohemia, Sweden, Russia and Poland is extensive and mostly focused on the danger of Islam, as strong as the Protestant heresy. Cardinal Andreas Bathory, the Duke of Transylvania and tireless promoter of Catholicism, died in 1599, the year Dell’uffizio del cardinale was completed. As Botero reported, he was killed while attempting to flee after the Battle of Şelimbâr. Despite the Ottoman Empire was at war against Persia, its forces were threatening Hungary and Bohemia more than ever. The peace treaty signed in 1596 between Russia and Poland (due to the Jesuit Possevino) was losing importance and a general religious crisis was affecting all those provinces, letting the Orthodox schism to diffuse all over.

The universal model conceived and recommended by Mercurino di Gattinara and Erasmus Rotterdamus for the young Emperor Charles V had failed during the long sixteenth century. Now, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the empire, the European nations, 

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40 Similar to the dedication to Cardinal Simón Tagliavia of Aragon in the American section of the Relazioni universali (G. BOTERO, Le relazioni universali, Vol. I, p. 345) and similar to a sonnet he wrote to one of the closest secretaries of Philip II, Gabriel de Zayas: see Blythe Alice RAVIOLA, Un sonetto a margine del corpus delle Relazioni universali, in: Eadem (ed.), Boteriana I. Giovanni Botero a 400 anni dalla sua scomparsa, Torino 2018, pp. 123–133.


42 Never published until 1895: see Carlo GIODA, La vita e le opere di Giovanni Botero, vol. 3, Milano 1895; now: G. BOTERO, Le relazioni universali, vol. III.


44 See the bitter and realistic considerations of Botero at pp. 286–289.
the small and medium states had to face the dissolution of that dream. New challenges were waiting for the Catholic Church and its pretended universal role.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{45} I would like to thank my friend and colleague Pavel Marek for involving me in this monographic number of \textit{Theatrum Historiae}. Our conversations about Spanish Imperialism and the Holy Roman Empire provided the inspiration for this short contribution.
Abstract: The study discusses the problems and evolvement of the 17th century relations of the Holy See and Hungary. One of the most important aspects of these were the debates about the royal right of patronage that culminated in appointing the bishops. As part of the latter, when someone was appointed as a bishop, canonical investigation process (processus informativus) was conducted. These processes were useful sources of information of the Holy See about the state of the Hungarian Catholic Church. Furthermore, the Pope and the dicasteries could gain information from the compulsory ad limina visits. The Holy See could follow the realization of the deliberations of the Council of Trent also through the nuncios. From the other side, the Hungarian Catholic Church could not do without its representation in Rome: the cardinal protectors, the imperial legates in Rome and the episcopal agents could effectively represent their interests.

Key words: The Holy See – Hungary – Habsburgs – diplomacy – catholic reform

The development of Catholic confessionalisation in Hungary began only after the end of the Long Turkish War (1593–1606). The reform decrees of the Council of Trent (1545–1563) were enforced from the first decades of the seventeenth century. The impetus of the Catholic revival – accompanied by the powerful efforts of Counter-Reformation – lasted and triumphed until the wars of liberation against the Turks (1683–1699). Hereupon, it continued its expansion in the reorganization of church life in the territories that had been under Turkish rule.²

By the 1620s, the age of the reform popes had ended and the Catholic revival came to rest in its own centre; the administration of the offices in Rome was more and more characterized by a strong bureaucratism. Under the pontificate of Urban VIII (1623–1644) and his successors, the papacy became secluded and isolated within the continent. After the

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1 Made in the MTA-PPKE Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group.
2 Still fundamental: Egyed HERMANN, A katolikus egyház története Magyarországon 1914–ig, München 1973 (= Dissertationes Hungaricae ex historia ecclesiae 1), pp. 207s.
defeat in the crusade against the Turks at the turn of the century, the interests of the Papal State came into prominence insomuch as it had not experienced for a long time. The Holy See could not find its place in the new European politics formed in the Peace of Westphalia. The legal disputes with the national churches became frequent. The recently established church model of Trent was challenged by new trends such as Jansenism and Episcopalism, and in the secular field by Rationalism. With the establishment of the Propaganda Fide, the reform of the papacy ended in 1622. The popes of the mid-seventeenth century only succeeded in their missionary work.³

Ultimately, these circumstances determined the relations of the Holy See and Hungary’s territories under the Habsburgs. The difficulties derived from the late realization of the reform in Hungary, the different political interests of the Hungarians and Rome – primarily in the handling of the Ottoman threat – became the source of numerous strained relations. However, by the time the new church discipline strengthened in Hungary, the practical ways of communication had crystallized. When Innocent XI (1676–1689) acceded to the throne, the papal foreign policy again strove to achieve a new aim, namely the expulsion of the Turks. The relationship between Catholic Hungary and Rome had begun a chapter that had not been experienced before, nor in the future.

The Framework: canonical regulations and the catholic reform

The canonical regulations, which secured the primacy of Rome, were the guiding principles of the relations in this era, yet along with the reform acts, were in a new, more intensive and methodical form. As the successors of the apostles, the bishops headed the realization of the reforms of Trent. They were also the centre of the ecclesiastic contact between Hungary and the Holy See of the seventeenth century.

Appointing of the bishops

According to the practice which emerged at the end of the Middle Ages, the nomination of a prelate was the task of the Hungarian kings – the right of patronage – on the pretext of the foundations of Saint Stephen. However, the canonical procedure to consecrate a bishop was entirely supervised by the Curia.⁴ Rome has wanted to appoint its own nominee as the head of a Hungarian diocese only once. In 1629, Rome suggested to the court of Vienna and Péter Pázmány, the archbishop of Esztergom (1616–1637), that János Marnavich Tomko – who later became the bishop of Bosnia – should be appointed as the bishop of

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⁴ Vilmos FRANKÓI, _A magyar királyi kegyüri jog Szent Istvántól Mária Teréziáig_ , Budapest 1895.
Zagreb; but it was without success. In many cases, however, the nominated prelates were devoid of the papal confirmation (confirmatio). They were not objected to due to personal incapability; however, they were always dismissed by reason of having Protestant parents or lacking the necessary theological and canonical degree.

The on and off debate over the right of patronage caused constant problems. From the pontificate of Gregory XV (1621–1623), the Apostolic See endeavoured to replace the local hierarchy around the world that did not function properly or was hindered in its operation with administrators appointed by Rome itself; moreover, in these territories, it strove to establish a new, missionary structure. As a result of these efforts, Rome inevitably clashed with the states that wanted to fully preserve their traditional rights, especially with the monarchs of Portugal and Hungary. The Portuguese crown asserted a right to supervise the church administration in the colonial empire, whereas the Habsburg monarchs adhered to the appointment of the prelates in the dioceses under Turkish rule (Bosnia, Knin, Smederevo, Syrmia, Pécs and Csanád) and the bishoprics of Várad and Transylvania, whose function in their seat was hindered.

In addition, under the reign of the earnest Catholic Ferdinand II (1619–1637) numerous claims were made concerning the Balkan and Dalmatian bishoprics (Osor, Nin, Trebinje) that were under Turkish and Venetian rule. Both parties insisted their side was correct by using historical argumentation during the debates. They led ardent research in the papal archives and the archives of the Hungarian chancery and the solicitors prepared lengthy memorials. The Hungarian claims were assisted by the forthwith forged bull of Pope Sylvester II (999–1003), the contemporary of the Founder of Hungary. It is very

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7 Giuseppe SORGE, Santa Sede e Corona Porthogese. Le controversie giuspatronali nei secoli XVII e XVIII, Bologna 1988 (= Occidentale e Oriente Christianità I); Giovanni PIZZORUSSO – Gaetano PLATANIA – Matteo SANFILIPPO (edd.), Gli archivi della Santa Sede come fonte per la storia del Portogallo in età moderna, Viterbo 2012.
likely that the above mentioned János Marnavich Tomkó, who had excellent relations in Rome, was the forger.

The debates over the right of patronage culminated in the 1660s, owing to the filling of the bishoprics of Syrmia and Bosnia. The case was examined by a special committee of cardinals. Subsequently, it was the custom that Rome confirmed bishops appointed by the Hungarian monarch (as the head of the dioceses, established by King Saint Stephen) without protest. The situation of Transylvania and the territories under Turkish rule was settled when they were re-occupied by the Habsburgs.\textsuperscript{11}

The other main obstacle to the consecration of the bishops was the question of the \textit{annata} that had to be paid for the bulls of confirmation. The papal court, (of which the administration showed a deficit until the budget reform of Innocent XI) by withdrawing the century-old allowance, redemanded the settlement of the duties imposed through medieval incomes. In case of fulfilment, it would have laid a great burden upon the Hungarian Catholicism. For the archdiocese of Esztergom, the \textit{taxa} meant 4000 forint. While the Hungarian church considered an exemption from dues as an acquired right, Rome only granted allowances from time to time for a special request, however they were significant. By 1645, it enforced its view concerning this question.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Canonical processes, ad limina reports, faculties}

The canonical investigation process (\textit{processus informativus}) was also related to papal confirmation. According to the practice rooted in the Middle Ages and renewed by Trent, witnesses were asked about the characteristics of the nominee and the state of his diocese. The statements issued in the form of a notarial document were sent to the Holy See, augmented by the new prelate’s certificate of birth, education and his letter of appointment (in many cases). Based on this, the papal court decided on the suitability of the appointed person. From 1613 until the end of the century, there are about 140 statements that have survived and about 300 witnesses’ names that are known. Rome were able to gather information about the state of the Hungarian church from the testimonies of bishops, canons, diocesan and regular clergy; the novices of the Pazmaneum in Vienna; officials of the Chancery and the Chamber; aristocrats, estate stewards, noblemen and merchants who knew the local circumstances well.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Vilmos. FRAKNÓI, Okleváltár a magyar királyi kergyúri jog történetéhez, Budapest 1899, APF, Scritture. Ungheria-Transilvania, vol. 1–2, passim.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} V. FRAKNÓI, Okleváltár, pp. 255–264.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ferenc GALLA, A püspökjelöltek kánoni kivizsgálásának jegyzőkönyvei a vatikáni levéltárban. A magyar katolikus megújhodás korának püspökei, Levéltári Közlemények 20–23, 1942–1945, pp. 141–186.
\end{itemize}
The other information source of the Curia that was ordered by canon law was the diocesan bishops’ compulsory *ad limina* reports every four years. The Hungarian prelates appear only to have rarely met their commitments, as there are merely 22 related texts in the Vatican Archives from this period. However, there are lengthy and detailed reports such as those of Primate György Lippay’s (1642–1666) and Primate György Szelepchény’s (1666–1685) from 1650 and 1676, and the information of György Pongrácz (the bishop of Vác from 1675). The lack of reports is closely connected to the problems around the papal confirmation. Namely, the bishops themselves engaged to send regular reports only with their oath, taken before their consecration; therefore, prior to that they felt relieved of this canonical regulation. This lack is retrieved by the letters addressed to the pope which report on the occasional successes, the establishment of new institutions, and the mass conversions (especially from the second half of the century).

However late and accompanied with many shortcomings, Rome faced a constantly renewing church life in Hungary. The diocesan bishops made somewhat frequent pastoral visitations in their dioceses or had them visited; established seminaries, schools and convents; and participated in reforming religious orders. The most significant result was the revival of the Pauline Order, founded in Hungary with the active cooperation of the Holy See. The Roman Rite and Breviary were introduced and great efforts were made to create a union with the Orthodox Ruthenians. In the territories under the Habsburgs, the bishops resided in their sees, preached, administered the sacrament of confirmation, and held diocesan and provincial councils – though not at stated intervals. The majority of the new bishops continued their studies in papal colleges (mostly in the *Collegium*

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Germanicum et Hungaricum in Rome) and made an effort to find a place for their pupils at one of these institutes.\textsuperscript{22}

The various exemptions, authorizations given by the Holy See, represented the last area of relations that were defined by canon law. Not only the prelacy, but the whole Hungarian church was connected to the centre Church administration, with thousands of threads. The priority of Rome became a constant reality in the reviving church life, as shown through the faculties related to benedictions, liturgy and celebration of mass; the privilege of having a mobile altar and private chapel; the authorization of entering an enclosure of a monastery; the granting of indulgences; and the bulk of the Hungarian requests concerning the dispensations from an oath, vows, fasting and impediments to marriage.\textsuperscript{23}

The threads: nuncios, legates, cardinal-protectors, agents

Nuncios

The Holy See followed the realization of the reforms with the assistance of its permanent diplomatic representatives. The institution of the nunciatures covered the whole of contemporary Catholic Europe. Hungary, together with the hereditary provinces, was under the authority of the nunciature of Vienna.\textsuperscript{24} The nuncio and its office had a key role in communication with Rome. The nuncio informed the papal secretariat of state through numerous weekly reports about current political and ecclesiastical issues, many of which were related to Hungary.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, he conducted the canonical investigation process


\textsuperscript{23} F. GALLA, \textit{Magyar tárgyú pápai felhatalmazások}.

\textsuperscript{24} On the nuncios working in the court of Vienna after 1592: Donato SQUICCIARINI, \textit{Die apostolischen Nuntien in Wien}, Città del Vaticano 1999, pp. 103 s.

in his court of Vienna, he sent letters, requests addressed to the Holy See through his diplomatic post, and had the papal breves and bulls reach their addressee.

In the third instance, the matrimonial cases, inheritances, and disciplinary proceedings that were discussed in front of the ecclesiastical tribunals were sent to the tribunal of the nunciature. Here, they were usually reviewed by a local prelate of legal knowledge. In numerous cases, the Hungarian prelates (as well as Pázmány) tried to help or influence the decision making by providing necessary background information. Furthermore, the nuncio also passed judgement on the missionaries sent from Italy to Hungary. From the end of the century, due in large part to Lipót Kollonich (1695–1707), the Hungarian primates’ tribunal of third instance was restored, which remains unique in canon law.

The nuncio rarely passed the conclusion of legal proceedings on to the Curia. The exceptions were in cases of controversies between the ordinaries and the orders, or in the case of a monastery’s foundation. In the second half of the century, these cases were sent to the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, who had previously had a negligible role in the Hungarian relations. In Rome, only the chapter of Zagreb initiated proceedings against Bologna for the estates of its college and was successful.

The papal legates visited the countries only in the case of a diet, where they closely collaborated with the Catholic party against the Protestants. The visit of Nuncio Giovanni Battista Pallotto to Pázmány and Palatine Esterházy, before his recall and his cordial report on his experience of June 1630, was a rare exception.

Cardinal-protectors, imperial legates

The Hungarian Church logically could not do without its representation in Rome. The institution of the cardinal-protectors was established in the late Middle Ages to represent and support particular countries and orders. Hungary shared the same protector with the hereditary provinces during that time. The most important task of the cardinal-protector was to induce the pope into confirming the nominations of the bishops during the joint meeting of the pope and the cardinals. In the consistory, he presented the name of the nominees, reported on their characteristics, and the state of their dioceses; based on the extracts from the verbalis of the canonical investigation. The duty paid for the cardinal-

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26 F. GALLA, Püspökelöltek kánoni kivizsgálásának jegyzőkönyvei.
27 ASV, Archivio della Nunziatura in Vienna. Cause civili, n. 22.
28 As Nuncio Camillo Melzi did with Conv Francesco Cosmi da Mogliano, the chaplain of Miklós Zrínyi in 1645–47. ASV, Archivio della Nunziatura Apostolica in Vienna. Negotia regularium, n. 27.
29 T. VANYÓ, A bécsi pápai követség levéltárának iratai, pp. 191–201.
30 BAV, Barb. Lat. 6900, ff. 77r–v e 78r–v; 7056, f. 64r–v.
31 BAV, Barb. Lat. 6219, fol. 152r–v.
Theatrum historiae 23 (2018)

The performance of the cardinal-protectors – who were usually of aristocratic Italian origin and an adherent of the Emperor – was considered inadequate. By demanding their dismissal, the Hungarian prelates often blamed them for the postponement of their consecration. Péter Pázmány felt it was necessary to establish an independent Hungarian protectorate that required no compensation: “The Hungarian Protection, methinks, should be only Titular and not Venal”, he wrote in 1635. The lack of accomplishment of this problem may have played a role in the unfulfilled ambitions of his successors, Lippay and Szelepcsényi in becoming cardinals – beyond the fact that they endeavoured to establish a constant Hungarian presence in the College of Cardinals.

The role of the imperial legation in Rome in the first half of the century is also significant. They delivered royal letters on the cases concerning the Hungarian church to the pope at the usual Friday audiences; they followed and urged the fulfilment of their content. Although their personal presence exerted a positive influence on the fulfilment of the requests, it was mainly the foreign prelates with Hungarian titles who grasped the rising opportunity. However, there are few exceptions, like that of the later bishop of Pécs, then of Zagreb, Benedek Vinkovich who contacted Paolo Savelli, imperial legate already as a grand provost of Zagreb for the sake of receiving the papal privilege of wearing a mitre (infula).

The cardinal-protectors of Germany took over the duties of the permanent legates from the 1650s.

The episcopal agents

The most important members of the Hungarian Catholic representation in Rome were the permanent agents beside the contribution of the German assessors of the papal tribunal, the Sacra Rota Romana, partly of the Collegium Germanicum Hungaricum’s rectors and of the reluctant Hungarian clerics studying in Rome.

35 A part of the material on the imperial legates of Rome can be found: ASR, Archivio Sforza–Cesarini (Paolo e Federigo Savelli); Archivio Giustinianii (Paolo Savelli); Biblioteca Statale Santa Scolastica (Subiaco), Archivio Colonna (Girolamo Colonna).
36 ASR, Archivio Sforza–Cesarini, parte II, busta 224, s.f.
The permanent agents’ role in the administration was irreplaceable. They had access to the Secretariat of State; to the influential cardinal-nephew; to the Datary that granted papal privileges; and to the Apostolic Chamber that handled the finances and issued the bulls. Moreover, they had access to the Consistorial Congregation, which supervised Hungary as a missionary field (and was responsible for the appointment of the bishops), as well as to the Congregation of the Council, which supervised the execution of the decrees of Trent. They delivered letters; on which they commented by following the instructions they received; they managed the money transfers with the assistance of the Jesuits; and they posted the answers.

Based on the information given by the low-ranking officials of the Holy See and the secretaries of the congregations, the permanent agents regularly informed the leadership of the Hungarian church about the occurring difficulties, the recent papal orders and the most recent news in Rome. Apart from the Nuncio of Vienna, the contribution of the Hungarian agents ensured continued relations with the Curia.

Originally, the permanent agents were directly employed by the archbishop of Esztergom (e.g. Matteo Renzi or the previous official of the nunciature of Prague, Abbot Camillo Cattaneo). The first agent, Pietro Giacomo Favilla – who was Neapolitan by birth and represented the Hungarian church itself (Agens Cleri/Praelatorum Hungariae in Urbe) – was elected by the gathered prelates at the diet of 1637/38, headed by Primate Imre Lósy (1637–1642). The new agent was raised to Hungarian nobility and obtained the title of royal councillor. However, Ferdinand III (1637–1657) rejected the further suggestions of Lósy, namely for the establishment of the independent Hungarian cardinal-protectorate.

Favilla, who was active for almost two decades, was also commissioned by the Hungarian aristocrats. In 1642, on behalf of Palatine Miklós Esterházy, he tried to recover Nuncio Malatesta Baglioni’s debt of thousands of Hungarian forints. Baglioni returned to Vienna in 1639. Throughout the sources, Favilla is referred to as the representative of the whole country (l’Agente d’Ongaria). After Antonio Francesco Gallo (a previous auditor of a nunciature) and Abbot Alessandro Vecchi of Siena (from 1676 Giovanni Giani (Jány)), the Abbot of Báta became the Hungarian agent. He was a member of an Italian family, a law graduate who settled in Hungary and had gained ecclesiastical benefices.

The delegation of this Italian lawyer, who had a Hungarian background as well as the title of a royal councillor, was a fortunate decision of Primate Szelepchény. The Hungarian agency in Rome finally functioned properly under his service. His predecessors had been accused of embezzling the Hungarian bishops’ money transfers to Rome and causing the postponements of papal confirmations. Giani seemed to be able to avoid the intricate local conflicting interests and in 1679 he was granted a monopoly by Leopold I to solely manage the Hungarian cases.
The execution of Giani’s commission was significantly eased due to the representation of the Hungarian cases becoming bipolar. From 1666, the German protectorate (who had handled the diplomatic tasks from the middle of the century) and the protectorate of Hungary (with the hereditary provinces) were headed by the same cardinal. This change ended the previous rivalry between the two institutions. The protectorate that was practically united in a personal union had an exclusive jurisdiction over the supervision and abridgement of the verbals which the canonical investigation sent from Vienna; sometimes they conducted the process themselves. In contrast to its positive role, the dissolution of the imperial legation and the Rota’s German auditors’ loss of importance made the often-confused division of labour even more arranged. This was not changed by the occasional contribution of János Klobusiczky, the Jesuit Hungarian father-confessor (penitentiary) who lived in Rome from 1659.37

The occasional legates

The permanent forms of communication were functionally completed by the occurrence of the occasional legates in the Eternal City. In 1611, representing the dissolved chapter of Eger, Grand Provost Miklós Dallos personally asked for Paul V’s assistance in the restoration of the body.38 On behalf of Primate Ferenc Forgách – whose travel to Rome was hindered by the court of Vienna39 – he extensively informed him about the state of the Hungarian Catholicism and about the progress of the missionary work (as Péter Pázmány had in 1614–1615).40 In 1637, György Szelepchény and István Baghy, the canons of Esztergom,41 were involved in the procuring of the pallium, the metropolitan insignia of the newly appointed archbishop of Esztergom. This was thirty years later the Pauline János Vanoviczy,42 who also did his utmost to realize the Order of St. Paul’s settlement in Rome and the foundation of a Hungarian national church. The prelates of Zagreb were frequently running errands in Rome through their own representatives.43

The Hungarian bishops rarely fulfilled their attendance obligations and their ad limina reports were usually presented by their representatives. The short relations of Pázmány

41 BAV, Barb. Lat. 6894, f. 10r–v.
were often submitted by Mátyás Senkviczy (a canon of Esztergom), the above mentioned reports of Primate Lippay and Szelepcshény (1650 and 1676) by Jácint Macripodari (auxiliary bishop of Esztergom), and by the intercession of Francesco Giani (the brother of Giovanni, the agent of Rome). György Pongrácz, Bishop of Vác was the only one who travelled to Rome solely to do his ad limina visit and present his report, in 1675.

The journey of many prelates was motivated by obtaining their bull of confirmation. János Thelegdy (Bishop of Bosnia, 1611, then Archbishop of Kalocsa, 1625), György Jakusith (Bishop of Veszprém, 1639), György Bielavich (Bishop of Tinin), Péter Jurjevich (Bishop of Szerém), Count Tamás Pálfy (Bishop of Csanád, mid-century), and Count János Kéry (Bishop of Szerém, 1676) undertook the inconvenient travel primarily for their bull of confirmation and not for nothing at times.

The focus of Pázmány and Jakusith's legation of 1632 and 1645 was their political commission. In 1687, the later bishop of Csanád, the Pauline László Nádasdy returned to Rome primarily to ask Pope Innocent XI to mediate between Thököly and Leopold I (1657–1705). Between 1632 and 1634, the often raised idea of Pázmány to have a permanent imperial legation in Rome and the imperial mission of 1658 of his successor, György Lippay remained to be only plans.

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47 BAV, Barb. Lat. 6898, ff. 62r–70v.
49 BAV, Barb. Lat. 6872, ff. 145r–146v.
58 M. BEKE, Esztergomi érsekek, pp. 296–303.
Lights and shadows

The beginning of the century: collaboration

Beyond the institutional relations and the connections regulated by canon law, Rome and the Hungarian ecclesiastical administration collaborated best in the first decades of the century. The papal diplomacy, moreover, the spiritual supremacy of the popes – that still had an influence on the monarchs – was the greatest political support of Ferenc Forgách, the initiator of the long process of re-Catholicization, who obtained his appointment as an archbishop at the same time when he was created cardinal.

The Catholic scope for action could only be established by the active contribution of the Holy See against the Protestant dominance, which was realized in the ecclesiastical regulations of the diet of 1608 that was hallmarked by the persons of Palatine István Illésházy and György Thurzó, and which was realized in the ecclesiastical regulations of the diet of 1608 under Matthias II, who was raised to power mainly by the help of the Lutheran and Calvinist estates. On a motion from Forgách, the Sacred Office (Sacrum Officium, headed by the pope) initiated an inquiry against the Habsburg monarch due to his confirmation of the regulations against the Catholic Church. The court of Vienna eventually backed the procrastination of the practical execution of the regulations to avoid the possibility of excommunication.59

In contrast to his predecessors, Paul V (1605–1621) showed considerable understanding of the observance of the canonical regulations. For instance, in the case of aristocratic mixed marriages, he granted the necessary dispensations even before the Catholicization of the Protestant party. According to the secretly assumed obligation, the public conversion took place after the marriage when parental authority had lapsed. The first event of this manner took place in 1610, at the nuptials of Mihály Czobor and Zsuzsanna Thurzó (the above-mentioned palatine’s daughter), where Primate Forgách prepared the conversion of the bride.60

It was also the above-named Borghese pope who made Pázmány’s withdrawal from the Jesuit order possible, which enabled him to become an archbishop despite his vows (although it was eventually not legally realised). The filling of the archiepiscopal see was persistently urged by the papal nuncios. The cathedral chapter of Esztergom did not touch upon the contribution of Paul V by mistake in his letter to Rome on the appointment: “God has heard our heart’s desire and through the good offices of our Blessed Virgin Mary

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and all the saints, especially the heavenly patrons of our motherland tainted by heresy, His Imperial and Royal Majesty…”⁶¹

Pázmány’s activities as a prelate entirely fulfilled these expectations. In the last phase of his life, however, a significant breach appeared between Rome and the Hungarian church. Until the early 1630s, the collaboration was undiminished. (Even in political terms – Pázmány owed his appointment of a cardinal to it.) The Hungarian clerics made running efforts to “entirely conform to our and everybody's mother, to the Sacred Church of Rome as much as possible.”⁶² After this time, there were more considerable disappointments and discontent could be read between their lines.

The middle of the century: problems

Pázmány’s legation of 1632 was a turning point. The primate (representing the Habsburgs) came into conflict with Pope Urban VIII (who had a more pro-French policy) and the Hungarian primate became a persona non grata at the Vatican. Pázmány was specifically banned from being a permanent legate by the diplomacy of the Holy See and from returning as a cardinal-protector. Although, the papal nuncios regarded the disobedience of the Hungarian prelates and the negligence of canonical duties as Pázmány’s personal dissatisfaction and authority, the reasons were much more complex.

The Hungarian prelates were fighting daily against Protestantism in the papal authority’s defence; they spent significant sums on the establishment of new institutions and on defending against the Turks. Simultaneously, they felt that they got less and less help from the Barberini’s Rome: it was a common feeling that “they were denied every door to have any privilege or to have a fair judgement”⁶³ The Hungarian Church was unique, as they were still reliant on Rome’s support and needed constant political assistance.

The increasingly introverted papacy, with a mounting deficit, could not cope with the Hungarian suggestion of forcing the Turks out. It fervently insisted on the enforcement of its rights, especially regarding the payment of various duties. This dichotomy affected the relationship between Hungarian Catholicism and the Holy See until Innocent XI’s accession to the throne; both the aversions to the intensified demands and, conversely, their nonfulfilment.

⁶² Archivio Storico della Congregazione per le Cause dei Santi, Litterae et Rescripta, n. 8497.
⁶³ BAV, Barb. Lat. 7002, ff. 124r–127v.
The apostolic missionaries sent to Hungary also did not help the situation, as they had a wider spiritual authority – namely, they had several such faculties, to which one had to resort in Rome – and caused only further tension.64

The episcopal conference of Nagyszombat in September 1639 was the peak of the crisis. In the submission to the monarch about the conference, which the papal nuncio incidentally tried to get in vain, the bishops held the “curial ministers” exclusively responsible for their problems. By relying on historical precedents, they encouraged Ferdinand III to stick to his right of appointment at every episcopal see under the Hungarian Crown. The resolution wanted to base the representation in Rome on the cooperation of the imperial legate and the agent by excluding the protectorate.

Regarding canon law, two statements should be highlighted. According to the alleged former practice, they suggested that the Nuncio of Vienna should be deprived of the right of the canonical investigation process related to the appointment of the bishops. Instead this should be given to the archbishop of Esztergom, namely the primate and the legate of the Holy See (legatus natus). Their idea shows a striking similarity to a long-debated, then denied suggestion of the Council of Trent, who wanted to entrust the investigation to the metropolitan of the new bishop. Instead, they expressed their viewpoint that the pope's right of confirmation required for the valid consecration of a bishop was based on the special respect that the Hungarian monarchs had for the Apostolic See in Hungary. The past monarchs “could have adopted the practice of the Early Church that after the royal election the Hungarian bishops were consecrated by their metropolitan with the assistance of two other bishops; yet, they assigned and reserved the right of confirmation of the royal nomination to the most sacred prelate of Rome, albeit they could have initiated the practice of the Early Church by the consent of the Holy See since the conversion of the Magyars”.65 This proposal hints at the possibility of a national church – independent of Rome – that one could have seen in the Gallican movements of the French church at that time.66

65 “[...] eum primitivae Ecclesiae usum ac praxim potuissent sibi vendicare, ut a metropolitano et duobus episcopis, facta regia electione, episcopi regni consecrari possent, confirmationem tamen electionis regiae et electionem ad consecrationem Sanctissimo Romano Pontifici deferre et reservare voluerant, non obstante eo, quod annotatum usum ac praxim citra praecidium iuris positivi sibi appropriae a primordio suae conversionis etiam assensu Sedis Apostolicae potuissent.” AP, Archivum Ecclesiasticum Vetus, n. 204, fol. 32. Cfr. J. GRISAR, Francesco Ingoli über die Aufgaben des kommenden Papstes nach dem Tode Urbans VIII. (1644), Archivum Historiae Pontificiae 5, 1967, pp. 289–324, 324: “Questi due officij [this is Dataria and Cancelleria] per il rigore […] sono stati di gran preguditio alla Sede Apostolica […] e se non remedia, non solo bisognerà concordar con Spagno, ma anche seguiranno de scisme di Provincie, come è stato per succedere da vescovi ungari sotto Urbano 8°.”
66 P. TUSOR, Az 1639.
In the lasting debate over the duties, this theory moved towards a practical realization. In 1645, during the Roman audiences of György Jakusith, the Bishop of Eger held out the prospect that if the Holy See was reluctant to make allowances, the Hungarian prelates “would provide for the salvation of souls and by ancient right they would consecrate themselves by three summoned bishops, since they could not obtain the consecration of a bishop owing to the impossibility of the taxes’ payment”. They would do this accompanied by a ceremonial protest and without a papal approval.

The radical opinion succeeded. An agreement was reached with the new pope, Innocent X (1644–1655), by which Hungary had to pay only a symbolic annata. Previously, the act of consecrating a bishop without Rome’s confirmation would have carried the threat of schism. After the agreement was signed, it was no longer necessary.

However, a sign of certain independence remained, despite all the efforts of the papal nuncios. After the royal nomination and without waiting for the confirmation from the Holy See, the Hungarian bishops immediately undertook the spiritual and secular ruling of their dioceses and started to wear their episcopal insignia. In truth, the supreme protector of the Hungarian right of patronage was not the court of Vienna but the Hungarian church itself.

The end of the century: the expulsion of the Turks

It would result in a wrong and one-sided approach if one put the emphasis on an anti-Rome attitude based on the overestimation of the difficulties concerning the introduction of the new church discipline, or of the often-occurring functional inconveniences of the Roman representation. Namely, these problems were only symptoms of the restoration between the relationship of Hungarian Catholicism and the papacy; the fundamental issue is the development and consolidation of a manifold interrelationship.

There was no emergency in the seventeenth century when Hungarian Catholicism did not reach for their supreme foreign support, the Apostolic See. Innocent X was asked for help to stop the Protestant György Rákóczi’s campaign of 1644–1645 in Upper Hungary; the primary aim of Jakusith’s legation was its attainment. Over the course of the Ottoman attacks between 1658 and 1664, which led to the loss of Várad and Érsekújvár, Primate György Lippay desperately did his utmost to ensure that Alexander VII (1655–1667) efficiently intervened for the sake of Transylvania’s defence and re-Catholicization.

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67 BAV, Barb. Lat. 6870, f. 30r–v.
68 See above.
69 V. FRANKNÖI, A magyar királyi kegyüri jog.
70 P. TUSOR, Jakusith György egri püspök római követjárása.
After the Treaty of Vasvár, it was suggested that Hungary should be directly put under the protectorate and rule of the Apostolic See instead of the Habsburgs, knowing the nation’s “ancient and deeply ingrained respect for the Holy See, which is regarded as their patron.” This was reported to Nuncio Spinola by Chancellor György Szelepchény, then archbishop of Kalocsa in strict confidence in November 1665.72

In the second half of the 1670s, Szelepchény (as the archbishop of Esztergom) regularly informed Cardinal Secretary of State Alderano Cybo about the commotion of the Turks and the Kuruc. He called attention to the heads of the Papal State to the extent of the reviving pagan danger that was realized in the siege of Vienna in 1683.73

As Hungarian Catholicism took late measures to the idea of renewal, the papacy undoubtedly also took a lengthy time to respond to the Hungarian expectation of increased provision. When Rome was finally open the idea of the expulsion of the Turks, everything became possible concerning expenses, which had been neuralgic. According to the annual statements of the Apostolic Chamber, between 1683 and 1688, Innocent XI invested 1,083,753,22 scudi74 on the liberation of Hungary, with the assistance of Cardinal Francesco Buonvisi (Nuncio of Vienna). Additionally, it indirectly provided funds for the restoration of the rump church administration which had been the cause of many problems previously.

Given the knowledge of the previous events, the fact that in the autumn of 1682 the Hungarian church was the first to condemn the anti-Roman “Gallican articles”, which were finalized on the national council of France, and bore testimony to its unconditional adherence to the Holy See, was of special importance.75

74 ÖStA, HHStA, Allgemeine Urkunden, the appendix of the brief dated 20 February 1690.
The relationship network of nuncios and forms of reward for its members at the imperial court of Rudolf II (1576–1612)

Abstract: Unlike the Spanish envoys, the papal nuncios made use of individuals who were attached to the imperial court of Rudolf II. These were in particular members of the Privy Council or of the Aulic Council as well as the most influential representatives of the Czech nobility. The networks of the papal nuncios started playing a key role – with regard to the fact that the sovereign gradually stopped paying attention and carrying out the affairs of state – as centres of influence for pursuing papal interests and sources for gathering information. For their services, the members of these networks could require a wide range of specific rewards the papal court could provide them with.

Key words: nunciature – imperial court – papacy – networks – Rudolf II

One of the important means Spain used in the early modern period to promote and strengthen its power objectives abroad was through creating and maintaining relationship networks. Their carefully selected members, usually from elite aristocratic, courtly, or ecclesiastical strata of other countries, could enjoy not only the king’s confidence, but also draw from the very rich and diverse resources of the Spanish Crown for their client service provided to the ruler as their patron. From the sixteenth century onwards, it was beneficial for members of Italian aristocratic families to integrate into Spanish relationship networks, even though the Spanish political involvement on the Italian Peninsula had been significant therein.1 However, neither did the territorial possessions of the Austrian relatives from the Habsburg family in Central Europe, including the Czech lands, remain neglected by the “Most Catholic Majesty”. In the late sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth century, when the imperial court was based in Prague, many representatives of the great noble families as well as the influential ministers of Emperor Rudolph II, who became clients of the Spanish king, belonged to a precisely

1 For details see Angelantonio SPAGNOLETTI, Principi italiani e Spagna nell’età barocca, Milano 1996.
structured and highly functional relationship network, on the formation and maintenance of which the Spanish ambassadors had a significant influence. The means with which diplomats were rewarded for their services was diverse. In addition to direct financial commissions in the form of pensions or one-time gifts, rewards could have been a membership into the prestigious military orders of chivalry or being inducted into the exclusive Order of the Golden Fleece. This contributed to the increase of the economic, symbolic, and social capital of the individuals concerned, as part of the stratification of court society. The Spanish ambassadors played a significant role in Prague and used their relationships and networks to connect their clients with their patrons. However, the relationship network of Spanish diplomats was not the only entity of this type at the imperial court. An important place among the local diplomats belonged to the Permanent Representatives of the Holy See – the apostolic nuncios.

Research on relationship networks with respect to the papacy

Close attention has been paid to the working of relationship networks, especially regarding patronage, in recent decades by historical science. These networks have been investigated

from various perspectives in research focusing on specific countries, territories, as well as their expansion across Europe. Looking at the early modern papacy, Wolfgang Reinhard's extensive research produced interesting results. An important foundation for his work was the use of the concept of “micro-politics”. In Reinhard's words, this consists of “more or less planned deployment of the network [...] for political purposes, the filling of a position or the degree of its holder is usually more important than what this person actually pursues.”

Thus, it was possible to present a precise analysis of the working of these entities and their personnel structure under the pontificate of Paul V within the papal state, as well as in its foreign relations. A series of monographs then emerged from the circle of Reinhard's disciples. These focused on the individual countries that the papacy was in close contact with; they analysed cross-border “overlaps” of the relationship networks, presenting them as effective tools of power politics.

The topic was also elaborated with regard to a specific social group – diplomats. Their incorporation within the relationship networks of the rulers they represented, but often also those of other individuals or interest factions, has been dealt with, especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century, in many inspiring works that have also opened further related historical-anthropological issues in this context: the status and conduct of diplomats as links of family or political strategies, issues of pluralistic loyalty or identity, function or transposition of material values in early modern diplomacy or the reflection of a foreign environment by diplomats.

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9 For the summary thereof, see W. REINHARD, Paul V. Borghese.


Nuncios and their role as “brokers”

These interesting issues were also largely related to papal nuncios acting as early modern diplomats. It would be a mistaken to only perceive them as authorized representatives of the Roman Pontiff in a foreign country whose task was to promote curial interests in the country and obtain important information. They often performed multiple roles due to the changing nature of diplomacy of the type ancien, as was common with their “secular” colleagues, and were connected by close ties not only to the popes, but also to their own...

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families and their private preferences or to other individuals or factions.\textsuperscript{13} It was in the role of clients that they served to the Roman Bishop as the sovereign ruler of the Papal State, or a cardinal-nephew, as the case might have been, who controlled the fundamental elements of political administration and was at the head of the Curia as the most important “secular” patron,\textsuperscript{14} as was the analogous case with other diplomats. What distinguished them from the nuncios was that they represented the pope at foreign courts as the head of the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{15} To do so, they were given special authority to interfere not only in the ecclesiastical sphere as such.\textsuperscript{16}

Similar to the representatives of the king of Spain, the nuncios served at the sovereign courts of foreign countries as diplomats and informants, as well as brokers. They created and maintained relationship networks with important people who assisted with implementing local plans and promoting the papacy. These collaborators would be rewarded from papal funds for their loyalty and could be used for other personal goals of the nuncios. Having a reliable network was an important prerequisite for ensuring success in the nuncio’s activities and it helped to overcome the difficulties that most diplomats had to contend with. Not only did they stand in the position of foreigners, often without the knowledge of local languages or the cultural environment, but – and that is primarily the case of the Prague Nunciature at the imperial court during the reign of Rudolph II – even in an environment of other predominant religions than Catholic.

While the issue of integration of nuncios into relationship networks in the curial environment have been dealt with in a number of professional works, the structure and internal system of the functioning of those networks and the links created directly by the individual nuncios at their places of activity have been analysed rather marginally.\textsuperscript{17}

This also applies to the nunciature under review at the imperial court in the late 1500s and early 1600s; its origins date back to 1513. An important transformation took place during the reign of Emperor Charles V, where, in addition the papal representative at the imperial court, there was also a nuncio residing from 1524 at the Court of his brother,Emperor Franz I.

\textsuperscript{15} H. von THIESSEN, Diplomatie und Patronage, p. 122. For the function of the nunciatures within the “double” papal power, see P. PRODI, Il sovrano, pp. 308–323.
\textsuperscript{16} For this issue, see the still relevant study – Samuel STEINHERZ, Die Facultäten eines päpstlichen Nuntius im 16. Jahrhundert, MIÖG 19, 1898, pp. 327–342.
\textsuperscript{17} Briefly on this issue, see Alexander KOLLER, Imperator und Pontifex. Forschungen zum Verhältnis von Kaiserhof und römischer Kurie im Zeitalter der Konfessionalisierung (1555–1648), Münster 2012, pp. 48–60, 72–87; W. REINHARD, Makropolitik und Mikropolitik, pp. 72–75.
Archduke of Austria and later King of the Romans, Bohemia and Hungary Ferdinand I.\textsuperscript{18} The reunification of both nunciatures took place only after the abdication of Charles V and the ascension of Ferdinand to the imperial throne.\textsuperscript{19} In the second half of the sixteenth century, it also transformed its diplomatic representation. This was due to religious polarization and confessionalization in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and connected to the efforts to consolidate the positions of the Holy See. Pope Gregory XIII played a major role in the process. He decided to use nunciatures in an effort to campaign against the rapidly expanding Protestantism. During his pontificate and following years, a number of new nunciatures (Graz, Koln, Lucerne, Brussels) were established throughout the Holy Roman Empire and were influential counter-reformation centres.\textsuperscript{20} The nunciature at the imperial court continued to retain the most prominent position and prestige among them; the local diplomats at the church services were often granted the privilege of wearing the cardinal’s red hat.\textsuperscript{21}

**Basic resources and risks of their use**

If we want to focus more intensively on monitoring the activities of papal diplomats in their role as brokers and to analyse the structure and functioning of the relationship network that they formed at the imperial court in Prague, nunciature reports represent a source of great importance, whether they are available in previously published volumes of editions or manuscripts, especially those from the Vatican Secret Archives or the Vatican Apostolic Library. As Wolfgang Reinhard aptly put it, this type of written material can be understood as “any document between ordinary or extraordinary nuncios (papal legates including) and the State Secretariat and other Roman authorities, in particular the congregations, including the initial instructions given at the outset, jurisdictional powers and final reports.”\textsuperscript{22} According to recent German research, the evaluation of nunciature reports by historians has thus far been somewhat limited and inadequate in their significance, scope, and content. The causes of this fact have been seen in the slow and lengthy preparation of relevant editions, changes in the methodological framework of historiography during the twentieth century, language barriers of the texts or their perception as resources primarily focused on political

19 A. KOLLER, *Imperator und Pontifex*, pp. 36.
history in their methodologically older concepts.\textsuperscript{23} The above quoted research findings in recent years have demonstrated that the situation has somewhat improved and the use of historical anthropology methodology has opened new and intriguing perspectives for the use of nunciature reports. Considering the personal conduct of diplomats with members of their relationship networks or with other people, which may not be documented otherwise, they represent a relatively remarkable and exceptional source in this respect. This is further emphasized by the fact that nunciature reports were written at continuous, regular intervals over a rather lengthy period of time.\textsuperscript{24} When studying and analysing them, it is important to consider more than the historical criticism. We need to consider their character, determined by their “official” function, the interests and tasks of the diplomat but also the evidence limits of the document and specific language expressions.\textsuperscript{25} The texts are characterized by changing tones and internal tension. There is a difference between the expected activities of the individual nuncios and the reality of their work in foreign settings, the constraints caused by thought patterns leading to a specific or distorted projection of the environment or the presence of stereotypes that the diplomats used in their conduct or written communication.\textsuperscript{26}

However, a critical constraint lies, above all, in the purpose of the nunciature reports, which is manifested in their content. While the content of these letters follows events at


\textsuperscript{24} For general information on the characteristics of nunciature correspondence, see Karel STLOUKAL, \textit{Papežská politika a císařský dvůr český na předělu XVI. a XVII. věku}, Praha 1925, pp. 78–85; Josef SUSTA, \textit{Die Römische Kurie und das Concil von Trient unter Pius IV. Actenstücke zur Geschichte des Concils von Trient}, I. Band, Wien 1904, pp. XXXIV–XXXVII.


the imperial court, location of interest or the promotion of papal interests, they rarely
address by whom or how the information was obtained, or which individuals were used to
achieve the objectives. It is thus usually possible to analyse the structure of the relationship
networks, examine the status and importance of their members or the transformation
of these entities by studying minor indications or information in the text that must be
monitored in the context of a larger number of diplomatic reports.

When considering the collection of nunciature reports, the initial instructions and
final reports should be regarded as the most significant sections. Typically, they mention
the names of notable individuals at the imperial court with whom they could confidently
connect, as an important source of information for incoming diplomats. The private letters
of the nuncios are another source of the details of the relationships within their networks.
Correspondence between the nuncios and their family or contacts; between the Cardinal
protector of Germany and the emperor, letters of foreign diplomats working at the imperial
court in Prague; or the nuncios’ registries are all valuable resources. These resources
allow researchers/us to identify the individuals employed by the nuncios to facilitate the
realisation of curial objectives, identify their roles and examine the strategies utilised.

27 The pontificates of Clement VIII (1592–1605), Paul V (1605–1621) and Gregory XV (1621–1623)
available in editions – Klaus JAITNER (ed.), Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens VIII. für die Nuntien und
Legaten an den Europäischen Fürstenhöfen (1592–1605), Tübingen 1984; Silvano GIORDANO (ed.), Le
istruzioni generali di Paolo V. ai diplomatici pontifici, 1605–1621, Tübingen 2003; Klaus JAITNER (ed.),
Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV. für die Nuntien und Gesandten an den europäischen Fürstenhöfen

28 E.g. for nuncio Speciani, see Alena PAZDEROVÁ (ed.), Epistulae et acta Caesaris Speciani 1592–1598,
vol. I–III (1592–1594), Pragae 2016, pp. 25–26 (hereinafter referred to as EACS), for nuncio Caetani
4,17, p. 16 (hereinafter referred to as EAAC I).

29 For the reign of Rudolf II, especially ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Handschrift W 290, vol. 11, 12.

30 Thus far, this is the only known set from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in relation to the
Prague nunciature, namely the writings of Nuncio Giovanni Stefan Ferreri from 1604–1607; Maurizio
CASSETTI, L’archivio della nunziatura a Praga di Giovanni Stefano II Ferrero, vescovo di Vercelli (1604–

31 For the topic of the identification of relationship networks based on diplomatic correspondence, see
Anuschka TISCHER, Diplomaten als Patrone und Klienten: der Einfluss personaler Verflechtungen in
der französischen Diplomatie auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress, in: R. Babel (ed.), Le diplomate
au travail. Entscheidungsprozesse, Information und Kommunikation im Umkreis des Westfälischen
Friedenskongresses, München 2005, pp. 173–197, here pp. 176–177. For the topic of application of
methods of historical anthropology to nunciature reports, see Peter BURSCHEL, Das Eigene und das
Emperor Rudolf II and his relations with papal diplomats

The lengthy government of Emperor Rudolf II encompasses more than three and a half decades. In general, he continued the policies of his father Maximilian II. He preferred to negotiate yet was cautious when faced with challenging problems. He was a tactical strategist who made great efforts to maintain a balanced relationship between the Catholics and non-Catholics in his empire. The emperor’s health problems may have had a significant impact on his rule, especially towards the end of his reign: a hereditary mental illness and probably also from contracting syphilis. It seems, however, that this factor cannot be significantly overestimated, perhaps with the exception of the very last phase of his life.32

A similar description of the emperor’s conduct can be found in the nunciature reports. Orazio Malaspina, the first nuncio to reside in Prague in 1578, recorded at least eight cases of direct conversation with the emperor.33 Similar frequent contact continued in the 1590s with Nuncio Cesare Speciano,34 his successors in the seventeenth century had a different experience. In an interview with the Chancellor of Duke of Bavaria in 1609, Antonio Caetani complained that since he had begun working in Prague, he had had only three audiences with the emperor.35 When he assumed office in 1607, he was warned in advance from Cardinal Borghese’s initial instruction that he may not have much contact with the emperor. He was advised to present urgent matters to the emperor in the form of written “slips of paper.”36 Caetani repeatedly wrote to Rome that Rudolf II was prone to melancholy and he found it impossible to obtain any decisions from him.37 Rudolf II was


34 EACS, ad indicem.


36 “Con Sua Maestà tratterà Vostra Signoria poche volte, essendo l’udienze difficilissime et sarà necessitata comunicar li negotii col consiglio segreto et scriver biglietti a Sua Maestà.” EAAC I, No. 4,16, p. 15.

37 Tomáš ČERNUŠÁK (ed.), Epistulae et acta Antonii Caetani 1607–1611, pars IV, Praege 2013, No. 21,3, p. 24; No. 73,2, pp. 68–69; No. 247,7, p. 207 (hereinafter referred to as EAAC IV).
failing to fulfil his duties as a statesman, as necessary pending documents were remaining unsigned, even for months.\textsuperscript{38}

The nuncio found the emperor to be indecisive even during negotiations with the envoys of the Silesian estates,\textsuperscript{39} when addressing the issue of succession in the Duchy of Jülich-Kleve\textsuperscript{40} or in preparation for meetings with electors.\textsuperscript{41} Although Caetani in no way questioned the emperor’s legitimacy in his reports, he adopted a somewhat critical approach to him, due to the previously stated information.\textsuperscript{42} He believed the emperor was the reason for the troubled state of the government and the decline of the Habsburg and Catholic power in the Roman-German Empire and the hereditary lands. The emperor bowed to pressure from the non-Catholic Bohemian estates and signed the famous Letter of Majesty in July 1609, granting concessions to the Protestants.\textsuperscript{43} In his final report in December 1610, Caetani assessed the situation in the empire with scepticism; widespread chaos, pending long-term problems and potential conflicts threatened the future.\textsuperscript{44} Caetani’s view of the emperor’s rule and his capabilities was common throughout his peers. Similar accounts of the sovereign are found in reports written by his predecessors as well as those from diplomats in other countries.\textsuperscript{45}

It is important to be vigilant when studying diplomatic reports and consider that the authors had their own bias when speaking about the emperor or his reign. The nuncios had their own specific perspective on many issues and experiences in their situation.\textsuperscript{46} Additionally, it is important to consider that the emperor typically avoided foreign diplomats and did not openly communicate his political intentions or motivations when making decisions.\textsuperscript{47} What may have initially appeared to be an indication/ a symptom of the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{38} Ibidem, No. 223,1, p. 187.
\bibitem{39} Ibidem, No. 62,3, p. 61; No. 181,1–2, p. 153.
\bibitem{40} Ibidem, No. 178, pp. 150–151; No. 457,1, p. 386.
\bibitem{41} Ibidem, No. 339,6, p. 291.
\bibitem{45} R. J. W. EVANS, Rudolf II., pp. 76–77.
\bibitem{47} The description of a \textit{distant monarch} is appropriate for Emperor Rudolf II, as used by David Starkey – David STARKEY, \textit{Introduction. Court history in perspective}, in: idem (ed.), The English Court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War, London 1987, pp. 1–24.
\end{thebibliography}
emperor’s health condition could have been his political tactic. This refers to his alleged indecisions, lack of interest in handling state documents, as well as his relationships with individual diplomats. He frequently refused to grant an audience to Nuncio Caetani or other foreign diplomats and openly opposed the visit of Pontifical Legate Giovanni Garcia Millini, (sent by Paul V to solve the “brotherly dispute” in 1608). By contrast, audiences with other ambassadors or people with a specific objective were more likely to be relatively prompt and without problems. In one example, a canon sent by the Cologne Elector, Hartger Henot, arrived in Prague at the beginning of March 1609 and attended at least three personal audiences with the emperor within the next few days.

The cold and detached attitude of Emperor Rudolph II to papal diplomats may have been influenced by his personal strategies and tactics. He also had a complicated relationship with the papacy throughout his reign, which worsened over time. In his 1575 succession speech, Rudolf II formally declared himself a protector of the Catholic Church and the papacy; he approached them with mistrust and opposed their political and religious intentions. In matters where he perceived a threat to his own interests, he took actions and opted for procedures belonging to his own sovereign majesty, regardless of the declared allegiance to the Holy See. From the beginning of his reign, this was reflected in political and religious issues concerning the Roman-German Empire, the Czech lands, or Imperial Italy. Over time this attitude became increasingly stronger. The first contradictions in the perception of the relationship became evident in the negotiations of the obedience deputation of the new ruler of the Habsburg Empire in 1577. In matters relating to the German lands, the popes were dissatisfied with the sovereign’s negligent and cautious approach to current problems, his stance on succession, and they disagreed with him on how to elect bishops.

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48 For more information, see J. PÁNEK, K povaze vlády, pp. 79, 83.
49 An extreme example was the mission of the Savoy Ambassador, Guido San Giorgio. He unsuccessfully waited for four months for an audience with the Emperor in 1608. EAAC IV, No. 50, 2.
51 F. STIEVE, Vom Reichstag 1608, p. 584.
54 A. KOLLER, Imperator und Pontifex, pp. 88–102.
Pope Clement VIII criticized the emperor at the very end of the sixteenth century for his attitude regarding the dispute over the Duchy of Ferrara. The curial position in the Empire was also aggravated by the gradual restriction of the participation of its diplomats in the Imperial Diet. In 1608, Rudolf II prevented Nuncio Caetani from attending the Imperial Diet in Regensburg. He believed that the nuncio was carrying papal breves concerning the succession issue addressed to the bishops of the empire. In the same year, he angered Pope Paul V with his efforts to thwart the legation of Cardinal Millini, who was sent to the empire to help resolve Pope Paul V’s dispute with Archduke Matthias. Disputes between the Roman Curia and the emperor also arose in Italy. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, a dispute arose from Rudolf II’s efforts to replenish an empty treasury by selling one of the Italian imperial fiefs. However, the papacy sometimes also asserted feudal power over them. In the Czech lands, the emperor and the papacy had an agreement (in general principle) for the common interest of recatholization, but Rudolf II consistently pursued his own interest. This was demonstrated in his hesitant approach to the plan for the recatholization of the Prague Utraquist University, the defence of the royal powers over the ecclesiastical property, and the limitation of the concept of general visitation of the Czech lands. The emperor found areas of agreement with Pope Clement VIII and Paul V when dealing with the threat to Hungary from the Turkish Wars in the late 1500s and early 1600s.

Relationship network of nuncios at the imperial court in Prague

Rudolf II continued to express his critical or distant manner towards curial politics. As his reign continued, direct contact between the emperor and the nuncios continued to decrease

56 K. STLOUKAL, Papežská politika, p. 32.
59 J. P. NIEDERKORN, Papst, Kaiser, pp. 88–89.
60 A. KOLLER, Imperator und Pontifex, pp. 103–116.
61 In 1610, the dispute concerned the fief of Comacchio. EAAC V, No. 246, pp. 219–220; No. 261, p. 229; No. 424, p. 346.
and it was essential for the nuncios to utilise the support of the appropriate courtiers and noblemen, whom were part of the relationship network of the papal diplomats.

Throughout the nunciature reposts, initial instructions, final reports, or other correspondence, there is no word used as a collective term for the network of contacts. Using the term *papal party* would be inaccurate and misleading, as would the more established *Spanish party*. In nunciature reports, it is more likely to find the term *parte nostra*, referring to a group of Catholic courtiers or nobility, or the clerics who were allies to or served the nuncios, which had a wider meaning linked more to an actively manifested confessional affiliation. Unlike the clients of the king of Spain from among courtiers and nobles at the imperial court and beyond, who are referred to in the correspondence of Spanish diplomats terminologically, members of the Prague-based nuncios’ relationship network are usually not thus defined. In individual cases, an explicit client relationship to the popes can be observed among these individuals, but in most cases the relationship was of the patronage nature only partially or very flexibly.

The key figures of the relationship network near the end of the sixteenth century were emperor’s ministers Paul Sixt Trautson and Wolfgang Rumpf. Both men previously appeared in the reports of the first Prague Nuncio Orazio Malaspina in 1578, and continued to serve as important contacts with the subsequent Prague nuncios (Cesare Speciano and Filippo Spinelli) up to the last decade of the sixteenth century. Their significance was aptly described by Nuncio Camillo Caetani in his final report of 1592. He advised his successor Speciano that he “should befriend all the ministers, make them your helpful confidants, especially Rumpf, through whom you will request and be granted audiences with the emperor, and with whom it will be appropriate to share the same matters after the negotiations with the emperor in order to strengthen his trust and emphasize the importance of his person.” Trautson would become important to Speciano due to his relationship with Cardinal Ludovico Madruzzo, the Bishop of Trent and Cardinal Protector of Germany.

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65 In the case of Caetani’s nunciature, see EAAC IV, No. 94,2, p. 85; No. 257,1, p. 219; No. 281, p. 244.
68 For more information on him, see ADB, vol. 29, pp. 668–669.
70 E.g. EACS I, No. 34, p. 84; 40,6, p. 91.
According to Caetani, Trautson “shows a special affection for the servants of the Apostolic See.”

Of the two ministers, Rumpf was more important to them, according to the reports of the individual nuncios. He was a source of vital information about the events at the imperial court, the intentions or meetings of the emperor, the contents of documents delivered to the emperor; or the delivery of nuncio’s or curial letters. Rumpf’s assistance was an opportune way to advance the objectives of the papal policy, presented to him by the nuncios on behalf of the empire. These might be filling a vacant bishop’s cathedra with trustworthy candidates faithful to the Holy See or the important and sensitive issue of succession in the Roman Empire. Trautson was utilised in a similar way and for similar purposes, although less frequently.

Certain prestigious and long-term status of these two men continued until 1600, when they fell into disfavour with the emperor and had to leave his court. Johann Barvitius is another notable person found in the correspondence and direct negotiations of the nuncios. He served at the imperial court from 1589; initially as the secretary of the Latin expedition and later as a prominent figure in Empire’s relationship with the Italian region. Caetani’s report from 1592 highlights his significance, despite his age being much younger than either of these privy councillors: “it is for his virtue and capability that he is popular with the emperor, […] respectful of the Holy See and kind to its ministers.” According to Caetani, Speciano needed to establish “a close friendship with him for he will receive many services and help from him.” After Rumpf and Trautson were removed from office in 1600, Barvitius’s importance for papal diplomacy greatly increased. He proved very valuable to the nuncios Giovanni Stefano Ferreri (1604–1607), Antonio Caetani (1607–1611) and the last nuncio of the era of Rudolf II, Giovanni Salvago (1611–1612). The tasks Barvitius

72 EACS I, No. 198,4, p. 447.
73 E.g. NBD III, vol. 10, No. 142,6, p. 236.
74 E.g. EACS II, No. 472,3, p. 1034; No. 522,3, p. 1142.
77 EACS II, No. 204, p. 486; No. 211,1, p. 497.
81 EACS I, No. 198,4, p. 448.
83 E.g. BAV, Barb. lat. 6911, fol. 109r; Ibidem, Barb. lat. 6912, fol. 34r–34v, 68r.
carried out for the papal representatives were very similar to those of Rumpf and Trautson. He was essential in acquiring information about the actions or health of the emperor, on individual political-religious matters, or pushing them through in the Privy or Aulic Council or with the sovereign himself. The inclusion of Barvitius in the group of papal clients is explicitly expressed in the letters of Camillo Cattaneo, an agent of Francesco Gonzaga di Castiglione; addressed to Cardinal Nephew Scipione Borghese in 1611.

Barvitius's position towards supporting papal intentions had limits and he was not comfortable going beyond what served his personal interests. On September 22, 1608, Caetani wrote to Rome about a resolution he had made with Barvitius to encourage the emperor to resolve the open question of peace with Matthias, through a joint appeal from the members of the Privy Council and Bohemian provincial officials to the sovereign. However, two weeks later the diplomat reported Barvitius's interest had faded, which he attributed to the sovereign showing little interest in the idea. Nuncio Spinelli called attention to Barvitius's attitude in 1599, when he wrote to Rome that Barvitius was “willing to serve His Holiness and the Catholic faith, but only in secrecy.”

In addition to those individuals who were essential members of the papal relationship network in Prague, there are other imperial ministers and individuals from the court depicted in the nunciature reports. However, their significance was lesser than those previously mentioned. These associates may have changed their position at the Court, changed their attitude towards papal diplomacy, revealed their influence at the imperial court was relatively limited (from the perspective of the nuncios), or they may have died. This relates to the occurrence of references in the nunciature correspondence or in the number of activities they performed for the Holy See. For example, Jacob Kurz von Senftenau, the imperial vice-chancellor, worked very intensely for a brief period with Nuncio Speciani, until his premature death in 1594. Hans Christoph von Hornstein, an aulic councillor who also figures occasionally in the reports, was also closely associated

84 EAAC IV, No. 21,3, p. 24.
85 E.g. Arnold Oskar MEYER (ed.), Die Prager Nuntiatur des Giovanni Stefano Ferreri und Wiener Nuntiatur des Giacomo Serra (1603–1606), Berlin 1913, No. 580c, p. 530; No. 627e, p. 572; EAAC IV, No. 31,2, p. 32; EAAC V, No. 11,2, pp. 15–16; BAV, Barb. lat. 6912, fol. 57r; Barb. lat. 6913, fol. 108r.
86 EAAC IV, No. 16,2, p. 20.
87 BAV, Barb. lat. 7045, fol. 61r–67r, 77r–82r.
88 EAAC IV, No. 31,2, p. 32.
89 EAAC IV, No. 49,2, p. 47.
90 “Barvicio, il quale mostra volontà di servire la Santità di Nostro Signore et la religion cattolica, ma secretamente.” ASV, Fondo Borghese III, 84a, fol. 412r.
91 E.g. EACS I, No. 39,1, p. 87; No. 93,3, p. 211; No. 113,11, p. 263; No. 122,1–3, pp. 279–282. For more information, see Alena PAZDEROVÁ, Zázemí Specianovy nunciatury u císařského dvora v Praze v letech 1592–1594, Paginae historiae: sborník Národního archivu 23/1, 2015, pp. 7–54, here p. 20.
with Speciani.\textsuperscript{92} At the beginning of his appointment, Nuncio Caetani relied on privy councillor Andreas Hannewald von Eckersdorf. In 1607, the councillor benefitted from the emperor’s confidence and had frequent access to him. Eventually, Caetani reassessed Hannewald’s importance and willingness, reporting that “less […] than promised can be expected of him”\textsuperscript{93} and he was not willing to present matters that may make the emperor ill tempered.\textsuperscript{94} Similarly, in 1607, the emperor’s ministers Leopold von Stralendorf and Hermann von Attems were useful members of the network, however a year later they both lost the nuncio’s trust and their actions were sharply criticized by him.\textsuperscript{95} Caetani’s successor Salvago used the help of Ernest von Mollart,\textsuperscript{96} as well as that of Johann Barvitius and Karl of Liechtenstein, who held an important position at the imperial court in the early seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{97} Karl had a beneficial relationship with Caetani’s predecessor, Ferrerim. In his final report of 1607, he recommended Karl as a person “quite favourably disposed to the Holy See”\textsuperscript{98}, which can be read in their mutual correspondence.\textsuperscript{99} However, Caetani did not trust him, and his reports show that it was mutual.\textsuperscript{100}

It is evident that the general tendency of the nuncios was to recruit key people operating in the main institutions of imperial politics (i.e. ideally the members of the Privy Council or the Aulic Council) for cooperation in their affairs.\textsuperscript{101} In the later period of Rudolf II’s reign, his distrust of the representatives of the Holy See became evident. The nuncios were forced to use people from other social strata in the imperial court who had influence over the sovereign or were accessible to him. In the years 1603–1607, the nunciature frequently wrote of Philipp Lang, the emperor’s valet, who enjoyed the emperor’s confidence and managed to use it appropriately to his advantage.\textsuperscript{102} Nuncio Ferreri, referred to him informally in his reports as “Filippo” and used him to obtain information and promote papal matters. According to Ferreri’s report of March 19, 1606, it was Lang’s contribution that made it

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{92} EACS I, No. 40.8, p. 91; EACS II No. 238,2, p. 546.
\bibitem{93} “Da lui si può sperar meno che faccia gli uffitii, che promette.” EAAC I, No. 39, p. 60.
\bibitem{94} Ibidem, No. 67, p. 98; No. 86, p. 117; No. 90, p. 123.
\bibitem{95} T. ČERNUŠÁK – P. MAREK, Vztahové sítě, pp. 1079–1080, 1088–1089.
\bibitem{96} BAV, Barb. lat. 6911, fol. 83r, 109r; 6912, fol. 68r. An explicit statement of Mollart’s client relationship with Cardinal Borghese, see BAV, Barb. lat. 6914, fol. 29r. For more information on Mollart, see ADB, vol. 22, pp. 117–118.
\bibitem{97} Karel STLOUKAL, Karel z Lichtenštejna a jeho účast na vládě Rudolfa II., ČČH 18, 1912, pp. 21–37, 153–169, 389–434.
\bibitem{98} EAAC I, No. 4, p. 16.
\bibitem{99} National Archives of Prague, collection of transcripts from the Italian and Vatican archives, Card Index 94, Inv. No. 513, Letter 1 (dated August 17, 1605).
\bibitem{100} EAAC I, No. 36, p. 55; No. 41, p. 61; No. 103, pp. 138–139.
\bibitem{101} A. PAZDEROVA, Zázemí, pp. 18–22.
\bibitem{102} For the influence of this man, see J. JANÁČEK, Rudolf II., pp. 392–393.
\end{thebibliography}
possible for them to remove parts of the Treaty of Vienna which contradicted the interests of the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{103}

Other important components of the network of the Prague nuncios were the representatives of the Bohemian and Moravian nobility. In 1578–1581, Orazio Malaspino used the services of Vratislav of Pernstein, who was mandated to promote (albeit unsuccessfully) the recatholization of the Prague Utraquist University.\textsuperscript{104} When implementing papal plans concerning the Czech lands, Nuncio Spinelli relied on Kryštof Popel of Lobkowicz.\textsuperscript{105} Zdeněk Vojtěch Popel of Lobkowicz is another Catholic who played a minor part. Nuncio Ferreri used his services,\textsuperscript{106} however it is uncertain how much they were utilised by his successor, Caetani. The nobleman was in direct contact with Caetani, especially during the session of the Land Diet in 1609, but it cannot be unequivocally confirmed that he performed any services for Caetani.\textsuperscript{107}

Camillo Cattaneo was man who originated on the outside of the official court structures and was able to move into their immediate vicinity in the last years of Emperor Rudolf II’s life.\textsuperscript{108} In the years 1607–1611, he worked primarily as a Prague agent of the Italian nobleman Francesco Gonzaga di Castiglione, the emperor’s emissary to Rome (and later to Spain).\textsuperscript{109} This position allowed him to easily access the emperor’s key ministers, which was why he was employed by papal diplomats to obtain valuable information. Nuncio Caetani repeatedly wrote highly of his services in his letters.\textsuperscript{110} During his temporary stay in Rome in 1609, Cattaneo won cardinal-nephew Scipione Borghese’s confidence, which allowed him to then serve as Borghese’s client and independent source in Prague from the beginning of 1611.\textsuperscript{111}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} A. O. MEYER (ed.), \textit{Die Prager Nuntiatur}, No. 734b, p. 691.
\item \textsuperscript{104} E.g. NBD III, vol. 10, No. 150,1, pp. 249–250; No. 158,2, p. 261; No. 162,1, pp. 266–267.
\item \textsuperscript{105} ASV, Fondo Borghese III, 84a, fol. 408–411; III, 87c, fol. 92–94; III, 67v, fol. 136–137.
\item \textsuperscript{106} A. O. MEYER (ed.), \textit{Die Prager Nuntiatur}, No. 429, p. 377; No. 431c, p. 379.
\item \textsuperscript{107} T. ČERNUŠÁK – P. MAREK, \textit{Vztahové sítě}, p. 1081.
\item \textsuperscript{108} For more information on Cattaneo, see Camillo BOTTURI, \textit{Abati e arcipreti di Castiglione}, in: Massimo De Paoli (ed.), \textit{La chiesa sul colle}, Brescia 2013, pp. 13–29, here p. 17; Josef GRISAR, \textit{Maria Wards Institut vor römischen Kongregationen (1616–1630)}, Roma 1966, p. 536, Note 11.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Basic information on his life and work (including bibliography), see Gonzaga, Francesco, in: DBI, vol. 57, 2001, pp. 766–767.
\item \textsuperscript{110} EAAC II, No. 23, pp. 35–36; EAAC IV, No. 349, pp. 298–299.
\item \textsuperscript{111} BAV, Barb. lat. 7045, fol. 61r–84v. Most recently on him, see Tomáš ČERNUŠÁK, \textit{Camillo Cattaneo und sein Dienst am Papsttum. Zum Wirken eines der Agenten am Kaiserhof in Prag}. MIÖG 127, 2019 (to be printed).
\end{itemize}
Resources of papal nuncios

Similar to the king of Spain’s clientele network managed by Prague ambassadors, it is also possible to identify different types of resources of the papal network used by nuncios to reward services of its members.\(^\text{112}\) The typology, strategy and policy of the use of resources was different in the curial environment than those in the kingdom of Spain. An analysis done by Wolfgang Reinhard of Paul V’s pontificate revealed that there were three main types of sources. Firstly, there were benefices, which were a fixed income permanently attached to an ecclesiastical office. Secondly, offices. Thirdly, graces were various dispensations or privileges that could be given.\(^\text{113}\) At the imperial court in Prague, two of them in particular were used – benefices and graces of various kinds.

The main sources of rewards which appear in the nunciature correspondence would have been obtaining a benefice, usually for relatives of those in the network or others in their own relationship network. This system of rewards can be illustrated with the example of Nuncio Speciani. He was approached in July 1592 by both the rector of the papal college in Prague, Johann Elleborn and by the emperor’s minister Rumpf, asking for the endorsement of specific people to occupy the recently vacated canonry in Magdeburg.\(^\text{114}\) The Holy See eventually chose to support Rumpf’s request,\(^\text{115}\) who wanted to use the position to reward one of his own servants.\(^\text{116}\) Similarly, in 1600, Johann Barvitius made a request through Nuncio Spinelli to fill the vacant canonry position in Wroclaw with Gerhard Ecker, a former alumnus of Roman Collegium Germanicum.\(^\text{117}\) Barvitius then thanked the nuncio for the positive response to his request with a personal letter.\(^\text{118}\) In 1608, Herrmann von Attems sought to procure a canonry for his son, John James, but his request was rejected by Rome.\(^\text{119}\)

Another resource frequently mentioned in nunciature reports and other related correspondence was the provision of various graces. In 1580, Nuncio Malaspina pleaded with Vratislav of Pernstein to obtain the remains of St. Monika for the chapel in his chateau in Litomyšl.\(^\text{120}\) Graces could also be various forms of dispensations, such as the dispensation for Aulic Councillor Hornstein to read banned books and a marital dispensation for his


\(^{113}\) W. REINHARD, *Paul V. Borghese*, pp. 23–47. Briefly on this issue with regard to the relationship with Spain, see also H. von THIESSEN, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, pp. 51–53.

\(^{114}\) EACS I, No. 40,6, p. 91.

\(^{115}\) Ibidem, No. 56,3, p. 126.

\(^{116}\) Ibidem, No. 42,5, p. 94.

\(^{117}\) ASV, Fondo Borghese III, 67b, fol. 166–168.

\(^{118}\) Ibidem, fol. 274.

\(^{119}\) EAAC IV, No. 350, p. 299; No. 398,2, p. 334.

relatives. Additionally included in this term is the sending of personal papal breves, as illustrated by the previous examples of Barvitius or Kryštof Popel of Lobkowicz.

It is difficult to find any explicit references to direct financial compensation for the members of the network in the correspondence of the imperial court nuncios. One exception is a letter from Nuncio Ferreri’s registry, addressed to the nuncio by Cardinal Ottavio Bandini in November 1604. He appealed to Ferreri to support an unspecified matter at the imperial court for his “closest friend”, Cosimo Strozzi, not only with the authority of the nuncio’s office, but also with the “money he has to pay to His Majesty’s ministers at the behest of His Holiness.”

If we look at the issues of resources in terms of the often-quoted concept written by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, we can describe them as different forms of capital. However, it must be considered that sometimes it is rather difficult or ambiguous to identify individual resources as belonging to a specific one. Benefices can thus be perceived as economic, social, and symbolic capital. In addition to the direct financial income for the bearers, benefices undoubtedly brought them a prestigious position.

**Conclusion**

The relationship network set up and administered by papal nuncios was a remarkable entity at the imperial court in Prague. Its importance was more significant due to the reluctance of Emperor Rudolf II to yield to the claims and demands of the Holy See, and his personal aversion to and mistrust of the policies it pursued. This relationship network was not extensive and, especially after 1600, it suffered from increased personnel instability. Apart from Johann Barvitius, the network failed to compensate for the loss caused by the withdrawal of the long-term supporters such as Rumpf and Trautson. In addition, the activity of the members of the papal network was greatly limited by their personal interests and the threat of the sovereign’s disgrace or mistrust. The explicit client relationship of these and other individuals from the imperial court with the pope is rarely documented in historical sources. Presently, it is appropriate to state that the members of the network were mostly utilised for their positions at court, based on their confessional affiliation and

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122 EACS I, No. 2,1, p. 27; ASV, Fondo Borghese III, 67b, fol. 148–150
123 “Perché non solo Vostra Signoria potrà aiutarlo con la sua molta autorità, ma anco con la commodità del denaro, che lei deve sborsare per ordine di Nostro Signore alli ministri di Sua Maestà.” NA, Sbírka přepisů z italských a vatikánských archivů, Card Index 92, Inv. No. 498, Letter 1, dated November 20, 1604.
125 W. REINHARD, Paul V. Borghese, p. 23.
their positive attitude towards papal policies. These allies were supported by the material or symbolic benefits that cooperation with the nuncios provided. The resources available to the papal diplomats corresponded to the character of the Papal State and were rare compared to the resources of the king of Spain. However, their usefulness was limited, and their value was more significant in terms of symbolism. The papal relationship networks were used to strengthen the social status of individual members of the network in relation to the personal structures they built around themselves.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{126} The present study is based on the GAČR research project (GA17–06049S) \textit{Relational networks of Apostolic nuncios and Spanish envoys in the milieu of the imperial court at the turn of the 16th and 17th century}. 
Behind the negotiations: Nuncio Antonio Caetani’s experience at the court of Madrid (1611–1618)

Abstract: When the Borghese family’s ascent to power in the court of Rome began, the domain of the Sandovals within the court of Madrid was already well-established. Through analysis of the correspondence of Nuncio Antonio Caetani, this article underscores how the papal representative promoted himself as a principal interlocutor between these two groups of power. He had to serve the Apostolic See and to satisfy the Spanish ministers and expectations of the nobility, thus increasing the honour of his noble family. A perspective on the relations between Rome and Madrid at the beginning of the seventeenth century will be examined, by focusing on a myriad of recommendations, favours, rewards, and benefices as recompense for gratitude and friendship. The approach purports to deepen the practice of the early modern diplomacy, by considering Caetani’s networks and his perceptions as a privileged observer of court life.

Keywords: Antonio Caetani – Experience – Court of Madrid – Court of Rome – Early Modern Diplomacy – Networks – Nunciature

A privileged observer

In a letter written on November 18, 1617, Apostolic Nuncio Antonio Caetani reported an aphorism circulated through the corridors of the court of Madrid, which read as follows: “It was prudent to receive the disillusionments …, but not to administer them”.


Rumours attributed the maxim to Juan de Idiáquez, an esteemed man, with lengthy experience as a minister of the Crown of Castile.³

We may suppose that Idiáquez consciously used the word desengaño to address the nature of the Spanish Nation. This word is written in the nuncio’s letter as disinganno, a simple Italian translation; it is meant to point out what kind of virtues were necessary to establish good relations at court. As stated by Christopher Maurer, it is impossible to find an equivalent word in English for desengaño, as it means “more than ‘disillusionment’, it implies the dispelling of deceit and an awakening to truth”.⁴ To summarize, the wise minister wanted to explain what men should not be doing, as to not destroy the hopes of those who were asking for favours, and instead to meet their expectations.

Along the same line as Idiáquez, Caetani commented on Francisco de Sandoval, Duke de Lerma’s desire to be appointed cardinal: “To Gentlemen who, during their whole lives, were not used to anything but successes, it is not easy to cut off the desires when they are young and flourishing, just like when they are dry and aged”.⁵ For the king’s favourite, the biretta would have been the crowning achievement of his career. Therefore, although Lerma’s desire was unusual and had political consequences, he knew that he would receive a positive response from the Roman Curia.⁶ As also reported by the nuncio, the valido

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was certain to be supported by the king. Being a man unaccustomed to uncertainty and disillusionment, he would have been very disappointed with a negative answer, so much so as “to become a lion”.

Nuncio Caetani was accustomed to the mazes of princely courts. According to an unfinished manuscript version of his biography, Antonio Caetani was well-informed about the political relationships among the European courts. Due to his cultural background, he was able to converse with anyone in any situation or occasion. Furthermore, as the biographer notes, he was aware of the courts’ moods and factional struggles, in addition to the nobles’ aspirations and rivalries in their competition for honours. Caetani’s perceptions of his interlocutors’ dispositions were from a hard-earned wisdom during his ten year position as papal representative, six of which he spent as a diplomat resident in Madrid at the request of Lerma. The court was addressed by the nuncio as a deceptive place where people revealed a “flattering façade, preserving their private passions secretly”; and where “what one desires is hoped, and what one hopes gets done,” due to the recommendations of those who held the command and had the authority. As a privileged observer with first-hand knowledge of court life, he was aware of how important it was to acquiesce himself to the ministers’ will as much as possible.

As demonstrated by the renewed multidisciplinary approach to the history of diplomacy over the previous two decades, early modern ambassadors were not merely spokespersons in service to the prince, but rather political actors within networks of interpersonal relationships. Diplomats often created and intertwined these networks, using them to exercise their political role and for their own personal affairs. Whilst the ambassadors

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8 BAV, Barb. Lat., Ms. 6030, fols. 1r–77v. The author is Cristoforo Caetani (Bishop of Laodicea and Foligno).
10 “Quel che si desidera si spera, et quel che si spera si ha per cosa fatta.” ASV, FB, II, 264, fol. 157r. Madrid, 09. 7. 1613. Caetani to Borghese.
represented the crown, they often also acted as brokers of patronage resources. They were not only working for their king, but for their kin; acting "as heads of their families, as patrons of their clients and friends of their friends." In many cases it has been shown that the ambassadors maintained multiple and volatile political loyalties. On one hand, personal networks and family relationships helped Antonio Caetani strengthen his role at the court of Madrid, while serving the papacy and his noble family at the same time. On the other hand, his nunciature may be summarized as continuous research of balance to satisfy both the papal wishes and to fulfil the desires of Lerma and his adherents. In the future, Caetani's role as papal nuncio in Madrid became rather uncomfortable. As a privilege interlocutor and an exponent of a family fully dedicated to the Spanish crown, it became difficult to accommodate the relationship between the groups of power that dominated the two courts.

A political decision

When Camillo Borghese was elected Pope Paul V in 1605, the Caetanis entered the orbit of the papal family, even though this noble Roman family had strengthened its own position within the Curia during the last decades of the sixteenth century. The bond with the papal families was fundamental to understand the behaviour of the Roman elites. The papacy clientele system was based on spiritual resources and tended towards creating groups of power that supported the reigning papal family. The relations between the latter and the nobility were more of interdependence rather than supremacy and were strongly subjected

15 Paolo PERIATI, The Pope, the King and the Family: Triple Loyalty and Diplomatic Negotiations of the Apostolic Nuncio Antonio Caetani at the Court of Madrid (1611–1618), Librosdelacorte.es 8, nr. 12, 2016, pp. 7–24.
to the physiological transience of papal power.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, the alliances had to conform to this particular configuration, showing their volatile and blurred boundaries. As revealed by Wolfgang Reinhard, the networks – based on fidelity and devotion among friends, patrons, and clients – were necessary to give Roman politics the framework to guarantee a functioning system of rules. They were protection in case of changing of personal interests, primarily because self-realization was possible only in and through such networks.\textsuperscript{18} Due to this interwoven networks, the clientele system that bound the noble families to each other influenced the political choices within the Roman court.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, as demonstrated by Mario Rosa, the distribution of the ecclesiastical benefices and pensions was fundamental for the consolidation of the social-economic status of the pastoral cadre and for the building of the patron-clients relations.\textsuperscript{20} The Spanish high nobility tried to benefit as much as possible from the clientele system based on the relations with the Roman court,\textsuperscript{21} while papal families played a primary role, receiving Spanish feudal concessions in Naples as compensation.\textsuperscript{22} Maria Antonietta Visceglia stressed this point when she wrote that Spanish policy in Rome “consisted in attracting papal families into the orbit of Spain

\begin{footnotes}
\item[	extsuperscript{19}] Wolfgang REINHARD, Freunde und Kreaturen, “Verflechtung” als Konzept zur Erforschung historischer Führungsgruppen, Römische Oligarchie um 1600, München 1979.
\item[	extsuperscript{22}] See: Wolfgang REINHARD, Ämterlaufbahn und Familienstatus. Der Aufstieg des Hauses Borghese 1537–1621, Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 54, 1974, pp. 328–427.
\end{footnotes}
through the concession of Neapolitan estates” with the purpose of consolidating the Spanish faction in Rome, together with “the great and small Roman nobility ... who were divided by profound rivalries based on titles, encomiendas, knightly customs and pensions.” This custom will be revealed as the cement that strengthened the political bonds between the groups of power in the orbits of the courts of Madrid and Rome, essentially a do ut des which tended to renew and maintain the political and economic status. The concessions of the ecclesiastical benefices, pensions, and dispensations or the acquisitions of fiefdoms, titles and personal rewards will come back often in the Caetani’s correspondence. They were an essential practice to give him the status of main interlocutor, to obtain favours, and to guarantee prestige and high esteem for the nunciature.

It was during the papacy of Clement VIII that the young Antonio Caetani received several benefices and ecclesiastical titles and took his first steps in service to the Church. In one instance, in 1596, he went along with his uncle, the Cardinal Enrico Caetani, to the court of King Sigismund Vasa to accomplish an extraordinary apostolic mission. Another time, in 1600, he accompanied the Cardinal-Nephew Pietro Aldobrandini to Florence, to observe the celebrations of the marriage of Maria de’ Medici with the King Henry IV of France.

It was the papacy of Paul V that represented a real turning point for the Caetanis. Antonio, from being a creature of the Pope Aldobrandini, gave his loyalty to the new powerful Cardinal-Nephew Scipione Borghese. The “great friendship” of Pope Borghese towards the Caetanis had its roots in the strong relationship with the Patriarch of Alexandria Camillo Caetani. The former had been sent as nuncio to Madrid, where he was received by the ordinary papal legate Camillo Caetani with “all reverences and honours.” In the rooms of the Roman court, a bond and a feeling of congeniality was nurtured due to the satires

24 Antonio Caetani was nominated Archbishop of Capua (1605), and then sent to the Imperial court as nuncio (1607), while his younger brother Bonifacio Caetani was appointed Cardinal and Governor of Romagna (1606).
27 “Amicissimo”. BAV, Barb. Lat., Ms. 6030, fol. 17v.
composed by Bonifacio Caetani, Antonio’s younger brother, against Pietro Aldobrandini.29 This irreverence pleased Pope Borghese because of the well-known hostility between these two papal families;30 a rivalry based on amassing Neapolitan fiefdoms,31 and on the marriages among the Italian noble houses. In essence, the marriage alliances and the purchase of the fiefs moved the noble families closer to the Roman court and the papal families. It gave them the opportunity to achieve success and to consolidate their acquired socio-economic status.32

It is not a surprise that Antonio Caetani was appointed to the Spanish nunciature when the resident Nuncio Decio Carafa had to be replaced at the end of 1611. In addition to the aforementioned reasons, this choice was further influenced by the long-time closeness of the Caetani family with the Crown of Castile. This would have meant more possibilities to promote the interests of the papal House in Madrid. Furthermore, as Tomáš Černušák revealed in a recent article,33 Bonifacio Caetani and Pietro Caetani (Duke of Sermoneta) co-ordinated intrigues and personal alliances within the Roman court to beat any other candidates for the position.

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Being part of a *filospagnola* family was a strong point in favour of Antonio Caetani. It is worthwhile to reference a letter sent by Bonifacio Caetani to the King Philip III of Spain in 1615 to better understand the Caetanis’ perception of their loyalty. In this letter, he asserted that the family was not linked to the Crown of Castile as vassals, but by election. They were subjects not because of the circumstances or because they were forced, but they were specifically chosen. The convergence was possible due to a series of arranged marriages, leading to a closer relationship with the other important Neapolitan families, and consequently with the main representatives of the Spanish nobility. It is not a coincidence that the family had been defined “*more Spanish than Roman*” by the Spanish ambassador in Rome.

To summarize, the pope judged Antonio Caetani’s profile appropriate to pursue the political agenda of the papacy and to re-establish a good relationship with the court of Madrid. The conclusion was “[to temper shadows and suspects, that … were spreading between His Holiness and the Spanish Majesty.”

At the time that the Archbishop of Capua received the General Instruction, political relations between Rome and Madrid were not at their best. Rumours about a pope favourable to an anti-Spanish alliance, made by the French crown and the Duchy of Savoy (claiming strategic territories in northern Italy), had persisted from the previous year. During the final months of 1611, this difficult situation was worsened by the hesitations of the Roman Curia to consider the request of Lerma to simultaneously elect two Spanish cardinals within the Sacred College. This issue was defined by Antonio Caetani as the “most dangerous hurdle” of his entire nunciature, which came to a favourable end for the Crown of Castile four years later. In addition, a harsh jurisdictional dispute over the assets of the vacant diocese of Zaragoza developed between the Apostolic Camera and the local ecclesiastical authorities. This issue was managed too rigidly by Decio Carafa,
whose behaviour made him increasingly unpopular in the eyes of the Spanish court. They complained until the request for a replacement,\(^{42}\) followed by a request for separation of the nuncio’s office from the functions of the General Collector,\(^ {43}\) was granted.

As a compensation for their favourable disposition toward the Spanish demands, Paul V and Scipione Borghese asked the replacement of the Spanish ambassador in Rome, Francisco de Castro (Count of Castro and Duke of Taurisano).\(^ {44}\) The pope and the Cardinal-Nephew considered de Castro part of an autonomous group of power within the Spanish Nation in Rome,\(^ {45}\) and they were concerned about the excessive closeness of the ambassador’s family (the Lemos) to the former Cardinal-Nephew Pietro Aldobrandini, whom they considered their enemy.\(^ {46}\)

The conflict between the Borghese and the Aldobrandini families was replicated within the group of power\(^ {47}\) that dominated the court of Madrid – the Sandovals. Specifically, this refers to the hostility between those whom Caetani defined as the “partials”\(^ {48}\) of the Lemos family and the faction loyal to the king's favourite (and his son, Cristóbal Gómez de Sandoval, Duke of Uceda).\(^ {49}\)


The Lemos were close to Pietro Aldobrandini and their main representative was Catalina de Zúñiga y Sandoval (Countess of Lemos and sister of Lerma). The words of the nuncio clarify conflicting relationships among them. He describes the reactions of the court about a possible sudden death of Catalina de Zúñiga: “It is believed that this death will make the Duke of Uceda happy … and the Duke of Lerma … will console himself soon, because it seems that his respect for her was due to reverence rather than affection”. The entire court was aware of her great influence on Lerma and she never missed a chance to intervene in the political decision-making process to support their sons: the ambassador Francisco de Castro and the Viceroy of Naples, Pedro Fernández de Lemos. According to the Countess of Lemos, her expectation was that the removal of her son from the role he had in Rome could happen only for a similar or more prestigious role in government. She wanted Francisco to succeed his brother in Naples, once Pedro Fernández became the President of the Council of Italy. Thus, she became an insuperable obstacle in the nuncio’s path, as she was frequently busy planning “unbelievable trickeries for those who do not witness them.” Antonio Caetani recounted this in an attempt to justify his difficulties in satisfying the pope’s will.

The acrimony towards Francisco de Castro continued for at least five years; it was a growing obsession for the pope. The request for a substitution soon became a conditio sine qua non, which strongly affected the diplomatic negotiations during the Caetani’s nunciature and did not help to diffuse the tensions between the two courts. The nuncio was urged to resolve this negotiation, which was strictly dependent on the balance of power within the court of Madrid. Commands from Rome were sent as powerful means to persuade Lerma that the double election of Spanish cardinals would never take place if de Castro kept his role. For Scipione Borghese, it did not seem “convenient to give such kind of favours in time of an ambassador who is an enemy and declares it publicly.” These complaints occurred repeatedly during the nunciature, so much so as to have implications in the relationship between the Borgheses and the Nuncio. Caetani was accused of delaying his

obligations in order to have good relations with Lerma and his adherents, and managing his private affairs, rather than the interests of the papal family.

**Negotiations and reputation**

In Madrid, Antonio Caetani had to serve not only the Cardinal-Nephew “but even every member of his family and the dependents.” At the same time, he had to defend the Borghese family’s political choices and their reputation at the Spanish court. He was expected to closely watch and discredit all those who presented at court for personal purposes, especially those that were not well-disposed toward the papal family. In the summer of 1612, Caetani needed to dispel any reports about a possible inclination of Paul V toward the French crown, following the decision to arrange a marriage between Marcantonio Borghese (Prince of Sulmona and main laic representative of the papal family) with Maria Camilla Orsini (daughter of Virginio Orsini, Duke of Bracciano, who had ties with the Queen of France.) An inclination that was “clear to the most reasonable men, but the whole court was suspicious of it” (as reported by the Duke of Poli), particularly because the Spanish ambassador was also pressing to arrange the nuptials with a daughter of Filippo Colonna, Constable of Naples and servant of the Crown of Castile.

Sometimes, cardinals and their trustworthy persons would embark on the journey to Madrid to handle their interests: this was an occasion for concern to Scipione Borghese. Cardinal Francesco Sforza, among others, reoccurred in the nunciature’s correspondence. The Cardinal-Nephew considered Sforza a restless man, who was “full of bizarre ideas” and “dedicated to slanders.” Furthermore, he was also considered a close friend of the Spanish ambassador, with whom he was continuously “fantasizing about unattainable things.

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55 P. PERIATI, *The Pope, the King*, p. 22.
58 “Traluceva ai più sensati, ma che tutta la nostra Corte se ne insospettì.” AGS, E, leg. 999, s. fol. Poli, 1. 2. 1613. Relazione del Duca di Poli.
59 AGS, E, leg. 997, s. fol. Rome, 20. 6. 1612. Castro to Philip III.
60 For example, the visit of a Venetian prelate called Monsignor Marino (1616), and the potential mission of the Dominican friar Cornelio del Monte (1617), both agents close to Aldobrandini. See: ASV, FB, II, 261, fols. 148r–149r. Madrid, 12. 9. 1616. Caetani to Borghese; ASV, FB, II, 260, fols. 80r–81r. Madrid, 31. 5. 1617. Caetani to Borghese.
Thus, Caetani had to discredit him by underlining his dissolute way of life. A similar situation was the instance when the Count of Castro supported the candidacy of Cardinal Sforza to the Archbishopric of Taranto in 1612. This was a desirable vacant seat later obtained by the nuncio’s brother, Bonifacio – with the approval of the king and the blessing of the Cardinal-Nephew. The latter was also pushing to give a benefice on this archbishopric to his Master of Chamber Giulio Pavoni, who had been endorsed by the nuncio for the Cross of the Brotherhood of Knights of Saint Jacob. In the end, Caetani was sure that Sforza’s effort to visit Madrid would be useless, because “he will spend his money, he will have as much trouble as he wants and,” without any doubt, he “will return to Italy empty-handed.”

As mentioned, the relations between Rome and Madrid were intertwined with their common Neapolitan interests – even more so when one of the Lemos was the Viceroy of Naples and the other was the ambassador to Rome simultaneously. The pope and the Cardinal-Nephew feared that their family interests could be damaged by the two brothers, whose politics were considered to be oriented towards their private interests and to strengthen their family’s presence in Italy. Consequently, Scipione Borghese requested to be warned about any political moves and he asked Caetani to watch the agents close to the Lemos, within the Spanish court. One such instance was that of Juan Montoya de Cardona, regent of the Collateral Council in Naples, who was in Madrid at the beginning of January 1615. According to the nuncio, Montoya immediately proved himself “not to be devoted to the Church,” and a “foppish flatterer,” strictly loyal to Viceroy Pedro Fernández de Lemos. When Antonio Caetani met the regent in person, the latter behaved aggressively, not losing the opportunity “to curse … the poison of his evil intention” about the fief of Rigatti: one of the longest and harsher disputes between the Borghese family and the Lemos


66 See: BAV, Barb. Lat., Ms. 6030, fol. 71r; BAV, Barb. Lat., 8278, fols. 4r, 48, 112r.

67 “Spenderà il suo danaro, havrà strapazzo quanto ne vuole e … se ne tornerà in Italia con le mosche in mano.” ASV, FB, II, 266, fol. 163r. Madrid, 1. 10. 1612. Caetani to Borghese.


70 Previously Montoya had been part of the Borghese’s clientele. See: Guido METZLER, Clienti del papa, ministri del re. Le relazioni tra il cardinal nepote e ufficiali napoletani nel primo Seicento, Dimensioni e problemi della ricerca storica 1, 2004, pp. 83–108.

The fief was located in the Papal States, right on the border with Abruzzo Ultra, and belonged to the Mareri family. However, it was occupied by the soldiers of the Viceroy of Naples in the summer 1612 with the excuse that it was a den of criminals and had no approval from Madrid. Paul V demanded the restitution of the fief, accusing Francesco Mareri (nephew and enemy of the legitimate feudal lord) of having usurped it with the help of Francisco de Castro. Consequently, the papal family interpreted the dispute over Rigatti as “a new chapter of the Lemos-Aldobrandini’s conspiracy” against them.

The precautions the nuncio was asked to perform were meant to avoid misinterpretations of the intentions of the Apostolic See. They were to prevent any loss of reputation of the papal family and to preserve themselves in position as sole interlocutors for the crown. This was a fundamental point that Caetani remembered to Lerma during an audience, when he clearly affirmed that “the king’s faction in Rome must have the first correspondence” with Borghese, and not with Aldobrandini.

As previously stated, the relations between Rome and Madrid were mainly based on the distribution of pensions, titles and benefices. From the beginning of 1612, Scipione Borghese had been pressing the nuncio to get a Spanish naturaleza and grasp the benefits on the diocese of Jaén, the value of which was a thousand ducats. However, his primary goal was to obtain the “title of the Abbey of the Parco”. This was a negotiation that, despite Caetani’s perseverance, took the entire nunciature and finally ended in 1618 due to the royal chaplain Andrea Mastrillo. The nuncio supposed Mastrillo deserved to be particularly favoured because “his reputation was exposed to a great risk for the service.”

72 P. PERIATI, Mettere fine, p. 86.
74 Maria A. VISCEGLIA (ed.), Papato e politica internazionale nella prima età moderna, Roma 2013, p. 136.
77 AGS, E, leg. 997, s. fol. Rome, 20. 6. 1612. Castro to Philip III.
The nuncio’s important services, due to his obligation to Scipione Borghese, were fundamental to strengthen the status of the papal family (e.g. the title of Parco for his master and the benefice for Giulio Pavoni). Through trusted ministers or directly himself, Caetani had to submit [to Lerma] dozens of requests for recommendations, pensions and favours for people close to the Borghese family. He also had to submit requests from those who were part of the curial apparatus, which was another fundamental practice in establishing good relations between the two courts. There are a large variety of examples to illustrate these cases. For instance, pensions were asked by the Abbot Galeotto Uffreducci, cameriere segreto of Paul V and by the farrier of Scipione Borghese. On another occasion, the nuncio was asked to intervene in favour of the nobleman Giulio Arese, who wanted to be admitted to the Senate of Milan. Another example was the nuncio’s negotiation with Lerma for the Spanish nobleman Pedro Deza, who asked to be recommend for a title of marquis, and was later appointed as Count de la Fuente by Philip III. Furthermore, there was the recommendation for the Neapolitan poetess Margherita Sarrocchi to obtain a royal privilege, so that she could benefit from the sale and royalties of a newly published poem. In one other situation, Pier Francesco Colonna, Prince of Gallicano, asked to be appointed captain of a company of soldiers in Naples which had remained vacant after the death of his father. This was considered a negotiation without any difficulties by the nuncio because it was “customary not to deny the continuation of similar offices for deserving Houses.”

From the beginning of his tenure, Antonio Caetani had worked to ensure that his reputation as a valid interlocutor within the court of Madrid remained in high esteem, thus reinforcing the institutional role of the nunciature office. In order to maintain this, it was necessary to show favour to his family in Spain, who were useful for receiving confidential notices and information. The cultivation of a network of friendships by the nuncio through intercessions and recommendations was important in order to fulfil the private wishes of ministers of the court and gain their trust.

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80 BAV, Barb. Lat., Ms. 6030, fol. 71r.
81 BAV, Barb. Lat., 8278, fol. 64r. Madrid, 22. 11. 1612. Caetani to Borghese.
82 BAV, Barb. Lat., 8277, fol. 60r. Madrid, 29. 7. 1612. Caetani to Borghese.
87 ASV, FB, II, 266, fol. 60r. Madrid, 15. 1. 1612. Caetani to Borghese.
Caetani came to Madrid in December 1611 together with his “nephews, and other family members.” After a week, the apostolic representative went to the royal residence to meet the king. As “lords much-loving in that court,” during this first audience, the nuncio presented his sixteen-year-old nephew Francesco Caetani as a servant of King Philip III, emphasizing the unlimited devotion of the family. The nuncio arrived at the royal palace “riding a mule covered by a cloak” with a lavish and honourable ceremony through the streets of Madrid, thanks to the large financial outlay by his relatives. Antonio Caetani had Spanish relations through his mother, Agnesina Colonna. He was connected to the House of Enríquez, one of the most prominent noble families of the kingdoms of Spain, due to his female cousin Vittoria Colonna (Duchess of Medina de Rioseco), widow of Luis Enríquez de Cabrera (Almirante de Castilla). The nuncio was also closely related to Pedro Álvarez de Toledo (Marquis of Villafranca) son of Vittoria Colonna of Paliano. De Toledo’s second marriage was to Giovanna Pignatelli (Duchess of Terranova), who was a cousin of Caetani and sister of the Neapolitan nobleman Ettore Pignatelli (Duke of Monteleone). Through the Toledo-Colonna line, Caetani was also joined to Victoria Pacheco y Colonna (Marquise of Cerralbo), wife of Gabriel de Velasco y la Cueva (Count of Siruela).

It was not rare for the nuncio’s relatives to turn to the intercession of Antonio Caetani to fulfil their wishes or assert their rights. Although Caetani felt obliged to apologize to the pope for being forced to write letters every day “in favour of this or that, relative or stranger,” they knew very well in Rome that “it was not possible to do without giving such satisfactions.” Therefore, the letters of recommendation “never gave any annoyance” because this practice was necessary, useful, and gave dignity and prestige to the nunciature; cementing the relationship between the two courts. In this regard, it is very interesting the letter written in the summer of 1613 in which the nuncio emphasized the political importance of granting some graces requested by his cousin Vittoria Colonna for her daughter Ana and for Rodrigo Enríquez de Cabrera (Marquis de Valdunquillo). Caetani

90 BAV, Barb. Lat., Ms. 6030, fol. 59v. Becoming the Duke of Sermoneta, Francesco Caetani was appointed as Grande de España by Philip III in 1615, de facto operating a real break with Scipione Borghese, who asked the same title for Marcantonio Borghese.
92 She was the widow of Carlo d’Aragona Tagliavia (Prince of Castelvetrano, Duke of Terranova).
93 About: Berardo GONZAGA, Memorie delle famiglie nobili delle Province Meridionali, Napoli 1875.
underscore how the negotiation was supported by the authority of Lerma and Uceda who, as close relatives, protected the interests of the House of Enríquez as “their thing.”

During the nunciature Antonio Caetani came to be considered an enemy of Aldobrandini. He proved to be close to Lerma and his friends such as Rodrigo Calderón (Count de Oliva, Marquis of Siete Iglesias), and the canon Gabriel de Trejo (jurist, councilor of the Inquisition and cardinal in 1615). The closeness of the nuncio to the Lerma-Calderón-Trejo trio was made evident when he affirmed that he was not afraid of political attacks made by the Count of Castro because this group would protect him and never allow any defamations to his person. This closeness was viewed with suspicion by Scipione Borghese; Caetani looked as “the most involved person of the world” because of his “friendships and kinsfolk.” Being well-accepted and loyal to the Crown of Castile also meant being at the mercy of the will of Lerma. Caetani himself complained about the pressures of the valido, who “had made up his mind to force His Holiness to what he wishes.”

**Negotiations and representation**

The depiction of the court life and its representatives which reached Rome through Caetani’s writing was influenced by his personal perceptions and were affected by different situations and occasions. From Caetani’s perspective, the court was almost motionless and full of personal jealousies, in which the minutiae took precedence over state’s affairs. In Madrid, negotiations were endless and continuously disturbed by venality and flattery. The nuncio sternly expressed “there was no order and distinction of days as in Rome and in other well-regulated Courts, but often many things are resolved by the circumstance and by chance,

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98 According to the nuncio it seemed that Cardinal Aldobrandini planned the trick to discredit him, together with the friends of the Lemos. BAV, Barb. Lat., 8275, fol. 2v. Madrid, 3.1.1612. Caetani to Borghese.
100 AGS, E, leg. 999, s. fol. Rome, 2.1.1613. Castro to Philip III.
103 “Posto in testa obligar Sua Santità a quel che desidera.” BAV, Barb. Lat., 8277, fol. 102r. Madrid, 27.8.1612. Caetani to Borghese.
104 About: Peter BURKE, Performing History: the importance of occasions, Rethinking History 9, n. 1, 2005, pp. 35–52.
rather than diligence.”

Powerful individuals such as Lerma and Uceda communicated less than others: Lerma “not by nature, but by being inaccessible,” while Uceda “was truly dark and very secretive.”

Personal interactions and the ability to communicate were a key factor in understanding the interlocutors’ disposition and interpreting their intentions in order to gain their trust. Lerma was described by Caetani as an excellent negotiator and as a person “of an insatiable rapacity.” The entire government depended on him, although it was impossible to speak frankly with him; despite him being a man of good disposition, he was easily incensed. Consequently, it was impossible to “calm him with reasons,” and during meetings it was necessary for the ambassadors to move “with dexterity to not break everything” due to his changeable moods and fickleness. Thus, Lerma could only be persuaded with affection and kindness.

Another individual with ever-increasing authority emerged in the correspondence of the nunciature: the Dominican friar Luis de Aliaga, confessor of Philip III. Caetani repeatedly stressed how this was a distinguished person who must be kept supportive in service to the Church and of the Borghese family, as the king favoured him. Having “the king’s conscience in his hands” made Aliaga the most important minister of Christianity. His opinion was heard for all of the main negotiations concerning religious or state affairs. Caetani remarked that it was better to strive to satisfy his wishes than those of others. Aliaga appears to be the opposite of Lerma; he was moral, a substantial man who “struggled naked” into the political arena. Caetani affirmed this in his writing, basing

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105 “Non vi è ordine et distintione di giornate come in Roma et in altre Cortij ben regolate, ma molte cose spesso più che la diligenza, le risolve la congiuntura et il caso.” ASV, FB, II, 262, fol. 117v. Madrid, 22. 5. 1615. Caetani to Borghese.

106 “Non già per natura, ma per essere inaccesibile, ... per esser veramente di natura cupa et secretissima.” ASV, FB, II, 262, fol. 33v. Madrid, 14. 2. 1615. Caetani to Borghese.


his assumptions on the friar never demanding titles or churches. However, even Aliaga was not immune to gifts and favouritism (as per practice).\textsuperscript{117}

Lerma and Aliaga’s conflicting relationship was criticised by the nuncio as an “incurable plague”\textsuperscript{118} that infected the monarchy. It was a delicate situation that he needed to be removed from, so Caetani decided that the most convenient approach was to keep both as friends and to not interfere between them “showing ignorance about their competitions.”\textsuperscript{119}

The only negotiations that did not appear to suffer from the impasse were the requests for recommendations, favours and intercessions to the nuncio to obtain benefices, licenses and graces from Rome. Above all, it was fundamental for the service of the Church to give a positive answer to the host of ministers and their secretaries and to the influential men of the court or their family members; and protected both lay and ecclesiastics men. Giving benefits and loans as recompense for gratitude and friendship was a legitimate\textsuperscript{120} and necessary obligation. They were necessary to gain the confidence of those men who may be able to provide first-hand news; for the confidants who could support Roman interests; and for those ecclesiastics who would prove to be loyal servants of the pope, firstly following Rome and then Madrid.

Juan de Ciriza, the secretary to the king and to the Duke of Lerma, was one of the principal ministers that would have been opportune to reward. According to the nuncio, Ciriza was an excellent confidant, but moreover, he was “the door and most likely the only vehicle to introduce and promote all of the most serious negotiations.”\textsuperscript{121} At this time (January 1613), he was performing all the responsibilities that had previously been Calderón’s. Therefore, it was necessary to fulfil his request for a papal dispensation which would allow him to be part of the Order of Santiago, by overcoming the difficulties of certain constitutional norms. This was particularly important as the secretary proved to be a loyal friend, turning secretly to the nuncio and not trusting any intercessions by the Spanish ambassador in Rome. Likewise, this was true for Melchor Carrillo, the minister of the Italian branch of the Secretariat of State led by Antonio de Aróztegui. He managed the documentation that came from Italy and often informed Caetani about the departures

\textsuperscript{117} F. BENIGNO, L’ombra, p. 48, 55.
\textsuperscript{118} “Piaga insanabile.” ASV, FB, II, 262, fol. 23v. Madrid, 22. 1. 1615, Caetani to Borghese.
\textsuperscript{120} For example, Leonor de Sandoval y Rojas (Countess of Altamira, sister of Lerma), was nicknamed as “sponge of the Church of God” for the ability to gather ecclesiastical benefices for her sons. “Spugna della Chiesa di Dio.” ASV, FB, II, 263, fol. 245r. Madrid, 21. 9. 1614. Caetani to Borghese.
of the couriers bound for Rome by helping him dispatch letters.\textsuperscript{122} Hence, it was very important to give a grant to Carrillo’s young brother Juan Carrillo. In the summer of 1614, he obtained an ecclesiastical benefice to Baños de Montemayor in the diocese of Plasencia. This made the two brothers grateful to Scipione Borghese and brought honour to the intercession of the nuncio.\textsuperscript{123}

Caetani additionally intervened in favour of the servants of the Apostolic Camera, as in the case of Lucas Dionisio Gamir, lawyer of the tribunal of the nunciature for Aragon.\textsuperscript{124} Gamir proved to be useful in helping the nuncio with the matters of the Council of Aragon. Gamir’s primary role was as the agent of the Archbishop of Valencia Isidoro de Aliaga (brother of Luis de Aliaga) and, as such, he had a direct link to the attention of the confessor of the king.\textsuperscript{125} Thanks to the efforts of the nuncio and the involvement of Scipione Borghese, the lawyer obtained a prebend of the cathedral of Teruel against a parallel election of another canon, which was made by the cabildo of the cathedral.\textsuperscript{126}

Taking charge of the requests impetrated by key figures of the government was particularly useful for the nuncio in managing negotiations and approaching the multitude of bureaucratic offices. Understanding the motivations of the representatives of the Spanish nobility was fundamental to strengthen his position as principal interlocutor with Rome; improving his reputation within the court of Madrid while promoting the intercession of the pope.

The Convent of Santa Clara of Gandía, which belonged to the cloistered order of the Colettine Poor Clares, was traditionally close to the Borja family. In April 1612, the nuncio went outside his authority by appointing Catalina de Borja as the abbess of Santa Clara, although she was not old enough to be elected. She was considered a model of morality and the nuns agreed to the selection. Caetani decided to concede the grant requested, as he judged it as in service to the pope. Actually, the main reason was the intense pressure from Lerma and Cardinal Borja (her uncle and her brother) to confirm her without waiting for approval from Rome,\textsuperscript{127} which arrived approximately one month later.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{122} BAV, Barb. Lat., 8284, fol. 37r. Madrid, 17. 12. 1613. Caetani to Borghese.
\textsuperscript{126} Juan J. POLO RUBIO, Historia de los obispos de Teruel (1614–1700), Zaragoza 2005, pp. 33–35.
\textsuperscript{128} BA, Ms. 1222, fol. 73v. Frascati, 23. 5. 1612. Borghese to Caetani.
The same pressures were often exerted by Bernardo de Sandoval y Rojas (Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo, uncle of Lerma)\textsuperscript{129} for his relatives and protégés. He put forth several requests for his “favourite,”\textsuperscript{130} his personal contador and mayordomo, Luis de Oviedo. The nuncio underlined the importance of rewarding Oviedo, emphasizing how the cardinal was controlled by him as if he had been “his soul.”\textsuperscript{131} The Cardinal of Toledo also expressed a strong desire for a dispensation for the cantoria of the Church of Alcalà in favour of his nephew, the young undergraduate student Juan de Sandoval. As stressed by Caetani, it was important to concede the reward: first, because he was related to Lerma,\textsuperscript{132} and second, to keep the cardinal satisfied.\textsuperscript{133}

Another influential person who was fundamental in maintaining a supportive relationship toward the Holy See was Rodrigo Calderón. Despite the ups and downs of his political career,\textsuperscript{134} he remained very powerful in the shadow of Lerma, proving himself a genuine factotum and a strong enemy of the Lemos. The nuncio turned to the Count of Oliva several times because he was able to promote negotiations “better than any other person” and he had a “great reverence towards the Apostolic See.”\textsuperscript{135} According to Caetani, Calderón’s authority continued to be strong in the most important affairs of the crown, even without any office and despite Aliaga’s opposition. For these reasons, in 1615, the papal representative warmly recommended to grant some unusual spiritual rewards asked by the Count of Oliva, in order to “keep him as a friend”\textsuperscript{136} and to demonstrate that in Rome nobody obstruct the negotiations.

From the correspondence it emerges how recommendations and supplications were a type of “written ritual” through which the language of social relations was expressed in the Ancien Régime. Moreover, this epistolary genre reveals how protection, loyalty, service, and clientele have been instrumental in building forms of power and establishing social relations. Recommendations and supplications playing an essential role in forging

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\textsuperscript{129}See: Francisco M. GUTIÉRREZ, Un ejemplo de estrategia familiar dentro de la Iglesia: los Rojas y Sandoval y el deanato de la Catedral de Jaén en el siglo XVI, Historia y Genealogía 6, 2016, pp. 97–121; Luis G. CANSECO, Don Bernardo de Sandoval y Rojas. Dichos, escritos y una vida en verso, Huelva 2017.

\textsuperscript{130}“Favorito.” BAV, Barb. Lat., 8277, fol. 39r. Madrid, 14. 7. 1612. Caetani to Borghese.

\textsuperscript{131}“L’anima sua.” ASV, FB, II, 266, fol. 113r. Madrid, 30. 6. 1612. Caetani to Borghese.

\textsuperscript{132}“Molto caro e stretto parente.” BAV, Barb. Lat., 8277, fol. 85r. Madrid, 12. 8. 1612. Caetani to Borghese.

\textsuperscript{133}BA, Ms. 1222, fol. 171r. Rome, 8. 11. 1612. Borghese to Caetani.

\textsuperscript{134}About: S. MARTÍNEZ HERNÁNDEZ, Rodrigo Calderón, pp. 147–234.

\textsuperscript{135}“Meglio di ciascun altra persona […] gran reverenza verso la Sede Apostolica.” BAV, Barb. Lat., 8280, fol. 25. Madrid, 12. 3. 1613. Caetani to Borghese.

\textsuperscript{136}“Conservarselo amico.” ASV, FB, II, 262, fol. 86r. Madrid, 23. 4. 1615. Caetani to Borghese.
\end{flushleft}
communication. At the same time they represented a constant search for a relationship which may provide a solid social identity to an individual, family, or community.¹³⁷

**A final consideration**

To conclude, as recent historiography has highlighted, the Spanish imperial system was characterized by poly-centrism, rather than bilateral relations. Therefore, if one wants to examine the relations between Rome and Madrid, one must highlight the broader historical context in which every single participant played his or her role. On the other hand, this behind the scene approach to diplomatic negotiations helps to deepen the depiction of the relationship between Rome and Madrid during the period considered, notwithstanding the fact it is based on the subjective point of view that came out from Caetani’s writing.¹³⁸

From the correspondence of the nunciature emerged how the relationship was defined according to the peculiarities of two entities that were anything but compact and coherent. Entities which were in competition on the political, religious and jurisdictional front; completely separate from one another and permeating each other. The political relations were subjected to a fragile balance of friendship and hostility that connected the two courts. These were malleable balances within groups of power, founded on family and patrons without distinct borders and whose participants often demonstrated multiple and volatile political loyalties. The balance was based on the distributions of ecclesiastical benefices and pensions, as well as on recommendations, favours and compensation. It bound various participants together, who struggled to strengthen personal careers, meet familiar expectations, and intertwine political and information networks.¹³⁹


¹³⁹ I would like to thank Serena De Marchi (Stockholm University), for her precious help with the proof-reading of this article.
Cardinal Purple for Maximilian of Pernstein.
A Contribution to Aristocratic Women’s Political Communication

Abstract: The aim of the study is to show what means and methods served noblewomen in the early modern period when communicating with the papal court. The studied issue will be analysed through the example of Maria Manrique de Lara, who at the beginning of the 1590s attempted to help her second-born son Maximilian of Pernstein work his way up to the College of Cardinals.

Keywords: political communication – Maximilian of Pernstein – gender history – cardinal’s elevation – Holy See – Habsburg dynasty – family network – client relations

The communication of the Bohemian nobility with the Papal Curia in the early modern period has thus far been studied mainly with examples of prominent religious leaders. Most of the attention has been concentrated on Cardinal Franz von Dietrichstein, whose relations with the Roman court were recently analysed by Tomáš Parma. There are also numerous studies describing the contacts established by papal nuncios at the imperial court in Prague or Vienna. Even though the very instructions given to these diplomats clearly showed that in promoting curial policies in the Habsburg

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1 The present study is a partially modified and slightly supplemented version of the text published in the book Pernštejnské ženy. Marie Manrique de Lara a její dcery ve službách habsburské dynastie (Women of Pernstein. Maria Manrique de Lara and her daughter in the service of the Habsburg dynasty), published by Lidové Noviny Publishing House in Prague 2018.


3 Tomáš PARMA, František kardinál Dietrichstein a jeho vztahy k římské kuri: prostředky a metody politické komunikace ve službách moravské církve, Brno 2011.

4 Cf. e.g. Alexander KOLLER, La facción española y los nuncios en la corte de Maximiliano II y de Rodolfo II. María de Austria y la confesionalización católica del Imperio, in: J. Martínez Millán – R. González Cuerva (coords.), La Dinastía de los Austria. Las relaciones entre la Monarquía Católica y el Imperio, I–III, Madrid 2011, Vol. I, pp. 109–124; Tomáš ČERNUŠÁK – Pavel MAREK, Vztahové
monarchy they were not only assisted by prominent court dignitaries and other male clients, but also by their no less influential wives, mothers and daughters, the ties that Central European noblewomen maintained to the papal court in Rome have so far been rather neglected by researchers. Therefore, the aim of the present work is to highlight that the political horizons of some women belonging to the elite court far exceeded the boundaries of the Habsburg monarchy. These noblewomen used a network of foreign correspondents or agents; their high social status even allowed them to be in direct correspondence with important representatives of foreign courts, including the pope himself.

Although the knowledge we have about documents deposited in the Vatican Secret Archives (Archivio Segreto Vaticano) and the Vatican Apostolic Library (Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana) does not allow any quantification, it seems beyond doubt that communication with the pope was generally an exception. It concerned only a top level of noblewomen belonging to prominent and politically influential families whose services to the Catholic Church were not unknown in Rome. The House of Pernstein, in the late 1500s and early 1600s, were a powerful family of the nobility and thus, a great example to examine in this study.

In the sixteenth century, the Lords of Pernstein were members of the wealthiest and most politically influential noble families in the Kingdom of Bohemia. They owed their wealth primarily to Vilém II of Pernstein (1438–1521), who was remarkable for his political skills and extraordinary economic capabilities. Using them, he managed to create an extensive family dominium, which was located in both parts of Moravia and in southern and eastern Bohemia. It was the largest noble estate in the Lands of the Bohemian Crown. The value


6 This is confirmed from the research by Vanessa de Cruz, who focused her dissertation on the correspondence of Spanish noblewomen in the two mentioned institutions. To the best of our knowledge, her treatise is the only work that provides a detailed analysis of the written communication of noblewomen with important representatives of the Holy See in the early modern period: María Vanessa DE CRUZ MEDINA, Cartas, mujeres y corte en el siglo de oro, Madrid 2010 (= dissertation thesis Universidad Complutense de Madrid), cf. particularly the chapter Cartas cortesanas femeninas al Vaticano.

of the estate was increased by high yields that went to the Pernstein treasury – owing to the developed system of manorial management. Although Vilém’s successors did not manage to sustain this wealth, the dynasty of the lords with a wisent’s head in their coat of arms continued to enjoy a significant power status in the Kingdom of Bohemia and in the newly emerging Habsburg monarchy.

This was proven by the career of Vratislav of Pernstein (1530–1582), who was one of the closest confidants of the King of Bohemia (and future emperor) Maximilian II, and his wife Maria of Habsburg. Faithful service to the ruling dynasty elevated Vratislav to the prestigious office of the Supreme Chancellor of the Kingdom of Bohemia and secured him the highest Habsburg honour: the Order of the Golden Fleece. Finally, his loyalty to the House of Habsburg was also reflected in terms of religion. While his father, Jan, belonged to the Bohemian neo-Utraquists who professed the Lutheran-type reformation, Vratislav converted to the Roman faith in his youth and was an ardent Catholic.

Although Vratislav’s diversion from his father’s faith may well be attributed to his upbringing alongside Maximilian of Habsburg and the long months spent in the western Mediterranean, no less important role in his religious belief was undoubtedly played by his marriage to Maria Manrique de Lara y Mendoza in September 1555, a Castilian noblewoman and lady-in-waiting of Maria of Habsburg. Even though Vratislav of Pernstein had been a dedicated supporter of the Habsburg dynasty, his blood kinship with the Hispanic and Italian noble families made him even more attached to serving the ruling house. Vratislav fully adopted an idea that was already disseminated by Maria of Habsburg in the imperial court, based on the belief that it was necessary to preserve the unity of the Habsburg policy. Faithful to the idea, Vratislav did not hesitate to put his service to the Spanish Habsburgs on an equal footing with the service to his own king. He was convinced that what was beneficial to one branch of the Habsburg family also naturally benefited the other branch. With similar tenaciousness, he pursued a papal anti-reform policy in Central Europe.

9 The personality of Vratislav of Pernstein was also dealt with by Zdeněk KALISTA, Čechové, kteří tvořili dějiny světa, Praha 1999, pp. 27–37. His research was later substantially expanded by P. VOREL, Páni z Pernštejna, pp. 237–258.
11 In more detail: Rubén GONZÁLEZ CUERV A – Pavel MAREK, The Dynastic Network between the Imperial and the Spanish Courts (1556–1619), in: Rubén González Cuerva – Alexander Koller (edd.), A Europe of Courts, a Europe of Factions (Rulers & Elites), Leiden–Boston 2017, pp. 130–155. For the interconnection of this dynastic policy with the policies promoted in Central Europe by the representatives of the Holy See, see: A. KOLLER, La facción.
Vratislav surpassed most of his contemporaries (Czech land officials) with his ability to perceive local problems in a much wider European context. His correspondence, stored in the Lobkowicz Archives (Lobkowický archiv Nelahozeves), demonstrates that he used a wide network of people (besides his relatives, also his own agents) who informed him about events in South and Western Europe.\textsuperscript{12} He also used the same channels to strengthen contacts with members of the Spanish branch of the Habsburg dynasty, including King Philip II, representatives of the satellite courts in Milan and Naples, as well as the pontifical court dignitaries in Rome.\textsuperscript{13} His scope of political knowledge and influence was also strengthened by his wife, Maria Manrique de Lara, who even after her marriage remained a confidant of the Queen of Bohemia, Empress Maria of Habsburg.\textsuperscript{14}

When Vratislav died in 1582, it was left to his widow to take care of their children and defend the prestige of the family with a wisent's head in its coat of arms. In reality, this meant finding potential suitors for her daughters and securing proper careers for her sons, Jan and Maximilian. In the first circumstance, Maria's efforts were successful and soon after Elizabeth, who married Imperial Count Albrecht von Fürstenberg before her father's death, it was Jane who entered into marriage in 1585 with Fernando de Gurrea y Aragón, Duke of Villahermosa, and Polyxena, who in 1587 married the most powerful man of the Bohemian nobility, Vilém of Rosenberg, Supreme Burgrave of the Kingdom of Bohemia.\textsuperscript{15}

She was much less successful in supporting the career of her eldest son, Jan of Pernstein. Even the intercessions of Empress Maria and Habsburg archdukes and archduchesses failed to secure him employment at the court in Prague. It was likely due to the rising debts that brought the House of Pernstein to the brink of bankruptcy at the end of the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{16} This also may have been why Jan eventually chose a military career;

\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{12} LA Nelahozeves, LRRA, sign. B/175 and B/127.
\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{13} R. GONZÁLEZ CUERVA – P. MAREK, The Dynastic Network, pp. 146–149.
\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{15} P. MAREK, Pernštejnské ženy, pp. 131–279; IDEM, Las damas de la emperatriz María y su papel en el sistema clientelar de los reyes españoles. El caso de María Manrique de Lara y sus hijas, in: José Martínez Millán – María Paula Marçal Lourenço (edd.), Las Relaciones Discretas entre las Monarquías Hispana y Portuguesa: Las Casas de las Reinas (siglos XV–XIX) I–III, Madrid 2008, here II, pp. 1003–1037.
\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{16} Marek VAŘEKA, Jan z Pernštejna. Hospodářský úpadek Pernštejnů, České Budějovice 2008.
in 1592, he joined the Spanish troops operating in the Netherlands. Around this time, his
younger brother Maximilian was about to achieve success that would support the House
of Pernstein in going forward from all the adversity they had endured after the death of
Vratislav of Pernstein.17

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As a second-born son destined for a spiritual career, Maximilian of Pernstein lived at the
court of Olomouc Bishop Stanislav Pavlovský from the time he was a child.18 It was also
likely where he met Cardinal Ippolito Aldobrandini in the summer of 1588 when he was
passing through as Papal Nuncio Extraordinary on his way to Krakow and Prague to
negotiate a reconciliation between Sigismund III Vasa, King of Poland, and the Habsburgs.19
It was not until the end of 1588 that the Pontifical Legate visited Prague while returning from
Krakow. Although he did not bring good news, his two week stay in the capital of Bohemia
was a spectacular manifestation of the power of the Catholic Church and Aldobrandini
was bestowed with all possible honours. Even the characteristically withdrawn Emperor
Rudolf II went to meet the nuncio at the head of the parade, behind the city walls. Other
honours were given to the Cardinal by the Bohemian Catholic noblemen, who showered
him with attention during magnificent banquets they held in their palaces in his honour.
20 Aside from Jiří Popel of Lobkowicz and Vilém of Rosenberg, he very likely came into
contact with Maria Manrique de Lara, who used the Cardinal’s presence in Prague to entrust
her younger son to his care and sent him along with Aldobrandini to Rome. Maximilian
arrived there as the cardinal’s client and was his protégé in mid-July 1589.21

17 On the personality of Maximilian of Pernstein: Jiří KOTYK, Maximilián z Pernštejna 1575–1593, VSH
5, 1996, pp. 89–98; IDEM, Maximilián z Pernštejna (1575–1593), Heraldika a genealogie 30, 1997,
pp. 189–199; a lot of interesting information can also be found in T. PARMA, František kardinál
Dietrichstein, pp. 63–70.
18 The Pernsteins’ relations to Stanislav Pavlovský, the Bishop of Olomouc, were introduced in: Jaroslav
PÁNEK, Biskup a kancléř: (Stanislav Pavlovský a Vratislav z Pernštejna 1579–1582 a jejich úloha
v počátcích rekatolizace Moravy), ČMM 113, 1994, pp. 35–47.
19 For more information on Aldobrandini’s mission, see Karel STLOUKAL, Papežská politika a císařský
dvůr pražský na předělu XVI. a XVII. věku, Praha 1925, pp. 8–14.
21 According to Tomáš Parma, Maximilian of Pernstein travelled alongside a former nuncio at the imperial
court, Antonio Puteo. Cf. T. PARMA, František kardinál Dietrichstein, p. 65. The verification that Maria
Manrique de Lara entrusted her son directly to the care of Ippolito Aldobrandini is from a letter by
Elizabeth of Pernstein to her sister Polyxena, a copy of which is deposited in FFA, Donaueschingen,
OB19, Vol. XXVI/4. Abschriften von Urkunden aus dem Raudnitzer Archiv, fol. 1–18 ([Praha], February
1592).
When Aldobrandini was elected pope on January 30, 1592, it seemed reasonable to expect that Maximilian would also have a more prominent career. Maria Manrique and soon after the inauguration of Clement VIII they developed an intense “campaign” intended to help Maximilian, who was only seventeen years old at the time, get the cardinal purple. Although Maximilian was not ever named Cardinal, the entire account is a convincing proof of the great self-confidence of Pernstein women and testimony to how skilfully they could intervene in the careers of their male relatives. It was the family’s reputation and accomplishments for the benefit of the Catholic Church, their personal ties to the Habsburg dynasty representatives, and ultimately the extensive Pernstein network of clients and allies that helped them to realise their ambitions in this way. Most importantly, they were well acquainted with the rules of court etiquette and the complicated political climate in Papal Rome, which at the time was considered to be one of the most powerful but least transparent power centres in Europe.

Maria Manrique de Lara and her daughters were sent up-to-date information from Lorenzo Maggio in Rome, whom they met during his time as the head of the Austrian province of the Society of Jesus (1566–1578). After his departure from Vienna, Maggio systematically built his position in Rome, where he belonged to the main confidants of Claudio Acquaviva d’Aragona, the Superior General of the Society of Jesus. Maria Manrique was very fortunate to have him guide her through the tangled labyrinth of the scheming papal court. Shortly after Ippolito Aldobrandini ascended to the pope’s throne, Maria Manrique received a letter from Rome in which her father, Lorenzo Maggio, informed


23 It is worth mentioning that a few years later (similarly and more successfully), Margarita de Cardona also interceded for her son Franz of Dietrichstein. Maria Antonietta VISCEGLIA, Roma papale e Spagna. Diplomatici, nobili e religiosi tra due corti, Roma 2010, p. 145.


25 On his visits to Maria Manrique: Bohdan CHUDOBA, Španělé na Bílé hoře, Praha 1945, p. 126. The information that he continued to correspond with the women of Pernstein after his departure to Rome is documented in a letter from Elizabeth of Pernstein to her sister Polyxena, a copy of which is deposited in FFA, Donaueschingen, OB19, Vol. XXVI/4. Abschriften von Urkunden aus dem Raudnitzer Archiv, fol. 1–18 ([Praha], February 1592).

her that it was the best time to remind the new pope of his promise to name her son Cardinal after his accession. He based his assumptions on the outcome of a personal discussion with the pope, during which Clement VIII indicated that he was ready to keep his promise.27

It may seem surprising that the initiative leading to the appointment of the Pernstein cardinal was born directly from the papal court. Considering the context in which Aldobrandini’s election took place, this step was rational. The conclave of 1592 had a thrilling atmosphere and Aldobrandini, who had quickly advanced in his career, was elected with the support of the pro-Spanish faction. Initially, they supported Giulio Antonio Santori, however after several unsuccessful attempts they changed their allegiance to Aldobrandini.28 While Clement VIII longed for greater independence of the papal throne from the Hispanic monarchy, he was likewise very conscious of the importance of maintaining good relations with the Habsburgs for the Papal States. From this perspective, appointing a Pernstein cardinal may have been perceived as a responsive step by the new pope towards the imperial court and Madrid. In addition, by appointing a Pernstein he could make the representatives of the most powerful Catholic families in the Kingdom of Bohemia feel indebted to him, thereby strengthening his political influence in Central Europe. He was expecting not only the gratitude of Maria Manrique and her daughters, but also that from the Supreme Burgrave, Vilém of Rosenberg (Maximilian’s brother-in-law) for selecting the young Pernstein.29

Vilém of Rosenberg was to play a central role in the matter. Father Lorenzo Maggio appealed to Maria Manrique to turn to Clement VIII not only directly, but also to arrange for letters of intercession from the Emperor as well as from the “Viceroy of Bohemia” as Vilém of Rosenberg was usually titled in diplomatic relations.30 While Maria Manrique likely

28 On the conclave: Agostino BORROMEO, España y el problema de la elección papal de 1592, Cuadernos de Investigación Histórica 2, 1978, pp. 175–200. Due to the political influence that Empress Maria of Habsburg, with whom Maria Manrique de Lara and her family were in close contact, maintained in the Roman church circles, there is a hypothesis that the possible cardinal creation of Maximillian of Pernstein may have been previously arranged as an expression of the pope's gratitude for the support he had been given during the conclave by the cardinals belonging to the relationship network of Maximillian II’s widow. On the influence of Maria Habsburg in the Roman circles: Cf. A. KOLLER, La facción; R. GONZÁLEZ CUERVA – P. MAREK, The Dynastic Network. More information can be found through detailed research of the documents stored in the Vatican Archives.
29 For more information on the influence that the Pernstein women maintained in both main Habsburg courts: P. MAREK, Pernštejnské ženy. More information on Vilém of Rosenberg: Jaroslav PÁNEK, Vilém z Rožmberka, politik smíru, Praha 2011. Vilém of Rosenberg’s relations with the Holy See have been mapped by Pavel MAREK – Katerina PRAŽÁKOVÁ, Protireformáční politika Svatého stolce, in: V. Bůžek and others, Světy posledních Rožmberků, Praha 2011, pp. 46–58.
appealed to Rudolf II herself, she was also using her daughter Polyxena as an intermediary to Vilém.\footnote{The most recent biography of this noblewoman: Marie RYANTOVÁ, Polyxena z Lobkovic. Obdivovaná i nenáviděná první dáma království, Praha 2016.} This is evidenced in a letter sent by Elizabeth von Fürstenberg of Pernstein, on behalf of her mother Polyxena. She urged her to persuade her husband to support their cause hurriedly and to send his letter of intercession to Rome to the Pernstein’s agent, Dr Francesco Paduani, who previously been in the service of the apostolic nuncio at the imperial court. She stressed that the letter must be delivered by March 13, by this time it was realistic to expect that Maximilian would be appointed to the College of Cardinals in the first promotion of cardinals.\footnote{FFA, Donaueschingen, OB19, Vol. XXVI/4. Abschriften von Urkunden aus dem Raudnitzer Archiv, fol. 1–18 ([Praha], February 1592), Elizabeth of Pernstein to her sister Polyxena. On the Pernstein’s ties to Francesco Paduani, cf. LA, Nelahozeves, LRRA, B/164, fol. 24–25 (Praha, July 19, 1585), Francesco Paduani to Jan of Pernstein. Retrieved from the excerpts and comments made by Jindřich Růžička, Milan Skřivánek and Charlotte Fritz: SOkA Svitavy based in Litomyšl, Pernstein Files.} The importance of having Maximilian appointed to the College of Cardinals within the first promotion was primarily motivated by the social prestige associated with such a designation. In the sixteenth century, the method of appointing new cardinals at the consistories immediately after the papal election was established. According to the testimony of an anonymous author of a Parisian manuscript:

“The first Promotion of Cardinals, usually performed by each of the high priests of Rome, consists of elevating his own nephew or closest relative to the purple. Sometimes he also elevates people from the families of great princes to please them and gain their gratitude… In the second promotion, they usually pardon and reward those who have earned appointment to this great dignity in the offices of nuncios, tesauriarate, those of Roman Rota auditors, in the clericate of the Apostolic Chamber or other most important ranks of the Roman court, the State of the Church, or in legations. In the third promotion, the popes usually elevate persons nominated or recommended by the Crowns.”\footnote{Bibliothèque Mazarin Paris, MS 1659, fol. 2–3 retrieved from T. PARMA, Olomoucký biskup, p. 42. Also, cf. Maria Antonietta VISCEGLIA, ‘La ‘giusta Statera de’ Porporati’. Sulla composizione e rappresentazione del Sacro Collegio nella prima meta’ del seicento, Roma moderna e Contemporanea IV/1, 1996, pp. 167–211, here pp. 172–173.}

In the same letter, Elizabeth also sent Vilém precise instructions on how to compose his intercession letter in terms of both form and content. Specifically, she urged the Supreme Burgrave to write the letter himself.\footnote{FFA, Donaueschingen, OB19, Vol. XXVI/4. Abschriften von Urkunden aus dem Raudnitzer Archiv, fol. 1–18 ([Praha], February 1592), Elizabeth of Pernstein to her sister Polyxena.} In similar cases, letters written by a scribe and signed by the person were acceptable. However, the women of Pernstein knew the rules set by
period handbooks for writing correspondence, which considered it refined for a person to use letters written by their own hand.\textsuperscript{35}

In his letter, Vilém wanted to express his most sincere congratulations to Aldobrandini for being elected pope. He also wanted to remind him of his promise to Maria Manrique de Lara and ask him to promote Maximilian to the College of Cardinals. To support his request, Vilém had to mention the support that Vratislav of Pernstein and his family had demonstrated to the Catholic Church and to assure the Holy Father that he and his family would continue to serve the pope faithfully. Finally, his text was to be supplemented with the usual courtesies.\textsuperscript{36} While this combination of congratulations with a request or intercession on behalf of a third person may seem inappropriate by today’s standards, it was very common in the early modern period. There are letters in the Vatican Secret Archives in which the authors congratulated the pope in a similar way two years after his election.\textsuperscript{37}

It is surprising that Elizabeth wrote to Vilém and advised him on how to draft his letter for several reasons. The Supreme Burgrave of the Kingdom of Bohemia was undoubtedly a man of social skills, who was able to move with certainty in the cosmopolitan surroundings of the imperial court. Here he also came into regular contact with papal diplomats and other persons from the South of Europe. Unlike Maria Manrique and her daughters, he remained a Bohemian nobleman by nature. Having matured in the Central European cultural milieu, it was likely that some habits of the Romanesque world were foreign to him. By contrast, the Pernstein women were fluent in Italian and Spanish, their mother tongue, having been raised in accordance with the cultural rules adhered to in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{38} It should also be noted that Maria Manrique had handbooks in her library which contained information on forms and phrases appropriate for the different epistolary genres in Spanish and Italian. It is likely that Vilém would have never had this type of education and had he relied only on his intuition, it is doubtful that his letter would have had any effect.\textsuperscript{39}

Given the high position of Vilém of Rosenberg in Bohemian noble society, Elizabeth and her mother did not dare to address their instructions to the Supreme Burgrave directly, and instead communicated with him through his wife Polyxena. Through this line of communication, it allowed them to be as forthright as needed. Moreover, Polyxena could

\textsuperscript{35} M. V. DE CRUZ MEDINA, \textit{Cartas}, p. 221.

\textsuperscript{36} FFA, Donaueschingen, OB19, Vol. XXVI/4. Abschriften von Urkunden aus dem Raudnitzer Archiv, fol. 1–18 ([Praha], February 1592), Elizabeth of Pernstein to her sister Polyxena.

\textsuperscript{37} Examples are given by M. V. DE CRUZ MEDINA, \textit{Cartas}, pp. 206n.

\textsuperscript{38} P. MAREK, \textit{Pernštejnské ženy}.

use her influence to make her husband write the reply without any delay and to arrange for it to be promptly sent to Rome, to Dr. Paduani, Pernstein’s agent.\footnote{FFA, Donaueschingen, OB19, Vol. XXVI/4. Abschriften von Urkunden aus dem Raudnitzer Archiv, fol. 1–18 ([Praha], February 1592), Elizabeth of Pernstein to her sister Polyxena.}

It was expected that Vilém of Rosenberg should not only to compose his letter of intercession to Pope Clement VIII, but also write two similar ones for the pope’s nephews (nipoti). This was common practice at the time but had also been requested by Maria Manrique. Even though neither she nor her daughters knew the names of the nephews, their actions demonstrate how familiar they were with the established practices at the Roman court.\footnote{On nepotism: Antonio MENNITI IPPOLITO, Il tramonto della Curia nepotista: papi, nipoti e burocrazia curiale tra XVI e XVII secolo, Roma 1999.} It was often the letters to the nephews that opened the way to the Pope’s graces. The writers would first turn their requests to the pope’s nephews, and only later to the pope himself.\footnote{Examples are given by M. V. DE CRUZ MEDINA, Cartas, pp. 206n.} In order to carry out her intentions, Maria Manrique also planned to use her own contacts in Rome. Apart from Father Lorenzo Maggi, she had ties to Claudio Acquaviva d’Aragona, the Superior General of the Society of Jesus. Vilém of Rosenberg was to write both men and ask them to advocate the approval of Pernstein’s request.\footnote{FFA, Donaueschingen, OB19, Vol. XXVI/4. Abschriften von Urkunden aus dem Raudnitzer Archiv, fol. 1–18 ([Praha], February 1592), Elizabeth of Pernstein to her sister Polyxena.}

The letters were to be sent by a messenger, Bixan, and accompanied by Rosenberg’s agents and courtiers: Wendel Matter, Ladislav of Kytlíce, and Václav Pětipeský of Chýše. The delegation was likely led by Humprecht Czernin of Chudenice, Captain of Prague Castle. Although Elizabeth von Fürstenberg of Pernstein had emphasized in her instructions that Vilém’s letter of intercession had to reach Rome no later than March 13, due to numerous obstacles that Rosenberg’s legation had to overcome, it was not until the Feast Day of St. Dominic (March 17) that they arrived in the Eternal City.\footnote{J. KOTYK, Maxmilián z Pernštejna (1575–1593), Heraldika a genealogie 30, 1997, p. 196.}

Nonetheless, the delay did not seem to endanger the matter, as the next day Czernin and his companions were granted an audience with Pope Clement VIII. In addition to the mentioned delegation, Maximilian of Pernstein, Superior General Claudio Acquaviva and Lorenzo Maggi also attended. The pope read the letter in front of the legation and the group presented small gifts to the Holy Father. The key role in the negotiation fell upon Father Lorenzo, although the pope interrupted the hearing several times to talk to Maggi in private. In the end, the Pernstein delegation was not given any specific answers to their request. Clement VIII only assured the delegation that he immensely valued Pernstein’s services and promised to send Maximilian on a prestigious diplomatic mission to the Royal Court of Poland. On the third day after the audience, the delegation visited the papal
nephews, who promised their support to Maximilian. At the same time, they did not hide their disappointment that Rosenberg's servants had not brought Bohemian horses for them. After this, Czernin and his companions prepared to return home.\textsuperscript{45}

It is difficult to know whether the outcome of the negotiations with the pope was successful for Maria Manrique de Lara and her daughters or not. The pope's vague answer had likely discouraged any expectations that Maximilian would be named cardinal in the first promotion. However, the vision of securing a seat as cardinal remained realistic. The Pernstein women perceived sending Czernin's mission with the letters of intercession only as a first step and should be followed with additional steps. Elizabeth of Pernstein specifically spoke of the need to send Vilém's agent to bring a consignment of gifts to the pope and other prominent figures of the Roman court. In the early modern age, gifts and bribes were among the most common ways of expressing and consolidating a client relationship between the giver and the recipient of the gift.\textsuperscript{46}

Besides this unequal relationship of the patron, represented by Pope Clement VIII, and his clients, represented by the broad Pernstein dowager's family, another important aspect reflected in the affair – the relations between the Papal States at the time of the pontificate of Ippolito Aldobrandini and the two Habsburg empires. As previously stated, both Maria Manrique and Vilém of Rosenberg asked the Emperor for an intercession for her son. According to Elizabeth's letters, Rudolf II was happy and willing to oblige Maria Manrique, but he said nothing specific, which seemed to reduce any expectations for success in the entire matter.\textsuperscript{47} If the emperor had shown genuine determination to aid Maximilian in acquiring a position as cardinal, the original family-based request would have come to the level of the Hapsburg monarchy’s claims to the Holy See. In that case, Clement VIII would probably have had no choice but to oblige Maria Manrique and name Maximilian cardinal at the first promotion.

\textsuperscript{45} The journey to Rome, the audience, and other extremely interesting information was captured by Wendel Matter in his letter addressed to Elizabeth of Pernstein. The letter is dated from Rome on March 21, 1592 and is deposited in the LA, Nelahozeves, LRRA, B/179, fol. 46–49. Its content is described in J. Kotyk, Maxmilián z Pernštejna (1575–1593), Heraldika a genealogie 30, 1997, pp. 196–198.


\textsuperscript{47} “Lo que su majestad a hecho y con mucho calor aunque generalmente y lo ha hecho su majestad con tan buena gana y voluntad que es de agradecer mucho.” FFA, Donaueschingen, ÖB19, Vol. XXVI/4. Abschriften von Urkunden aus dem Raudnitzer Archiv, fol. 1–18 ([Praha], February 1592), Elizabeth of Pernstein to her sister Polyxena.
Although this did not happen, Maria Manrique must have been content with her son’s next career advancement. It was because Clement VIII had admitted Maximilian among his secret chamberlains by March 28, 1592, and in June of that year, Pernstein could have experience of the diplomatic service when he was sent to Krakow, on the basis of a previous pope’s promise, to hand over a consecrated golden rose to Queen Anna of Habsburg. But before he returned to Rome, the Pernstein family suffered a tragedy with the death of Vilém of Rosenberg. The Supreme Burgrave of the Kingdom of Bohemia had been suffering from various diseases for many years. In the beginning of the summer of 1592, his condition further deteriorated and he was confined to bed in his palace in Prague, where he died on August 31.

It appears that Maximilian of Pernstein’s chances of being admitted to the College of Cardinals were not affected by Vilém’s death in any way. Soon after the demise of Vilém of Rosenberg, the Roman Curia began to take a serious interest in his younger brother (and new lord of the House of Rosenberg) Peter Vok. They attempted to influence, inter alia, using his sister-in-law Polyxena and the other Pernstein women. In the autumn of 1592, Nuncio Cesare Speciano visited Peter Vok of Rosenberg at his Prague palace several times to discover the plans of this South Bohemian nobleman. Due to the fact that Peter Vok sympathised with, and eventually joined, the Unity of the Brethren, Rome rightly feared that he could take actions in the future in Vok’s dominions that would jeopardize the results of his brother’s long-standing Counter-Reformation activities. Peter Vok assured Nuncio Speciano during their meetings that he would not act against the Jesuits or other representatives of the Catholic Church operating on his dominions. Rosenberg’s answer was so considerate and convincing that the papal diplomats wondered whether the lord of the red five-petal rose could be converted to the Catholic faith. Although Peter Vok was far from having as much authority in the community of the Bohemian estates as his late brother, the representatives of the Curia assumed that many other Bohemian brethren might follow his example, and the illegal Unity of the Brethren would suffer a heavy loss. Moreover, as it became obvious that Peter Vok would not have any heirs, a struggle for the extensive Rosenberg wealth was also among the reasons for the apostolic diplomats’ actions. The alleged Rosenberg family ties to the Italian Orsini family made the Curia optimistic that Peter Vok’s Southern Bohemia estate would become Catholic property.

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48 T. PARMA, František kardinál Dietrichstein, p. 68.
50 More on him, IDEM, Petr Vok z Rožmberka: život renesančního kavalíra, Praha 2010.
52 For more information on the alleged kinship of the Rosenbergs and the Orsinis, see Petr MAŤA, The false Orsini from over the Alps: Negotiating aristocratic identity in late medieval and early modern Europe. Römische historische Mitteilungen 55, 2013, pp. 155–218.
The expectations of the papal diplomats concerning the conversion of Peter Vok of Rosenberg were encouraged by Maria Manrique de Lara and her daughter Polyxena. Maria Manrique assured Nuncio Speciano that to be successful they must first convince Vok’s wife, Catherine of Ludanice, to join the Catholic Church. She had previously been very close to converting to the faith when she was previously influenced by Polyxena.\textsuperscript{53} We can only speculate whether Maria Manrique meant it, or whether it was just a thoughtful strategy to get a better position for managing her own business at the Roman court. If it was just a political move, it worked out extremely well for Maria Manrique. In the correspondence between Nuncio Speciano and Cardinal Cinzio Aldobrandini and other Roman diplomats throughout the autumn and winter of 1592, there is ample evidence of how the Pernstein women’s reputation had grown in the Papal Court.\textsuperscript{54} In the past, Maria Manrique and her daughters were rarely mentioned in nunciature reports. Following the death of Vilém of Rosenberg, their names began to appear regularly in the reports of the Prague legate and in the instructions and answers that came from the Papal Court. Maximilian of Pernstein reported on the personality of his brother-in-law and gave advice on how to persuade Peter Vok\textsuperscript{55} after he returned from his Polish mission in Rome in the winter of 1592.

Though Maria Manrique did not miss an opportunity to remind Clement VIII of his commitment to her family, her efforts eventually came to naught. The ambitions she held on the career of Maximilian, were ended by his death on 2 September 1593, after a short illness.\textsuperscript{56}

\textit{“Hiersera parti di qua un’huomo che era del S. Massimiliano Prenestaim per la posta a portare l’aviso della sua morte che è rincresciuta a N. S. in estremo, et a tutti noi altri, né se gli è mancato nell’infermità di quanti rimedii et quante medicine poteva dar l’arte. V. S. Rev.ma consola la S. Donna Maria anco per parte di N. S. perché non se li puotè scrivere hieri, sebene si diedero per lei brevi et le lettere di condoglienza. Quella Signora è prudente, et pia, nè sarà difficile conoscere quanta compensa sia di questa perdita la sicurezza di havere quell’anima in Paradiso, tuttavia che doverà far ella quando né N. S. né noi altri qui havemo potuto ritenere le lagrime,”}

Cardinal Cinzio Aldobrandini wrote to Cesare Speciano, the Pontifical Nuncio at the imperial court.\textsuperscript{57} A few weeks later, the nuncio noticed how much the message had affected Maria Manrique:

\textsuperscript{53} A. PAZDEROVÁ (ed.), \textit{Epistulae I.}, pp. 300–301.
\textsuperscript{54} E.g. ibidem, pp. 329, 382 and 595.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibidem, p. 512.
\textsuperscript{56} T. PARMA, \textit{František kardinál Dietrichstein}, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{57} [Yesterday evening, one of Maximillian of Pernstein’s courtiers left with the postal service, with a notice of Pernstein’s death. Our Lord and all of us have been deeply affected by the news. They tried to treat him with all the drugs and remedies known, but without success. Though our Lord has sent a breve}
“Venne la settimana passata quel gentilhuomo che portò la nuova della morte del S. Massimiliano de Pernstain (che sia in cielo), la quale si è intesa con universale dispiacere anche per rispetto della S.ra Dona Maria, sua madre, che si trovava indisposta già parecchi di sono, la quale se bene intese la nuova con quel sentimento che si può imaginare di buona madre nella morte d’un figlio tanto caro et di cui haveva tante speranze, nondimeno ha vinto sé stessa et si è mostrata signora veramente christiana et resognata, perché quando io andai a vistarla et consolarla mi parlò in modo che poco mi lasciò che dirle et mostra tanta obligatione a N. S. et a V. S. Ill.ma et all’Ill.mo S. Pietro del breve et lettere scrittele consolatorie che non si può satiare di predicarlo, et di dare gratie a S. B. et alle S. V. Ill.me di tanto favore, et certo che dopo la gratia del Signore le hanno giovato incredibilmente a consolarla in questa sua perdità.”

It was Maximilian’s tombstone which became the legacy of Maria Manrique’s magnificent power-politics strategy, which she developed to secure the influence of the Pernstein family at the papal court. At the end of September 1592, the widow of Vratislav of Pernstein sent a courtier back to Rome to take care of the technicalities. She intended to design the tombstone, which was to be erected in the parish church of the German nation in Rome, Santa Maria dell’Anima, at the direction of Pope Clement VIII. The work was to be paid for from the sale of the furniture and the clothes left behind by her late son. Maria Manrique wanted to also use this money to fund several chaplaincies in Rome or Prague where the chaplains would pray for the salvation of Maximilian’s soul, as of those of his parents. However, Maximilian of Pernstein was not buried in Santa Maria dell’Anima. It was likely Pope Clement VIII who arranged to have the corpse of his secret chamberlain buried in one of the major Roman basilicas, the Basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore. The promising career of Maximilian of Pernstein is memorialized by an impressive multicoloured marble tombstone. It is worth noting that the cost of its purchase was partly paid by Diego de
Campo, the pope’s private chamberlain.⁶⁰ Although another male representative was gone from the Pernstein family, it was well known in papal Rome that they could continue to count on the services and political influence of Maria Manrique de Lara and her daughters.

**Conclusion**

After the death of Vratislav of Pernstein in 1582, Pernstein’s widow Maria Manrique de Lara became the leading figure of the noble house. More than anyone else, it was she who would ensure her family’s prestige in the coming years and determine the fate of her children. Although the Pernsteins faced considerable economic problems, Maria Manrique succeeded in finding her daughters wealthy husbands. A more challenging task was to aid her sons in finding employment, Jan and Maximilian. As Jan’s attempts to find employment in the emperor’s diplomatic service ended in failure, he eventually enrolled in the army. Paradoxically, more promising prospects were open to his younger brother Maximilian. He had been predestined for an ecclesiastic career since he was a child, and from 1589 he was a member of Cardinal Ippolito Aldobrandini’s retinue.

The promising career of Maximilian was further bolstered after his patron ascended to the papal throne in 1592. Soon after Aldobrandini was elected Pope Clement VIII, Maximilian’s mother launched an extensive campaign aimed at installing him in the College of Cardinals. She made use of her close contacts: representatives of the Habsburg dynasty, extensive family and client networks, as well as numerous agents and residents operating in Rome. Her main allies were her daughters Elizabeth and Polyxena, who always stood by their mother’s side and helped her to create a variety of power strategies. Although Maximilian’s death ended the promise of his career, the account is a remarkable corroboration of the Pernstein women’s confidence and ability to succeed in the challenging environment of high diplomacy. It demonstrates how women in the early modern period managed to influence the careers of their male relatives.⁶¹

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⁶¹ The present study is based on the GAČR research project (GA17–06049S) *Relational networks of Apostolic nuncios and Spanish envoys in the milieu of the imperial court at the turn of the 16th and 17th century*. I thank Radek Vantuch for the translation of the present article.
Rubén GONZÁLEZ CUERVA

Vienna, the Spanish Ambassador and the Nuncio: The 3rd Marquis of Aytona and the Fading Catholic Alliance (1624–1629)

Abstract: The papacy and the Spanish Monarchy were, by the decade of 1620, the most global powers in Europe and their dynastic and confessional priorities led to changing clashes and alliances around the world. Local contexts were decisive: in Rome, the creation of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide challenged Spanish control over missionaries beyond Europe, while in Madrid the royal favourite Olivares attempted to establish a major Catholic alliance with France and the papacy against the Protestants. In Vienna, the conflict between papal and Spanish diplomats was hard to dissimulate after 1623. The arrival of a new ambassador –the 3rd Marquis of Aytona– supposedly closer to the papacy, should reverse this situation. This article explores the causes of the distancing between two intrinsic allies. It examines their competing tactics of negotiation and communicative devices to voice their positions at the Imperial court, especially in the polarizing context of the War of the Mantuan Succession.

Keywords: House of Austria – diplomacy – papacy – Thirty Years’ War

The Imperial court constituted one of the most complex centres of power in early modern Europe due to its overlapping of roles and functions. Vienna in 1618 was firstly the seat of the Holy Roman Emperor, theoretic head of the Christian princes but member of a secondary branch of the powerful Habsburg dynasty. Secondly, it was the centre of a disaggregated Habsburg Monarchy including the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia and the archduchies of Austria. Thirdly, it was the capital of Lower Austria, a territory with broad traditional liberties and Protestant majority. Behind a brilliant and cosmopolite facade, the Viennese court was smaller and weaker than those of Rome, Madrid, Paris or London. It was relatively close to the frontier with the menacing Ottoman Empire and still assessing its position after the recent return from Prague in 1612–1615. The Imperial court was not yet the undisputed centre of patronage for imperial elites due to its limited resources and confessional specificities as a Catholic hub among a predominantly Protestant population.¹

¹ Volker PRESS, The Habsburg Court as Center of the Imperial Government, Journal of Modern History 58, 1986, pp. 23–45; Jeroen DUINDAM, Vienna and Versailles: the Courts of Europe’s dynastic Rivals,
For these reasons, the papal and Spanish diplomats held a comparatively high influence and had the ability to condition the decision-making process in the imperial entourage.\textsuperscript{2} The Spanish kings were the closest relatives of the imperial family and their ties were continually reinforced through regular intra-dynastic marriages and the circulation of common servants. The Spanish Monarchy had the economic and social resources that the poorer imperial branch lacked for rewarding most of these servants. Meanwhile, the papacy targeted the Holy Empire as the goal of the Catholic reconquest and the Viennese nunciature concentrated on guaranteeing that the Emperor’s policy would adhere to Catholic orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{3}

While Maximilian II (1564–1576) had been a poorly committed Catholic far from papal positions and Rudolf II (1576–1612) developed a genuine obsession against the Spanish influence, Emperor Ferdinand II (1619–1637) both guaranteed an ardent Catholic faith and a doubtless devotion to his Spanish family. The outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War in 1618 exacerbated the tense court environment. It became a battleground for factions mediated by exterior factors. The Spanish Monarchy was an extremely committed ally, providing funds for the Imperial army. The papacy was expected to clarify the goals of a war fought in the name of the Catholic faith. The papal nunciature and the Spanish embassy had cooperated tightly for decades to impose their common confessional goals at the Imperial court. Paradoxically, the final acceptance of those general principles brought to light inner tensions and disagreements which had been relatively concealed until this time.\textsuperscript{4}

**Ambassador Oñate, dictator or statesman?**

The Bohemian phase of the Thirty Years’ War ended in 1620–1621 through the defeat of Frederick V (Elector Palatine and the disputed King of Bohemia) and his Calvinist allies

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in that kingdom. Once the rebellion and uprising had been suppressed, the goals of the Catholic allies diverged and they were faced with many questions. Should they declare a general war against the Protestant princes of the empire, as Pope Gregory XV seemed to desire? Should they follow the prosecution against the Elector Palatine until divesting him of his electoral title and lands to the benefit of the Catholic Duke of Bavaria, as the Duke proposed? Should they take advantage of the mobilization for defeating the other rebellious Protestant member of the empire, the United Provinces, as the Spanish Monarchy urged? After facing these constraints, should the reclamations of peaceful and moderate Protestant powers like England and Saxony be negotiated or ignored? Finally, who was entitled to set the objectives: the pope, the emperor or the Spanish king?\footnote{Rubén GONZÁLEZ CUerva, Baltasar de Zuñiga. Una encrucijada de la Monarquía hispana (1561–1622), Madrid 2012, pp. 505–520.}

The Spanish ambassador in Vienna was Íñigo Vélez de Guevara, Count of Oñate, who had arrived in 1617 and immediately signed the dynastic pact known as the Treaty of Oñate (Oñatesvorttrag, 29 July 1617). This document implied a preponderance of the Spanish branch of the dynasty over the German branch. King Philip III (1598–1621) renounced his theoretical succession rights to the realms of the Habsburg Monarchy to benefit his brother-in-law Ferdinand II. In exchange, Ferdinand II would enfeoff Philip III every vacant imperial fief Philip desired as soon as Ferdinand became the emperor. The agreement was deliberately vague and its importance represented more of a written record than a binding agreement; it was never publicly acknowledged, and its enforcement was quite challenging.\footnote{Jesús M. USUNÁRIZ, El tratado de Oñate y sus consecuencias, in: José Martínez Millán – Rubén González Cuerva (edd.), La dinastía de los Austria: la Monarquía Católica y el Imperio (siglo XVII), Madrid 2011, pp. 1279–1300; Luis TERCERO CASADO, Infeliz Austria: Relaciones entre Madrid y Viena desde la Paz de Westfalia hasta la Paz de los Pirineos (1648–1659), Wien 2017 (= Universität Wien, PhD thesis), pp. 127–129.}

The Treaty of Oñate reinforced the progressive and decided implication of Philip III in imperial affairs by supporting his German relatives, a continuous and discreet trend of his reign since his participation in the Long War of Hungary (1592–1606) or the Catholic League of the Empire (1610–1611).\footnote{Magdalena S. SÁNCHEZ, A House Divided: Spain, Austria, and the Bohemian and Hungarian Successions, Sixteenth Century Journal 25, n. 4, 1994, pp. 887–903; Rubén GONZÁLEZ CUerva, La mediación entre las dos cortes de la Casa de Austria: Baltasar de Zuñiga, in: J. Martínez Millán – R. González Cuerva (edd.), La dinastía de los Austria, pp. 479–506.} In that context, both Philip III and Philip IV (1621–1665) had decisively supported Ferdinand II since the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War in May 1618. The vague notion of dynastic solidarity became the central axis of Spanish diplomacy between 1618 and 1620, as part of the process of reordering their priorities. Among the ruling elite, those individuals advocating for the dynastic strategy dominated
over those more interested in Mediterranean concerns. Included in the first group were the Duke of Infantado (the most senior counsellor of State), Baltasar de Zúñiga (former ambassador at the Imperial court, 1608–1617), and Mother Margaret of the Cross. She was the aunt of Philip III, who had, throughout her fifty years of stay at the Descalzas Reales nunnery in Madrid, tirelessly favoured her German relatives before the successive Spanish kings.\(^8\) This dynastic priority was maintained for decades because Philip III devoted to it and his son Philip IV also attached his survival to the preservation of the dynasty.

During the 1620s, a permanent alliance was established between the courts of Madrid and Vienna. However, it did not correspond to the official dynastic version according to which the Spanish branch was just disinterestedly assisting their hounded relatives with troops and money. The Spanish circles of power followed their own agenda. The first objective was to block the ascent of the Duke of Bavaria to the rank of electoral prince because he could represent a fearsome Catholic rival in the empire. The second objective was to channel the dynastic war machine from the Palatinate to the Low Countries in order to defeat the Nederland rebels. At the same time, the Spanish Monarchy was forced to keep a courteous relationship with the moderate Protestant princes to prevent an escalation into a general and uncontrollable confessional war.\(^9\) Oñate was the key Spanish agent to maintain pleasant relationships in Vienna, continuing a tradition well—established by his predecessors Guillén de San Clemente (1581–1608) and Baltasar de Zúñiga (1608–1617). These men all enjoyed long terms as ambassadors, notable financing autonomy and remarkable closeness to the imperial family and their ministers. They benefitted from their ability to reward the common servants of the House of Austria when needed and had superior ceremonial advantages due to being considered family representatives rather than foreign diplomats.\(^10\)

Many courtier observers regarded such a privileged position with a mixture of envy and mistrust. The Venetian ambassadors Erizzo and Contarini assured that “il Conte d’Ognat Ambasciatore di quel Re fa conoscere, che in Hiermania possegga più tosto il titolo di Dittatore, che d’Ambasciatore”.\(^11\) For his part, the papal nuncio Carafa blamed Oñate’s “ostinata aversione” for boycotting the awarding of Frederick V’s electoral title to the Duke

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of Bavaria, a faithful ally of the pope. After the death of Baltasar de Zúñiga on 7 October 1622, tensions increased. Zúñiga had been the first minister of Philip IV in Madrid and using his vast experience in the subtleties of imperial policy, had advocated for a balance between the many participants. Without him, Oñate threatened to interrupt the Spanish subsidies for the Imperial army and to foster a general peace agreement with the mediation of King James I of England. Oñate proved himself to be resourceful and expeditious. He was among the few able to simultaneously negotiate with the Duke of Neuburg, the Elector–Archbishops of Mainz and Trier and to take into consideration the positions of the Calvinist Elector Palatine and the Lutheran Duke of Saxony. According to nuncio Carafa, Oñate could deceive all his interlocutors at once, but his ability to “tener sospezo il mondo” could also show his para–imperial and insightful approach looking for more consensual and acceptable solutions than those of the militant emperor and his papal and Bavarian allies.

On 23 February 1623, Maximilian I of Bavaria was awarded the electorate and conquered territories of the Upper Palatinate; Oñate’s resistance was futile, except for arousing the enduring suspicion of both the Nuncio Carafa and the Duke of Bavaria. The direct communication between Oñate and Carafa never ceased, however the sincerity and confidence between them was fractured. The Bavarian question was the first open quarrel between the Spanish embassy and the papal nunciature and it presented an opportunity to test their respective court allies and the efficiency of their strategies. Oñate was the broker of the Spanish king’s patronage and counted on a close alliance with the Prince of Eggenberg, the imperial favourite, and many other counsellors.

12 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 20 April 1624, BAV, Barb. lat., 6947, fols. 43r–44r. P. MAREK, La diplomacia española, pp. 118–120.
13 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Ludovisi, Vienna, 28 August 1621 and Regensburg, 24 November 1622, BAV, Barb. lat., 6946, fols. 16 and 148.
14 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Ludovisi, Regensburg, 14 and 20 December 1622, BAV, Barb. lat., 6946, fols. 160 and 163. For England, Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Ludovisi, Vienna, 27 October 1622 and Regensburg, 8 February 1623, BAV, Barb. lat., 6946, fol. 147v and 179. E. STRAUB, Pax et Imperium, pp. 163–204.
17 P. MAREK, La embajada española, pp. 117–123.
those closer to Oñate or to the nunciature. However, at the moments of truth during the Bavaria's electoral negotiations, Carafa found he could only rely on the counsellor Johann of Hohenzollern–Sigmaringen, who was the brother of Cardinal Hohenzollern and a close friend of the Duke of Bavaria.\textsuperscript{18} Apart from Hohenzollern, Carafa considered the Secret Council a hostile body that changed the righteous decisions of the Emperor because those counsellors were “guadagnati dai Spagnuoli”.\textsuperscript{19}

Unable to match the Spanish structure of patronage, the nuncio resorted to more discreet strategies. Ferdinand II was a very pious prince; he was educated by the Jesuits and was promoted as an example of sanctity. Carafa emphatically considered him “cosi devoto e bene affetto verso la Sede Apostolica, che credo che da Costantino in qua non habbiamo havuto simile a lui.”\textsuperscript{20} Based on this, Carafa exploited the moral scruples of the Emperor, the “via di coscienza” versus the traditional “via di consiglio”, to revert those decisions considered sinful.\textsuperscript{21} The nuncio was escorted by Martin Becan, the Jesuit imperial confessor between 1620 and 1624. Additionally, other charismatic clergy passing through Vienna, such as Capuchin Giacinto da Casale and the Discalced Carmelite Domingo de Jesús María accompanied him.\textsuperscript{22} Becan was a rather passive figure of unquestionable loyalty to nuncio Carafa,\textsuperscript{23} in contrast to the impulsive and independent Wilhelm Lamormaini, the subsequent imperial confessor. Carafa reported to a small board of theologians arranged by Ferdinand II to consult on specific issues; it was always presided over by Becan and aligned with papal policies to a certain extent.\textsuperscript{24} The Emperor was less receptive to undesired

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Ludovisi, Vienna, 28 August 1621, and Regensburg, 8 February 1623, BAV, Barb. lat., 6946, fol. 16 and 179.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Giacinto da Casale OFMCap to Cardinal Ludovisi, Vienna, 14 August 1621, BAV, Barb. lat., 6792, fol. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Ludovisi, Vienna, 4 September 1621, BAV, Barb. lat., 6946, fol. 20–21v; Giacinto da Casale OFMCap to Cardinal Ludovisi, Vienna, 20 August 1621, BAV, Barb. lat., 6792, fol. 10; Hermann Questenberg to Franz Christoph Khevenhüller, Prague, 12 July 1623, HHStA, SDK, 18/1, p. 206.
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{Votum P. Becani & Lamormaini}, Vienna, 23 November 1623, HHStA, Spanien Varia, 5/5, fol. 529.
\end{itemize}
advice by scheming friars like Capuchin Casale – who had a well-deserved reputation of “frate seditioso” and whom Carafa never fully trusted.25

New ambassador, new hopes

The changing circumstances of the Thirty Years’ War provoked a tentative Spanish–papal rapprochement around 1624. At the same time, England and France were negotiating a matrimonial alliance (the wedding of Prince Charles of Wales and Henrietta of France) and there were rumours of a French military campaign which supported German Protestants. Carafa found it difficult to ascertain which reports were actual threats or merely Spanish propaganda, thus highlighting his information limitations.26 In any case, Rivero assesses that Olivares was opening a new political line in 1624, which meant neglecting Zúñiga’s approach based on the reason of state and exploring a Catholic alliance with France under papal protection. The friendly composition for overcoming the Valtellina crisis through the Peace of Monzón (10 May 1626) represented the most evident accomplishment of this oncoming alliance. It continued in 1627, with the joint strategy to invade England and Spanish naval support for the French siege of La Rochelle.27 Unfortunately, subsequent hostilities between the two major Catholic monarchies and an estrangement with the papacy overshadowed this chapter of relative confessional entente between France and Spain.

In the Viennese embassy, the substitute for Oñate had to fill a very different profile. Due to the general change of priorities, it was required a loyal person to Olivares and not a proud and independent dignitary as Oñate was. Moreover, it was preferable a diplomat in good terms with the papacy and able to restore the trust with the nunciature and the Duke of Bavaria. Francisco de Moncada (1586–1635) was chosen: he was the Count of Osona and son of the Marquis of Aytona – a title he inherited in 1626. His father Gastón de Moncada was a reputable Catalan aristocrat with a distinguished career serving the monarchy. Gastón was the Viceroy of Sardinia (1590–1595), then Aragon (1609–1612) and notably was the ambassador to Rome (1606–1609), where he had an excellent reputation in the curia of Paul V.28

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25 Giacinto da Casale OFMCap to Cardinal Ludovisi, Vienna, 20 August 1621, BAV, Barb. lat., 6792, fol. 10.
26 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 22 April 1624, BAV, Barb. lat., 6947, fol. 46.
Francisco had accompanied his father to Rome and Naples; he was acquainted with the curial milieu and had forged a good relationship with the Neapolitan nuncio Carafa.\textsuperscript{29} His positive reputation with the papacy was strengthened by his uncle Juan de Moncada, Archbishop of Tarragona (1613–1622), who was well connected in Rome.\textsuperscript{30} Before being appointed ambassador to the empire, Francisco had leaded two minor missions in the Low Countries (1622) and Catalonia (1623) under the protection of Olivares.\textsuperscript{31} By then, he was better known as a well-educated nobleman, historian and dilettante in stoic philosophy.\textsuperscript{32} Due to his excellent artistic taste, Francisco is a very recognizable figure, as the painter Van Dyck portrayed him twice, on horseback (1634, Louvre Museum) and standing (1633, Kunsthistorisches Museum).\textsuperscript{33}

Carafa cautiously saluted the appointment of Aytona, because “è cavaliere di buon tratto, e credo sarà sincero, e almeno non così cupo, com’è stato Ognati”.\textsuperscript{34} The nuncio accurately identified the political change in Madrid after the rupture of relations with England; thus, the schemes of Oñate were no longer required. In Vienna, Carafa suspiciously watched the ongoing matrimonial negotiations between France and England. He anticipated this changing scenario would move the Spanish Monarchy towards a confessional strategy with the emperor and Bavaria under the papal benediction.\textsuperscript{35}

Aytona met the expectations of a better relationship with the papal representatives since the first day. He indirectly assured that Philip IV had not approved the autonomous policy of Oñate, but the royal will was that Aytona had to agree with the nunciature and to procure peace at all costs.\textsuperscript{36} Cardinal nipote Barberini ordered nuncio Carafa to keep the “good correspondence” with Aytona, as Carafa attempted to dispel any doubts. In one instance this was done by assuring that Father Casale’s schemes in Paris, representing Bavaria, were

\textsuperscript{29} Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 13 July 1624, BAV, Barb. lat., 6947, fol. 92r.
\textsuperscript{30} Archbishop Volpiano Volpi to the Marquis of Aytona, Rome, 7 August 1627, ADM, AH, 59, ramo 5/1, n. 48; H. von THIESSEN, Diplomatie und Patronage, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{31} Jesús GUTIÉRREZ, Don Francisco de Moncada, el hombre y el embajador, Selección de textos inéditos, Boletín de la biblioteca de Menéndez Pelayo 56, 1980, pp. 7–9.
\textsuperscript{33} Jahel SANZSALAZAR, Van Dyck: noticias sobre los retratos ecuestres de Francisco de Moncada, marqués de Aytona, y su procedencia en el siglo XVII, Archivo Español de Arte 315, 2006, pp. 320–332.
\textsuperscript{34} Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 13 July 1624, BAV, Barb. lat., 6947, fol. 92r–92v.
\textsuperscript{35} Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 10 August 1624, BAV, Barb. lat., 6947, fol. 102r–103r.
\textsuperscript{36} The Marquis of Aytona to Philip IV, Vienna, 18 July 1624, BL, Add. Mss. 28473, fols. 66v–68v; P. MAREK, La diplomacia española, pp. 121–123.
without papal knowledge.\textsuperscript{37} On the Spanish side, Olivares sent a personal agent to Munich to assist with the relations with the Duke of Bavaria and nuncio Carafa received a copy of the documentation. The appointed representative was Matteo Renzi, a Roman priest whom Olivares used for special missions abroad misinforming the ambassadors. At first, Carafa was better informed than Aytona on Renzi’s Bavarian mission, but afterwards Renzi also offered his services to Aytona in Vienna.\textsuperscript{38}

Another simultaneous negotiation tested the rapport of the German and Spanish Habsburgs with the papacy. The correspondence of Alvise Valaresso, the Venetian ambassador in London, was intercepted by Archduke Leopold of Tyrol (brother of Ferdinand II) in the autumn of 1624. The contents of these private letters were as scandalous as they were predictable: Venice was negotiating a league with England and other Protestant powers “contro la Religione, Imperio e Casa d’Austria”.\textsuperscript{39} Ferdinand II, Eggenberg and Aytona were the only people to know the exact content of those documents and nuncio Carafa struggled to overcome being marginalized. One of Eggenberg’s chamberlains partially informed him about this issue in December 1624. A month later, Carafa managed to secretly borrow the correspondence for one night, by way of a “\textit{ministro mio amico}”, who was most likely the chancellor Johann Baptist Verda von Werdenberg. Aytona visited Carafa, perhaps suspecting this situation, assuring him that he had remained absolutely silent on the Valaresso question following Ferdinand II’s strict orders.\textsuperscript{40} Only after three months did Eggenberg grant Carafa legal access to the sources, in part to justify the Imperial–Spanish plans to attack the Venetian frontier in Friuli.\textsuperscript{41} That operation would imply invading Italy,
The dynastic entente was positively tested because Pastrana and Savelli, Philip IV and Ferdinand II’s ambassadors in Rome, were well coordinated with the ministers in Vienna to pose the question to Pope Urban VIII. This aggressive plan seemed to be a diplomatic manoeuvre to halt Venetian machinations; it was discussed and postponed for more than one year. Nuncio Carafa deliberated that the Imperial court would likely react only if Philip IV ordered them to do so. Despite the personal rapport between Carafa and Aytona, their missions and goals were separating.

Aytona did not attempt to develop strong ties with Roman authorities. His personal correspondence offers a detailed look at his network of friends and “obligados” in Germany and Italy, of which the Milanese correspondents constituted the majority. There were merely two contacts in Rome: the Archbishop Volpi (Aytona’s father old ally) and the Cardinal nipote Barberini. There is just one letter from nuncio Carafa registered among Aytona’s papers and only once did Aytona recommend an individual on behalf of Carafa to Philip IV: Marcello Luciffano. He was Carafa’s servant and Aytona clearly stated that he was writing it at the behest of Eggenberg.

Aytona’s relation with his distant relative Cardinal Franz von Dietrichstein was clarifying. Dietrichstein declared himself to be his uncle (Dietrichstein’s mother, Beatriz de Cardona, was a relative of the Moncada family), however Aytona refused to establish a familiar relationship with Dietrichstein. This indifference was justified by Dietrichstein’s excessive patronage demands. After almost a year as ambassador, Aytona asked Dietrichstein for his first favour and the cardinal immediately began to request honours and offices on behalf of his relatives, friends and servants. Neither Italian policies nor papal questions appeared in their correspondence; they were more devoted to micropolitical concerns than to state negotiations. In one letter, Dietrichstein urged Aytona to protect Baron Magno, one of Dietrichstein’s “criaturas”, against the Imperial General Pappenheim and Aytona yet again

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42 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 1 March and 12 April 1625, BAV, Barb. lat., 6948, fols. 33 and 62; the Marquis of Aytona to Philip IV, Vienna, 18 November 1625, BL, Add. Mss. 28473, fols. 175v–176r; Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 4 March 1626, BAV, Barb. lat., 6949, fol. 22r–v.
43 Archbishop Volpiano Volpi to the Marquis of Aytona, Rome, 7 August 1627, ADM, AH, 59, ramo 5/1, n. 48; Cardinal Barberini to the Marquis of Aytona, Rome, 21 August 1627, ADM, AH, 59, ramo 5/1, n. 49.
44 Nuncio Carafa to the Marquis of Aytona, Vienna, 5 August 1625, ADM, AH, 59, ramo 5/1, n. 42; the Marquis of Aytona to the Count Duke of Olivares, Vienna, 26 August 1628, ADM, AH, 60, ramo 4/1, n. 76.
chose the other side.45 Perhaps the ambassador shared a poor opinion of Dietrichstein stated by another confidant, the Duke of Guastalla: the Cardinal is “a good lord but neither too acute nor in good concept, he professes to be Spaniard but his resolution and ability are not reliable.”46 Therefore, being related to a Cardinal did not imply necessarily more closeness to the Curia nor a fruitful ally for high politics.47

Margarita de Castro, Aytona’s wife, remained in Spain with their children, suggesting that the embassy neither had a familiar atmosphere nor attracted other Spanish aristocrats to stay in Vienna as embassy’s gentlemen.48 That is the impression given in Aytona’s personal correspondence, where only Flemish bureaucrats are mentioned as having sent their children to be raised in the embassy.49 Aytona personal networks could be weak, but in any case the Spanish embassy seemed a giant with feet of clay. The war constraints directly affected the ability of the ambassador to reward the imperial clients of the Monarchy, especially in the delicate field of paying pensions. Aytona’s letters reflect his anxiety and his deceptions to handle these outraged and dissatisfied individuals, whose disappointments deteriorated the quality of Spanish communicative networks.50 The ambassador prayed to restructure such an untenable system of patronage, but the Spanish court was not receptive to Aytona’s financial requests and this led to his own salary being unpaid.51

Outwardly, the powerful Spanish image endured and the ambassador of Tuscany assured that among the imperial counsellors “tutti sono comperi da’ Spagnuoli, alcuni con pensioni ordinarie et altri con donativi”.52 Nuncio Carafa was among the few agents aware of the

45 Cardinal Dietrichstein to the Marquis of Aytona, Mikulov, 22 June 1626, ADM, AH, 59, ramo 6, c. 22–3, fol. 149; the Marquis of Aytona to the Count Duke of Olivares, Prague, 13 June 1628 and 16 May 1629, ADM, AH, 60, ramo 4/1, fols. 73 and 102–5.

46 He is “buen señor, no muy agudo, ni en gran conçeto, haze profission de español, pero no se ha de hazer fundamento de su ressoluzion ni habilidad”. Parecer de Guastalla a los puntos de la Dieta de Ratisbona, AGS, E, 2331, n. 50, fol. 22r.

47 Correspondence between Cardinal Dietrichstein and the Marquis of Aytona, 1623–1627, ADM, AH, 59, ramo 6, c. 22–3, fols. 112–178. For Dietrichstein’s good opinion in Madrid and his familiar context, see P. MAREK, La diplomacia española, pp. 134–135.

48 By contrast, Oñate resorted to his own son, Íñigo Vélez de Guevara, for different missions in the empire. U. NAGEL, Zwischen Dynastie und Staatsrätion, pp. 142–143.

49 They were René de Vos, son of the Master of the Chamber of Accounts of Lille, and the son of the counsellor Engelbert de la Neuforge. The correspondence between both fathers and Aytona is in ADM, AH, 59, ramo 5/1, n. 31–37.

50 The monothematic correspondence between Konrad XII von Bemelberg und Hohenburg and Aytona (1624–1627) offers an excellent catalogue of tactics to obtain the payment of his pension. ADM, AH, 59, ramo 6, fols. 223–241.


52 The Tuscan ambassador to Ferdinand II de Medici, Vienna, 22 March 1628, ASFi, MP, 4379, s. fol.
reality; neither Aytona had the funds Oñate lacked and by 1625 the Spanish pensions had not been paid for two and half years. Nevertheless, Aytona was able to retain key allies at the Imperial court who informed him about the ongoing negotiations. The most important allies were the Prince of Eggenberg and the Duke of Guastalla, a North Italian prince. He had shared interests in Milan and Vienna and his support during the War of the Mantuan Succession proved to be crucial.

Carafa’s strategy was very different from Aytona’s: lacking resources to gratify the imperial ministers, he threatened the Emperor with spiritual condemnation through the “via di coscienza”. The nuncio had few and unreliable allies: a charismatic clergyman like Father Casale was much discredited in the eyes of the Emperor for his meddling character and his undisclosed Bavarian sympathies. A key figure was the imperial confessor, Wilhelm Lamormaini (in office 1624–1637). A determined and unmanageable Jesuit, he was out of the nuncio’s control, in contrast with his predecessor Becan. Lamormaini assured that only his advice, unlike those by the imperial ministers, was free from material interests and Ferdinand II sometimes paid him great attention. Carafa begged him to voice the papal positions whenever “questo neg.o tocante la coscienza, di gratia operasse quanto potesse con S. M.tà e suoi ministri.” Lamormaini revealed several secrets to Carafa about imperial policy and assisted him with Italian matters. However, both men clashed in several other topics and Carafa attempted to avoid negotiating with him controversial issues. The nuncio acknowledged his inability to control the “via di coscienza”, which was in the hands of Lamormaini (“poco ben affetto alla Corte di Roma”) and his Jesuit brothers. Ferdinand II was advised by a board of these Jesuits without Carafa’s say, even for ecclesiastical topics such as the Patriarchy of Aquileia’s jurisdiction.
On many occasions, Aytona did not perceive these divisions between Carafa and Lamormaini and equated their initiatives as “pretexts of piety”.\(^61\) The progressive lack of understanding between the Spanish embassy and the papal nunciature magnified the other’s influence and quality of information; it is accurate that Aytona participated in several negotiations whose existence Carafa ignored. The nuncio did not regard the Spanish ambassador as a potential ally, but as a deceptive strategist who imposed his own principles over the imperial policy in many issues.\(^62\)

### The War of Mantua: the end of the world as they knew it

After the failure of Oñate in the instance of the “electoral translation” from Palatinate to Bavaria, the Spanish diplomacy abandoned the previous dissimulated attitude. The disputes with the papacy escalated and were made public with the major crisis of the War of the Mantuan Succession (1627–1629). This conflict was a turning point in the Thirty Years’ War, beyond confessional considerations, as all of the parties involved were Catholic and the papacy was clearly aligned against the House of Austria. The war outcome was as chaotic as violent: Duke Vincenzo II of Mantua died in Christmas Day 1627 without an undisputed heir, but the most obvious option was Charles de Gonzague, Duke of Nevers and a French courtier. Such a French prince ruling in the hinterland of the Spanish possessions of Lombardy was intolerable for Philip IV, who consequently was obliged to support the candidacy of his client Cesare Gonzaga (Duke of Guastalla) and urged Ferdinand II to impose his authority over those imperial fiefs. The premature death of Vincenzo II precipitated the plans and the Spanish Governor of Milan, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, invaded Monferrato supported by the Duke of Savoy. Olivares accepted this \textit{fait accompli} and acted as stubbornly as duplicitously, without a long–term plan. He was dragged down by the events in Milan and Mantua and was not successful in deescalating this perilous and futile war.\(^63\)

\(^{61}\) The Marquis of Aytona to Philip IV, Vienna, 9 September 1629, BL, Add. Mss. 28474, fol. 125v.


In Vienna, the Mantuan conflict polarized the courtier positions and new alliances were established beyond traditional factions, but instead around the candidacies to the Dukedom of Mantua by Nevers and Guastalla. Once the news of Vincenzo II’s death arrived in the Imperial court, duplicitous incidents transpired. Aytona spared the confusing information he was receiving from Madrid and Milan and simultaneously pressed Ferdinand II to authorize Gonzalo de Córdoba’s invasion of Monferrato.  

In March of 1628, Aytona and Guastalla were successful in negotiating with Eggenberg and the other ministers for the declaration of kaiserliche Beschlagnahme (“imperial seizure”) for Mantua. According to the declaration, an administrator must be appointed until the Emperor decided on the righteous heir of Vincenzo II. Nevers was suspected of not accepting this resolution while Córdoba was openly preparing for the invasion of Monferrato. When the scandalous news of the Spanish attack arrived in Vienna in March of 1628, Aytona did his best to make this unilateral manoeuvre, which ignored imperial authority, acceptable. The seizure of Mantua was finally declared, so as to avoid the worst. Aytona was very reluctant to endorse Córdoba’s plans and inadvisable Savoyan alliance. Carafa did not suspect these machinations and was simultaneously discussing with Imperial Generalissimo Wallenstein a unrealistic plan of crusade against the Turks. Carafa was understandably disappointed at being unaware of this process of decision–making, which he was only able to reconstruct in hindsight.

The Spanish diplomats opportunistically used their political resources close at hand; far from their absolutist image, they sponsored a legal tactic through the slow procedures of imperial justice. Consequently, experts in imperial law were sent to Vienna to aid Aytona: the Milanese Ottavio Villani and the Flemish Jacques Bruneau. In contrast to this “via di giustizia” and the institutional support of imperial councils, the opposition did not control the discussion framework and seemed guided by partisanship and its effects. The main

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65 Manuel FERNÁNDEZ ÁLVAREZ, Don Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba y la guerra de sucesión de Mantua y del Monferrato (1627–1629), Madrid 1955, pp. 67–70.

66 Traslado de memorial del marqués de Aytona a ministro de Fernando II, 9 January 1628, ADM, AH, 59, ramo 1, fol. 11; Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Prague, 19 January and 23 February 1628, BAV, Barb. lat., 6951, fols. 3r–6v and 45v–46r.

67 The Marquis of Aytona to Ferdinand II, Prague, 3 March 1628, ADM, AH, 59, ramo 1, fol. 12; the Marquis of Aytona to Philip IV, Prague, 23 March 1628, BL, Add. Mss. 28474, fol. 51v–56v; Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Prague, 22 March 1628, BAV, Barb. lat., 6951, fol. 66–72r.

supporters of Nevers were the nuncio and Lamormaini who exploited the moral scruples of Ferdinand II and Empress Leonora Gonzaga. She was the sister of the late Vincenzo II and defender of the rights of Maria Gonzaga – her only niece and the wife of Nevers. The Empress had not made a remarkable political contribution but this dynastic issue revealed her as a very combative and firm patroness because “si tratta della sua patria, della sua casa e del suo interesse”. She was fully aware of her position. Although she enjoyed a strong influence over her husband Ferdinand II, she had to appear impartial and instead guided by affection.69

Despite Aytona’s concept, the supporters of Nevers did not constitute an organised group. Nuncio Carafa was neither on good terms with the imperial confessor Lamormaini nor had easy access to the Empress; Carafa only knew her dealings with the Mantuan agent Marbioli through two covert mediators.70 Beginning in April 1628, Urban VIII de facto had supported Nevers and disregarded the imperial jurisdiction; Carafa immediately felt the indifference and dissimulation from most of the imperial ministers towards him. The Count of Trauttmansdorff was one of the rare important counsellors out of the Eggenberg circle who operated as an informant to Carafa in this critical circumstance.71

Aytona realized it was impossible to expel Nevers from Italy due to the Empress’s protection and the papal and Tuscan support, but this insightful admonition by Aytona was not attended in Madrid.72 Aytona regained Carafa’s confidence to some extent as the nuncio was convinced of the ambassador’s good will towards achieving a peaceful agreement. According to the nunciature, Aytona even implicitly acknowledged the injustice of the Mantuan War to Lamormaini, who pleaded with him to inform Philip IV on this injustice. Lamormaini felt that if Aytona did not, the sin would stain the Spanish king and his ministers.73

Carafa took advantage of a fortunate situation and of his lack of time. His replacement, the nuncio Pallotto, arrived in May 1628 and Carafa needed to finish his mission with palpable success. Accordingly, he arranged a banquet with Aytona, Guastalla and Count Orso (ambassador of Tuscany) to reach an agreement. The outcome was the Treaty of

70 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Prague, 9 April 1628, BAV, Barb. lat., 6951, fol. 108r–109r, 113r, 116r.
71 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Prague, 26 January and 26 April 1628, BAV, Barb. lat., 6951, fols. 20v–23v and 143r–144v.
72 For Trauttmansdorff’s alliance, Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Prague, 26 January and 26 April 1628, BAV, Barb. lat., 6951, fols. 20v–23v and 143r–144v.
73 The Marquis of Aytona to Philip IV, Prague, 3 June 1628, BL, Add. Mss. 28474, fol. 65v–66r.
Prague, on 24 May 1628. It stated that Nevers would be acceptable as Duke of Mantua if he granted several fiefs to Guastalla and exchanged Monferrato for Cremonese with Spain.\footnote{Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Prague, 24 May 1628, BAV, Barb. lat., 6952, fols. 44r–49v; Nuncio Pallotto to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 27 May 1628, NBD, IV.1, pp. 58–59.}

Pallotto began his mission by dealing with this delicate situation.\footnote{Hans KIEWNING (ed.), Nuntiatur des Pallotto. 1628–1630, [= NBD IV, vol. 1], Berlin 1895, pp. xxxvi–cvi.; Robert BIRELEY, The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War: Kings, Courts, and Confessors, Cambridge 2003, pp. 94–95; Antonio D’AMICO, Giovanni Battista Maria Pallotta, in: Dizionario biografico degli italiani, vol. 80, Roma 2014 (http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giovanni-battista-pallotta_(Dizionario-Biografico)/).} His arrival did not modify the existing mistrust between the nunciature and the Spanish embassy; from day one he regarded the “Spaniards” as his enemies.\footnote{Nuncio Pallotto to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 10 June 1628, NBD, IV.1, p. 87.} Aytona was not singled out as his opponent but instead regarded as an obedient and overwhelmed minister with whom he spoke freely on the Mantuan question and received conciliatory and well-intentioned messages.\footnote{Nuncio Pallotto to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 8 July 1628, NBD, IV.1, p. 117; Bishop Vincenzo Suardi to the Duke of Nevers, Vienna, 11 March 1628, NBD, IV.1, p. 22.} Pallotto instead blamed the Spaniards in a depersonalized way, referring to Philip IV’s numerous ministers in Italy and the empire. These individuals were often Flemish or Lombard, as the label ‘Spaniard’ did not identify a national origin as much as a political style of deceit and arrogance.\footnote{In contrast, the Duke of Tursi, Aytona’s Italian successor, assured that he “non vuole fare spagnolate, ma cedere al servitio del Re con modo, et con maniera italiana”. Niccolò Sacchetti to Andrea Cioli, Vienna, 31 May 1630, ASFi, MP, 4385, s. fol.}

The Treaty of Prague, whose negotiation Aytona tentatively accepted until receiving orders from Madrid, was fiercely rejected by Gonzalo de Córdoba as a disservice to the Spanish king. That outcome provided Aytona with a reputation as a peaceful but powerless agent among Nevers supporters.\footnote{Nuncio Pallotto to Cardinal Barberini, Znam, 1 July 1628, NBD, IV.1, pp. 105–106.} For his part, Aytona pressured Ferdinand II against Nevers and discredited Bishop Suardi, one of Nevers agents in Vienna, as an unreliable negotiator. Aytona changed his mind (or perhaps was overruled by the ministers in Madrid) and despised the previous pact.\footnote{The Marquis of Aytona to Ferdinand II, Znojmo, 24 and 29 June and Vienna, 25 July 1628, ADM, AH, 59, ramo 1, fols. 20r–20v, 22, and 27r.}

Throughout the summer of 1628, the conflict worsened. Córdoba besieged Casale Monferrato, Nevers was officially deprived of Mantua by the Emperor and the imperial ministers cooperated with Aytona to establish a joint position. The supporters of Nevers (the Empress, the nuncios and Lamormaini) felt cheated by the imperial entourage and attempted to circumvent the situation in an uncoordinated way. Nuncio Carafa, who was still coexisting with his successor Pallotto, attempted the typical “via di coscienza” through
Lamormaini. However, this time their opponents – especially Eggenberg and Aytona – were not accepting that “si vogli intrigare in negotii di Stato”.81 This incident tested the information networks that both nuncios had in Vienna. Carafa was able to offer a very insightful explanation of the process through his close ally, the chancellor Verda, while Pallotto still trusted Aytona and spread his more limited version of the events leading to the severance of relations with Nevers.82

Once the “via di coscienza” had failed, the supporters of Nevers changed their strategy to convince the Duke of Guastalla, the other candidate for Mantua, to accept an agreement. By linking the nuncios and the Empress, Verda was yet again the key player, until he realized that the entire operation was futile. Guastalla could not being convinced because he depended directly on Philip IV. For his part, Aytona had no powers to conduct negotiations but the Spanish ministers in Italy. Finally, Ferdinand II and Eggenberg were decided to keep the dynastic entente and not making a pact with Nevers.83 Out of desperation, Carafa ordered a clergyman to spy Eggenberg unsuccessfully looking for insubordinations towards the Holy See.84 Pallotto followed with more moderate tactics and he spoke frankly with Aytona. He appreciated both the Spanish inability to stop the war once it had begun and how counterproductive the emotional interventions of the Empress were.85

The Spanish and papal diplomacies were in different positions during the crisis of August 1628. While the nuncios’ messages look chaotic and unbalanced, Aytona had better control of the situation. He feared a powerful court alliance supporting Nevers, so he tried to disrupt the thought of it by curtailing their unwarranted access to political communication.86 Aytona informed Ferdinand II that Lamormaini was spreading the idea that the Mantuan conflict was an unjust war, so the Emperor ordered Eggenberg to reprimand the confessor because “un cleriguillo haveva da rezar y no metterse en estas cosas.”87 Thereafter, Lamormaini kept silent.

81 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 22 July 1628, BAV, Barb. lat., 6952, fol. 89. See also ibidem, 8 July 1628, fol. 86r–v.
82 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 22 July 1628, BAV, Barb. lat., 6952, fol. 89–93; Nuncio Pallotto to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 19 July 1628, NBD, IV.1, p. 135.
83 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 10 and 19 August and 9 September 1628, BAV, Barb. lat., 6952, fols. 102–106r, 111–114v and 125v.
84 Nuncio Carafa to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 19 August 1628, BAV, Barb. lat., 6952, fol. 120.
86 In general, Mark HENGERER, Access at the Court of the Austrian Habsburg Dynasty (Mid-Sixteenth to Mid-Eighteenth Century): A Highway from Presence to Politics?, in: Dries Raeymaekers – Sebastiaan Derks (edd.), The key to power? The culture of access in princely courts, 1400–1750, Leiden 2016, pp. 125, 137–150.
87 Nuncio Pallotto to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 19 July 1628, NBD, IV.1, p. 135; the Marquis of Aytona to Philip IV, Vienna, 23 August 1628, BL, Add. Mss. 28474, fol. 69r–v.
Aytona’s second target was Empress Leonora. He was aware that, despite Ferdinand II forbidding it, she was covertly acting in support of Nevers. In time, she was discredited for overstepping her duties and for her “descompuesto” style. When Aytona was summoned to her presence at the beginning of September 1628, they had a strong argument in which her frustration met his determination. That audience had been authorized by Ferdinand II, however after this, Empress Leonora was prevented to speak on this topic. She confessed this to nuncio Pallotto on a rare occasion when they discreetly met alone in a pavilion, during a hunting party.

Though Aytona acknowledged the nuncios legitimacy to negotiate, he realised they were attempting to unite the imperial ministers favourable to Nevers – such as Trauttmandorff and Verda – and the Catholic diplomats in Vienna. However, there was one key factor that Aytona could depend on: Guastalla was almost impossible to bribe or influence because the survival of his Italian fiefs depended on Philip IV’s support. The motivation of Guastalla’s tremendous service to the Catholic king was because he was simultaneously serving himself, the same combination of loyalty and self-service of Eggenberg’s relationship with the Catholic king. These personal ties were very strong but also implied a serious weakness for the Spanish system, because the dependence on the human factor was too high and in the absence of Eggenberg the entire structure of patronage could fall. This caused Aytona to urge Olivares to send money for rewarding the imperial ministers and retain the powerful image of the Spanish Monarchy.

The direct communication between Pallotto and Aytona never ended but they came to the realisation that their positions were irreconcilable. The dynastic alliance was reinforced in the summer of 1629 as the imperial troops entered in Italy to support the Spanish army against the recent French invasion. Eggenberg advocated this aggressive line at the Secret Council without opposition, apart from the doubts raised by the Imperial Vice–chancellor Stralendorf. Nevers had not lost his supporters but the latter lacked opportunities and leadership to voice that position. As Lamormaini was a maverick, the only legitimised
representative of those supporting Nevers was nuncio Pallotto. Aytona identified him as the “guide” of that group and his “enemy and emulus”.  

In September 1629, Aytona left Vienna for Brussels, where his services were required as ambassador extraordinary and adviser of the governess Isabel Clara Eugenia, aunt of Philip IV. The Viennese embassy remained in an interim situation and major decisions were suspended until the arrival of his successor, the Count of Castro–Daire. Castro–Daire was a Portuguese statesman without any previous experience in Central European affairs, so Secretary Jacques Bruneau was permitted considerable influence during negotiations. Pallotto had known Castro–Daire in Portugal and the men quickly renewed their earlier friendship and the nuncio commended Castro–Daire’s good will towards a peace in Mantua. The replacement of the ambassador provided some optimism for diplomatic changes, as it had five years previously with the arrival of Aytona.

**Final remarks**

As Marek called attention to in his book *La diplomacia española*, the separation of the Spanish and papal policy in 1620s Vienna provoked the local Catholic elites to choose a side; most of them preferred the social and economic advantages offered by the Spanish patronage. Therefore, the previous situation was just clarified: the papacy had traditionally depended on Spanish clients and had not equivalent communicative and economical resources on its own. At the same time, the structure of Spanish patronage was collapsing due to the economic constraints caused by the Thirty Years’ War and a deeper reason: as soon as strict Catholicism and the defence of the House of Austria were no more indissoluble messages, as Spanish diplomats found more difficult to impose their views, especially against the “via di coscienza”. Emperor Ferdinand II was somewhat receptive

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96 Philip IV to Isabel Clara Eugenia, Madrid, 17 May 1629, CCE, II, p. 445; Nuncio Pallotto to Cardinal Barberini, Vienna, 11 November 1628, NBD, IV.1, p. 296.
98 P. MAREK, *La diplomacia española*, pp. 139 and 143.
to this influence, as it was more economical and efficient than the Spanish patronage. Although the nuncios did not control the “via di coscienza” but the imperial confessors, it was difficult to reverse tactics.

According to the principles set by Schlögl, the human factor was decisive in early modern society, defined as an Anwesenheitsgesellschaft (“face to face society”). Moreover, the personal trust between the different actors who negotiated and acceded to information and influence was also crucial. Applying this model to Aytona, he had a very limited ability to develop his own policy. He was a victim of the authoritative turn of Olivares, who wanted to influence and develop imperial policy from Madrid. Therefore, Olivares attempted to limit Aytona’s role to executing decisions previously taken in Madrid and poorly adapted to the specificities of the Viennese situation. Moreover, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba was deciding the strategy for the War of the Mantuan Succession from Milan without consulting Aytona. Córdoba’s adventurous and imprudent character was not very adaptable to this situation. As a result of his failure in Casale Monferrato, a secret investigation was organised against him in Madrid.

Facing this situation, the Spanish and papal diplomats were destined to clash and distrust on another, regardless of the efforts to retain open communication. Spanish diplomats proved to be very resourceful and tried to benefit from every opportunity. They usually resorted to juridical solutions at convenience as the most rightful curse of action. However, after the departure of Aytona, the efficient and cheaper moral pressure on the Emperor through the “via di coscienza” was also explored. In 1631, Maria Ana of Austria, sister of Philip IV, arrived to marry the imperial heir Ferdinand (III). After criticising Empress Leonora and confessor Lamormaini’s illegitimate access to political communication, Philip IV used the same weapons. Maria Ana was relatively influential on her husband and her father-in-law, while her confessor Diego de Quiroga successfully replicated the charismatic style of the theological advice advocated by Lamormaini. Finally, the Spanish authorities had at their disposal and used the domestic and theological channels of communication they had missed during Aytona’s embassy.

100 Rudolf SCHLÖGL, Anwesende und Abwesende: Grundriss für eine Gesellschaftsgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit, Konstanz 2014, pp. 11–16; M. HENGERER, Access at the Court, pp. 140–149.
101 M. RIVERO RODRÍGUEZ, El conde duque de Olivares, pp. 169, 247–48. Even Ferdinand II requested Philip IV to authorise Aytona to reach agreements, because the dependence on Madrid’s decisions was dispiriting and contrasted with the previous practices. P. MAREK, La embajada española, pp. 135–136.
102 M. FERNÁNDEZ ÁLVARÉZ, Don Gonzalo, pp. 101–113.
103 Consulta by the Council of State, Madrid, 6 July 1630, AGS, E, 2331, n. 42, fols. 2v y 1r; R. BIRELEY, Ferdinand II, pp. 278–282.
104 This research was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Project HAR2015–68946–C3–2–P.
The Imperial ambassador, the nuncio and the favourite: The Count of Pötting, Vitaliano Visconti Borromeo and Juan Everardo Nithard at the time of the Spanish crisis (1668–1669)

Abstract: The essay aims at touching different aspects of Spanish policy during the regency of Mariana (1665–1675), the interest in the political and physical weakness of the heir to the throne Prince Charles and future King Charles II, the last Hapsburg on the Spanish monarchy. At that time, Madrid's fate was mainly in the hands of three men: the Austrian Jesuit Nithard, the Count of Pötting, and the Apostolic nuncio, Vitaliano Visconti Borromeo.

Keywords: regency – Charles II – Spanish foreign policy – European diplomats

The political period that the Jesuit Juan Everardo Nithard (Johann Eberhard Nidhard) lived and acted in was marked by the demise of the presence of those ministers who had previously monopolised the political landscape – to some extent unlawfully when not clearly illegally – in Europe's leading courts from the first half of the seventeenth century through to 1661.

The presence and the role of powerful ministers in Western European courts only became the subject of heavy criticism following condemnation of the political inappropriateness of an instrument such as the presence of the favourite ministers, ironically set down in


his will (in 1661) by the highly powerful favoured minister of Louis XIV, Cardinal Giulio Mazzarino.

The absence of power these figures left behind took on undefined and unique contours in each of the courts: in Paris, Louis XIV embarked on period of absolutism and foreign policy clearly targeted at war and the conquest of power forming part of a large-scale hegemonic design that went as far back as Charles V;\(^5\) in London, it helped accelerate the separation between court and country in the radical form of the clash between the Stuarts and Parliament which was to be the most violent expression of the modern age prior to the French Revolution; in Madrid, from 1643 up to the death of Philip IV in 1665, both the court and the new favourite minister Luis de Haro had to reckon with Olivares’ legacy, resulting in a system of power more similar in many ways to the multi-party system, which existed prior to the government of the Duke of Lerma, than to the single-party system of traditional government of favourite ministers;\(^6\) at the Court of Rome, the power of Secretaries of State gradually went to replace the totally unofficial one of nephews, however for certain aspects in a completely antithetical manner from the previous power;\(^7\) in Vienna, something similar happened upon the death of Portia who had been behind a policy aimed at keeping the Emperor Leopold I away from government-related matters and, at steering him instead towards more suitable activities for a Baroque ruler such as literature, music and theatre.\(^8\)

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Vienna, Madrid and Rome in the season of the crisis of favourite ministers’ system.

Upon Portia’s death in February 1665, the young emperor wrote to his ambassador in Madrid, the Count of Pötting, announcing his intention to carry out the same political revolution as the one carried out by the French king and which had become a model for the European courts9 “firstly, because I am young and I can work; secondly, I will be the leader.”10

While Leopold’s intention had still yet to be disclosed, the fact that he had already chosen a High Steward although he had not decided to assign the latter the position of favourite alarmed the anonymous author who hoped that the emperor “would lead by himself, it would be the best thing for his subjects while they will not respect the favourites’ obscurity, gains, and caprice.”11

Leopold’s decision had dashed the hopes of those who, during Portia’s government, had thought they would be take over from him in the favourite government. The Prince of Auersperg, in particular, did not greet the news of the emperor’s decision with any enthusiasm12 “because he cannot cure his own insane ambition; not to reach the highest place he longs for.”13

The prince, who had been one of the Emperor Ferdinand III’s trusted aides and who was renowned throughout Europe for his diplomatic ability, was also undoubtedly well-known for his lack of fondness for Emperor Leopold I, who had preferred Portia as his favourite minister over him, opting to forego political continuity with his father’s government.

Despite the emperor’s wishes, Auersperg was a member of the Aulic Council as from 1665 and was not excluded from the empire’s political life, nor was he completely incapable of influencing the emperor’s choices in the aftermath of the Viennese changes of 1665.14

10 “Porque en primer lugar soy joven y puedo trabajar, en segundo lugar me mantendré como señor y ningún otro puede vanagloriarse de que todo depende de él, y en tercer lugar puedo responsabilizarme mejor, pues puedo atribuirme todo a mí”, Vienna, 18 February 1665, quoted in J. BÉRENGÈR, La supresión, p. 380, n. 4.
11 “Volesse diligersi da se stesso sarebbe gran fortuna de’ propri sudditi mentre non soggiocarebbero all’[oscurità], interesse e capriccio de’ favoriti”, BAV, Borg. Lat. 80, Anonymous, without a date, 1665, without folio.
12 Hubert Christian EHALT, La corte di Vienna tra Sei e Settecento, Roma 1984, p. 45 and following.
13 “Non puol guarire la sua ambitione inferma, perché non puol giongere a posto elevato, dove aspira”, BAV, Borg. Lat. 80 cit.
14 H. Ch. EHALT, La corte di Vienna; Stefan SIENELL, Die Geheime Konferenz unter Kaiser Leopold I. Personelle Strukturen und Methoden zur politischen Entscheidungsfindung am Wiener Hof,
Together with important ministers such as the Princes Lobkowitz\(^{15}\) and Schwarzenberg and the Count of Lamberg,\(^{16}\) Auersperg was part of the emperor's Privy Council.\(^{17}\) For a decade, he was one of the main figures of reference at the Viennese court for Madrid's pro-empire party, to the extent that we can define him as one of the key players in European politics, especially with regard to the 1660s, without running the risk of being rhetorical. His political actions and influence went beyond the empire's boundaries (as far as Madrid) and even succeeded in significantly influencing the dynamics within the Catholic monarchy's government.\(^{18}\)

In order to truly understand the role the court of Vienna and its leading ministers played in Spanish politics during the critical period of the Nithard's affair, it is necessary to highlight the presence of two opposing parties: a pro-Spanish action whose main representatives included the very Prince of Auersperg, and a pro-French faction led, ironically, by Emperor Leopold in person.\(^{19}\)

The previously mentioned pro-Spanish political group within the imperial court was closely linked to Madrid's pro-empire party and had a strong sense of loyalty to the common Hapsburg dynasty. Nevertheless, each faction acted independently with most internal political questions concerning Madrid and Vienna. This approach seemed to be confirmed by the words spoken by a leading Spanish minister to one of his trusted aides at the Viennese court:

"If the Prince of Auersperg or that of Lamberg would become the favourite minister it would be the same to me, as things occurred in the Philippines that are not so far from my concern and my reason of state than Vienna."\(^{20}\)

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16 H. Ch. EHALT, La corte di Vienna, p. 52 and following.


18 J. BÉRENGER, La supresión, pp. 368 and following.


20 "Sea el principe de Auesperg el valido o sealo él de Lamberg, a mi poco me importa por que las Filipinas no están más lejos de mi concepto y para mi razón de estado que Viena", BNE, Ms 13.307, Cardinal Moncada to the Marquise of Grana, Madrid, 25 February 1667.
Why was a well-informed minister still referring to the favourite ministers’ system in 1667? Had it not been done away with after the 1665 revolution? Had the emperor been considered none too convincing? Or perhaps the Spanish minister adopted old terminology to speak about something new? The minister from Madrid seemed to be solely interested in hearing about the relationship between the Prince of Auersperg and the Jesuit Nithard. Once the prince’s hostile attitude to the Jesuits had been assured – a theory which Nithard himself confirmed in his memoirs – as from the time of Fernando III when, in his capacity as favourite minister, he had attempted to boycott them, Auersperg was looked on in Madrid as a possible way to exercise pressure on Emperor Leopold in Vienna.

Vienna’s neutrality during the Spanish crisis tended to promote the conspiracy theory as an *extrema ratio* to save a kingdom on the irreparable path towards ruination. For their part, the Spanish ministers attempted to involve the emperor (suspected of being too close to the French king) in the anti-Nithard group on numerous occasions, and, in some way to defend a queen, Leopold’s sister, who was completely dominated by the decisions of her confessor and favourite minister.

The reality which the Madrid – based ministers involved in the plot to get rid of Nithard had to contend with were the politics of an emperor hostile to Spain’s highest aristocracy and in favour of the Jesuit’s cause. The Spanish ministers were unaware of the actual reasons why Leopold had decided to support the Jesuit: on the one hand the pressure of his own confessor, the Jesuit Müller, on the other the magnetism a figure such as Louis XIV had over him, as he did over most of his contemporaries. Leopold had gone as far as humiliating Spain’s highest aristocracy, his acolytes, treating them like derelicts. This unacceptable way of treating them has decisive in the highest aristocracy’s decision to act, regardless of the backing of Vienna. On the eve of the Jesuit being banished, the situation was that described by Cardinal Moncada to the Marquis de Grana, the emperor’s envoy in Madrid, in the spring of 1667: “regency became tyranny; the king is Eberado Neydart; [...] and the confessor’s loyalty are with the French ministers.”

22 BNE, Ms 13.307, Cardinal Moncada to marquise of Grana, Madrid, 8 March 1667.
23 Rafaela PILO, Juan Everardo Nithard y sus «Causas no causas». Razones y pretextos para el fin de un valimiento, Madrid–Córdoba 2010, pp. 174–175.
24 J. BÉRENGER, La conjuration, p. 368.
25 “La Regencia se ha reducido a tiranía; el monarca es Eberardo Neydart; [...] las confidencias del confesor son con los ministros de Francia”, BNE, Ms 13.307, Cardinal Moncada to the Marquise of Grana, Madrid, 16 May 1667, s. f.
The offended aristocracy needed a political impetus able to retaliate for the insult they had been on the receiving end of, and to create a government that would not allow for the recurrence of such offensive and politically inappropriate behaviour.

Considering that one of the main aims of the Jesuit favourite ministers’ politics was to eradicate the Imperial party from Madrid; even if they did not form a compact, strong political group, Leopold’s men had tried to establish an alliance with all of Madrid’s ministers that, for the most diverse of reasons, were against Nithard and interested in getting him out of power.26

As regards the Spanish members of the Imperial party, some of the most important ministers of that period are to be found among them: the Duke of Medina de las Torres, Cardinal Moncada and some other key figures united in a strong and solid brotherhood with the empire’s main representatives in Madrid between 1665 and 1669 and these are the figures that can be looked on as the hyphen between the two courts. A study of the fragile relations which linked them to the emperor, to the Prince of Auersperg, as well as the colourful world of Madrid’s court, can help reconstruct the complexity of the general situation and may be able to explain some stances which are, otherwise, difficult to interpret.

For example, the imperial ambassador in Madrid, the Count of Pötting, was one of the first at the Spanish court to be informed of Leopold’s decisions regarding internal politics, especially concerning the decision to adopt the French model as from 1665. He was also one of the first to understand the consequences of such a decision: just a few months on from the death of Philip IV and subsequent resulting crisis, the prolongation of a regency and presence of a child king (especially in the case of Prince Charles whose precarious health conditions were well – known to all European rulers), who would be crowned king ten years from then, would inevitably result in serious political instability – the Hapsburg dynasty could be seriously weakened for a number of reasons; and lastly, the passing of full powers into the hands of an emperor who did not seem to be particularly qualified to exercise a power completely freed from the control of Vienna’s ministers.27


The most problematic aspect was the influence the French king had already exerted and could continue to exert on the emperor. This was what caused the ambassador greatest concern with him undertaking to reveal his worries to the other members of the pro-empire party residing in Madrid to come up with a line of action shared with members of the anti-French group in Vienna and led by the betrayed Prince of Auersperg himself.28

The Imperial ambassador began to establish contact with those ministers who were known to be against the Jesuit Nithard and these included Cardinal Moncada. In May 1666, he wrote to his brother-in-law, the Marquis of Castelo Rodrigo, to inform him of Pötting’s assertion to meet with him: “The emperor’s ambassador persisted in those last days to meet me, and I suppose it depended on the knowledge that the confessor treated me badly and that I am his enemy.”29

It did not take much for the roles to be inverted and for Cardinal Moncada to take over at the helm, including against the very Count of Pötting,30 indeed, on the one hand, tired of the Spanish ministers’ and imperial envoy’s cowardly, wait-and-see attitude, and on the other, extremely disheartened by the whole situation, the cardinal wrote to his brother-in-law, the Marquis of Castelo Rodrigo that “those ministers who thought of sharing the palace’s offices, coercing his sad boy’s will, and annihilating the regency’s power.”31

The cardinal had informed the emperor of the situation in Madrid and organised a meeting between the imperial ambassador and the queen to ensure the emperor would not be influenced by the decisions taken by the Council of State.

The political situation required an immediate reaction: the scenario had changed in the space of a year and, if the emperor had started to govern on his own, the government in Spain was still led by a favourite minister during a period when European public opinion had condemned such a political practice, labelling it despotic and typical of undeveloped states, such as Muscovy or the Ottoman Empire.32 Oddly, the Catholic monarchy was

28 See J. BÉRENGER, La conjuration, p. 368 and following.
29 “El Embajador de Alemania ha hecho grandes instancias estos días por unirse conmigo, debe de ocasionarlo el conocimiento de lo mal que me trata el confesor y de ser su enemigo,” BNE, Ms. 13.307, Cardinal Moncada to the Marquise of Castel Rodrigo, Madrid, 18 May 1666.
32 J. BÉRENGER, La conjuration, p. 370.
controlled by a foreign favourite minister at that time, who was a Jesuit, and incapable of governing, according to numerous opponents.\footnote{See some analogies with the Holy Siege of Rome between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in A. MENNITI IPPOLITO, Il tramonto.}

Leaving to one side the fact that the negative image of Nithard which came from sources against him and expressed the opposition to his government that was building up in Madrid, many Spanish ministers hoped for the emperor to act in Spain which went well beyond the letters of support written to his sister Mariana. The Spanish ministers opposing the Jesuit were extremely concerned about Leopold’s dangerous familiarity with France’s foreign policy, to be feared by the Spanish monarchy and viewed with great mistrust by Madrid where it could be seen how many were not indifferent to the clinking of French money used to oil certain mechanisms and of great use to promote the French party. The French king’s party in Madrid seemed to take on important dimensions, maybe a lot fewer (at least during that period) than appeared to the worried eyes of Madrid’s anti-French faction. Even if it is true that Louis XIV did not encounter huge obstacles to his plan to gain followers in Madrid since neither Queen Mariana, nor the emperor were backed by a strong, united political group.\footnote{R. PILO, Juan Everardo Nithard.}

Ambassador Pötting let off steam with Madrid’s pro-Empire ministers regarding the cowardly attitude and undefined political decisions taken by the emperor which tended to delay the opening of an anti-French front, with a view to creating a pro-Empire party led by him, able to win over all those who had not yet joined the French block which, in the meantime, was becoming larger and more compact throughout Europe, slowly but without having to deal with any obstacles.

According to Pötting, Leopold continued to avoid the problem and stopped encouraging his men to find a solution that would allow the Spanish monarchy to avoid becoming part of France. The ambassador’s opinion was confirmed by the emperor’s decisions and the empire’s followers were left powerless by the emperor’s policy, which did not seem to encourage support for the queen. The queen distanced herself from the Hapsburg party and the ambassador, however the ministers determined the solution was to assemble a supranational network of alliances, bringing together Madrid and Vienna.

The ministers most heavily involved in the conspiracy included both the Count of Pötting and the Baron of Lisola, as well as the young Marquis de Grana who was very close to Cardinal Moncada and had helped ruin the Jesuit’s reputation in Vienna to facilitate the plan devised by Madrid.\footnote{Ibidem, p. 125. In Nithard’s opinion, the ambassador and the baron provided Don Juan with few expectations for his marriage arrangement with the Archduchess of Tyrol. They then blamed the Jesuit for the failure of the marriage.}
The Marquis, who was orphaned as a child, was protected and favoured by Nithard at Vienna’s court, but he then decided to support the anti-Jesuit position adopted by the Prince of Auersperg during the years of the government of favourite ministers. Indeed Nithard went so far as to say that the Marquis de Grana’s arrival in Madrid was the result of an agreement between the emperor and Spain’s pro-Hapsburg ministers, signed with Auersperg acting as go-between who, was interested in the mission in Madrid and the valuable information which he would have got hold of and would prove useful for defeating the Jesuit at a political level.

Meanwhile, the Count of Pötting and his wife, Marie Sophie de Dietrichstein, who remained in Madrid until 1673, acted as go-betweens for the imperial plans of action (mostly in favour of Louis XIV) and the maintenance of Spanish ties preceding the Nithard’s affair.

Specifically, they intended to maintain relationships with the Marchioness (Espinardo’s widow) and the Marchioness de la Fuente Ana Portocarrero, whom the ambassador visited to obtain confidential information. The Marchioness had a rather lively circle, not only lovers, which included French ministers not directly linked to Louis XIV, as in the case of the Lord of Gourville, Juan Herault, a representative of the Prince of Condé, appointed to collect amounts due to the Catholic monarchy. On 6 July 1673, near the end of his stay in Madrid, the imperial ambassador went to pay his condolences to Ana Portocarrero upon the death of her husband, recalling the Marquis de la Fuente as “a very good friend of mine, who always has been, and was an instrumental reason for me coming to this Spanish embassy.”

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37 Ibidem, p. 176. About the diplomatic advance of the Marquis of Grana as gobernador de Flandes between 1682 and 1685, see Carmen María FERNÁNDEZ NADAL, La política exterior de la monarquía de Carlos II. El Consejo de Estado y la Embajada en Londres (1665–1700), Gijón 2009, p. 44 and following.
38 On her role, see Laura OLIVÁN SANTALIESTRA, Egregia virago: la mujer como agente del poder en la corte de Mariana de Austria, in: XIII Coloquio Internacional de la AEHM, La historia de las Mujeres: Perspectivas actuales, Barcelona 2006, p. 19.
39 Married to Gaspar de Téves y Guzmán, I Marquise de la Fuente, the ambassador in Venice (1644), and then in Vienna (1656–1661), and a member of the Consejo de Estado since 1666, Feliciano BARRIOS, El Consejo de Estado de la monarquía española 1521–1812, Madrid 1984, p. 386; L. OLIVÁN SANTALIESTRA, Egregia virago, p. 19.
The apostolic nuncios in Madrid: Vitaliano Visconti Borromeo and Federico Borromeo.

The Apostolic nuncios, Vitaliano Visconti Borromeo and Federico Borromeo were other figures with whom the ambassador remained close and who performed a non-marginal role in resolving the problems inside Madrid’s court.

The ambassador and the papal legates enjoyed an intense exchange of confidential information: to better understand Pötting’s position, the nuncio maintained that the confessor could have remained in power for a long time, while the ambassador forecast the demise of favourite government in a short period of time.

The nuncio was intent on avoiding a crisis but was certain of the fact that the only way possible for a peaceful solution to the matter was to remove the Jesuit from Madrid and it was crucially important that, by February 1669, he had succeeded in the difficult task of convincing the Jesuit to abandon the government before the situation worsened.

Nevertheless, Nithard continued to fear for his safety; this fear, which was anything but unfounded, was also shared by the nuncio himself who opted to make use of a guarantor who offered the Jesuit the certainty that everything would peacefully go back to complying with the queen’s decisions and authority once he left Madrid. The nuncio and Cardinal Moncada reached the following agreement: the former would persuade the confessor and the queen to act carefully, while on his part the cardinal would convince John of Austria the Younger to accept the government of Flanders.

In the meantime, not a single voice of dissent had been heard in Madrid with regard to John of Austria the Younger and, in order to prevent the army led by the illegitimate son of Philip IV from encountering the favour of the population and causing unrest, the Admiral of Castile and the confessor (without any prior consultation with the Councils or Committees decided to put together a guard corps of around one thousand horsemen to defend the Jesuit. Clearly it was a move destined to meet with general disapproval and some ministers, including the Vice-Chancellor of the Council of Aragon, Cristóbal Crespi,

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asked the queen for leave to abandon court, fearing possible retaliation by the military should John of Austria the Younger and his men be defeated.45

The nuncio tried to settle the crisis, warning the queen of the inappropriateness of similar situations during the period when the king was still a minor since the government would inevitably be weakened as a result. Mariana hurried to write to John of Austria the Younger, reassuring him of her complete non-involvement in the decision to put together an army.46

At the same time, the nuncio attempted to convince the confessor of the risks connected with his position and that a peaceful solution was to be hoped for to prevent the situation from worsening and military action by Don John, and he tried, inter alia, to get the illegitimate son of Philip IV to pay heed to more cautious counsel.47

However, what surprised and wrong-footed the papal legate was the determination with which Queen Mariana did not seem intent on reaching an agreement in a political context where even the ministers that backed John Joseph of Austria – with the end goal, as already stated, of removing Nithard from the government, but without any plans to carry out a coup d'état – had shown their willingness to take part in mediation coordinated by Nuncio Visconti, in order to prevent the situation from worsening with unpleasant consequences for all.48

At this point, the nuncio called for Rome to adopt a position in favour of the cardinals that were working to resolve the problem since it would be fitting, also in the future, to keep under control Don John’s “ambitious and restless” nature through the cooperation of Spain’s valuable cardinals.49

The crisis ended with Nithard’s departure from Madrid on 25 February 1669.50

BNE, Ms 5742, Diario, f. 413 and following. See also ASV, SS, Spagna, vol. 136, ff. 358r–361r, Nuncio to Pope, Madrid, 23 February 1669, ff. 358rv.

ASV, SS, Spagna, Vol. 136, ff. 358r–361r, Nuncio to Pope, Madrid, 23 February 1669, ff. 359r.


ASV, SS, Spagna, Vol. 136, Nuncio to Pope, Madrid, 6 March 1669, ff. 362r–363r. About the relationship between Juan José and Nithard in Calderón’s work, see Catalina BUEZO, Utopía y antimodelo en el teatro aurisecular: de la comedia calderoniana “La estatua de Prometeo” a la moyjanga dramática “Merlín y los animals”, Teatro de Palabras, 2, 2008, pp. 45–56; Cecilia BRAIN, Juan Everardo Nithard, protagonista de “La estatua de Prometeo” de Calderón de la Barca, Anuario calderoniano 6, 2013, pp. 31–47.

ASV, SS, Spagna, Vol. 136, Nuncio to Pope, Madrid, 6 March 1669, ff. 362r–363r.

The government was reorganised during the spring and summer of that year with some of Nithard’s proudest opponents playing leading roles. A new inquisitor-general was required and the Count of Castrillo was recommended for the position, forcing him to resign as president of the Council of Castile. The Count had many enemies; however he was the only person capable of being an antagonist to the Marquis of Aytona in the favourite government.\textsuperscript{51} The offices of President of Castile or Vice-Chancellor of Aragon were offered to the latter’s brother-in-law, Cardinal Moncada: the two of them had made peace immediately after the conspiracy thanks to mediation by the nuncio who hoped to leave Madrid in a situation of relative governability in which none of the rival factions succeeded in prevailing on the other and so as the queen was free to reign.\textsuperscript{52}

If Moncada had chosen the position of vice-chancellor, the position of President of Castile would have conferred on the Count of Peñaranda; the Marquis of Castelo Rodrigo would have then replaced him on the committee. In this situation, a kind of triumvirate would have been created, comprised of Aytona and his two brothers-in-law: Moncada and Castelo Rodrigo. It would have been the ideal solution that also allowed Cardinal Aragón, freed from the factions involved, to side with the majority.\textsuperscript{53}

However, nothing was to come of the nuncio’s plan as “the fabrication made by me with great effort in gathered those trees in government benefit big fall had received.”\textsuperscript{54}

As if not enough, Emperor Leopold – whose position, which was officially neutral, but actually in favour of the French hegemonic design, had helped determine the Spanish crisis – attempted to persuade his sister Mariana to once again hand over government to a favourite minister upon the fall of the confessor. The purpose of this choice was to place a figure alongside the Queen of Spain who was linked to the courts of Vienna and Paris and able to intervene in Spain’s internal affairs. However, Leopold and Mariana failed to agree on a person and the emperor’s plans were ended.\textsuperscript{55}

An unresolved question remains regarding the Nithard matter: what was the importance of Rome’s role in the situation?\textsuperscript{56} It is true that the destiny of the Spanish monarchy

\textsuperscript{51} ASV, SS, Spagna, vol. 136, ff. 416r–417v, Nuncio to Pope, Madrid, 19 June 1669.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibidem. Towards this objective, the Nuncio considered a reconciliation between Cardinal Moncada and the queen, see Ibidem, ff. 388r–390r, Nuncio to Pope, Madrid, 11 May 1669.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibidem, ff. 416r–417v, the nuncio to the pope, Madrid, 19 June 1669.
\textsuperscript{54} “Gran crollo ha ricevuto la fabrica da me fatta con somma fatica in riunir questi tre a beneficio del Governo”, Ibidem, ff. 444r–445v, Nuncio to Pope, Madrid, 14 August 1669.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibidem, vol. 141, f. 524rv, Nuncio to Pope, Madrid, 26 August 1671.
continued to be crucial for the fate of the whole of Europe and this is the reason why Rome had always paid great attention to Spanish political matters.\(^{57}\) It is also well-known how, inter alia, Clement IX’s main interest during that period was to re-establish the pope’s role as the architect of international peace.\(^{58}\)

Clement IX decided to interfere in Spain’s internal politics, with the desire to redeem himself after the recent Candia crisis. However, the pope’s position was not clear – even if obviously anti-Nithard – as it fluctuated between the vision of a French successor and the possibility of Don John Joseph succeeding his step-brother Charles.\(^{59}\)

The pope, extremely concerned for the fragility of this situation, had sent Federico Borromeo to Madrid in the capacity of extraordinary nuncio. He was a trusted aid that the pope hoped would be able to resolve the matter.\(^{60}\)

Borromeo, a close friend of Cardinals Aragón and Moncada and the Imperial ambassador, backed John Joseph’s aspirations and supported this strategy. Despite this, he adopted the policy the pope held dear in a totally linear manner, hence an approach focused on maintaining peace and, above all, restoring peace within the Spanish monarchy which was indispensible to release the island of Candia from Turkish control.

The role of the Spanish ambassador in Rome, the Marquis of Astorga was crucial. He was politically close to Don John Joseph, had to help make the Jesuit’s life difficult once he reached Italian soil.\(^{61}\) He delayed the confessor’s appointment as extraordinary ambassador to the Holy See and forced him to extend his stay in Maccarese beyond the agreed period.\(^{62}\)

The marquis also attempted to impede the confessor’s audiences with Pope Clement IX


\(^{62}\) “He resuelto se le de título de Embaxador extraordinario a Alemania o Roma, donde eligiere”, AGS, E, K, 1645, *Decreto de la Reina Gobernadora*, cit., in: F. TOMÁS Y VALIENTE, *Los validos*, p. 177 and following.
and to deflate the attitude of members of the Spanish faction, dissuading pro-Spanish cardinals from seeing him.\textsuperscript{63} The reasons for this can be attributed to a lasting result of the aristocracy’s reactions towards Nithard, a foreigner and an usurper, that extended from Madrid to Rome.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{63} F. TOMÁS Y VALIENTE, \textit{Los validos}, pp. 106 and following.

\textsuperscript{64} For a comparative perspective, see also Julián J. LOZANO NAVARRO, \textit{Dos embajadores del rey católico en la Roma del siglo XVII: los cardenales Trivulzio y Nithard. Una perspectiva comparada}, Chronica Nova 42, 2016, pp. 137–166.
A number of Czech historians are currently struggling with the fundamental issue of whether to publish their work in Czech or in English; to surmount the boundaries of the domestic scientific ground. The publication from Tomáš Černušák et al. resolved this challenge by issuing a dual edition: both in Czech (Papežství a české země v tisíciletých dějinách, Praha 2017) and English (The Papacy and the Czech Lands, Praha 2016).

This collective monograph presents a topic that historians have traditionally dealt with, the papacy, but from a new perspective and with an unprecedented time span. In a total of 450 pages (including a detailed index of people), the leading Czech historians, who have been studying the papacy at various historical stages in the long term, present the relationship of this thousand-year-old multinational institution to a small country in the middle of Europe, over the centuries, from the deep Middle Ages to the present (ending in 2013). On the subject of the time span, it is a remarkable achievement, as we rarely encounter such an extensive synthesis. Additionally, the readers (especially Czechs) will appreciate the chosen perspective linking the Holy See with the Czech lands. The authors are aware that the two subjects are difficult to compare; the historical interest of the papacy in Czech lands lacked a stable influence, and it was also weaker than its interest in other countries. Nevertheless, the Holy See had a considerable influence on the formation of Czech history; at the same time many significant events influencing the development of the papacy occurred in Czech history.

The book is divided into eight extensive chapters, each of which is written by a different historian. The only exception to this format is by the author Tomáš Parma. He divided the long period that began after the Battle of White Mountain and continued until the beginning of the 19th century into two units; the division being 1740, the year of the death of Emperor Charles VI and Maria Theresa’s accession to the throne. Both the chapters and their interpretation are chronologically arranged, which seems to be the logical solution with such an extensive collaboration. The historiographical introduction was written by Jaroslav Pánek, the head of the Czech Historical Institute in Rome, who assisted in compiling the entire project. Indeed, most of the authors were scholars at the Institute and were able to find the necessary background information there during their research in Italy. Pánek does not resort to the so often seen enumeration of all the works published so far on the subject under examination, but
merely refers appropriately to the relevant research and the missing places that this monograph seeks to fill. As a result, the historiographical introduction does fulfil the role of familiarising the reader with the subject; it is not just an austere list of authors and works, which would be unbearable in such an extensive timeframe.

The main body of the book begins in the period of the Great Moravian Empire, showing the first steps in establishing relations with the papal institution and manoeuvring under the still great influence of the empire (Josef Žemlička). The main body of the book continues to the last of the Přemyslid dynasty and the arrival of the House of Luxembourg (Zdeňka Hledíková). A separate chapter covers the Reformation period and the Hussite movement emerging in the Czech lands (Antonín Kalous). The subsequent period (up to the important year of 1620) engages the reader's attention with the innovative approach of the author (Tomáš Černušák), who managed to bring a new perspective to this frequently discussed topic. Recatholization and the time of enlightened Josephinism are appropriately divided into two chapters. The author succeeded in pointing out the contradictory approach of the state to the relationship with the papal institution in these two successive phases (Tomáš Parma). The changing period of the status of the Catholic Church and the papacy – from the beginning of the 19th century until the end of the Habsburg Monarchy – is also appropriately addressed in the monograph (Jitka Jonová). The last chapter is particularly valuable and takes place from the interwar period until the present (2013), which is seldom in the centre of historians’ attention (Jaroslav Šebek).

The authors of the book highlighted the interrelated historical events of the papacy and the Czech lands. They often seek to examine known facts from a different angle or using unused sources to show their interrelation, which has remained unaccentuated thus far. The text is written in clear, accessible language, yet lacking a scientific form. This makes the book more accessible to the wider population, although the reader is naturally expected to have at least a basic knowledge of general history.

While the book maintains its consecutive and uniform character, the reader may sense a slight form or style disunity stemming from the collective authorship. Even though each author has their own distinctive style of writing, which cannot be suppressed or restricted. There is a slight imbalance in the book’s accentuation of the topics of papacy and Czech countries, which varies in different chapters. Additionally, the arrangement of the chapters is not entirely uniform. This is most evident in the passage by Jitka Jonová, whose content in the book is not larger than the other authors but has nearly twice as many subchapters.

Still, this criticism is merely superficial and does not affect the exceptional quality of the text or of the research carried out. The topic and concept of the publication are extremely thorough and unique in the Czech context. The extensive time span required
distinct expertise for each historical section and this was adequately utilised. The team of historians assembled by Tomáš Černušák succeeded in writing a valuable modern monograph on a topic that is not entirely new, yet with a unique grasp.

Nela Michalicová


The presented monograph Conclave. Secrets of the Papal Election by the ecclesiastical historian Hubert Wolf examines changes in papal elections over the past two thousand years of Christianity. Its topicality is all the greater given that the contemporary believer has quite recently witnessed two conclaves (in 2005 and 2013). At this time, the eyes of the world were on the meetings of the College of Cardinals convened to elect the popes. They viewed the prospective candidates to the Holy See, the factions in the Curia, and learned the background of the election, among other details. Wolf’s book analyses, describes and summarizes the form of these elections through the context of events of antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Modern Age, and present-day events, while putting it in the theological-historical context of the period. Though it is not the first book about the conclave in Czech or Slovak historiography, it certainly surpasses the available short texts by Marcel Šefčík (Conclave)¹ and Bernhard Hülsebusch (Der Stellvertreter Jesu). Das Geheimnis der Papstwahl (the original German title) has been published in Czech as Jak se volí papež).²

Hubert Wolf (1959) is a professor at Münster University and is a Catholic priest. He is one of the most important German church historians of the present; in recent years he has been renowned as a distinguished expert when talking about the twentieth century. In addition to the critical online edition of the diplomatic reports of Eugenio Pacelli, an apostolic nuncio to Munich and Berlin, available at www.pacelli-edition.de, of particular interest to historians, theologians and community of experts is his monograph Pope and Devil: The Vatican’s Archives and the Third Reich, which deals with the diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s.³

Wolf’s book Conclave is divided into seven chapters: preface, concluding reflection, afterword, notes, recommended literature, a list of illustrations, and an index of names. The thematic chapters examine important areas of the analysed issues in the

² Bernhard HÜLSEBUSCH, Jak se volí papež, Kostelní Vydří 2003.
³ Hubert WOLF, Il Papa e il Diavolo. Il Vaticano e il Terzo Reich, Roma 2008.
chronological perspective. The subjects of
the chapters can be considered key aspects
of the papal election: I Who elects the pope?,
II Who can actually become a pope?, III
Where is the pope elected?, IV How is the
pope elected?, V What makes a pope a pope?,
VI How secret is the papal election really?
and VII How does the pope resign? Each of
these chapters is divided into unnumbered
subchapters.

While most similar books go through
the topic gradually and with increasing
details, Wolf’s readers discover the multi-
layered world of the papal election, which
constitutes a natural set of answers to the
author’s questions asked in the title of each
chapter. In his interpretation, the author
does not try to obscure the unsavoury sides
of the dark centuries of ecclesiastical history.
The papal office was the subject of power
struggles between influential family clans or
between several rival claimants to the title of
pope at the same time (the problem of the
Western Schism – when two or three men
simultaneously claimed to be the true pope).
He also does not hesitate to inform readers
of narratives filled with the frequent earthly
misconducts of church leaders.

In order for the secular power to inter-
fere with the election of the new pope,
the institutionalization of the College of
Cardinals, originally made up of exclusively
Roman clergy who served in parishes of the
Eternal City, was promoted in the Middle
Ages. However, the College of Cardinals
gradually became a papal advisory council;
a sort of senate that sought independence for
the papacy from secular power and rejected
the underhand selling of ecclesiastical
offices and criticised clerical marriages.
In the eleventh century, the College of
Cardinals assumed an important role both
in the government of the Church and in the
papal election, when it abolished the right of
people of Rome to intervene in the conclave;
thereby eliminating the lay element. In 1059,
the College of Cardinals was designated as
the sole body of electors of the pope. They
were men who mainly came from the ranks
of the bishops and, for the last 650 years,
exclusively from the ranks of cardinals. This
step was not accepted without criticism, as
some people feel the College of Cardinals
does not evenly represent the Church
throughout the world, but it has survived to
this day. From the end of the twelfth century,
a two-thirds supermajority vote has been
required to elect the new pope, abandoning
the requirement of unanimous election of
the head of the Church, and significantly
shortening any inconclusive conclaves. Since
the seventeenth century, a secret ballot in the
election – held in the Sistine Chapel before
Michelangelo’s monumental fresco of the
Last Judgment – has been gradually adopted.

From 1274, the election of the future
head of the Catholic Church was held in
seclusion cum clave (Latin for with a key), in
an enclosed space in the papal palace that can
be locked; to prevent the clergy and nobility
from intervening. Thus, the elections have
been typically held in Rome, although they
have been intermittently held outside Rome
(in 1088 in Terracina; 1264–1265 in Perugia;
1243 in Anagni; 1254 in Naples; or 1260 in Viterbo). The papal elections have mostly taken place when the pope has died. From the middle of the fifteenth century until the end of the eighteenth century, the conclave took place in the Apostolic Palace in the Vatican, in the Pauline Chapel. It has only been since the seventeenth century that the conclave has met in the Sistine Chapel (except in 1799–1800, when Napoleon’s troops occupying Rome forced the election to be held in Venice, and 1823, 1825, 1830–1831 and 1846 when the conclave took place in the Quirinal Palace in Rome, which was the main residence of the popes in the 19th century).

Despite the high secrecy of the election and its formalities, under the threat of severe church punishments, we now have relatively detailed information not only on the distribution of power factions in the conclave, but also about the voting in individual rounds, disputes in the election and election favourites. For example, we know that in the 1922 contest for the tiara, there were two competing factions. The conservatives favoured the policies and style of Pope Pius X and their most prominent candidates were Rafael Merry del Val, Gaetano De Lai, and Camillo Laurenti. The liberals preferred the policies and style of Benedict XV and were represented by Achille Ratti, Pietro Gasparri, and Pietro Maffi. Achille Ratti was elected as Pius XI; he was the compromise choice of the most divided conclave in many years.

In this monograph, Wolf reveals the frequency of the changes made to the papal election. During the twentieth century, all of the Roman pontiffs, except for Pope Benedict XV and John Paul I, made changes to the conclave. They were eager to improve and modernize the highly differentiated legal and liturgical regulations to better meet the requirements of modern times. For example, Pope Pius X significantly intervened in the papal election when he forbade jus exclusivae (Latin for right of exclusion, claimed by several Catholic monarchs of Europe to veto a candidate for the papacy) in the apostolic constitution Commissum Nobis (1904), which he had witnessed a year earlier in his election during the conclave.

In his motu proprio Cum Proxime (1922), Pius XI set the start of the conclave at ten to fifteen days from the death of the pope, instead of a fixed interval of ten days. In the constitution Vacantis Apostolicae Sedis (1945), Pius XII increased the majority required for election from two-thirds of those voting to two-thirds plus one. In 1970, Pope Paul VI determined that only cardinals under the age of 80 were allowed to vote in a conclave. The current form of the election is based on the constitution Universi Dominici Gregis, issued by Pope John Paul II in 1996, which reflected the intervention of the future Pope Benedict XVI.

Based on the above, I consider Wolf’s cultured and readable book an extraordinarily valuable contribution to ecclesiastical history. It calls attention to the interesting and important context of the papal election,
convincingly formulates the causes and consequences of the individual aspects of the old rituals and places it in the politico-religious-cultural context of Europe over two millennia. It is not only the readability but also the logical arrangement of parts of the entire work which further increases the appeal of Wolf’s book. Therefore, we can undoubtedly consider it a necessary and significant contribution that intelligibly identifies a valuable aspect in the history of papacy through antiquity, medieval times, modern period and contemporary history.

Marek Šmíd


The history of diplomacy is a topic as old as historiography. Contemporary studies place emphasis on the so-called new or cultural history of diplomacy, shifting away from a positivist understanding (i.e. the conclusion of peace treaties, alliances, distinguished diplomats) towards cultural contexts (housing, eating, traveling, ceremonial). In other parts of the world, the view of the history of diplomacy was already established by the end of the last century, however in the Czech Republic it has only been in recent years. This book, written by Pardubice and Prague historians about the history of diplomacy in the Baroque period, deservedly belongs to this production and is also the first original contribution to this topic in our country. This collective monograph was developed through a grant awarded to the Institute of Historical Sciences in the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy at the University of Pardubice (2013–2017) from the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic.

Kubeš’s book is based on the stories of 134 noblemen from the Lands of the Bohemian Crown who are studied as a representative sample for the given time and place. It builds on Klaus Müller’s classic book, which has in many cases inspired its authors. This work by Jiří Kubeš et al. is divided into two general sections: theoretical and practical. The theoretical part, which opens the book, is a good introduction to the topic. In addition to the necessary introduction to the geopolitical

1 GAČR Grant No. 13-12939S – Bohemian and Moravian Nobility in the Diplomatic Service of the Austrian Habsburgs (1640-1740). The research team comprised of: Martin Bakeš, Michaela Buriánková, Jiří M. Havlík, Jiří Hrbek, Martin Krummholz, Jiří Kubeš, Lenka Maršílková, Nela Michalícová and Vítězslav Prchal.

2 Klaus MÜLLER, Das kaiserliche Gesandt­­­­schafswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Friede (1648–1740), Bonn 1976.
history of the period, emphasis is placed on ceremonies, the diplomat's residence (including the phenomenon of chapels of imperial diplomats) and the people in it. Also addressed are the difficulties of travelling and the long separation of the aristocrat from both their family and the imperial court.

The practical part investigates the imperial diplomatic missions to individual countries: Spain, Rome, England, Sweden, Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russia, and the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, respectively. It is not a description of the situation in all European countries, which would have been very difficult, if not impossible. For one thing, the book would have had unimaginable proportions, and, for another, it would have had to have gone into too many aspects of the very fortunes that the publication is based on, not to mention the superficiality that would have to be resorted to with such a scope. The absence of some of the major players in European politics, such as France or the Ottoman Empire, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries cannot be perceived as a negative and the authors are conscious of this (p. 19). However, these (and other countries) have not been completely overlooked – in a number of passages, additional stories have been added to the main corpus of narrative, thus expanding and complementing the already quite extensive scope of the book.

These are not only stories of diplomats of the highest ranks (i.e. ambassadors and envoys) who came from the most noble families of the monarchy. Attention is also placed on the lower ranks – residents and secretaries of legation – who were often the heart of the embassy. They were people who intimately knew the environment and made them invaluable assistants to any newly appointed ambassadors. The authors also deal with some lesser-known issues, such as the issue of wives of ambassadors. These women had considerable influence (especially in Spain) and some negotiations could not do without them.

The chapels of imperial legates are another topic Kubeš et al. explores. They were mainly founded in Protestant areas (England, Scandinavia, and Protestant regions of the Empire) and their influence often went beyond the embassy walls. This resulted in a variety of disputes with the ruling elites, as mass at the embassy, led by the chaplain of the legation, was illegally attended by the local Catholic minority. These problems could have seriously jeopardized the course of the mission itself and, in extreme cases, have resulted in the imprisonment of the legation chaplain or other persons associated with the embassy. Though it has long been marginalized, even the issue of the actual embassy building is fundamental. Only recent research has shown that it was always a very representative palace at a very prestigious address.

The selection and quality of the residences and their furnishings were largely determined by ceremonial rules. In the early modern period, these rules influenced the diplomat's life much more than they did before or after this time. It was not only about the various
celebrations and balls they were invited to or hosted; the protocol was their everyday bread and butter. However, the adherence thereto was not always without problems, as not all rulers were willing to recognize the Emperor’s superior position (Russia, significantly). Thus, the journey to a foreign country was difficult for a diplomat not only due to the distance from home and the amount of money it cost, but also because of different cultural and religious customs. There were frequent cultural differences that may have been related to factors such as cuisine, clothing, design or architecture. An ambassador who returned from abroad was then recognized in his homeland as an expert in the foreign environment.

The diplomatic service was perceived by the aristocrats as a suitable stepping stone to another office, which is what happened in seventy-six percent of the cases investigated therein. Forty-one percent were individuals who even reached the highest offices at the court or in the individual lands of the Habsburg Monarchy during their lifetime (pp. 171 and 173).

The second part of the book describes the considerably different situations found throughout the European countries. While high-level senior diplomats with the title of ambassador who were sent to Spain, having already established contacts there, in Rome, the emperor was essentially represented by three groups of people. First, there were the cardinal protectors; these were people who lived in the Eternal City and supported the emperor. Next, there were the envoys; clergymen who were sent to the Eternal City. The last group was comprised of imperial auditors from the Apostolic Tribunal of the Roman Rota, the highest ecclesiastical court constituted by the Holy See.

In England (or, more precisely, the United Kingdom) and Sweden, the problem was the dominant Protestant religion. This was reflected in the fact that the Emperor sent inexperienced young second-rank diplomats (envoys, or even those of lower ranks) to these countries, with a few exceptions.

The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth had a rather specific and unique situation compared to the other European countries. It was ruled by a king who was elected by the general sejm. This was also where audiences of the ambassadors took place, not with the king, as was customary elsewhere. Initially, the sejm banned long-term missions, so the status of imperial diplomats was particularly complicated in this composite state. Diplomatic missions to the Tsardom of Russia had to deal with an entirely different cultural and religious environment. Moreover, many negotiations ended unsuccessfully due to ceremonial disputes. The emperor was unwilling to recognize the tsar as his equal and the tsar did not want to give the Emperor’s representatives any special treatment. It was not until after the death of Peter the Great in the mid-1720s that the situation was able to improve.

The last subchapter is dedicated to the envoys to the Holy Roman Empire. The prince-electors and the most prominent imperial princes began to act like sovereigns
over time, so it was increasingly important for the emperor to be informed of the events in their courts. The number of imperial diplomats was considerable. For example, in 1686, there were seven Emperor’s representatives (p. 351) working only in Regensburg (the seat of the Perpetual Diet of the Holy Roman Empire). Other envoys were employed with numerous (arch) bishops and in free imperial cities (a major diplomatic representation was in Hamburg, for example).

This book is based on thorough archive research conducted throughout almost all of Europe and is firmly entrenched in literature (in addition to information in Czech, English and German, also in French, Spanish, Polish and Russian). Nonetheless, it does not get overburdened in facts or details. On the contrary, it is written in a light, fresh style that is typical of all the authors and therefore there is no significant difference between the chapters (which can happen with collective monographs). The positive impression is further enhanced by a rich pictorial supplement. This monograph redresses one of the significant omissions of Czech research and is an important contribution, even in an international context.

Filip Vávra


Jana Černá, of the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen, is known among Czech Hispanics for bringing new themes to Hispanic and Latin American studies, especially from the field of Spanish Renaissance philosophy and science. She has confirmed this with her latest book, which deals with the emergence of new forms of science in the Early Modern Age and examines the role that the discovery of America played in this phenomenon. She does so primarily based on an analysis of texts written by Spanish authors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Huarte, Vives, Hernández, Nieremberg et al.). In addition to the aforementioned task, the process allowed her to pursue another objective: to prove that the Spanish knowledge of the Renaissance and Baroque, often disregarded in the past, was not nearly as irrational, dogmatic and mystical as it tends to be presented, but that it showed many parallels and analogies with European research. To some extent, the submitted manuscript is a follow-up to the monograph Eye-witness Accounts. Spain, the New World and a Change in the Scientific and Communication Paradigm (Červený Kostelec, 2012). In it, Černá successfully presented how the discovery of the American continent had transformed particular ways of scientific communication, relying on her extensive knowledge of Iberian Renaissance science.

Černá based her work on thorough interpretations of texts written by authors whose
names are unfairly neglected in international research and, with exceptions, almost unknown in the Czech context. During their time, the works of José de Acosta, Juan Huarte de San Juan, and Juan Eusebio Nieremberg earned wide acclaim, not only among scientists, but also among ordinary readers. This is also demonstrated by their presence in aristocratic and ecclesiastical libraries of the geographically and linguistically remote Kingdom of Bohemia (for more information, see Robert Archer – Jaroslava Kašparová–Pavel Marek, Bohemia hispánica. Fondos españoles de los siglos XVI y XVII, Barcelona 2013). While it may not have been the main intention of Černá, the book is the first and only work written in Czech in which the reader is able to get acquainted with the work and ideas of these authors. Therefore, it is misfortunate that the author did not cite a detailed list of references in her work, complete with the basic biographical and bibliographic information about the authors.

The work is very well-structured. In the introduction, Černá clarifies the reasons of the predominantly dismissive attitude of historians, philosophers and great thinkers of the past to Spanish Renaissance philosophy and science. She indicates that even in the present day, many authors do not hesitate to question Spain's contribution to European modern science.

The introduction is followed by the principal work, which consists of the following three chapters. In the first chapter, the author describes how the discovery of the New World helped shape the attitude of modern man towards the traditional knowledge represented by texts of ancient authorities. The discovery of the American continent not only encouraged the interest of writers in natural science, but it also revealed the inadequacy of previous approaches. Černá attempts to demonstrate this notion with numerous examples of works by Spanish thinkers. By doing so, she proves that during the Renaissance, new findings acquired through sensory experience were usually brought into line with the traditional or biblical context. Textual and empirical cognition thus coexisted side by side in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In the following chapter, the author addresses the issue of Renaissance anthropocentrism, which she understands not only as one of the prerequisites for the emergence of a new science, but also as a consequence thereof. Černá notes that the increase in the self-confidence of the early modern individual resulting from the extension of their geographical and cognitive horizons led to the emergence of various treatises on the dignity of man. The individual had enough self-confidence to try and learn about nature and to control and benefit from it. In the last chapter of the work, the author shows how confrontation with the nature of the New World prompted a change in the perception of curiosity that ceased to be considered a sin in the Renaissance period, and on the contrary it turns into a virtue, because it leads to the knowledge of God himself and his work of God.

There is no need to emphasize the importance of the investigated topic, which is
revolutionary in Czech historiography. The method Černá used to process it is very original even in the Europe-wide context. Her results are based on her considerable knowledge of the sources, and, besides the large number of edited documents, she also uses personal notes of Jesuits from the New World stored in the archive of Real Academia de Historia in Madrid. The list of references, containing nearly one hundred sources, principally by Spanish authors, is an invaluable source of information for historians associated with the intellectual history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The author’s excellent knowledge of the studied topic is also apparent in the list of secondary literature, where we find references to German or Italian studies, in addition to the Spanish and English resources. The quality of the work is accentuated by the language; the book is clear and comprehensible, which makes it appealing to both experts and educated readers.

The work reviewed clearly shows that the Spanish early modern philosophers and scientists were able to make profitable use of incentives obtained during exploratory voyages and conquest expeditions. It is unfortunate that Černá did not attempt to learn whether similar scientific developments were achieved at the same time by Portugal. This type of comparison would be supported by the fact that the Portuguese were considerably involved in the discovery of the American continent and were also part of the Hispanic monarchy in the years 1580–1640.

The definition and use of the term “Spanish Renaissance science and philosophy” has some concerns. If the author’s research is bound to a specific time frame – between the discovery of the New World and the second half of the seventeenth century – a historian may find this term inaccurate or even inappropriate. In my opinion, authors such as Juan Eusebio Nieremberg and Hernando Castrillo, whose works are among the basic sources used in the book, can hardly be regarded as Renaissance thinkers, and it would thus be more accurate to choose the term philosophy and science of the Spanish Golden Century/Siglo de Oro, or philosophy and science of the Renaissance and Baroque. However, it is clear to me that it is where my view of a historian clashes with traditional conventions of philosophy.

This contradiction of terminology should not reduce the overall positive evaluation of the presented text. Černá’s book is an impressive illustration of how important a modern interdisciplinary approach is in contemporary research and how interesting the topics it offers are. However, it also shows that contemporary Czech Hispanic studies do not only uncover more and more chapters from the history of Czech-Spanish relations, but they produce works whose ambition is to contribute to the key debates of European science and which can also attract attention abroad. Therefore, we can hope that this strong example of research and writing by Černá will encourage others to continue this trend.

Pavel Marek
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Archivio Caetani, Fondazione “Camillo Caetani”</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDF FSO ST</td>
<td>Archivio della Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede, Fondo Sant’Uffizio, Stanza Storica</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Allgemeine deutsche Biographie</td>
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<tr>
<td>Add. Mss.</td>
<td>Additional Manuscripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Archivo Ducal de Medinaceli, Toledo</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>Archivo General de Simancas</td>
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<td>AH</td>
<td>Archivo Histórico</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Archivum Primatiale, Strigonium</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>Archivio Storico della Sacra Congregazione per l’Evangelizzazione dei Popoli o de “Propaganda Fide”</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASFi</td>
<td>Archivio di Stato di Firenze</td>
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<td>ASM</td>
<td>Archivio di Stato di Massa</td>
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<td>ASR</td>
<td>Archivio di Stato di Roma</td>
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<td>ASV</td>
<td>Archivio Segreto Vaticano</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Biblioteca Angelica</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barb. Lat.</td>
<td>Barberiniani Latini</td>
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<td>BAV</td>
<td>Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana</td>
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<td>British Library</td>
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<td>BNE</td>
<td>Biblioteca Nacional de España</td>
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<td>Borg. Lat.</td>
<td>Borgiani Latini</td>
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<td>CVH</td>
<td>Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae</td>
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<tr>
<td>ČČH</td>
<td>Český časopis historický</td>
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<td>ČMM</td>
<td>Časopis Matice Moravské</td>
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<td>DBI</td>
<td>Dizionario biografico degli Italiani</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>Estado</td>
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<td>EAAC</td>
<td>Epistulae et acta Antonii Caetani</td>
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