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Abstract: Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein participated within the imperial delegation at the peace negotiations in Münster and Osnabrück where together with Georg von Plettenberg he represented the interests of Ferdinand III as the King of Bohemia at the Electoral College. Although he only took part in discussions that concerned one specific disputed issue, namely the return of the electoral vote to the Count Palatine of the Rhine, his presence at the meeting represents important evidence about the relations between the Czech Lands and the Holy Roman Empire during the period prior to the readmission of the Bohemian Elector and his representatives to the Electoral College, which occurred as late as in 1708. That mission also had an impact on the career of the young Waldstein, who, after his return, was introduced to the Aulic Council and from 1650 onwards another career awaited him in the Bohemian provincial offices and even there he was still performing tasks that were associated with the imperial policy.

Keywords: The Peace of Westphalia – the Bohemian electoral vote – imperial diplomacy – Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein – the Electoral College – the Electoral Palatinate

On the 29th November 1645 the main imperial negotiator Maximilian von Trauttmansдорff accompanied by the young Bohemian nobleman Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein arrived for the Westphalian negotiations, which were intended to bring an end to the Thirty Years’ War. Count Waldstein stayed in Münster on Königsstraße and later he should become a representative of the Bohemian King. Information of this kind may well seem strange for several reasons. Above all at that time the Czech Lands already constituted a fixed part of the Habsburg Monarchy and this bond had been additionally strengthened in a fundamental manner by the Battle of the White Mountain and the subsequent issuance of the Verneuerte Landesordnung (1627/1628),

1 This research was realised within the standard grant project Nr 13–12939S Bohemian and Moravian Nobility in the Diplomatic Service of the Austrian Habsburgs (1640–1740) supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic.
which the earlier historiography often referred to as “The End of Czech Independence”.\(^2\) Thereby amongst the representatives of the European powers an individual appeared who was acting on behalf of the Monarch of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, which clearly at that time did not match the definition of a sovereign state. Whereas the legitimacy to hold top-level talks with other independent states belongs and in the 17th Century also belonged to the indisputable signs of sovereignty in regard to international law. Such a discrepancy is just one of the oddities that was associated with Waldstein’s mission that the following lines will attempt to explain.

**Authorisation**

Although the results of the Westphalian negotiations brought peace to most of Europe and the actual war continued only between France and Spain, their primary purpose was to arrange relations within the Holy Roman Empire. Also the Kingdom of Bohemia does not act in the person of its King or of his authorised deputy on the basis of European international law, but as a subject nation of the Holy Roman Empire. The mission of Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein alternately in Münster and Osnabrück can only be understood in the context of the relations between the Empire and the Czech Lands.

Especially historians of the early and high Middle Ages, who have followed the turbulent relationships between the Bohemian Dukes and Kings on one side and the Emperor on the other side, have up till now been trying hard to answer the question of pertinence of the Czech Lands to the union of the Holy Roman Empire.\(^3\) Since in early

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\(^2\) This view specifically resonated in “Masaryk’s” perception of Czech history. The French historian and bohemist Ernst DENIS described the pre-White Mountain period in *Konec samostatnosti české I-II* [The End of the Bohemian Independence], Prague 1893 as representing the phasing out of Czech independence and this perspective is also shared by Jindřich Vančura, the translator of Denis’ work.

modern times the person of Roman-German Emperor and Bohemian King, with a few exceptions, was identical, there was not any similar rivalry that in regard to the feudal rights often had a personal character. This does not mean, however, that the relationship between the two constitutional units was any less complicated.

The majority of the reforms that Emperor Maximilian I (1495) implemented in the late 15th Century did not affect the Czech Lands; primarily because they were not included in the imperial provincial system (Reichskreise) and thereby paid no imperial taxes, which, since 1530, were regularly prescribed for them based on the Imperial Register (Reichsmatrikel) and after some time also amortised, however. The Czech Lands were also not subject to the imperial laws nor to the imperial authorities’ resolutions, including those of the Imperial Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht) and the Aulic Council (Reichshofrat). The attempts to achieve stronger ties in the economic sphere also failed, including an attempt to introduce a unified monetary system into the Empire’s territory including the Czech Lands. Still, it cannot be clearly affirmed that the Czech Lands were not part of the Holy Roman Empire in early modern times; fundamental question should therefore not sound whether they existed, but how did the constitutional ties between the empire and the Kingdom of Bohemia actually manifest. When doing so it is important to disregard such categories as inferiority and superiority and even today’s concepts about the State.

Outside the imperial provincial administration that was playing its vital role, especially in those areas with the most widespread territorial fragmentation (i.e. Franconia and Swabia) were not only some smaller Imperial Estates (these were “ungekreist”), but also, for example, the Confederatio Helvetica that had not officially been released from the bond to the Empire until the year 1648. The Czech Lands were not released from the imperial union by means of a formal legal act, so its basic law, i.e. The Golden Bull of Charles IV, continued to apply to them and counted them as pertaining to one of the Electorates. This periodically enlivened feudal bond thereby continued to function and, for example,

Ferdinand II, in 1628, did not hesitate to grant his son a Bohemian Electorate in fief.\(^5\) It should be emphasised that the subject of this act was not just an electoral vote or the office of *archipincerna* (*Erzmundschenk*), but the Electorate as such (“*das Churfürstenthumb mit der Chur und dem Erzschencken Ambt des Heiligen Römischen Reichs*”).\(^6\) In addition to the constitutional plane it is also necessary to take into account the personal level: the imperial bodies (especially the Aulic Council) were always seated by the members of the Bohemian and Moravian Catholic (and therefore loyal to the Emperor) families, which the Habsburg Emperor counted-on for strengthening his influence in the Empire. So the paradoxical situation occurred that while the resolutions of the imperial authorities should not have applied to the Czech territory, the implementation of these resolutions often laid in the hands of the Czech nobility. Understandably the influence of the Czech representatives in the imperial bodies was considerably augmented after 1708, when by the readmission of the Bohemian Electorate they became members of the Electorate Collegium of the Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*) in Regensburg or members of the *Reichskammergericht* in Wetzlar. For the sake of completeness, it can be recalled that unlike the Aulic Council these representatives were paid from a special provincial fund that was approved annually by the Bohemian *Landtag*.\(^7\)

Perhaps the strongest remaining bond between the Czech Lands and the Holy Roman Empire was the rank of Elector, that was performed by the Bohemian King or even by representatives of the Estates.\(^8\) The Bohemian King’s right to vote within the

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\(^5\) Cf. Jiří VESELÝ, *K otázce lenního vztahu k římské říši v českých dějinách* [On the Issue of the Feudal Relation to the Roman Empire in Czech History], Sborník archivních prací 29, 1979, pp. 56–116; in this text pp. 75–77. It is possible to encounter the efforts to re-emphasise the position of the Czech Lands within the Empire at Matthias, who, shortly before his death (in 1619), granted the Czech Lands to Ferdinand II in fief. The last time that fief was granted to Ferdinand IV, was in 1653. The template document that the Emperor gave to (the younger) King of Bohemia was in every case Frederick III’s liege sheet from the year 1477 that had originally been granted to Vladislaus II Jagiellon.

\(^6\) Analogously a liege reverse of Ferdinand IV was edited in ibidem, pp. 104–105. In regard to liege oath Alexander BEGERT, *Böhmen, die böhmische Kur und das Reich vom Hochmittelalter bis zum Ende des Alten Reiches*, Husum 2003, p. 428. In regard to the genesis of the liege reverse also P. VOREL, *Státoprávní vyčlenění*, pp. 760–764. Whether the term “Electorate” meant only the elector’s office, or the country, disputes were already being conducted there since the early modern period. In summary Jiří KUBEŠ, *České země a římsko-německá říše v raném novověku* [The Czech Lands and the Holy Roman Empire in the Early Modern Period], in: Karel Schelle – Jaromír Tauchen (eds.), Encyklopedie českých právních dějin I, Prague 2015, pp. 677–682.

\(^7\) For example, in the year 1709, 6000 guldens were approved for an elector legate in Regensburg and for an observer at the *Reichskammergericht* in Wetzlar. Národní archiv v Praze [The National Archives in Prague] (hereinafter referred to as the NA Praha), Sněmovní snešení, inv. Nr. 130a.

\(^8\) In this respect, the election of a Roman-German King was carried out by the estates representation both in 1440 and in 1519. The Estates after being acknowledged as the bearers of the elector title also later sought, and to this end they submitted, by the proxy of Zdenko Adalbert Popel von Lobkowicz and
community of Electors was based on Charles IV’s Golden Bull (Wahltag). Negotiations on electoral capitulation (Wahlkapitulation), which since the time of Charles V comprised an agreement between the claimant to the Roman-German throne and the electors as representatives of the Empire and it also defined the future limits of imperial power. It actually took place, however, in the format of the Imperial Diet’s Electoral College (Kurfürstenrat). There the representative of the Czech Lands had not had any access until 1708, although the candidate stayed at the place of the election accompanied by the current Emperor, when the election was taking place during the life of the previous ruler (vivente imperatore). During the 16th Century, a few days before the actual election, the future Emperor (often accompanied by Bohemian noblemen) was usually also made familiar with the text of electoral capitulation. Due to the short deadlines (the election date had to be determined in advance by the archbishop of Mainz), however, he could interfere only minimally with the capitulation text. The actual election that was taking place mostly in a side chapel of St. Bartholomew in Frankfurt am Main was then also attended by the Bohemian King. Thanks to previous agreements and to the subsequent unanimity he could always afford to abstain and not have to vote for himself.

Until 1708 attendance at other meetings of the Electoral College was an exceptional event. The electors themselves protested against the representatives of the Czech Lands coming amongst them and the arguing about this finished with the Kingdom of Bohemia’s non-payment of the imperial taxes. It is necessary to admit that until the rule of Emperor Matthias the Habsburg emperors did not try too hard and sometimes – as for example Ferdinand I did in 1545 – they even turned the argument upside-down: i.e. since the Bohemian King there has not been admitted to the Electoral College he does not pay any taxes.

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10 The election procedure for a Roman-German King, who, in the early modern period after his coronation with the Ottonian crown became an Emperor, has recently been described in the Czech historiography by Jiří KUBEŠ, Trnitá cesta Leopolda I. za říšskou korunou (1657–1658) [The Trying Way of Leopold I to the Imperial Crown (1657–1658)], České Budějovice 2009, pp. 22–45.

11 A. BEGERT, Böhmen, p. 324.
electors, even in the form of imperial decisions. In this area the Sovereign had to proceed very cautiously, because the electors were placing themselves into the position of being the most significant interpreters of the Golden Bull of Charles IV and they considered the approval or the refusal of allowing someone to attend their college as a sign of their privileged rights and a feature of the much vaunted “teutsche Libertät”. On the part of the Habsburg ruler as the King of Bohemia there could be maximally protests served at periodic intervals to the Imperial Archchancellor – that is to the Archbishop of Mainz.

A dynamic debate took place regarding the pertinence of the Czech Lands to the Empire throughout the entire early modern era both at the level of scholarly treatises (often compiled compulsorily) and in the area of producing pamphlets and leaflet journalism. As in the case of other peripheral areas such as Lorraine or various fiefs located in northern Italy and also in the case of the Kingdom of Bohemia, the argument of imperial jurisdiction was purposefully used and it happened that the official authorities in Vienna, during the reign of one and the same Habsburg, changed their opinions several times in accordance with the current international and domestic situations. The process of the exclusion of the Czech Lands from the Empire during the late 15th Century that was described by Petr Vorel was therefore neither the first nor the last and – especially in the 17th Century – we can also identify the mirror-inverted processes of their re-integration. Even during the Westphalian negotiations, the positions of the imperial ambassadors were not at all clear: when discussing the applicability of the imperial religious freedoms in the Czech Lands they were also stressing the Czech Lands’ independence, while when there was a need to influence the negotiations that were related to the imperial representations, they were suggesting representatives of the Bohemian Electorate to them. This attitude of ambiguity obviously weakened the position of the imperial negotiators but nevertheless they still managed to introduce to the Westphalian negotiations, at least for a while, Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein, as a representative of the Bohemian King.

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12 E.g. the work of a Swiss lawyer Melchior GOLDAST OF HAIMINSFELD, Consultatio de officio electoris Bohemiae iureque in conventibus S. Rom. Imperii electorum tam electorali in actu eligendi, quam collegiali in consilio rei publicae sibi competente, Frankfurt am Main 1627 (issued with a dedication to Johann Ulrich von Eggenberg). The manuscript for the first work on this topic had already been compiled in 1612; probably either on the orders of Melchior Khlesl or directly by King Matthias himself. Goldast also operated with pertinence of the Kingdom of Bohemia to the Empire in his other works and for this he was attacked by the Czech Baroque Patriots. More on this topic from Jiří HRBEK, “That feckless Bohemomastix”: The Life and Work of Melchior Goldast of Haiminsfeld, Acta Comeniana 22–23, 2009, pp. 99–132.

13 Specifically P. VOREL, Státoprávní vyčlenění.
The Course of the Mission

The reason for which the representative of the Bohemian King participated in Westphalian negotiations was related to the ongoing discussions concerning the form that the Electoral College would take after the Thirty Years’ War. It was because in 1623, during the war, Maximilian of Bavaria was awarded this rank for helping the Emperor that he became the holder of the Upper Palatinate, that had been confiscated to the Bohemian “Winter” King Frederick of the Palatinate. Due to imperial anathema the latter’s elector rank was also taken away from him. At the end of the Thirty Years’ War, however, the issue of the restitution of the elector rank reappeared, which at that time would have been linked to the Lower (Rhine) Palatinate, and it was returned to Charles (I) Louis, the son of Frederick of the Palatinate. About the Bavarian Electorate, Ferdinand II made a decision arbitrary and therefore not entirely consistent with imperial law and their own electoral capitulation.

Now the enlargement of the Electoral College should carry out in accordance with the imperial law.\textsuperscript{14} Thereby the number of electors would have increased to eight, which entailed a sequence of risks, especially during the election of a new Roman-German King, which, according to the Golden Bull of Charles IV, should be carried by a simple majority. Therefore, if in the future there were to be a 4:4 stalemate there would be a risk of the destabilisation of the Empire or even the election of Anti-Emperor that had troubled the Medieval Empire at a time when a consensus choice was needed. For this reason, several solutions for how to avoid this dangerous split were laid on the table during the first half of 1646: in the game were \textit{duplex votum}, i.e. a double vote for Saxony or for the Bohemian Elector, the establishment of a ninth Electorate bound, for example, to the Austrian lands, or a \textit{votum decisivum}, i.e. the deciding vote of the Dean of the Electoral College, the Imperial Archchancellor and the Archbishop of Mainz.

Since \textit{causa Palatina} was related to the actual composition of the College and additionally also to electoral issues, in which, as the Imperial Elector, the Bohemian King regularly intervened, while Maximilian of Trauttmansdorff, the head of the imperial mission, had the idea to invite the representative of the Kingdom of Bohemia to the Westphalian negotiations. During the legitimisation of their claim to be representing the Kingdom of Bohemia the Habsburg party skilfully used Swedish arguments such as that peace negotiations should be attended by the maximum possible number of stakeholders, including those from the provincial estates of the individual imperial principalities.

The requirement that the Swedes should push-on until the end of 1645 in the belief that through the participation of the North German Protestants they will manage to

numerically outweigh the Catholic side, now also served as a supporting argument for both Bohemian and also Austrian participation.

First, the instruction for Westphalian mission was prepared for the Vice-President to-be of the Aulic Council, Georg Ulrich von Wolkenstein, who came from an important Tyrolean family,\textsuperscript{15} and for the Lower Austrian Chancellor Dr. Leonhard Richtersberger. They were supposed to represent Ferdinand III and Archduke Ferdinand Karl in the Princely Council (Fürstenrat). Ferdinand Karl, following the long guardianship reign of his mother, took over the reign in Tyrol in 1646. The interests of the Bohemian Electorate, which, at rather a symbolic level, however, should be represented by the experienced Westphalian aristocrat Georg von Plettenberg, who from 1634 worked in the imperial diplomatic service while the highlight of his previous career was a mission to the Danish King Christian IV in the middle of the year 1644.\textsuperscript{16} Now Plettenberg managed to persuade the Archbishop of Mainz to grant him formal admission into the Electoral College, which, however, was not enough for Ferdinand III.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff, the main imperial negotiator and the Obersthofmeister, still wrote on 7\textsuperscript{th} December 1645, to Ferdinand III to also send, in addition to representatives of the Austrian Lands, representatives of the Kingdom of Bohemia, amongst whom there would be at least one native Czech.\textsuperscript{18}

Although Waldstein had already arrived in Münster in late November 1645, he stayed a member of Trauttmansdorff’s staff without any assigned task and probably after the Trauttmansdorff’s letter to Ferdinand III the concept of Waldstein’s instruction was

\textsuperscript{15} In regard to Wolkenstein Oswald VON GSCHLIESSER, Der Reichshofrat. Bedeutung und Verfassung, Schicksal und Besetzung einer obersten Reichsbehörde von 1559 bis 1806, Wien 1942, pp. 222–223.

\textsuperscript{16} An overview of Plettenberg’s biography at URL: <http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/plettenberg-georg-herting-graf-von/> [viewed on 1. 9. 2016]. In regard to his mission to Denmark also Miroslav TOEGEL et al. (eds.), Documenta bohemica bellum tricennale illustrantia VII. Der Kampf um den besten Frieden (1643–1649), Prague 1981, passim.

\textsuperscript{17} “Jedoch halten [wir] vor guth und ratsamb ..., dass zwischen dem Anbringen und Begehren wegen unsern als königs zu Boheimb Admission und dann der wirklichen beywohnung im Churfürsten-rath ein Unterschied gemacht werden möchte und zwar, was das begehren wegen der blossen admission betrifft, würde gle[n]ug sein, da solches allein von dem Plettenberg zu seiner Zeit, wann du es zum falschtesten erachten würdest, anliecht und negociert, auch der churfürsten erklärt darüber ersucht und sollicitiret würde. Nachdeme aber hierauf die admission erhalten und diese materia wegen des achten churfürsten oder einer alternativa gewiss und sicher bey dem churfürstlichen collegio ... kommen würde ... so würden als dann die Graf Ferdinand von Waldstein und Plettenberg sich vor unsere als König zu Böheimb-gesandten angeben und der consultation dieses Werks abwarten kennen.” NA Praha, Sbírka opisů z cizích archivů – Vídeň, Ministerstvo vnitra (1612–1845) [A collection of transcripts from foreign archives – Vienna, the Ministry of the Interior (1612–1845)], Ferdinand III to Trauttmansdorff, s. d.

\textsuperscript{18} A. BEGERT, Böhmen, p. 393, note 178.
written on the 5th January 1646.19 Waldstein should obtain the necessary creditives as well that were signed by the Bohemian Chancellor Georg Adam von Martinitz20 and also the accompanying letters for Trauttmansdorff.21 These documents were delivered to Waldstein in May 1646, so he could be officially incorporated into the largest delegation, which in addition to the Emperor’s Obersthofmeister was led by Johann Ludwig von Nassau-Hadamar and Johann Maximilian von Lamberg. The legal work, however, was supervised by the experienced and competent Aulic Councillors, Isaak Volmar and Johann Crane, on whom, to a large extent, the foreign policy of the Habsburg Monarchy in the Empire depended during the mid-17th Century. Also working for them was a powerful apparatus which, of course, also reflected the interests of the individual players that were grouped around the Emperor (one example may be Wilhelm Schröder who, as one of the principal secretaries, acted rather on behalf of the Archbishop of Mainz). Connected to this “core” were representatives of other constitutional units that were linked to the Habsburg family, such as the Austrian Lands and the County of Tyrol mentioned above. The Emperor’s brother Leopold Wilhelm who, amongst other things, was the holder of eight ecclesiastical principalities in the Empire also sent delegates to take part in the imperial mission.22 The homogeneity of this diverse group should be defined by a link to Trauttmansdorff, who was the head of the association and was also the most frequent recipient of the Emperor’s letters.

In accordance with the instructions received Waldstein was supposed to find out “ob solten bey ietzigen friedenstractaten vorschläg unnd sachen obhanden sein, welche die hergebrachte verfaßung deß churfürstlichen collegii betreffen thetten”.23 Given the previous developments the primary reason for his mission was to inform both the Emperor and Trauttmansdorff about the topics that were discussed in the context of the Electoral College

19 Ibidem, p. 393, note 179. A. Begert states, that there was a false dating of the concept of Waldstein’s instruction (end of 1645) and he argues with the opinion of Karsten Ruppert, who mentioned the instruction has never been released. Karsten RUPPERT (Hg.), Acta pacis Westphalicae. Die kaiserlichen Korrespondenzen, Serie II, Abt. A, Bd. III, Münster 1985, s. 21, note 4.
20 W. BECKER, Der Kurfürstenrat, p. 297, note 118.
21 Concepts in Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Hofkanzlei, sign. II B 4, Kart. 250; originals of the fair copy dated in Linz on 5. and 6. 1. 1646 in ÖStA Wien, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Korrespondenz, Fasz. 7b (Conv. IV), fol. 2. Also in NA Praha, Sbírka opisů z cizích archivů – Vídeň, Ministerstvo vnitra (1612–1845) [A collection of transcripts from foreign archives – Vienna, the Ministry of the Interior (1612-1845)].
and about the attitudes of its individual members. Trauttmansdorff was also required to choose a specific strategy based on which Plettenberg and Waldstein should strive to obtain admission to college (e.g. when and in what manner to file a request for admission to the meeting) and he interceded in Vienna by sending money for the equipping of Waldstein’s representative office, if this Czech nobleman was actually admitted to the college.\textsuperscript{24} Initially Ferdinand III chose a cautious strategy and urged his diplomats to not question the preferences of the Archbishop of Mainz as the Dean of the college nor the sovereignty of his decision-making. Perhaps also because of this the caution negotiations dragged on for a long time and it was only on the 24\textsuperscript{th} August 1646 that Waldstein informed the Emperor that he had presented his credentials and his application to both the Mainz Chancellor Nicolas George Neigersberger and to the Bavarian and Palatinate representatives because the discussion about the Palatinate electoral vote was impending.\textsuperscript{25}

Gradually, however, the leaders of the imperial delegation became more audacious and when they saw that the usual wave of protests against Waldstein’s participation in meetings did not arise, and with the exception of some Saxon invective,\textsuperscript{26} the Czech representatives were prepared to commence their full participation in the negotiations. Trauttmansdorff even arranged a festive entry to Münster for Waldstein and Plettenberg, about the course of which, unfortunately, we were not informed in detail.\textsuperscript{27} Similarly also little is known about the ceremonial dispute over the seating arrangements between the Papal Nuncio (and officially the mediator between the warring parties) Fabio Chigi on one side and the Czech Counts Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein and Johann Friedrich von

\textsuperscript{24} NA Praha, Sbírka opisů z cizích archivů – Vídeň, Ministerstvo vnitra (1612-1845) [A collection of transcripts from foreign archives – Vienna, the Ministry of the Interior (1612-1845)], 25. 1. 1646, Trauttmansdorff to Ferdinand III. Trauttmansdorff acted as a spiritus agens and on the 11. 3. 1647 he wrote to another Imperial Ambassador, Nassau, that there will be a discussion “… zu welchem ich den herrn Graven von Wallenstein morgen oder übermorgen hinüberkommen lassen werde, gestalt selbiger consultation als königlich böheimbischer gesandter beyzuwohnen.” Antje OSCHMANN (Hg.), Acta pacis Westphalicae. Die kaiserlichen Korrespondenzen, Serie II, Abt. A, Bd. V, Münster 1993, p. 608.

\textsuperscript{25} NA Praha, Sbírka opisů z cizích archivů – Vídeň, Ministerstvo vnitra (1612–1845) [A collection of transcripts from foreign archives – Vienna, the Ministry of the Interior (1612-1845)], 24. 8. 1646, Waldstein to Ferdinand III. The hearing scheduled for the 27. 8. 1646 was eventually suspended due to the efforts of Bavaria to first reach an agreement with the Swedes. A. BEGERT, Böhmen, pp. 394–395.

\textsuperscript{26} Already in January 1646 it was suggested that the Bohemian King, if he wishes to be invited to the Electoral College, should finally begin to pay the imperial tax due in the amount of one Roman month (corresponding to the cost for the monthly maintenance of 400 horsemen and 600 infantrymen). Cf. Johann Jacob MOSER, Neues teutsches Staatsrecht. Bd. X – Von der Teutschen Crays-Verfassung, Frankfurt am Main – Leipzig 1773, pp. 17–18, §13. I would like to thank to Jiří Kubeš, for pointing out this source.

\textsuperscript{27} Waldstein’s presence in Münster and Osnabrück was not noticed even by such a careful observer as the diplomat and the author of famous memoirs, Isaak Volmar. Cf. Joachim FOERSTER – Roswitha PHILIPPE (Hg.), Acta pacis Westphalicae. Diarium Volmar I-II, Serie III, Abt. C, Bd. I-II, Münster 1984.
Trauttmansdorff on the other side.\textsuperscript{28} Johann Friedrich’s father who was the Chief Imperial Ambassador in fact intended to seat both these two young men, imperial chamberlains, in front of clergymen in accordance with the Vienna practice, which naturally aroused the Nuncio’s resentment. The frequent ceremonial problems that occurred during the diplomatic missions could not diminish the importance of Waldstein, who during that period visited important personalities and the ambassadors of foreign powers, who were thereby re-affirming his status (for example, the Chief Spanish Ambassador Don Gaspar de Bracamonte y Guzmán, Conde de Peñaranda).\textsuperscript{29}

The second half of 1646 brought about other significant problems, so that the negotiations concerning the expansion of the Electoral College became deadlocked while the parties involved insisted on their own opinions being correct. Still in October 1646 Trauttmansdorff received an order from Vienna to attempt to enforce \textit{duplex votum} for the Kingdom of Bohemia, while the Swedish ambassador, Johann Oxenstiema, based on sheer brazenness, proposed the cancellation of the Bohemian electoral vote and suggested transferring it to the Rhineland Palatinate. Finally, both the Catholics and the Protestants started to incline towards the introduction of a decisive vote for the Archbishop of Mainz, which was specifically advocated by representatives of Maximilian of Bavaria. While awaiting the unblocking of the Palatine issue Waldstein passed his time at social events\textsuperscript{30} and on journeys to neighbouring towns; he visited not only Osnabrück but also some relatively remote locations such as Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck and Oldenburg.\textsuperscript{31}

It seems that progress on the Palatine issue depended primarily on the imperial side. There, together with the Cologne deputy, they handed over to the Swedish diplomats the Electoral College’s statement in regard to the potential establishment of the eighth elector (Palatinate). These also included the Palatine electoral vote. Thereby, after a break

\textsuperscript{28} The dispute apparently impressed the diplomatic community because even Abraham DE WICQUEFORT mentioned it in his work entitled \textit{Mémoires touchant les Ambassadeurs et les Ministres publicis}, Cologne 1679, pp. 329–330.


\textsuperscript{30} Regarding the regular visits and the joint dinners cf. the diary of the Imperial Ambassador Johann Maximilian von Lamberg – Herta HAGENEDER (Hg.), \textit{Acta pacis Westphalicae. Diarium Lamberg, Serie III, Abt. C, Bd. IV}, Münster 1986, pp. 104, 113, 122, 124, 132, 171. It is interesting that Waldstein’s younger brother, Karl Ferdinand, who was then only twelve years old, was also present in Osnabrück at that time.

of more than six-months, there was suddenly a reopening of this issue. And just then, in March 1647, climactic moments occurred in regard to the Waldstein's journey.

Actual presence in the college was preceded by bilateral negotiations between Waldstein and Plettenberg and the representatives of the individual missions that took place in rapid succession from the 14th of March onwards. At the moment when their participation in the plenum became evident, the electors’ representatives started to offer their assistance to Waldstein and Plettenberg and to ask for support in regard to various matters. Finally they were inducted into the plenum of the College and on the 18th March, as the third entity after the Archbishop of Mainz and the Archbishop of Cologne, they officially carried-out their votum which supported the establishment of an eighth electoral vote for the Palatinate. All of this took place on behalf of the Bohemian King Ferdinand III. Both the Czech representatives spent the next ten days making final visits to the Bavarian and the Trier diplomats and also to the Spanish ambassador Peñaranda and the Austrian ambassador Wolkenstein; then they left Münster and went on to Osnabrück. There, together with the Cologne deputy, they handed over to the Swedish diplomats the Electoral College’s statement in regard to the potential establishment of the eighth Electoral Palatinate. Thereby de facto Waldstein’s duties in Westphalia ended and he again enjoyed the subsequent weeks of social contacts and travel, while he also went to the United Provinces. The stay in Westphalia was thereby extended until July

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32 For example the Trier ambassadors sought for support against the demands of the Palatinate that at that time was holding a part of the territory that belonged to the Speyer Chapter (the Archbishop of Trier, Philipp Christoph von Sötern, was also the Bishop of Speyer). NA Praha, Sbírka opisů z cizích archivů – Vídeň, Ministerstvo vnitra (1612–1845) [A collection of transcripts from foreign archives – Vienna, the Ministry of the Interior (1612-1845)], 19. 3. 1647, Waldstein and Plettenberg to Ferdinand III.

33 The negotiations regarding the admission of Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein to the Electoral College also required clarification as to whether he is actually representing the Emperor and the Bohemian King Ferdinand III or his son, the crowned “younger” King of Bohemia, Ferdinand IV. During the election activity the Bohemian electoral representatives always held the positions of the “younger” King of Bohemia, who usually was also a contender for the imperial throne. In the case of the Westphalian negotiations, however, the electors concluded that from the perspective of the Golden Bull of Charles IV Ferdinand IV was not mature enough to carry-out his electoral role. A. BEGERT, Böhmen, pp. 395–396.

34 There is more information about the departure in the NA Praha, Sbírka opisů z cizích archivů – Videň, Ministerstvo vnitra (1612–1845) [A collection of transcripts from foreign archives – Vienna, the Ministry of the Interior (1612-1845)], 22. 3. 1647 Waldstein and Plettenberg to Ferdinand III.


1647 and then on the 16th of that month, he left the Congress together with Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff, although some uncertainties remained in regard to the Electoral Palatinate (e.g. the possible recovery of the office of Imperial Vicar or of the hereditary rank of archidapifer). Somewhat unclear is the role played by Georg von Plettenberg, the second Bohemian electoral ambassador, in Münster and in Osnabrück. It seems that for the period of Waldstein’s presence he also remained de jure the Bohemian ambassador. Thanks to his experience he was arranging for himself some service, some catered formal events and during the six-month intermezzo, when the Palatine matters were not on the agenda, he travelled across northern Germany to carry-out a variety of tasks. His letters sent in December 1646 are dated in The Hague, and concurrently the instructions for Brandenburg where he was negotiating the possible division of Pomerania between the Great Elector Friedrich Wilhelm and the Swedes were drawn up for him. After Waldstein’s departure Plettenberg stayed in the Westphalian cities and continued to be a part of the imperial delegation, although he did not attend any of the highest-level meetings. It was not until February 1648 when, via the mission leaders, he received from the Emperor a passport enabling him to leave the meeting places and subsequently we can find him living as an imperial resident in Hamburg in the Lower Saxony region and working for the Elector of Saxony as his diplomat (1665–1667).

The mission of Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein did at least have a symbolic meaning. Although at the actual signing of the Peace of Westphalia the signature of the representative of the Bohemian King and his seal are both missing (unlike the seal of Count Wolkenstein, who attached his on behalf of the Austrian Lands), we can still find Waldstein’s portrait between the other portraits at Friedenssaal in Münster. The young Czech nobleman was also immortalised on one of the forty medals that were issued on the occasion of the


In regard to Trauttmansdorff’s hasty departure, for example Bedřich ŠINDELÁŘ, Vestfálský mír a česká otázka [The Westphalian Peace and the Bohemian Question], Prague 1968, p. 240.

These issues were resolved by a majority vote at the Nuremberg Execution Diet in 1650. Additionally also Antje OSCHMANN, Der Nürnberger Exekutionstag 1649–1650. Das Ende des Dreißigjährigen Krieges in Deutschland, Münster 1991.


A. BEGERT, Böhmen, p. 396.
Peace of Westphalia – on the reverse there is a crowned Waldstein coat of arms visible between the palm leaves and also the biblical inscription: “Que Caesaris Caesari, que Dei Deo.”44 In addition to the constitutional implications of this diplomatic journey that also influenced Waldstein's further rise, since because of it he found himself involved in the middle of the Habsburg world.

**Career consequences**

In the 17th and the 18th Centuries the Emperor's delegations visiting the Holy Roman Empire were entrusted to the care of leading courtiers or of active members of the Aulic Council. Till now, however, the career of Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein had been taking place only within the confines of the Kingdom of Bohemia and at the Court of Appeal (Appellationsgericht) he was looked upon as being a “mere” councillor. Therefore, his selection for the mission to Westphalia was, at the very least, looked upon as being unusual. It is only possible to speculate about the reason for this choice: apparently Trauttmansdorff’s requirement that was referred to above – that a Czech representative should be from a Czech family and be connected with the Czech authorities – was behind it. Maximilian von Waldstein, who belonged amongst the most influential collaborators of Ferdinand III and till 1642 held the important post of the Oberststallmeister and then became the principal military commander in Prague while in 1647 the Privy Council (Geheimer Rat) also recommended his son. Shortly before Ferdinand Ernst's appointment Maximilian additionally wrote a letter to the Emperor in which he explicitly expressed his fervent wish that his children could also follow in his (Maximilian's) footsteps and faithfully serve their Emperor and the whole House of Habsburg.45 For the sake of completeness it should be noted that Maximilian was actually able to ensure a career for all of his sons, not only for his second son Ferdinand Ernst, but also for his brothers Franz Augustin and Karl Ferdinand and, with the help of Cardinal Harrach, also for Albrecht Leopold who was handicapped and for the future Archbishop of Prague Johann Friedrich too.46

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45 The letter from Maximilian von Waldstein to Ferdinand III has been paraphrased by O. VON GSCHLIESSER, *Der Reichshofrat*, p. 256.
Unlike that of the 1650’s, the mutual correspondence between Maximilian von Waldstein and his son Ferdinand Ernst has not been preserved. It was precisely Maximilian, however, who during the years 1647 and 1648 regularly sat in the narrowest group of the chosen Privy Councillors who participated in formulating opinions, which were sent to Münster and Osnabrück on behalf of the Emperor. The Privy Council was corresponding with Nassau, Lamberg, Crane and Volmar, while Trauttmansdorff communicated directly with Ferdinand III. Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein and Plettenberg were also corresponding with the Emperor however and it was this direct contact that represented the most significant benefit from the Westphalian mission for the personal experience and the future career of young Waldstein. Subsequently the latter often thanked the Emperor for his confidence in him.47

Waldstein’s appointment to the Bench of Lords of the Aulic Council took place just prior to his departure on the 20th October 1645, while he was not inaugurated to the Reichshofrat until the 2nd March 1648, after returning from a trip to the Westphalian cities.48 In this regard Trauttmansdorff reminded the Imperial Vice-Chancellor (Reichsvizekanzler) Ferdinand Sigismund Kurz von Senftenau not to forget about Waldstein, who, at that time, was still in Münster.49 Within the activities of the Reichshofrat, there were other missions awaiting him after his return from northern Germany, such as in Wasserburg in the Bavarian region, where he was expected to convince the gathered estates about the need to financially participate in the payment of the Swedish troops who were still residing in the territory of the Empire.50 This was also the topic that he had most often had to deal with in his office of Aulic Councillor and he also participated in providing expert opinions that the Reichshofrat then forwarded to the Geheimer Rat, where they were also decided on, amongst others, by Waldstein’s father Maximilian.

Ferdinand Ernst returned to Prague to take up the vacant post of the President of the Court of Appeal in February 1650. At the same time he retained his seat in the Reichshofrat, though he appeared only rarely on its meetings and his presence is documented during the year 1655.51 An illustrious career, behind which it was possible to see the hand of his

48 For example ibidem, 18. 6. 1646, Trauttmansdorff to Ferdinand III.
50 More details in regard to this mission can be found in Jiří HRBEK, Barokní Valdštejnové v Čechách (1640–1740) [The Baroque Waldsteins in Bohemia (1640–1740)], Prague 2013, pp. 529–530.
51 ÖStA Wien, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Reichshofrat, Residenzprotokolle, Nr. 164.
powerful father, continued actually in Prague. His experienced father Maximilian needed a good contact in the Czech state capital rather than in Vienna, who would be able to take care of his affairs and keep an eye on the management of the Waldsteins’ estates that could suffer from Maximilian’s long-term absence. In 1650 this long-time courtier also occupied the post of the Obersthofkämmerer of Ferdinand III, which required his constant presence close to the Emperor. Ferdinand Ernst was soon promoted to the ranks of the highest officials in the Kingdom of Bohemia, while from holding the post of the President of the Court of Appeal (Präsident des Appellationsgerichts) he then became the Oberstlandrichter (1651) and later even the Oberstlandkämmerer (1652). In both cases the highest provincial officials’ vota were maintained who always nominated Ferdinand Ernst as one of the most suitable candidates for these offices. Unlike his knowledge of the law and of both of the provincial languages, no voices defined his representation of the Bohemian King in the Westphalian negotiations as being amongst his merits.52 Even in these provincial offices he did not avoid his obligations that were associated with the Empire. At the end of February 1652, he left for Saxony with Johann Crane to invite Duke Johann Georg to attend the Electoral Diet in Prague.53 In September of the same year, Waldstein was at the southwestern border welcoming the Electress of Bavaria and the Emperor’s sister, Maria Anna, who was the guardian of the juvenile Ferdinand Maria.54 He escorted her together with her courtiers to Prague and Waldstein’s entourage, which consisted of the accountants and of the fourriers who took care of the catering and the accommodation, thereby ensuring both the smooth course of the journey and also the payment of the considerable bills.55

In accordance with Harrach’s Diary, Ferdinand Ernst was not the healthiest of people and his weak body structure corresponded to the Cardinal’s reports concerning Waldstein’s frequent digestive problems. These were also accompanied by chronic inflammation of the throat, which could exclude him from public life for even longer periods of time.56

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52 Unfortunately the vota in regard to his appointment as the President of the Court of Appeal, which initiated his career in Czech offices, have not been preserved. The vota prior to his appointment as the Oberstlandrichter and the Oberstlandkämmerer are stored in the NA Prague, Česká dvorská kancelář [The Czech Court Office], inv. Nr. 860, sign. IV H 5, Kart. 718.

53 Their stay in Saxony lasted only briefly (i.e. from 27. 2. to 7. 3. 1652). L. BITTNER – L. GROSS (eds.), Repertorium I, p. 162. Eventually Johann Georg (II), the successor, arrived in Prague as the Plenary Representative of his father.

54 ÖStA Wien, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Obersthofmeisteramt, Ältere Zeremonialakten, Kart. 3, Nrs. 3–22.


56 In my opinion the onset of the disease may explain, for example, the fact that he was inducted into the Aulic Council a whole nine months after his return from northern Germany.
It was also illness that ended his promising career in May 1656, during the midst of the preparations for the Bohemian Coronation of Leopold I, for which, based on his function as the *Oberstlandkämmerer*, he was required to ensure the fresh decoration of the Old Bohemian diet room (*Stará sněmovna, Alte Landstube*) at Prague Castle, including the upholstery of the royal throne. The probable cause of his death, which surprised the aristocratic society of the time, was *aposthema*, i.e. a tuberculous abscess in the left lung, probably also with metastases throughout the body and especially in the areas of the neck and the lymph nodes.

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According to the diary of Cardinal Harrach, Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein arrived at Westphalia only to gain some experiences and to visit the towns in northern Germany as well. His “grand tour” changed to diplomatic mission thanks to his patron Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff and became one of the biggest intervention in the negotiations of the Electoral College during the entire 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> Centuries that implemented by a representative of the Bohemian King, apart from the election of the Roman-German King. It can also be interpreted as having been a “trial balloon” that was dispatched in the direction of the imperial public and the other electors, by means of which the Emperor could test if there was a suitable moment for the readmission of the Bohemian electoral vote. In this respect it is possible to observe a certain continuity of the decisions of Ferdinand III with the previous policies of his predecessors, Ferdinand II and Matthias, who, unlike Ferdinand I, Maximilian II and Rudolph II, all tried to change the status of the Czech Lands and to find a path to stronger ties with the entire Holy Roman Empire.

This is to say that the Bohemian Electorate also provided the Habsburgs with a solid base within the Empire. In this respect, they actually followed the concepts behind the dynastic and territorial policies of Charles IV, whose Golden Bull for the Empire belonged...

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57 Originally the new decoration and upholstery was to have been paid for out of the arrears on the Coronation Tax, which was approved for the coronation of Ferdinand IV (1646). Eventually this purpose was abandoned because many of the receivables proved to be recoverable and therefore a cameral portion of collected taxes (i.e. a *quantum camerale*) was used instead. The NA Praha, Nová manipulace [The New Record file manipulation], sign. K1/7, Kart. 290.

58 Cf. the testimony of Waldstein’s servant Johann Sigismund Neschitz in a letter written to Cardinal Harrach. ÖStA Wien, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Familienarchiv Harrach, Kart. 153 (Graf Franz Ernst von Waldstein), 21. 5. 1656. In regard to Waldstein’s posthumous translation and funeral also Jiří HRBEK, *Proměny valdštejnské reprezentace* [The Changes of Waldsteins’ Representation], Prague 2015, pp. 242–244.

to its set of “constitutional” laws till the end of this sovereign entity in 1806. The mission of Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein can therefore be read only within the context of these long-term objectives, for the achievement of which the Czech Lands were, for the last time, granted in fief to Ferdinand IV on the 16th May 1653 at the Regensburg Diet.60 Then he demonstrated his rank during his election at the end of May of the same year, in which he participated personally and which he attended in a specially-made electoral ermine coat and he also acceded to the throne in it during the subsequent imperial coronation.61 At a symbolic level this also demonstrated the pertinence of the “younger” Bohemian King (Ferdinand IV who had been crowned in St. Vitus Cathedral on the 5th August 1646) to the Electoral College.

Parameters of statehood in the modern sense are not applicable either to the Holy Roman Empire nor to the Czech Lands. The model of state sovereignty by which we currently judge the state organism that was theoretically defined during the second half of the 16th Century; in practice, however, was only introduced very slowly and as a result of the enlightened absolutism and nationalism of the 19th Century. In pre-modern times the state entity was maintained by personal (feudal) bonds, symbolic acts and only an ad hoc enforcement of rule. Nevertheless, the brief participation of Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein at the meeting of the Electoral College concerning one single issue still necessitated a long and complicated preparation and this is also why, in the end, it actually meant more than it may now seem to be at first glance.

60 Cf. J. VESELÝ, K otázce lenního vztahu, p. 75.
Abstract: This paper addresses the topic of the early modern Habsburg-Ottoman relationship through the special aspect of interpreting and translating in a multicultural environment at the Sublime Porte. More precisely, it focuses on interpreters – in Ottoman context the so called “dragomans” – of the mid-seventeenth-century Habsburg embassy in Constantinople: Josephus Barbatus, Giovanni Battista Corel and Nicusio Panaiotti. The analysis of their activity as imperial interpreters gives a solid overview of the professional abilities, competences and personal characteristics which were advantageous or disadvantageous for this position; furthermore, it also sheds light upon the various requirements and selection criteria of the imperial government towards interpreters. The paper also reflects investigations concerning the efforts of the Habsburg Court in Vienna in order to create a corps of loyal and competent professional interpreters trained in Constantinople especially for acquiring the necessary skills of Oriental languages in the mentioned period.

Keywords: Habsburg-Ottoman relations – interpreters – Constantinople – 17th Century

Preliminary remarks

It has always been a key question of diplomatic history how diplomatic missions are to perform in multicultural contexts when not only the preferred languages, but also the sociocultural environment of the negotiating partners are extremely different. Contrary to the undoubtedly crucial role of diplomats, interpreters seem to have been proved to be less interesting for scholars, although their pivotal position in multicultural diplomatic negotiations cannot be denied. The complex nature of interpreting is even more striking regarding the relationship between the seventeenth-century Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. This present article addresses Habsburg functionaries performing their mission as translators at the Sublime Porte, which usually required far more than linguistic abilities only. Apart from their linguistic role, these premodern translators –

1 This research was realised within the project Everyday Life and Imperial Politics in the Köprülü Era (serial number: OTKA K 109070) supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund.
according to the contemporary terminology in the Ottoman context, the “dragomans” – are known to have faced various challenges during their service: they regularly visited leading officials of the Ottoman government and negotiated on behalf of the ambassadors, they wrote reports and dispatches concerning substantial background knowledge, and they contributed to the maintenance and functioning of the secret intelligence network supplying the Habsburg embassy with essential information on the Ottoman Empire. At the same time the Viennese Court counted upon them as couriers between the Habsburg and Ottoman territory or as creditors of the poorly financed embassy. Above all, Habsburg interpreters in Constantinople should be considered as a special group of multi-functional clients, whose exact position in the diplomatic universe of the Habsburgs is still in need of a thorough clarification.

Regarding the professional framework of the investigations I am going to present in the following pages, it has to be noted that I currently cooperate in a project at the University of Szeged (Hungary) that prepares for publication the official reports of the imperial ambassador Simon Reniger von Renningen (1649–1666). Among several issues which contribute to our knowledge concerning the functioning and working conditions of the Habsburg embassy in Constantinople, Reniger’s surviving reports of his long term of service supply the research with promising pieces of evidence related to the activity of the dragomans as well. His reports also shed light upon the efforts of the Habsburg Court to create an appropriate corps of imperial interpreters, which already had its antecedents at the time of the previous resident, Alexander Greiffenklau (1643–1648). The reports of these resident ambassadors concerning the problem of interpreting tempted me to explore further sources related to this topic. Among the documents of primary importance preserved in the “Turcica” collection, records of other Viennese archives – primarily in the Archives of the Aulic Chamber (Hofkammerarchiv) – are being processed with the aim at creating a solid description of the functioning and personnel (including dragomans) in the mid-seventeenth-century Habsburg embassy of Constantinople.


3 The archival collections consulted will be henceforth quoted with the following abbreviations: Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilungen, Türkei I. [ÖStA, HHSTA, StaAbt Türkei I.]; Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv, Sonderbestände, Reichsakten [ÖStA, FHKA, SB, RA]; Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Finanz- und
However, it has to be taken in account that due to the versatile research possibilities offered by the topic, the issue of translation and interpreting in premodern Habsburg diplomacy has already attracted a number of scholars, especially in the past few decades. It also motivated investigations focusing on interdisciplinary aspects, with an emphasis on the remarkable analytical prospects in overlapping fields of research between history, sociology, linguistics or translation studies. From the point of view of a historian focusing on premodern Habsburg-Ottoman relations, it is particularly important to note the distinguished attention that was paid to the Oriental Academy (Orientalische Akademie) of the Habsburg Empire, which was established in 1754 and functioned as an important link between Austria and the Ottoman Empire. The question of premodern interpreting in Habsburg-Ottoman context in the period before the Academy apparently proved to be less attractive so far, which is not surprising considering the research difficulties with the scattered archival material.

Hofkammerarchiv, Alte Hofkammer, Hoffinanz Ungarn [ÖStA, FHKA, AHK, HFU]; Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv, Alte Hofkammer, Hoffinanz Österreich [ÖStA, FHKA, AHK, HFO]; Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv, Alte Hofkammer, Reichsgedenkbücher [ÖStA, FHKA, AHK, RGB]; Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, Wiener Hofkriegsrat, Hauptreihe, Protokoll-Expedit und Protokoll-Registratur [ÖStA, KA, HKR, HR, Prot. Exp. and Prot. Reg.].


In order to contribute to this field of research, my present paper shall address the question of recruiting interpreters for the Habsburg embassy in Constantinople, mainly during the 1640s and 1650s. In this framework, two main problems shall be discussed. Firstly, I will give a brief overview of the most important local interpreters hired in Constantinople by the Habsburg ambassadors in this period, with an emphasis on the advantages and disadvantages of Ottoman subjects as imperial interpreters. Secondly, the objectives and efforts of the project shall be discussed in which the imperial government tried to create a loyal staff of professional interpreters by educating young men of German origin in the Ottoman capital. The topic of this present article is also inspired by my previous investigations related to the general conditions of Simon Reniger’s election to the post of resident ambassador in Constantinople, which also targeted a wider context of eligibility criteria of imperial functionaries in the field of oriental diplomacy. In order to address the same issue from another point of view, I will also try here to answer the question, which were the most important requirements, abilities and personal characteristics needed to become a successful translator in the Habsburg-Ottoman affairs and, accordingly, which group of interpreters – Ottoman or German subjects – turned out to be more useful for the Habsburg emperor.

The dragomans and the problem of interpreting

Considering the difficulties of pre-modern interpreting at the historical crossroads of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, the importance of translators in the Habsburg-Ottoman relationship needs no further emphasis. Yet the multifunctional character of this position should be pointed out again, for interpreters were facing numerous challenges during their translating work, both on the Habsburg and on the Ottoman side, which required a range of competences. Scholars have already shown that besides the required language proficiency (including the thorough knowledge of the curial style of the relevant chancelleries), interpreters had to be aware of cultural characteristics, be able to settle


the differences of the distinct diplomatic protocols, and, of course, should have been well informed of the current negotiations and their background. All in all, interpreters served not only as communicative support personnel, but also as an important diplomatic link between the Ottoman and Habsburg Courts, notwithstanding, in a position formerly subordinated to the official emissaries.  

Considering the 17th century, even after the closing of the Long Ottoman War in 1606, the frequency and intensity of bilateral negotiating did not decrease, and translators were continuously needed, both in the Imperial Court in Vienna and at the Habsburg Embassy in Constantinople. Regarding the complex challenges depicted briefly above, it is not surprising that hiring an appropriate interpreter turned out to be a problematic point for the Habsburg government in general. Relevant measures and decisions were practically made in the Aulic War Council, the body responsible for Oriental affairs. More precisely, there must have been a form of a special bureau within the War Council involving councillors and secretaries specialised in Ottoman diplomacy towards Constantinople, Ottoman-Hungary and the borderland. The War Council operated with a small number of translators acting primarily in Vienna, although the service of interpreters was clearly also needed on several locations of Habsburg-Ottoman communication, such as in Graz or Győr (Raab).  

An important initiative aimed at solving the constantly threatening lack of qualified translator personnel came from Emperor Ferdinand III – obviously on the advice of the Aulic War Council – in 1644, related to a mission of Hermann Czernin to the Ottoman Porte. In his instructions from the 27th of June 1644, the emperor ordered Czernin to find fully trained dragomans in Constantinople who would be willing to enter imperial service, primarily in Vienna, but also at the resident embassy in the Ottoman capital. Concerning the exact requirements which should be fulfilled by an applicant for the position of an imperial interpreter, the document does not reveal much: only a good command of spoken and written Turkish and loyalty towards the Emperor were expected from the applicants. 

9 P. MEIENBERGER, Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn, pp. 80–82.  
10 D. KEREKES, A császári tolmácsok, pp. 1199–1200.  
Besides the constant demand of having appropriate translators in the secretary of the Aulic War Council, the Habsburg court was keen on hiring at least one new translator specifically for the embassy in Constantinople. This remote diplomatic outpost operated only with a single official dragoman at that time: the well-known Coptic bibliophile and scholar Josephus Barbatus. However, he was unlikely to be able to continue serving over a longer period and had to be replaced urgently because of his advanced age and bad state of health. The present article does not address the impressive career path of Barbatus, which has been thoroughly explored by Alaister Hamilton already. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to map up his most significant actions in imperial service, with a special interest in the general conditions of interpreting at the Habsburg embassy in Constantinople.

Originating from Alexandria, after spending almost two decades in Europe as a well-known master of several European and oriental tongues, Barbatus accepted an invitation to Vienna from the imperial librarian Sebastian Tengnagel in 1622. He made important acquaintances with leading officials of the oriental diplomacy in the imperial capital and a few months after his arrival he entered imperial service as an interpreter of oriental languages in the Aulic War Council. Furnished with the support of the imperial chief interpreter Michel D’Asquier, Barbatus was sent to Constantinople in 1623 in order to occupy the post of the Habsburg dragoman at the Sublime Porte. He appears to have been disappointed with his position soon and tried to find a way back to Europe – in vain. He served under the resident ambassadors Sebastian Lustrier (1625–1629), Johann Rudolf Schmid (1629–1643) and Alexander Greiffenklau (1643–1648) probably until 1645, when he was dismissed. In this long period of a declining career, he experienced the hardship of the mission in Constantinople: the inconvenient living conditions, the
constant lack of money, the persecution of Ottoman functionaries and the intrigues of various political groups in both capitals. Considering this long tale of woe, it is not surprising that he was hardly able to perform missions in Greiffenklau’s term of office either as interpreter or as the resident’s assistant. Greiffenklau often pointed out his incapacity and described the old dragoman aged 83 in 1645 as “emeritus et indecibilis” who was not fit for the day-to-day dealings of the embassy anymore.

Strong though the complaints of the resident were, he still had to content himself with Barbatus because it was not easy to replace him with a person who fulfilled the requirements of the Aulic War Council. In order to come closer to what kind of criteria of eligibility the Habsburg Court had in the 1640s and 1650s, we shall analyse the abilities of the new interpreters they finally hired for the Habsburg embassy in Constantinople. Nevertheless, the comparison of Corel and Panaiotti has many conclusions to offer in itself: according to the relevant literature and archival material, Corel proved to be the worst and Panaiotti the best translator of the following years. In this case the obvious questions arise: what makes a good interpreter and why was one of them an excellent and the other a poor dragoman?

Firstly, some remarks on the career path of Gian Battista Corel. He appears to have been recommended both by the outgoing translator Barbatus and the resident ambassador Alexander Greiffenklau, albeit the first evidence of his presence in the communication of the War Council dates back to the year 1644 in accordance with the mission of Hermann Czernin. Unfortunately, the remaining pieces of information do not reveal the exact conditions of him being contacted by the ambassador. Czernin only mentions a talented Arab interpreter from Aleppo, aged about 30, speaking Arabic, Turkish and Italian, who

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18 Report of resident ambassador Alexander Greiffenklau to emperor Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 23. 5. 1645 (ÖStA, FHKA, SB, RA, Fasc. 186, fol. 151–155); Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council concerning the dismission of Barbatus, June of 1645 (ÖStA, KA, HKR, HR, Prot. Exp. 1645, fol. 263v).
19 A profound contemporary comparison of their competences with the same conclusion was given by Johann Rudolf Schmid. See: Report of Johann Rudolf Schmid to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 13. 8. 1649. ÖStA, HHSTA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 121, Konv. 1, fol. 229–232.
20 Instruction of Ferdinand III. to his ambassador Hermann Czernin (ibidem, Kart. 117, Konv. 2, fol. 362–391); Application of Giovanni Battista Corel for the position of an imperial interpreter in oriental languages, s. d. l. [1645] (ibidem, Kart. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 482).
was apparently willing to enter the imperial service, although preferably in Austria. After a short hesitation, the ambassador employed him for the position of imperial translator, albeit at first for the Habsburg embassy in Constantinople, in order to be secured of his competences. Accordingly, he served as a “supplementary interpreter” in the staff of the extraordinary ambassador, supporting the old dragoman Barbatus, who seems to have been frequently corrected by him during the negotiations. After a half year of further service as dragoman of the Habsburg resident Greiffenklau, Corel was brought to Vienna and a few months later to Graz, where he served as an interpreter of oriental languages in a subordinated body of the War Council.

There is no evidence of any problems during his service in Habsburg territory, but as he returned to the Ottoman Empire in 1649 as an interpreter in the retinue of the extraordinary ambassador (internuncius) Johann Rudolf Schmid, he became rather inconvenient for the emperor. It has to be mentioned that Schmid was not simply an interim ambassador sent to the Ottoman capital in order to prolong the peace treaty between the two empires, as the title internuncius would suggest. He was the most influential member of the Viennese War Council and the leading imperial expert of Oriental affairs. His abilities were indeed exceptional: he had a good command of Turkish and a wide experience of Habsburg-Ottoman negotiations. Within a few weeks, he

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22 Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council concerning the assignment of Giovanni Battista Corel supported by Alexander Greiffenklau and Hermann Czernin, July of 1645 (ÖStA, KA, HKR, HR, Prot. Exp. 1645, fol. 266°); Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council referring to the fifteen-month service of Corel, 13. 1. 1646 (ibidem, Prot. Exp. 1646, fol. 2°–3°).
23 Report of resident ambassador Alexander Greiffenklau to the Aulic Chamber, Constantinople, 29. 7. 1646. ÖStA, HHSTA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 119, Konv. 2, fol. 172–173.
24 Application of Giovanni Battista Corel for the position of an imperial interpreter in oriental languages, s. d. l. [1645] (ibidem, Kart. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 482); Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council concerning an appropriate accommodation for Corel, 2. 8. 1645 (ÖStA, KA, HKR, HR, Prot. Reg. 1645, fol. 258°); Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council referring to the fifteen-month service of Corel, 13. 1. 1646 (ibidem, Prot. Exp. 1646, fol. 2°–3°).
26 On his person and activity in more detail, see: P. MEIENBERGER, Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn; Sarah DUREGGER, Diplomatische Kommunikation zwischen Kaiserhof und Hoher Pforte. Die Berichte der kaiserlichen Residenten Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn und Alexander Greiffenklau von Vollraths, Akademikerverlag 2015. His reports from his term of office as imperial resident ambassador in Constantinople are edited by István Fazekas and Dóra Kerekes
discovered that the language knowledge of Corel was not sufficient at the Ottoman Porte (the Ottoman functionaries complained of his poor Turkish, with too much Arabic influence); moreover, he got involved in shady financial affairs and sold secret information to Ottoman officials. This all questioned his loyalty towards the emperor and could have been dangerous not only for his person, but for the entire Habsburg embassy as well. Consequently, Corel was removed from service by Schmid in the same year. It is also noteworthy that the Aulic War Council was continuously worried about Corel’s affairs with Ottoman authorities in the following years. Finally, on account of his confrontations with some Ottoman officials, the former dragoman had to convert to Islam in April 1652 and soon became the secretary of a higher Ottoman functionary (kislar aga). 27

Unlike Corel, a young interpreter of Greek origin, Nicusio Panaiotti (or Panagiotis Nikousios), proved to be well-qualified and reliable from the first time he was offered a position as imperial dragoman in 1645–1646. 28 His person and remarkable career as an interpreter have already been thoroughly studied by scholars such as Gunnar Hering or Damian Janos, 29 and here I will refer only to his most important competencies as an imperial interpreter. First of all, I would like to highlight his extraordinary language skills: besides Greek, Italian, Ottoman Turkish, Persian and Arabic he also mastered Latin, which was exceptional among Levantine dragomans operating at the Sublime Porte. In contrast to Corel, he was also aware of the ceremonial skills of negotiating in the

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27 Report of Johann Rudolf Schmid to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 10. 5. 1649 (ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 121, Konv. 1, fol. 96–97); Extracts from the reports of Johann Rudolf Schmid to Michel D’Asquier, Constantinople, 30. 5. 1649 and 2. 6. 1649 (ibidem, fol. 105–110); Extract from the report of Simon Reniger, Constantinople, 29. 8. 1649 (ibidem, fol. 236–237); Report of Simon Reniger to Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn, Constantinople, 15. 2. 1650 (ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 67–72); Report of Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 16. 4. 1652 (ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 125, Konv. 2, fol. 20–24); Extract from the report of Simon Reniger to Johann Rudolf Schmid, Constantinople, 31. 7. 1652 (ibidem, fol. 153–154).

28 Report of resident ambassador Alexander Greiffenklau to the Aulic Chamber, Constantinople, 29. 7. 1646 (ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 119, Konv. 2, fol. 172–173); Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council referring to the first salary of Panaiotti sent by imperial runner Johann Dietz, 20. 7. 1646 (ÖStA, KA, HKR, HR, Prot. Exp. 1646, fol. 278); Report of Johann Rudolf Schmid to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 10. 5. 1649 (ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 121, Konv. 1, fol. 96–97).

Ottoman environment. As a member of the Greek community in Fener (Phanar), he knew Constantinople quite well and had his own network of natives who functioned as a source of information or as unofficial support in negotiations with Ottoman functionaries. Above all, he came from a wealthy family, which ensured him to survive in hard times when his salary granted by the Emperor was issued late. He was young and healthy, also quite calm, and preferred a settled and respectful life among his family members and in his Greek community. His loyalty towards his imperial employer could not have been questioned at that time,30 which was also a rather unusual characteristic among dragomans who were Ottoman subjects. He probably also had good communicative skills, because his ability for cooperation and negotiation with both Ottoman and Habsburg authorities is documented to have been one of the best among his contemporaries. All in all, he was the best choice available for the position of an imperial interpreter in Constantinople – a fact beyond any doubts already from the remarks of resident ambassador Greiffenklau, who claimed that Panaiotti was esteemed so much that other European embassies competed for him as well.31

Table 1: The qualities of the dragomans Barbatus, Corel and Panaiotti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Languages spoken and written</th>
<th>Josephus Barbatus</th>
<th>Gian Battista Corel</th>
<th>Nicusio Panaiotti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Turkish</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman-Turkish</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicative skills</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal network</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>negative</td>
<td>negative</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 Panaiotti was often described as a functionary of indisputable loyalty in the relevant literature. He undoubtedly did his utmost in imperial service, however, recent research has shown that he sold information to Transylvanians and Spaniards as well. See: Gábor KÁRMÁN, A Seventeenth-Century Odyssey in East Central Europe: The Life of Jakab Harsányi Nagy, Leiden – Boston 2015, pp. 68–69; Miguel CONDE PAZOS, La embajada turca en Madrid y el envío de Alegreto de Allegretti a Constantinopla (1649–1650), in: URL: <http://www.librosdelacorte.es> [cit. 14. 11. 2015].

31 Report of resident ambassador Alexander Greiffenklau to the Aulic Chamber, Constantinople, 29. 7. 1646. ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 119, Konv. 2, fol. 172–173.
### Establishing the institute of language students (“Sprachknaben”)

Considering the utmost confidential character of their commissions in imperial service, the post of an interpreter seems to have been entrusted to Ottoman subjects only for the reason that there was a lack of trustworthy imperial subjects with profound knowledge of oriental languages. This resulted most probably from the relatively low interest in oriental customs and languages in general, for the language of the “infidels” was not preferred in the European Christian states. Only a few speakers of oriental languages are known from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries – primarily scholars and merchants –, who must have had a special professional interest in acquiring the language of the “enemy” and the “Barbars”. For this reason, it is not surprising that most of the European outposts in Constantinople operated with Levantines as interpreters, a characteristic group of Ottoman subjects with diverse ethnicity – they were above all Greeks, Armenians, Jews or converted Arabs – and in many cases with an attachment to some Christian church in the Orient.  

However, on account of queries about “alien” interpreters, various efforts can be detected to obtain well-qualified translator personnel from one’s own nation in most

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loyalty</th>
<th>bad</th>
<th>bad</th>
<th>good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical and mental status</strong></td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>good enough</td>
<td>good enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial status</strong></td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>good enough</td>
<td>good enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td>Roman Catholic [converted from the Coptic Church]</td>
<td>Non-Muslim</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other characteristics</strong></td>
<td>Salary in imperial service</td>
<td>500 Rf/year&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>500 Rf/year&lt;sup&gt;33&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>“Arab” (Copt)</td>
<td>“Arab” (Syrian)</td>
<td>“Greek” (Phanariot)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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33 His salary was elevated to 60 Rf per month after joining imperial service in Vienna. Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council referring to the salary of Corel, January 1646 (ÖStA, KA, HKR, HR, Prot. Exp. 1646, fol. 21<sup>1</sup>). The original proposal concerned 90 Rf, which was most likely approved only after his commission to Graz. Entries in the Registry of the Viennese War Council referring to Corel, 13. January 1646 (ibidem, fol. 2<sup>1</sup>–3<sup>1</sup>) and June of 1646 (ibidem, fol. 211<sup>1</sup>).
34 Report of Johann Rudolf Schmidt to Ferdinand III. ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 123, Konv. 3, fol. 187–205.
of the European states who were linked to the Ottoman Empire, just as it was the case with the Habsburg administration in Oriental affairs. Regarding the required abilities referred to above, the most desired characteristics of an interpreter were the sufficient language skills and an unquestionable loyalty towards the Emperor. In order to get more translators who would fulfil both requirements at the same time, Vienna attempted to obtain own interpreters by training them from a young age specifically for this function. Aiming at realizing this idea, ambassador Czernin was not only expected in 1644/45 to find new interpreters for the Aulic War Council, but he also had to take four young boys of poor descent with him in order to educate them under the supervision of the resident ambassador in Constantinople and create loyal and qualified imperial interpreters out of them – according to the Viennese hopes, within four to five years.

Before answering the question, whether they fulfilled the requirements of the Habsburg government or not, it should be examined briefly what exactly happened to these boys during their training in Constantinople. Regarding their professional education, in the first four years almost nothing happened. One of them died soon after having arrived at the city, and another one converted to Islam and left the imperial service. Only two of them, Hans Georg Zemper and Heinrich Julius Wachin/Wogin remained at the Habsburg embassy in Constantinople. According to the imperial decree concerning the number of the language students, the War Council seems to have been eager to complete the group. Regarding the obstacles to bringing newly appointed language students to Constantinople within a short a time, there was hardly another possibility to refill the vacant posts of the lost two students than choosing locals again who were thought to be suitable for imperial service in the future. These newcomers must have been the Levantines Francesco Navone/


37 See the document quoted in note 8. This was not the first plan attempting to educate Germans students in Constantinople. However, the proposition of the War Council remained without long-term success. See: P. MEIENBERGER, Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn, p. 95.

38 Extracts from the reports of Johann Rudolf Schmid to Michel D’Asquier, Constantinople, 30. 5. 1649 and 2. 6. 1649. ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 121, Konv. 1, fol. 105–110.
Naon and – probably ad interim – Natale di Paulo, whose assignment and further career are well-documented in the Viennese archival material. Their appearance also provides further information on the internal relations and rankings among the pupils, for it is very likely that there was a certain hierarchy established among the students: Francesco Navone, obviously already with an advanced knowledge in Turkish, was assigned to the position of a vice-interpreter, most probably at the side of the chief-interpreter Panaiotti.

According to financial obligations related to the creation of the language student group, the emperor sent a sum of 200 tallers for their settlement in the embassy in 1644. Ferdinand III also granted 500 tallers per annum for covering the extra costs incurring through their presence. This was submitted to his resident ambassador, Greiffenklau, who was responsible for the education of the boys. Furthermore, there was a plan to supply the students with a modest monthly financial help. Yet it also has to be mentioned that these students – similarly to the other functionaries and servants of the diplomatic outpost – were in reality not paid regularly. Especially in this particular period of the last phase of the Thirty Years War, the Imperial Court could not finance even the maintenance of the embassy in Constantinople. The years between 1645 and 1648 count as the poorest in the history of the Habsburg embassy in the Ottoman capital; it

39 Francesco Navone was member of the famous dragoman-dynasty Navone di Pera, his brother served as interpreter of the Venetian embassy in Constantinople. Extracts from the reports of Johann Rudolf Schmid between 30. 4. and 2. 6. 1649, Constantinople. Ibidem, fol. 60–81.
40 Extract from the reports of resident ambassador Alexander Greiffenklau, Constantinople, 23. 11. and 6. 12. 1647. Ibidem, Kart. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 203–205, 216.
41 Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council concerning the application of Francesco Navone for the position of an interpreter in the Habsburg embassy of Constantinople, June of 1645. ÖStA, KA, HKR, HR, Prot. Exp. 1645, fol. 505r. Navone was also involved in confidential affaires of the embassy, see: Zsuzsanna CZIRÁKI, Követ vagy szélhámos? A Habsburg diplomácia útvesztői egy konstantinápolyi gyilkosság tükrében [Ambassador or Swindler? The diplomatic labyrinth of the Habsburgs through a murder in Constantinople], Aetas Történettudományi Folyóirat 31, 2016, Issue 3, pp. 22–39.
43 The salaries of the lower functionaries employed in the field of Oriental diplomacy were paid usually from the incomes of the Hungarian Chamber. Among the countless examples in the collections of the Aulic Chamber’s Archives see especially the procedures concerning the payments for couriers and interpreters: Supplication of Natale di Paulo registered on 14. 3. 1650 (ÖStA, FHKA, AHK, HFU, Kart. 424, r. Nr. 182, Januar – Juni 1650, Konv. März, fol. 193–199); Procedure of the Aulic Chamber related to the default payments for Josephus Barbatus registered on 30. 4. 1650 (ibidem, Konv. April, fol. 130–133); Supplication of Vincenzo Bratutti registered on 18. 5. 1650 (ibidem, Konv. Mai, fol. 193–199); Procedure of the Aulic Chamber related to the payments for the language student Hans Georg Zemper with resolution of Ferdinand III dated 22. 9. 1651 (ÖStA, FHKA, AHK, HFU, Kart. 434, r. Nr. 186, September – Dezember 1651, Konv. September, fol. 112–117, 129–133).
practically collapsed, as the resident ambassador Alexander Greiffenklau died in the June of 1648 because of an accident. Most of the employees left their positions or debauched.\(^ {44}\) The affairs were managed by Panaiotti who acted with the permission of Vienna as a kind of a “supplementary agent” until the new resident arrived almost a year later.\(^ {45}\)

In this critical situation, the Aulic War Council was not able to support the language students either, who are reported to have fooled away their days in Constantinople. Probably the only person who really cared about them was Nicusio Panaiotti, who had been involved in their education still in the lifetime of Greiffenklau and taught them oriental languages, primarily Turkish.\(^ {46}\) In spite of all existential hardship and the vices of the city, the boys might have acquired some skills. The new resident ambassador, Simon Reniger – unfortunately, a beginner in Oriental affairs, who arrived at Constantinople in the spring of 1649 and took over the embassy as fully credentialed functionary at the beginning of 1650\(^ {47}\) – mentioned upon his arrival that the language students already were able to speak Turkish. Apart from this one particular compliment, he complained of the boys a lot in his first reports: they were said to be too lazy, making no advance in Ottoman curial style and spending most of their time with roaming around the capital. They also were reported to have been drinking a lot and to have had dangerous affairs with Turkish women. The students also created terrible debts, which is not surprising, regarding the lack of any financial support from Vienna. Nevertheless, they appear to have been accommodated in Constantinople in a way, for Reniger noted bitterly that they dressed like the locals and looked entirely like Turks, so it was almost impossible for him to find them on the streets.\(^ {48}\)

Alongside a detailed discussion concerning the various conflicts related to the language students, it has to be emphasized that Reniger finally managed to discipline them, although he was not completely satisfied henceforth either: in particular he missed

\(^{44}\) Related to the various forms of temptations in Constantinople see Report of resident ambassador Alexander Greiffenklau to the Aulic Chamber, Constantinople, 29. 7. 1646. ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 119, Konv. 2, fol. 172–173; V. MIOVIĆ, *Dragomans of the Dubrovnik Republic*, p. 85.

\(^{45}\) Letter Nicusio Panaiotti’s to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 17. 6. 1648 (ibidem, Kart. 120, Konv. 2, fol. 118–121); Report Johann Rudolf Schmid’s to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 28. 3. 1649 (ibidem, Kart. 121, Konv. 1, fol. 42–44).

\(^{46}\) Report of resident ambassador Alexander Greiffenklau to the Aulic Chamber, Constantinople, 29. 7. 1646 (ibidem, Kart. 119, Konv. 2, fol. 172–173). However, Josephus Barbatus is known to have contributed to their teaching in some extents too. See: Communication between Imperial War Council and Aulic Chamber dated 8. 2. 1650. ÖStA, FHKA, AHK, HFÖ, Kart. 813, r. Nr. 317, Januar – März 1650, sin fol.

\(^{47}\) In more detail see: Z. CZIRÁKI, *Habsburg-oszmán diplomácia a 17. század közepén*, p. 840.

\(^{48}\) Report of Johann Rudolf Schmid to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 10. 5. 1649 (ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 121, Konv. 1, fol. 96–97); Extracts from the reports of Johann Rudolf Schmid to Michel D’Asquier, Constantinople, 30. 5. and 2. 6. 1649 (ibidem, fol. 105–110).
diligence and commitment in the young men.\textsuperscript{49} However, Zemper and Wogin seem to have advanced in the Turkish language, and both were eventually taken back to Vienna.\textsuperscript{50} It is questionable whether they acquired all of the necessary qualifications required for a fully authorized interpreter in Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic affairs, although their activities are documented at the side of imperial translator Michel D’Asquier.\textsuperscript{51} This did not however mean that they could not be useful for the Habsburg government at all. Their acquaintance with the Turkish language, customs and morals made them competent for obtaining a role in the Habsburg administration by all means. Zemper and Wogin were employed ad interim as “Turkish couriers”\textsuperscript{52} by the War Council – that is runners who linked German and Ottoman functionaries by transporting letters and messages using their language competence and previous experiences on the long and dangerous routes connecting both empires; furthermore, they were commissioned with negotiations in day-to-day conflicts with the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{53}

\section*{Concluding remarks}

Returning to the initial questions about the requirements, advantages and disadvantages of Levantines and Germans as imperial interpreters, we have reached to point of telling which of them proved to be more useful for the Habsburg government. Based on the conclusions of the studied material, the answer is: neither the Levantines, nor the Germans

\textsuperscript{49} See especially the letter of disappointment from Reniger: Extract from the report of Simon Reniger, Constantinople, 13. 7. 1651 (ibidem, Kart. 124, Konv. 1, fol. 60); Report of Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 16. and 20. 11. 1651 (ibidem, Kart. 124, Konv. 2, fol. 64–70).


\textsuperscript{52} Regarding the term of “Turkish courier” see e. g. the supplication of Natale di Paulo for his salary as “Turkish courier” registered on 24. 3. 1650 which also highlights the important background information that couriers acting between Vienna and Constantinople were financed through the Hungarian Chamber, including the assent of Ferdinand III. ÖStA, FHKA, AHK, HFU, Kart. 424, r. Nr. 182, Januar – Juni 1650, Konv. März, fol. 193–199.

\textsuperscript{53} D. KEREKES, \textit{A császári tolmácsok}, p. 1198. Some examples for the assignment of elder students advanced in Turkish language as couriers: Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council concerning the sending of Natale di Paulo, 6. 11. 1645 (ÖStA, KA, HKR, HR, Prot. Exp. 1645, fol. 317\textsuperscript{v}). Francesco Navone attempted assignments as imperial runner in the 1640’s. Extract from the reports of resident ambassador Alexander Greffenklau, Constantinople, 23. 11. and 6. 12. 1647 (ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 203–205, 216). See also the missions of Hans Georg Zemper in the years 1649–1650. Extract from the report of Simon Reniger, Constantinople, 14. 8. 1649 (ibidem, Kart. 121, Konv. 1, fol. 248–250); Report of Johann Rudolf Schmid to the War Council, Constantinople, 3. 12. 1649 (ibidem, Kart. 121, Konv. 2, fol. 255–261); Report of Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 13. 12. 1650 (ibidem, Kart. 123, Konv. 1, fol. 171–174).
can be considered to be solely suitable. The ideal interpreter might have been a mixture of them, somebody who would have possessed all the communicative abilities which were required in Oriental affairs and who would have been faithful to the Emperor at all times – a concept that was quite far from the reality of that time.

To be more precise, occupying a post of importance should have required loyalty, above all in regards confidential information, which was often sold by the dragomans like Corel, Barbatus, but even by Panaiotti as well. The problem of loyalty is even more striking if we consider the fact that interpreters and language students were not employed as translating personnel only. On account of the fluid border between fields of activity in terms of premodern functionaries, their multiple obligations as couriers, interpreters, and sometimes as “supplementary diplomats” generated wide possibilities to mishandle important pieces of confidential information. Even worse, the bad payed and sometimes rather debauched functionaries and students often came into contact with obscure persons – e. g. creditors, tavern-keepers, criminals – which could result in further dangers to the imperial affairs.

Regarding their linguistic abilities, the ideal interpreter should have mastered several languages of the communication at the Sublime Porte: Turkish, Italian, Greek and – according to the opinion of Reniger – a Slavonic language as well, which proved to also be quite useful with regards to the great number of renegades in the Ottoman administration. As familiarity with the curial Ottoman style had certainly a special importance, the new dragomans – both fully trained outsiders and language students educated on the emperor’s costs – were accepted only after proving their relevant competences. This aim was realised usually primarily through a “language exam”: a sample of text written in Ottoman-Turkish was sent to Vienna and proofread by an experienced professional, usually by imperial chief interpreter, Michel D’Asquier. Another opportunity to test the abilities of the candidate was his cooperation in an audience of the imperial ambassador at the Sublime Porte where he was expected to translate under the supervision of another, well-trained dragoman. It also has to be mentioned that the communication between the imperial representatives and their Levantine dragoman was realised mainly in Italian.

54 Report of resident ambassador Alexander Greiffenklau to the Aulic Chamber, Constantinople, 29. 7. 1646. ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 119, Konv. 2, fol. 172–173.
55 Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council concerning requiring a sample of text in order to testify the language abilities of Panaiotti, 1. 8. 1645 (ÖStA, KA, HKR, HR, Prot. Exp. 1645, fol. 255’); Entry in the Registry of the Viennese War Council concerning the supervision of incoming samples of texts by Michel D’Asquier, March of 1646 (ibidem, Prot. Exp. 1646, fol. 94’).
order to involve the German language as well, Reniger was keen on schooling the new
generation of language students of Levantine origin in this tongue as well.56

The period of the 1640s and 1650s appears to have had special importance in the
development of education aiming at creating a group of loyal and competent imperial
interpreters. According to the educational and financial difficulties related to the language
students in Constantinople, the summer of 1651 seems to have been a turning point as
the Aulic War Council almost gave up on training the pupils.57 However, in accordance
with the opinion with Johann Rudolf Schmid, Reniger raised a possibility which might
have saved the institution of imperial language students in Constantinople. After a few
years of experimenting, Reniger observed that it could be much more fruitful to train
young boys of Catholic communities from Constantinople, mainly of Italian or Greek
descent. He also gave the reasons why: they already had a good command of Turkish and
Italian or Greek as native speakers; moreover, the Ottoman world was their home, so they
already had a profound everyday-experience in the Orient – which characteristics were
undoubtedly advantageous considering the time-consuming training of the Germans
both in languages and customs of the Orient.58

It is quite interesting that Reniger – after a few years of experience – opted definitely
against the education of German pupils in Constantinople. He appears to have been
extremely discontent with Zemper and Wogin. He complained continuously not only
about their behaviour, but of the high pretension of “German students”, their impetuous
attitude and their inability to acquire Oriental languages with efficiency. It was not
surprising that he would have rather had two or three locals of poor origin who already
had some knowledge in the required languages and would have been contented easily
by granting them only poor clothing, food and education in the Habsburg embassy.59

In 1653, the Viennese Aulic War Council accepted the proposal, and consequently
Reniger was allowed to train local Levantine students commended by his closer
acquaintanceship – above all by Panaiotti and the Jesuits – in the Ottoman capital.60

56 Extract from the report of Simon Reniger to Johann Rudolf Schmid, Constantinople, 12. 7. 1653. ÖStA,
HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 126, Konv. 2, fol. 3–4.
57 Report of Johann Rudolf Schmid to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 8. 6. 1651 (ibidem, Kart. 123,
Konv. 3, fol. 187–205); Letter of introduction including samples of text written in Ottoman-Turkish
from Marcantonio Mammucca della Torre to Johann Rudolf Schmid, Constantinople, 14. 4. 1654
(ibidem, Kart. 126, Konv. 4, fol. 73–74).
58 Report of Johann Rudolf Schmid to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 8. 6. 1651. Ibidem, Kart. 123,
Konv. 3, fol. 187–205.
59 Extract from the report of Simon Reniger to Johann Rudolf Schmid, Constantinople, 12. 7. 1653. Ibidem,
Kart. 126, Konv. 2, fol. 3–4.
60 Opinion of the War Council, Vienna, 2. 8. 1653 (ÖStA, FHKA, AHK, HFU, Kart. 443, r. Nr. 191,
Juli – August 1653, Konv. August, fol. 211–215); Extract from the report of Simon Reniger to Johann
This initiative finally ended with success: Reniger assisted the rise of dragomans like Marcantonio Mammucca della Torre or Giorgio Cleronome, whose outstanding career as interpreters started as imperial language students in the second half of the 1650s. However, this solution emphasises the most significant discrepancy between the most wanted abilities – loyalty and professional knowledge – of the imperial dragomans: Germans were thought to be loyal, but regarding the required language skills, it was more rentable to get Levantines. Consenting to preferring the latter group, the War Council – following the advice of Reniger – tried to make sure that they would serve loyally in another way: Roman Catholics had to be preferred among the newly recruited languages students. This seems to have taken over the importance of being a Habsburg imperial subject. All in all, it is probably safe to conclude that Reniger’s initiative of aiming at educating young boys of Levantine origin but with strong attachments to the Habsburg embassy can be interpreted as a second best way of ensuring appropriate subjects to enter the imperial translator service.

Rudolf Schmid, Constantinople, 12. 7. 1653 (ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I., Kart. 126, Konv. 2, fol. 3–4); Report of Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 25. 7. 1654 (ibidem, Kart. 126, Konv. 4, fol. 113–114).
The Illusion of Power or Relentless Reality? Ceremonial and Ritual Practices at the Court of Moscow in the Middle of the 17th Century through the Eyes of the Imperial Diplomats

Abstract: The main aim of the contribution is to show upon the background of the diplomatic missions of the Habsburg diplomats – Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Theodor of Lorbach (1655–1656), Johann Christoph of Fragstein and Christoph Beuer of Binnen (1657–1658) – how the ceremonial and ritual practices at the Tsar’s court were perceived by these mentioned diplomats. Furthermore, how there were reflected particular means of visualisation of the political status of the Habsburg representatives on the one hand and of the Russian head of state and his counsellors and advisers on the other hand. These mutual encounters of at the first sight completely different worlds of thoughts and value systems could not avoid cultural clashes and misunderstandings (the arguments about the usage of right titles, about rules of precedence, the Tsar’s inappropriate gestures during official meetings, the Russians, imposing of their arrogant behaviour on the Habsburg diplomats).

Keywords: Habsburg diplomats – court of Moscow – 17th century – ceremonial and ritual practices – performance of power

The series of peace treaties in Münster and Osnabrück at the end of 1640s constituted a significant turning-point in the development of modern diplomacy and international relations. Despite of reaching agreements between particular antagonized parties, the political situation in Europe was exceedingly complicated. There henceforward endured bitter power rivalry between France and Habsburg Monarchy

which significantly influenced political circumstances and affairs in other European countries. Also the relationships of Danubian Monarchy towards Tsardom of Russia (Grand Duchy of Moscow) were in this period dependable on current international situation. It can be said to simplify that a majority of embassies sent by Habsburg emperors to Moscow in this time were concerning extraordinarily escalated Polish-Russian relations. The descendants of Rudolf I of Habsburg belonged to traditional allies of the Rzeczpospolita and endeavoured actively to mediate peace between the both antagonized powers.

This topic is also being paid attention to in the following study. It strives to outline problems which imperial diplomats Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach in years 1655–1656 and Johann Christoph of Fragstein together with Christoph Beuer of Binnen in years 1657–1658 had to face during their diplomatic missions to Moscow,

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3 Leading European powers considered the Russian sovereign as a “Grand Duke of Moscow” until the year 1721 in which Peter I the Great was officially proclaimed the “Tsar of all Russia”. Jan HENNINGS, *The Semiotics of Diplomatic Dialogue: Pomp and Circumstance in Tsar Peter I’s Visit to Vienna in 1698*, The International History Review 30, 2008, pp. 515–544, here p. 519.


following long-term stay and also their everyday life there. A characteristic feature of the mutual meetings of these two at first sight different intellectual and value worlds was constituted by frequent misunderstandings and thereupon rising conflicts. The detailed commentaries of various conflict situations (for example concerning proper titling of both the emperor and tsar, ceremonial succession, inappropriate gestures of the tsar during audiences and alleged disdainful behaviour of the Russian side towards imperial diplomats), the argumentation of imperial and Russian sides as well as the outfalls of particular quarrels significantly influenced the views of Habsburg diplomats reflecting researched topics.

**Mid-Eastern Europe in the first half of the 17th century**

The countries of Mid-Eastern Europe did not particularly take part in the Thirty Years’ War. Nevertheless, there were breaking out numerous armed clashes which were crucially reflected in mutual contacts of both the above mentioned powers. Apart from the tsar Russia, these campaigns were alternately entered also by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Brandenburg, Sweden, the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. Independently of the biggest war conflict of the 17th century there was waged so-called Smolensk War (1632–1634) between Poland and Russia. This followed a period of struggles for the tsar throne after the extinction of the Rurik dynasty in 1598 (Smuta – “Time of Troubles”) which also the Polish king joined in. The Smolensk War broke out after the death of Polish king Sigismund III Vasa (1566–1632) when by contrast the Muscovites,

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who had been ruled by the Romanov dynasty since 1613, strived to take advantage of disturbances during Polish interregnum. Tsar forces vainly tried to conquer Smolensk which performed a strategic fort and symbolic key to the river gate – a corridor towards West between the rivers Dvina and Dnieper. Finally, for Russia there happened to be more important the peace talks in Polanowo in 1634 than the war operations themselves. In this peace treaty concluded “for all time” Władysław IV Vasa (1595–1648) resigned on the title of Moscow tsar which had been claimed by the Polish kings since the end of Polish-Russian war in years 1609–1618. He among others also accepted the validity of the election of Moscow tsar Michael I Fedorovich Romanov (1596–1645) in 1613 and awarded him the titles of Grand Duke and Tsar. After the accession of Aleksey I Mikhailovich (1629–1676) to the Russian throne in 1645, the Polish-Russian relations even improved and both countries cooperated in facing the Tartars.

After the death of Sigismund III Vasa there also came a split between the Rzeczpospolita and the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish side was worried about possible accession of the Habsburgs or the Romanovs to the Polish throne. Other reasons were provided by Polish subjects, Zaporozhian Cossacks, whose settlements had been allegedly built on Ottoman territories. They were in addition lunging toward Turkish borderland. However, this clash was also warded off at the end of the 17th century. A far more serious problem was represented by the efforts of Władysław IV Vasa, the successor of Sigismund to the Polish throne, to realize a new pan-Christian military campaign against the Turks which should have been undertaken in 1640s. Its aim was to recover the “tarnished glory of Christian chivalry” and reunite the Catholic and Protestant Christians against their mutual enemy. But the effort of the monarch to raise a strong Cossack army against the Turks contributed to an internal disaster of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which consequently gained international significance.

14 Z. WÓJCIK (ed.), Historia dyplomacji polskiej II, p. 117. It is interesting that Polish diplomat Mikulas Woronicz, who addressed Michael I Fedorovich in this way, should have been subsequently put on trial by the Polish Sejm. Ibidem, p. 96.
For there broke out the uprising of the Cossacks led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the Ukraine in 1648. Although it was an internal matter of the Rzeczpospolita, one of its main features was the immediate internationalization. Since its beginning, Khmelnytsky promptly negotiated about a coalition with the neighbouring countries. He nearly immediately succeeded in persuading the Tartars to ally and addressed Transylvanian and also Hungarian aristocracy. Nevertheless, the most powerful neighbour – Russia – refused Khmelnytsky as a rioter and rebel. In year 1654 the Muscovites consented to bargain with the Cossacks and there was concluded the Treaty of Pereyaslav by means of which the Zaporozhian Cossacks entered the liege bound to Russia. This agreement resulted in another Polish-Russian war for the Left-bank Ukraine that lasted with certain interludes until the year 1667. The so-far complicated international situation, in which the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth involved in several conflicts with its neighbours, was further perplexed by relations to ancestral homeland of the Polish Vasa dynasty members – to Sweden. During years 1600–1629 there repeatedly arose wars between the both countries concerning the rights of succession to the Swedish throne. In 1629 there was called the six-year Truce of Altmark which was then prolonged in Sztumskà Wieś for the following 26 years (until the year 1661). The situation changed in 1654 when the Swedish queen Christina resigned and the throne was acceded by Charles X Gustav.
During the following year he invaded with his armies Poland, because of persisting dynastic quarrels and his efforts to constitute the “imperium maris Baltici”, and he soon occupied nearly all the country. The Polish king John II Casimir had to flee to the Habsburg territories in Silesia whereby he forced Ferdinand III of Habsburg to take a clear viewpoint concerning the occurred matter.

The year 1654 became a turning point of the international situation in Mid-Eastern Europe. In June Charles X Gustav superseded the queen Christina on the Swedish throne, in January there was concluded the Treaty of Pereyaslav between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and Russia that lead to the Polish-Russian war and also to the change of political orientation of the Tartars who joined the Rzeczpospolita. In the same year there were also resumed diplomatic relations between the Habsburgs and Russia after nearly a forty-year silence. Aleksey I Mikhailovich, who negotiated with the rioting Cossacks even before the Treaty of Pereyaslav was concluded, decided to use his diplomats in order to find out the attitudes of particular powers towards the forthcoming war against the Rzeczpospolita and spy out their possible counter actions. By the end of 1653 he therefore gradually sent his delegates to Sweden, France, Denmark and the Netherlands and during the following year also to Constantinople, Moldavia, Wallachia, Brandenburg, Courland, Vienna and Crimea.

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27 The last diplomatic contacts between the both powers were approached before the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War during years 1616–1617. At that time tsar Michael I Fedorovich sent a deputation lead by Lukijan Ivanovich Mjasnov to Vienna. Boris Nikolajevič FLORJA, *Россия и чешское восстание против Габсбургов*, Moscow 1986, pp. 20–32; L. SVOBODA, *Diplomatiké vztahy*, pp. 56–58; Antonia von REICHE, *Der Weg des russischen Zarentums zur Anerkennung in der Zeit von 1547 bis 1722 (Eine völkerrechtlich-historische Studie)*, Hamburg 2001 (Dissertation thesis), pp. 89–90.

Vienna and Moscow in the mid-17th century

The Russian delegation arrived to Vienna in October 1654. It was led by okolnichy Ivan Ivanovich Baklanovskij and dyak Ivan Mikhailov.29 There were 23 persons involved and its official mission was to deliver Ferdinand III of Habsburg a message about the death of Michael I Fedorovich Romanov (died on 23th July 1645), the accession of his son Aleksey I Mikhailovich to the tsar throne and request for maintaining “good friendly relations” between the new Russian monarch and the descendants of Rudolf I of Habsburg.30 According to the Tsar’s instruction, the delegates should have tried to obtain information about the attitude of Ferdinand III of Habsburg towards the currently running Russian-Polish war. There was simultaneously needed to find out if the Habsburg monarch would send his forces to help the Polish king or possibly let John II Casimir Vasa to recruit soldiers in the Holy Roman Empire territories.31 As a pretext to declare the war, the delegates quoted faulty titling of the tsar which the descendant of Sigismund III Vasa used during their contacts, his alliance with the Tartars, armed raids on his subjects and further series of slights and violations.32 In the same time a roving ambassador of the Rzeczpospolita – Alexander Dönhoff – was heading to Vienna to convey a condolence concerning the death of Ferdinand IV of Habsburg (1633–1654). He was also instructed to inform the imperial court about the ongoing Polish-Tartar negotiations and ask for military support in the war with Russia.33

The Danubian Monarchy was not willing to involve in any war conflict after the Thirty Years’ War. Therefore Ferdinand III of Habsburg decided to follow the course of

30 An official announcement of the enthronization of a new sovereign belonged to the most frequent reasons of sending diplomatic delegations in Early Modern period. However, in this case it came nine years after the death of Michael I Fedorovich Romanov, which was of course not so common. Памятники дипломатических сношений древней России с державами иностранными III (с 1632 по 1660 год), St. Petersburg 1854, pp. 91–248; L. SVOBODA, Diplomatické vztahy, pp. 63–65; Anastasija Vladimirovná MERZANOVA, Возобновление дипломатических отношений России и Священной Римской империи германской нации в 1654 г. Посольство И. И. Баклановского и И. Михайло, Vestnik Moskovskogo государственного областного университета. Серия: История и политические науки 2014, No. 3, pp. 63–69.
31 On the contrary, there was not mentioned anything about the Zaporozhian Cossacks during the negotiations. L. SVOBODA, Diplomatické vztahy, p. 65.
his ancestors and offered the both antagonized sides to arrange peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{34} The role of mediator – peacemaker in solving the conflict between the both powers belonged to exceedingly prestigious matters in the perspective of observing contemporaries. Also in this case the son of Ferdinand II of Habsburg appointed himself to the position of a make-peace who reputedly wanted no further unfortunate warfare and bloodsheds within Christian countries.\textsuperscript{35} The mediation, though, brought a welcomed possibility to influence the conditions under which the peace was negotiated and determine these according to the profit of the mediator.\textsuperscript{36} In case of Mid-Eastern Europe such a function had been permanently striven for by two sworn rivals – the Habsburg Monarchy and France.\textsuperscript{37}

At the Viennese court there were launched feverish arrangements for sending a delegation to the heart of Russian state which brought considerable difficulties. The emperor’s party was well aware of the everyday life, values and behaviour patterns commonly accepted in that geographically remote area. For that reason the diplomats were ordered to study the final reports of their predecessors in order to gain necessary knowledge of everyday life in Moscow and potential conflict situations which they should have been able to prevent. These documents served also as a kind of “manuals” how to act during solving similar problems.\textsuperscript{38} But the last Habsburg delegate in the capital of the Grand Duchy of Moscow had been Heinrich von Logau 50 years earlier (in 1604).\textsuperscript{39} So the new diplomatic mission could have been sent there only on the basis of some outdated fifty-year-old information gathered from court archives and other variously reliable reports and tales about distant Moscow.\textsuperscript{40}

Also the choice of an appropriate diplomat increased the attention of highest imperial officials. In this case there were more important communicative and language skills


\textsuperscript{35} More about this in the Instruction by Ferdinand III of Habsburg to Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach dated on 5. 6. 1655. I. SCHWARCZ, Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной, pp. 234–236.


\textsuperscript{37} Z. VESELY, Dějiny diplomacie, p. 79.


\textsuperscript{39} F. von ADELUNG, Kritisch-literarische Übersicht, pp. 146–156.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibidem, pp. 92–93.
exercisable in the destination rather than his social status or geographical knowledge. Therefore the Habsburg diplomacy often used the persons of Slavic origin with regards to their language similarities with Russian language also in later years. On 12th April 1655 Ferdinand III of Habsburg appointed Allegretto Allegretti (a court chaplain and native of Dubrovnik) and Erasmus Constantine Sattlow (a secretary of the Imperial Council of War, i.e. Hofkriegsrat) the leader delegates. The second of these however resigned from his position and was replaced by Johann Dietrich of Lorbach. The delegation left Vienna on 27th July 1655 and it festively entered Moscow on 7th October 1655. After the following lengthy and not seldom tempestuous conferences, Aleksey I Mikhailovich agreed with the Habsburg mediation as well as with the cessation of hostilities until peace talks. These started in mid-August 1656 in Lithuanian Vilna where the emperor was represented by Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach themselves. During the negotiations the Polish delegation granted several concessions and even agreed with the election of the Russian tsar the future Polish king while John II Casimir being still alive (on the condition that he would come to rule the Rzeczpospolita after the death of the current sovereign). However, there was not concluded any peace between the antagonized sides but only ratified the truce.

The diplomatic mission of Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach was followed by a legacy of imperial resident in Poland Johann Christoph of Fragstein and Christoph Beuer of Binnen. Their main task was to inform Aleksey I Mikhailovich about the death of Ferdinand III of Habsburg and accession of his son Leopold I to the throne, who also expressed a wish to maintain friendly relations with the Grand Duchy of Moscow. There was, however, a much more important point represented by ensuring

43 Ibidem, pp. 95–113; I. SCHWARCZ, Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной.
44 Памятники дипломатических сношений, pp. 470–471; L. SVOBODA, Diplomatiké vztahy, p. 154.
the peace talks between the Rzeczpospolita and Russia to continue because their mutual relations seemed to begin getting worse again. The Habsburgs moreover needed to preserve the war *status quo*. Thanks to the current conflict (1656–1658) namely the tsar army was fighting Swedish forces in Baltic region, mostly in Ingria and Livonia, due to which the Swedish troops could not threaten the Holy Roman Empire territories.\(^47\) The actual diplomatic negotiations in Moscow which lasted more than a month finally failed due to bitter disputes mostly concerning appropriate titling of Leopold I of Habsburg and Aleksey I Mikhailovich, allegedly disdainful behaviour of the Russian side and persistence of Johann Christoph of Fragstein.\(^48\) He also refused to bring back to Vienna a tsar’s personal letter addressed to the young Habsburg because in its title there was used a wrong prerogative, which purportedly disparaged his leading position within the presumable hierarchy of European sovereigns, so Fragstein left it on the table in his Moscow room.\(^49\)

**Travel and stay in Moscow as a permanent sequence of conflicts**

The preserved archival documents reflect that the Habsburg delegates had prepared for their mission in advance and consequently endeavoured to fulfil the commonly accepted patterns of behaviour and decency. For these reasons they also stopped by the borders of the Moscow state and asked the local authorities for the permission to enter and appropriate introduction to the area ruled by Aleksey I Mikhailovich.\(^50\) The tsar by contrast sent towards them some of his servants by whom he expressed his respect to the enterprising monarch. At the same time, he secured the voyagers during their travel


\(^{49}\) A Final report by Christoph Beuer of Binnen dated on 27. 5. 1658 and a Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 1, fol. 117–124; Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wroclawiu (= BUW), Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 1–8.

\(^{50}\) An entry in a Travel diary by Christoph Beuer of Binnen dated on 10. 7. 1657; also a Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated 30. 7. 1657; and the Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. Ibidem. Comp. Olga Genievna AGEEVA, *Дипломатический церемониал императорской России. XVIII век*, Moscow 2012, p. 40.
through the foreign territory.\textsuperscript{51} The welcome, greetings and introducing to the country were in the period society perceived as a kind of initiative ritual for the future mutual interaction of the newly-come visitors and their hosts. Its procedure reflected the current international political matters as well as the power relations between the both states. There were ordinarily articulated several bilateral expectations and objectives.\textsuperscript{52}

Although the Habsburg diplomats tried to prevent possible conflict situations, the first disagreements repeatedly came already during their travel to Moscow. Johann Christoph of Fragstein and also Christoph Beuer of Binnen considered their more than fourteen-day long waiting at the Russian borders for the permission to enter the country as egregious.\textsuperscript{53} They also complained about the acting of tsar clerks and military officers who gradually welcomed and visited them in towns which they went through. According to the opinion of Johann Christoph of Fragstein, they did not have any notion about elementary good manners. For example in Nowidwur was Fragstein visited by a certain captain. “Who, having no pertinent authority, entered my dwelling. And so I, not willing to let that man crossing my threshold, stepped forward to him; and also let him greet me by kissing my hand.”\textsuperscript{54} Much bigger disillusion of the diplomat’s was caused by intercepting his delegation nearby town Borisov. There they had to spend approximately 20 weeks in quarantine because of spread plague epidemic. The whole building, in which they stayed,
was moreover guarded by an armed patrol counting 27 men, who allegedly watched also the very door into the diplomat’s room.55

During the mentioned interception, the Russian party even tried to utterly isolate Fragstein and his suite from the outer world. They neither let him to inform via letters the Viennese court about the journey, nor to communicate with diplomatic missions of other European powers which were also retained there.56 The imperial diplomat considered such a local stay to be a kind of purpose imprisonment or detention because the Russian delegations, including couriers, were allowed to pass through the same place freely.57 That was why he did not respect the ban to communicate with anyone and secretly exchanged encrypted messages mostly with a Polish delegate Stephan Franciszek Medeksza of Prószcza.58 With help of Medeksza he also secretly sent several coded letters to Vienna. Some of them were, however, seized by the Russian party who had it translated and sent to Moscow.59 Fragstein sharply protested against such procedures: “[B]y this tort there was violated the right of nations… Indeed by such barbarian and negligent nation there was achieved nothing in terms of honour.”60 And these steps only deepened the mutual distrust.

On the other hand, the encryption he used reputedly increased Russian suspicion about


56 The Letters by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 2. 1. 1658 and Christoph Beuer of Binnen to an unknown addressee dated on 3. 1. 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 1, fol. 1–2, 130; I. SCHWARCZ, Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной, pp. 297–298, document No. 17.

57 A Letter draft by Christoph Beuer of Binnen to an unknown addressee dated on 28. 10. 1657. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 131.


60 “… de violato iure gentium de hac iniuria. … Sed apud gentem barbarum et honestatis incuriam nihil profectum est.” One of its effects was for example the reinforcement of their guards. It is referred to in the Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 4.
Fragstein’s suite. All these assumed or actual injustices were by Fragstein considered as disregarding the reputation of Leopold I of Habsburg and breaching the hospitality rights.61

Another bitter dispute came shortly before the ceremonial entry of the delegation to Moscow. When the commissioners appointed by the tsar were to welcome the arriving delegates in front of the capital of the Grand Duchy and greet them, they insisted upon Habsburg diplomats dismounting from their horses or getting off their carriages sooner than the commissioners themselves.62 They argued by talking on behalf of the tsar himself. The Mid-Europeans regarded the raised query extremely inordinate and emphatically objected to such Russian dictation. According to Allegretto Allegretti “the legates of the Roman Emperor, the supreme sovereign of Christendom, respected by their master – the Grand Tsar, cannot be equalized to messengers of other rulers and they must be paid higher tribute for they are servants of a greater master”.63 On the basis of commonly accepted standards of behaviour, the West-Europeans viewed the hosts to be first in getting off the carriages before arrived foreigners as corresponding good manners.64 On the contrary, the tsar’s commissioners considered such acting to be extremely improper and rude because it was inconsistent with the conventions in their country.65

Consequently, the tsar’s commissioners got in an argument with the Habsburg delegates which lasted possibly more than an hour. They were referring to former diplomats sent by the Habsburgs who allegedly always respected the Russian customs and made the mentioned gesture, whereas the delegates were disproving it by explaining that their duty was to defend good reputation and honour of their sovereign.66 They at the same time clearly expressed that they were well aware of the former ceremonial reception procedures of their predecessors.67 The Russian party had finally always conformed to the demands

61 Ibidem, fol. 5.
63 “... li ablegati dell’Imperatore Romano, sovrano Prencipe della Christianità, riconosciuto per tale dallistesso Gran Zar lor Signore, non s’havevano da’equiparare con quelli daltrì potenti, e <che> gli sono dovuti maggiori gradi d’honor, quanto sono servitori di maggior padrone.” I. SCHWARCZ, Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной, p. 256. See also Памятники дипломатических сношений, pp. 347–350.
64 O. G. AGEEVA, Дипломатический церемониал, p. 131.
65 I. SCHWARZCZ, Die kaiserlichen Gesandten, p. 270.
66 The Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Johann Adolf of Schwarzenberg dated on 8. 6. 1657. SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, RA Schwarzenberků, fasc. 373, fol. 784–785.
of Habsburg delegates and its representatives eventually promised to get off the carriages simultaneously with the foreign diplomats.68

Nevertheless, each side was searching for other advantages and tried to achieve symbolic power superiority and claim more respect at least by various minor gestures. This way there was made a bargain between the Habsburg delegation lead by Johann Christoph of Fragstein and the tsar’s commissioners in front of Moscow on 1st February 1658. The first to get off the carriage would be Christoph Beuer of Binnen simultaneously with a younger tsar commissioner Grigorij Bogdanov. The same step would have been then made by the Baron of Fragstein together with Jakov Nikitich Licharev. When the diplomat of Leopold I of Habsburg noticed, though, that the older courtier of Aleksey I Mikhailovich rather delayed leaving his means of transport and therefore was trying to achieve a slight privilege, he regarded that to be an obvious breach of mutual agreement. So Fragstein immediately beckoned Beuer of Binnen to return back in the carriage. After the both sides clarified their viewpoints via messengers, whereas the Habsburg delegates insisted on meeting the arranged conditions, the exiting proceeded according to the previously agreed order.69

As the reports and other written records by some Early Modern diplomats arriving to Moscow show, the dispute of Johann Christoph of Fragstein and Christoph Beuer of Binnen with Jakov Nikitich Licharev and Grigorij Bogdanov was not any rare or exceptional case. The events experienced by Friedrich Joachim of Borrethin, Sigismund of Herberstein, Adam Olearius, Allegretto Allegretti, Augustin Mayer of Mayerberg, Johann Georg Korb and many others unambiguously prove that such events traditionally concerned receptions of abroad delegations in front of Moscow.70 The Russian party strived to symbolically express their own power superiority and increase personal prestige by such practice “especially towards the foreigners”.71 Another explanation for this behaviour of the commissaries of Aleksey I Mikhailovich was offered in a text by Adam Olearius, a traveller and diplomat serving the duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp. According to his opinion, the tsar officials expressed a kind of their personal loyalty to the monarch.

71 D. LOHMEIER (ed.), Adam Olearius, p. 189; C. GARNIER, „Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch”, p. 34.

Within this context, it is also necessary to draw attention to completely different perception of the significance of ceremonial entries of foreign delegates to destinations in the eyes of West-European powers’ representatives on the one hand and the Russian tsar on the other hand.\footnote{K. MÜLLER, Das kaiserliche Gesandtswesen, pp. 126–127. Generally to the topic of ceremonial entries Peter JOHANEK – Angelika LAMPEN (eds.), Adventus. Studien zum herrscherlichen Einzug in die Stadt, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2009; Harriet RUDOLPH, Das Reich als Ereignis. Formen und Funktionen der Herrschaftsinszenierung bei Kaisereinzügen (1558–1618), Köln – Weimar – Wien 2011.} In the first case it was realised at the expense of the incoming diplomats. The performance itself served as an instrument for presenting the majesty and glory of monarch who was directly represented by the diplomat in this remote geographical area. It offered a welcomed opportunity for the delegating sovereign as well as for his deputy to legitimize his real (or assumed) power and show wealth and social status in public. The propagation itself was realised by a spectacular parade, costly materials used, allegorical carriage decorations, thoroughbred horses and also numerous participants in cavalcade.\footnote{Karl VOCELKA, Die politische Propaganda Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1576–1612), Wien 1981, pp. 121–187. On representative strategies of particular imperial delegates during ceremonial entries to European metropolises in the beginning of the Early Modern Age see: Herbert HAUPP, Diplomatie und Repräsentation im Dienst des Kaiserhauses. Die öffentlichen Einzüge des Fürsten Joseph Wenzel von Liechtenstein, in: Reinhold Baumstark (ed.), Joseph Wenzel von Liechtenstein. Fürst und Diplomat im Europa des 18. Jahrhunderts, Einsiedeln 1990, pp. 24–53; Rostislav SMÍŠEK, Anton Florian von Liechtenstein und Rom. Selbstpräsentation eines kaiserlichen Gesandten zum Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts, in: Marek Vafěka – Aleš Zářický (eds.), Das Fürstenhaus Liechtenstein in der Geschichte der Länder der Böhmischen Krone, Ostrava – Vaduz 2013, pp. 197–212.} The Russian sovereign on the contrary used the mentioned ceremonial to visualise his own person. This was connected with lending his personal splendid carriage and thoroughbred horses from tsar stables by which the diplomats should have passed the ritual.\footnote{Alejandro LÓPEZ ALVAREZ, Kutschen und Sänften als Macht- und Statussymbole des spanischen Adels im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. Eine Beschreibung anhand zeitgenössischer Festberichte, Achse, Rad und Wagen. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Landfahrzeuge 7, 1999, pp. 20–29.} These arrangements of all the necessities financed by the tsar treasury formed
an integral part of representation of the descendants of Vladimir Monomakh. Thereby they symbolically expressed their noble-mindedness, power and wealth.\(^{76}\)

Further displeasure of the Habsburg delegates was caused also by a regulation that nobody was allowed to leave the interiors of reserved palace until the audience with the tsar (and often also after that) and visit any streets of Moscow. This order was fulfilled by the assigned security guard.\(^{77}\) Allegretto Allegretti, Johann Christoph of Fragstein and also Christoph Beuer of Binnen accordingly compared such restrictions to imprisonment: “Thanks to such categorical answer, we had to stay in our dwelling for two whole months like being arrested in prison, having no contact with people…”\(^{78}\) Except the worries of the tsar court about the possible communication with diplomatic missions of other foreign powers’ delegations in Moscow, eventually different persons or potential plotting against Aleksey I Mikhailovich, this restrictive regulation can also reflect ceremonial reasons. The Russian party acted in similar way as Western European festival scholarship which did not recommend the diplomats to pass any courtesy visits by other persons, especially other foreign diplomats, until the initial hearing at the monarch.\(^{79}\) Doing so, they would have offended his honour and majesty because of visiting him as far as the second one. Providing the main aim of the diplomatic mission to be the official meeting with the monarch and subsequent discussion with the Tsar of Russia, they were to meet him as the first one before any other gatherings.\(^{80}\)

Not even the course of inaugural audience was spared of various misunderstandings which offered incentives to following quarrels and frictions. These could significantly influence the results of diplomatic mission as appeared also in the case of hearing of Johann Christoph of Fragstein at Aleksey I Mikhailovich on 4\(^{th}\) February 1658.\(^{81}\) According to the Habsburg diplomat, the tsar used utterly inappropriate titling for addressing Leopold I of Habsburg during the discussion. When he was asking about the health of

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\(^{78}\) “Con cosi categorica risposta vissimo nel nostro quartiere duei mesi intieri come in una prigion rinchiusi, senza comercio humano…” I. SCHWARCZ, Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной, p. 256. Comp. the entry in the Travel diary by Christoph Beuer of Binnen dated on 1. 2. 1658, Beuer’s Final report dated on 27. 5. 1658 and the Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 6. 1658. ÖStA Wien, HHSTA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 1, fol. 117–124; BUW, Oddział Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein; L. SVOBODA, Diplomatiké vztahy, pp. 145–146.


\(^{80}\) L. JUZEOVIĆ, Путь посла, pp. 107–108.

\(^{81}\) More about this in Памятники дипломатических сношений, pp. 819–820.
Ferdinand III of Habsburg’s son, he did not call him a “Brother” and also omitted some gestures generally used among Christian sovereigns during their mutual contacts – above all he did not whip off when pronouncing the name of young Habsburg. Moreover, when Fragstein wanted to pass his letter of credence into the hands of the tsar, Aleksey I Mikhailovich touched it only reluctantly and wanted it passed to a duma dyak Almaz Ivanovich Ivanov. So Fragstein immediately pulled his hand with the letter back. On the contrary, the Russian side perceived this enforcement as a big impertinence and breach of elementary manners. For them there were possible only exceptional opportunities for direct contacts between the tsar and subjects of another monarch. In the absolute majority of cases the communication was realised by tsar’s high courtly officials. If he had approached a diplomat or taken some documents himself, such gestures would have been considered as an extraordinary manifestation of grace towards the diplomat and also the sovereign represented by him.

During the following discussions with tsar’s high officials there burst a bitter exchange of views between the both sides because Johann Christoph of Fragstein objected to in his perspective inappropriate acting of Aleksey I Mikhailovich; arguing that he only demanded the same ceremonial and ritual elements and gestures which there had been granted to his predecessor Allegretto Allegretti in 1655. While in case of calling the young Habsburg a “Brother” the tsar’s officials admitted the requested title because also Leopold called Aleksey I Mikhailovich with the same term, in the event of “whipping off” they refused to compromise. Even after Fragstein referred to the fact that: “[I]t used to be customary among all Christian monarchs to ask each other about health bareheaded”, the Russian party replied with a logic counter-argument: “While their Grand Duke had always wore a crown on his head during the public audiences, the other Christian sovereigns had been used to carry only a cap.” Therefore he only touched it.
The tsar’s commissioners also considered the demand of Habsburg diplomats to be treated in the same way as in case of the delegation lead by Allegretto Allegretti at the turn of years 1655 and 1656 as faint. In the Russian perspective the delegates of Leopold I of Habsburg should have kept in view the different ranks of both crowned heads.\textsuperscript{88} Whilst the Russian sovereign had the title of tsar, the descendant of Ferdinand III of Habsburg could for that time perform only as the Hungarian and Bohemian king because he had not been elected the Holy Roman emperor so far.\textsuperscript{89} This had to be necessarily respected during their mutual interaction. Therefore Fragstein was not in any case allowed to demand such a symbolic gesture from the monarch who was higher socially situated in the notional hierarchy of Early Modern sovereigns.\textsuperscript{90} In addition, Aleksey I Mikhailovich reputedly paid him more respect (allegedly only because of his friendship and sympathy) than it was customary towards a lower situated monarch.\textsuperscript{91}

Probably the sharpest conflict was caused by inappropriate usage of titling concerning the both monarchs.\textsuperscript{92} The first hints of that appeared already at the very borders of the Rzeczpospolita and Russian Tsardom where the delegation was kept waiting for permission to enter the country ruled by Aleksey I Mikhailovich. There a Grodno voivode Bogdan Aprelev complained via his messenger about wrong titling of the tsar stated in the passport of Johann Christoph of Fragstein. While the Vienna court used the phrase of “\textit{Serenissimus Magnus Moscoviae Dux}” in the document, the tsar’s official demanded the formulation of “\textit{Magnus Moscoviae Czar}”. According to Aprelev’s opinion, the term of tsar meant in the Russian mind the same as an emperor (“\textit{Caesar}”).\textsuperscript{93} On the other hand, Christoph Beuer of Binnen noted in his travel diary that Bogdan Aprelev protested against the statement of “\textit{Magnus Moscoviae Dux}” and demanded it to be replaced by expression of “\textit{Czarea Majestas}”.\textsuperscript{94} Johann Christoph of Fragstein apologized to the voivode for the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
mentioned offence explaining that the Vienna Court Chancery was not used to state all the prerogatives of monarchs in similar documents. It was no intention of Leopold I of Habsburg to depreciate the honour of Aleksey I Mikhailovich. To appease the official of Grodno, Fragstein also promised that the tsar would not be denied any other titles. He allegedly even wanted to assign him prerogatives which had not been used any time before by any delegates of foreign powers.  

As the votum of the Privy Council (Geheimer Rat), an advisory board of Leopold I of Habsburg in home and abroad politics of the Habsburg Monarchy, from the 19th September 1657 indicates, the Viennese court did not pay any attention to possible problems with appropriate addressing of the Russian monarch. However, Johann Christoph of Fragstein did not underestimate the above-mentioned reproach. He was well aware of such disputes over titling thanks to the reports of his predecessors, especially by Allegretto Allegretti. Some of these lengthy controversies remained unsolved until his time. According to his point of view, the inappropriately chosen titling of the tsar in Fragstein’s passport could have been the reason of more than the three-week long waiting for the permission to enter the Russian territory. He consequently ended his considerations by a prophetic statement: “It seems that the more times mentioned voivode was appeased by this information. Once, the time will show if there arise other disorders in this matter.”

The Fragstein’s presentiment came true already during the inaugural audience on 4th February 1658. There he noticed that the Russian interpreter did not use the predicate “Majestas”. So he protested against such practice immediately during the following conference. Also the representatives of the Grand Duke pointed out that Johann Christoph of Fragstein addressed their master using only the phrase of “Euere Czarische Großmächtigkeit” and not “Majestas”, which had been allegedly done also by the delegates.

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95 The Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 30. 7. 1657. Comp. the entry in the Travel diary by Christoph Beuer of Binnen about the course of diplomatic mission to Moscow dated on 19. 7. 1657. Ibidem, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 112–115 and 207.
96 The Votum of the Privy Council addressed to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 19. 9. 1657. Ibidem, fol. 120–121.
98 ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Polen I, Kart. 69, Konv. Mai, fol. 37; Памятники дипломатических сношений, pp. 796–798.
100 Памятники дипломатических сношений, pp. 798–804.
of other countries as well as by the diplomats of Ferdinand III of Habsburg before.\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, Leopold I of Habsburg stated in his letter to the tsar only the prerogative of “Praepotens” or “Großmächtigkeit” although the predecessors of the young Habsburg had commonly titled him by the term of “Potentissimus”. The above-mentioned terms, according to the opinion of Russian side, did not sufficiently correspond to the prestige of the tsar title.\textsuperscript{102}

Fragstein argued that he acted according to the former practice and experience reported by his predecessors Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Dietrich of Lorbach who had newer mentioned the predicate of “Maiestas” even by a single word.\textsuperscript{103} That was why he requested the tsar’s commissioners to propose him some official document which would have contained the demanded titling. They, however, refused it accusing Allegretti and Lorbach of lying and reporting false information in their texts.\textsuperscript{104} To support their demands, the Russian commissioners used in addressing Leopold I of Habsburg only the terms of “Ihre Königliche Großmächtigkeit” whereas the titling of the tsar contained “Maiestas” category. Fragstein considered such acting as impertinent and very arrogant “not to let it seem obvious that they were asking for the title, but as they were claiming the due right”.\textsuperscript{105} So he clearly expressed that he would never award Aleksey I Mikhailovich the requested prerogative.\textsuperscript{106}

Similar behaviour had been, besides, noticed also by Allegretto Allegretti a year before. Shortly before his inaugural audience, he was visited by a certain tsar official who asked him about the prerogatives which the imperial diplomats would concede to the tsar. When they asked that these would be the same as used in the letter of Ferdinand III of Habsburg, he insisted on adding also “the Voivode of Smolensk and the Grand Duke of Lithuania” (these were recently conquered territories).\textsuperscript{107} Allegretti was taken aback by his impudence and commented it mockingly: “There would be only one thing left – if he

\textsuperscript{103} Памятники дипломатических сношений, p. 831; I. SCHWARCZ, Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной, pp. 255–263.
\textsuperscript{104} Памятники дипломатических сношений, pp. 832–833.
\textsuperscript{105} “… ne scilicet titulum istum videantur petere, sed quasi debitum vi extorquere.” The Final report by Johann Christoph of Fragstein dated on 18. 7. 1658. BUW, Oddzial Starych Druków, akcesja 1988.16, Fragstein, fol. 15.
\textsuperscript{106} Comp. L. SVOBODA, Diplomatické vztahy, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{107} Iskra SCHWARCZ, Австро-русские дипломатические отношения в первые годы Северной войны, in: В. Н. Флоря – Л. Я. Семенова (eds.), Русская и украинская дипломатия, pp. 31–46, here pp. 33–34; L. SVOBODA, Diplomatické vztahy, pp. 106–107; Julija Vladimirovna SITKEVIČ, Эволюция титулатуры московских князей в практике отношений со странами Центральной
demanded a title of emperor, when it would be enough to add a single syllable CE to the word "tsar" – Cezar = Cesar.\textsuperscript{108} He as well dared to make a slight reproach towards the emperor and his predecessors because they, according to Allegretti, were much more benevolent and generous in titling Muscovite Grand Dukes than the other (European) sovereigns and granted the successors of Vladimir Monomakh prerogatives which they had no claim on.\textsuperscript{109} If they had granted them particular titles in the past, which he was not sure about himself, there was no wonder that the Russians requested more.\textsuperscript{110}

The above mentioned inquiries eloquently depict the peculiar attitude of Russian side to the usage of appropriate titling of their monarch. The hypersensitivity of the tsar court concerning the titling can be further illustrated with the fact that the missing or inappropriately formulated prerogatives could have become a cause of war declaration.\textsuperscript{111}

The acknowledgement of any title of Aleksey I Mikhailovich by the abroad powers at the same time meant the legitimation of his territorial claims concerning a particular conquered area. There was, however, even more important fact that such acknowledgement precisely defined the position of his descendant Fyodor III Alekseyevich Romanov in
the hierarchy of European sovereign.\textsuperscript{112} Also its role in constituting the ancestral identity of the House of Romanov, who succeeded to the Russian throne as lately as in 1613, was no less important.\textsuperscript{113} As a relatively “young” dynasty among the European ruling houses, the Romanovs strived to confirm their belonging to this exclusive group of noble individuals. They were related to these, among others, due to the self-presentation referring to inheritors and successors of the ancient Rurik dynasty.\textsuperscript{114} An integral part of this bond was formed by anxious adherence to all the titles which the last Rurik on the Russian throne – Fyodor I Ivanovich – held until his death in May 1598, possibly the efforts to gain also the new ones.\textsuperscript{115}

The “Muscovites” in the eyes of Johann Christoph of Fragstein

Numerous problems concerning ceremonials, rituals and other matters which Johann Christoph of Fragstein faced during his diplomatic mission often originated also from the fact that he was by Leopold I of Habsburg appointed a lower diplomatic rank than Allegretto Allegretti.\textsuperscript{116} While the cleric and native of Dubrovnik acted as an envoy (Abgesandte, посланник), Fragstein was only granted the status of messenger (Geschikter, гонец) by the young Habsburg.\textsuperscript{117} The preserved sources reflect that the messenger of Leopold I of Habsburg was not willing to respect his different diplomatic rank. He, on the contrary, required the same treatment from the servants of Aleksey I Mikhailovich as it had been practiced with Allegretto Allegretti and the same consequential respect than he was actually ranked. The Russian party was though well aware of this difference


\textsuperscript{113} К 400–летию Дома Романовых. Монархии и династии в истории Европы и России: Сборник материалов международной научной конференции I, St. Petersburg 2013.

\textsuperscript{114} Jiří LOUDA – Michael MACLAGAN, Lines of Succession: Heraldry of the Royal Families of Europe, London 1995, Table No. 137, p. 274; S. LAMBERTZ, Das diplomatische Zeremoniell, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{115} W. LEITSCH, Moskau, p. 200; L. SVOBODA, Diplomatiké vztahy, pp. 46–47.


\textsuperscript{117} More about this in the Letter by an unknown secretary or writer of the Privy Council addressed to Ferdinand Sigismund Kurz of Senftenau dated on 2.6.: “Ihr Mayestät befohlen, daß mir hocher her […] hern Valderode [Johann Valderode of Eckhausen] sagen solle, daß er ein schreiben an den von Fragstein stellen solle, darinen ihme imperative befolhen [!] werde, weilen er khein gesandter sonder nuhr also geschikter ist, ohne replie die 4000…” ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 93.
and accordingly to that he was also dealt with. Their behaviour, which was mostly resulting namely from the different perception of his rank, was by Johann Christoph of Fragstein considered as an offence against his person and reputation as well as against his master – Leopold I of Habsburg – whom he represented there. When he objected to such acting, he was firmly reproved. According to the tsar’s commissionbers, it was highly inappropriate to lecture them and require anything at all. He should have got acquainted with all the customs including the ceremonial rules of the Moscow court before entering the Russian country, as the other diplomats did. Doing so, he could have avoided the occurred misunderstandings.

The mutual conflicts, persistence and final failure of the diplomatic mission of Johann Christoph of Fragstein were most likely determined yet by another fact reflected in the preserved sources. The servant of Leopold I of Habsburg had also worked as an imperial resident in the Rzeczpospolita – a country with which the Grand Duchy of Moscow had strained relations in spite of temporary peace. His close contacts with the Polish royal court, John II Casimir and many other (noble) persons from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were in Moscow seen as suspicious, supposing that Fragstein could promote also the interests of Russian enemies instead of those of the young Habsburg. But also by Fragstein there can be noted a certain aversion to the long journey heading to rather an exotic and for West-Europeans unknown country in which he could also lose his life in an extreme case. He after all hesitated to set off for the diplomatic mission till Leopold I of Habsburg assertively urged him to leave at last.

118 In contrast to the former diplomat, there was not arranged any banquet after the inaugural audience which the tsar would personally take part in. He was delivered the dishes and drinks from the Grand-Duchy kitchen by a butler Andrej Ivanovich Chilkov who acted only on behalf of his master. Памятники дипломатических сношений, pp. 787–790; I. SCHWARCZ, Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной, p. 259; C. GARNIER, “Wer meinen Herrn ehrt, den ehre ich billig auch”, p. 39.


120 Памятники дипломатических сношений, p. 836.


122 Памятники дипломатических сношений, p. 863. Comp. the Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Johann Adolf of Schwarzenberg dated on 12. 6. 1657 and his Letter to Johann Morand Girardin dated on 22. 6. 1657. SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, RA Schwarzenberků, fasc. 373, fol. 782.

123 The Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Leopold I of Habsburg dated on 12. 6. 1657 and his Letter to Johann Morand Girardin dated on 22. 6. 1657. ÖStA Wien, HHSTA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 9, Konv. 3, fol. 98 and ibidem, Polen I, Kart. 69, Konv. Juni, fol. 57–58.

The mentioned reluctance is clearly reflected in Fragstein’s letters and other preserved documents. There can be seen contemporary the stereotypical West-Europeans’ imaginings of the “Muscovites” which were of throughout negative forms. According to Fragstein, they were very aggrieved, arrogant and aggressive individuals who did not impeach the other side at all during negotiations and were putting their own opinions through together with imposing their subjective views upon any terms, including force. Any reproach addressed to them was on the contrary considered as a defamation of character, so they demanded an immediate satisfaction and apology.

Fragstein also repeatedly labelled them as a crude and ill-mannered nation that was not familiar of good manners and did not respect the honour of others.

Another particular image, significantly reflected in Fragstein’s texts, is represented by continuous references to the backwardness, ignorance and complete isolation of the Muscovite inhabitants from the rest of the world, especially the “cultivated and learned” West. To express his own civilization supremacy, he called the Muscovites names like “gens Barbara” or “natio rustica”. Fragstein thought that, except their mother tongue, this nation was not able to communicate in any foreign language, including Latin. That was why it was so difficult to make oneself understood there. His broadminded smile was other times elicited in his view by absolutely incompetent and bizarre questions of tsar officials and officers about the election of Leopold I of Habsburg the Holy Roman


126 More about this also in the Letter by Johann Christoph of Fragstein to Johann Adolf of Schwarzenberg dated on 11. 4. 1658. SOA Třeboň, oddělení Český Krumlov, RA Schwarzenberků, fasc. 373, fol. 731.


129 The Letter draft by Christoph Beuer of Binnen to Leopold I of Habsburg dated only by year 1658. ÖSTA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Russland I, Kart. 10, Konv. 2, fol. 43–45. This fact was mentioned also by Allegretto Allegretti. I. SCHWARCZ, Отношения Габсбургов с Россией и Украиной, pp. 256, 258.
Emperor: “Namely, whether in case that Your Holy Royal Highness did not become the emperor, would he remain the Hungarian and Bohemian king? Or whether the one who was elected the emperor, would also possess the mentioned kingdoms at the same time? Thereupon, I gave a little smile and asked if I could answer by giving the same question: ‘If the Spanish or French king had not become the emperor, would that one, who would be elected instead of him, have become the future king of Spain or France?’ I believe that they could recognize the inappropriateness of their ridiculous thought as they proceeded to another topic of the conversation after a moment of silence.”

Conclusion

The preserved documents of the Habsburg diplomats in Moscow in the mid-17th century offer an interesting source for understanding the intellectual world and value hierarchy of both them and the other side, mostly the tsar’s commissioners and officers who the Mid-Europeans got in contact with. As there was suggested above, the interaction of both worlds different in terms of intellectual categories and values did not proceed in calm and harmonic way at all; rather conversely. The indivisible part of their mutual interaction, including political discussions, was constituted by numerous misunderstandings which often resulted in bitter arguments and lengthy disputes between the both parties. Namely these conflict situations and their final conclusions were significantly projected in the following Mid-Europeans’ negative views of particular Moscow court officials and the tsar armyofficers. The Habsburg diplomats although did not regard this bounded group of individuals as a mixed group of individual characters, but as the common representatives of the Russian Tsardom (the Grand Duchy of Moscow). These people were characterized by certain features typical also for all the inhabitants of the mentioned state.

The construction of the image of the Muscovites and their ceremonial and ritual practices in the perspective of the delegates of Ferdinand III and Leopold I of Habsburg

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can be comprehended as searching for the “Self” in the “Other”. The above-mentioned personal testimonies reveal much more about the personalities of the diplomats themselves than about Aleksey I Mikhailovich and his tsar clerks and officers. In the view of “those other” and “different” persons there is encoded the capacity of self-awareness, personal problems and aspirations. The approach of Allegretto Allegretti, Johann Dietrich of Lorbach, Johann Christoph of Fragstein and Christoph Beuer of Binen arose from the way how they perceived the Muscovites. They based their comparisons on the premise that the Slavic nation was formed by people of equal rights, therefore they did not hesitate to measure them using their own hierarchy of values. So the Habsburg diplomats tried to match their value systems with the general one which was at the same time generalized on the basis of West-European values, neglecting the East-European value system.

There was only little attention of the diplomats paid to the matters that resembled their homeland, corresponded with their upbringing and education and fitted their personal experience together with expected behaviour patterns. On the contrary, even a slightest stray of the tsar or his servants from conventionally regarded practice was seen as negative. The Habsburg diplomats categorized the observed events by choosing certain self-relative features based on their own experience framework. As they were not able to understand any stray from their previous experience, they condemned it. The “Other” meant for them the new and unknown which the Mid-Europeans encountered for the first time and which differed from their present experience. They were predicating the observed objects features of mostly negative evaluation. Because of choosing only particular aspects of the observed events which they considered to be typical, the diplomats contributed to strengthen the so far present stereotypes. In their eyes the “Muscovites” were constructed as the “others” getting a lower value by which the Habsburg delegates strengthened their own status (in case of Fragstein there also could have been involved a kind of effort to

excuse the failure of his mission). The preserved documents by the diplomats reveal a process of distancing from the constructed image on the basis of comparison and analogies together with searching for the “self” and labelling the “otherness”.¹³⁶

Martin BAKEŠ

Shaping the Danish and Imperial Legation Chapels in Vienna and Copenhagen during the Period after the Thirty Years’ War

Abstract: The following article primarily analyses the operation of the Lutheran Legation Chapel during the long-term residency of the Danish Envoy, Andreas Pauli von Liliencron, in Vienna. The targeted support for the denominational minorities in Vienna and Copenhagen by the legation envoys caused numerous conflicts on both sides. The ways of resolving these disputes eventually become reminders of the extraordinary dynamism of international relations during the second half of the 17th Century.

Keywords: History of Diplomacy – legation chaplains – Vienna – Copenhagen – Andreas Pauli von Liliencron – Lutheranism – Catholicism

The issue of the operation of the ambassadorial chapels belongs amongst the least explored topics in the study of Early Modern diplomacy. Especially those researchers who study the relationships between the denominationally diverse environments of Royal residential towns, sooner or later came across records about the activities of the legation chapels. Many of them also correctly noted the key role of the legation chapel for an illegal (or just tolerated) religious minority that benefited from asylum and from the spiritual services of the present chaplain.

1 This text was written as part of a grant project funded by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic No. 13–12939S entitled Czech and Moravian Nobility in the Habsburg Diplomatic Service (1640–1740).
2 In Czech historiography we can find only two articles about this topic. The functioning of the Imperial Chapel in Dresden was explored by Jiří KUBEŠ in Kaple císařských vyslanců v Drážďanech v druhé půl 17. století [The Chapels of the Imperial Envoys in Dresden during the Second Half of the 17th Century], Folia Historica Bohemica 30, 2015, pp. 127–156. The second and the last contribution to this topic is Martin Bakeš’ work describing the position of the Imperial Chapel in Stockholm. See M. BAKEŠ, Legační kaplani ve službách císařských vyslanců ve Stockholmu ve druhé polovině 17. století [Legation Chaplains in the Service of the Imperial Envoys in Stockholm in the Second Half of the 17th Century], Český časopis historický 114, 2016, s. 941-967. The fundamental work in the Anglo-Saxon environment is the Benjamin J. Kaplan’s article that primarily discusses the Embassy Chapels in London. Cf. B. J. KAPLAN, Diplomacy and Domestic Devotion: Embassy Chapels and the
When studying Danish and Austrian historiography we can encounter several works that deal with confession minorities in the Kingdom of Denmark and in the Habsburg Empire during the 16th to the 18th Centuries. The current Danish historical community has already reproduced a considerable number of papers that deal with the Catholic communities in the area of Early Modern and strictly Lutheran Denmark. Unsurpassed in this respect, however, is the three-part monograph by the Norwegian historian Oscar Garstein that describes in detail the progress of the Counter-Reformation and also the daily life of the Catholic minority who were clustering together close to foreign embassies in Denmark or on the Scandinavian Peninsula.

The German-speaking researchers from Austria and Germany still provide a much wider scope. These days there are already an almost uncountable number of works that deal with the Protestant minority in the territory of the Habsburg Empire, including several works that summarise the history of the Austrian Protestant community. However, only a few monographs and scientific articles fully appreciate the vital role that was played by the Protestant Ambassador Chapels in the seat of the Holy Roman Emperors. Only remaining, truly exceptional in this respect, is the article written by Martin Scheutz, who, however, places the emphasis of his research on the second half of the 18th Century, i.e. an epoch that is characterised by a significant release of tension prior to the issuance

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3 The basic briefing monograph concerning the functioning of Catholic chapels was written by Preben Hampton Frosell, Diplomati og religion. Gesandterne for de katolske magter og deres kirkepolitik i Danmark 1622–1849, København 1990. Another unfortunately very brief monograph was written by the Jesuit Alfred Otto, Jesuitterne og Kirken i Danmark i det 17. og 18. Aahundrede, København 1940. The Danish historiography also comprises a very well-researched history of the Catholic Congregation of St. Ansgars Kirke, which was formed with the support of several foreign embassies. See Johannes Hansen, Sankt Ansgars Kirke i hundrede Aar, København 1942.


5 Very sound factually, for example, is the older work of Theodor Wiedemann. Cf. T. Wiedemann, Geschichte der Reformation und Gegenreformation im Lande unter der Enns, Bd. V., Prag – Leipzig 1886. The basic work that exclusively explores the history of the Austrian Protestant Community is by Grete Mecenseffy, Geschichte des Protestantismus in Österreich, Wien 1956. A more detailed discussion of the same topic was also offered by Georg Loesche, Geschichte des Protestantismus im vormaligen und im neuen Österreich, Wien 1930. Crucial amongst the newer works is, for example, Arndt Schreiber, Adelige Habitus und konfessionelle Identität. Die protestantische Herren und Ritter in den österreichischen Erblanden nach 1620, Wien 2013.
of the Tolerance Patent. A considerable part of Scheutz’ article was drafted on the basis of the well-known Vollständige Nachrichten by the Danish Legation Chaplain Johann Hieronymus Chemnitz, which were first edited and published in 1760.

So far, however, no historian has studied the activities of the Danish Legation Chapel in Vienna during the second half of the 17th Century. Still remaining and totally unexamined are the voluminous archival sources that can be found not only in the Rigsarkivet in Copenhagen but also in several archives in Stockholm. No one has yet offered a view from the other side nor shown any deep interest in the documents from the provenance of Nordic diplomats that offer not only responses related to the operation of the Danish and the Swedish Embassies, but also provide a valuable and unique reflection on the religiously quite homogeneous environment of the Imperial Court.

The goal of this article, however, is not to provide a complete picture of the operation of the Danish legation chapel during the second half of the 17th Century. It will be sufficient for us if we can take a look into the characteristic significantly reciprocal shaping of the religious rules that determined the daily performance of the religious services of the Danish and Habsburg legation chapels in the 1650’s and the 1660’s in Vienna and Copenhagen. During this period, just after the Thirty Years’ War, for the first time in their history, these two countries established more permanent diplomatic relations at the level of permanent envoys. What did the daily operation of their chapels look like then? What was characteristic for the background and missionary notions of individual legation chaplains? What was characteristic for the Catholic and the Protestant confessional minority communities that were attracted to the Imperial and the Danish Chapel, and what kind of problems arose from their regular failure to meet the already established rescript, we will discover on the next few pages.

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The first long-term envoy of the Danish kings in Vienna in the second half of the 17th Century was the Lutheran Andreas Pauli von Liliencron who, in the seat of Leopold I, carried out his activities for twenty-two years (1663–1683 and 1690–1691). His education,
his background and his youthful ferocity were perfectly suited to this emerging diplomatic post in Vienna. He was the son of a Schleswig trader who, like many others like him, made a fortune by supplying military material during the Thirty Years’ War. Thereby young Andreas Pauli could study law at the University of Rostock and later-on at the progressive and relatively new University of Leiden. After a generously conceived study tour that took several years, during which he primarily visited France, Italy and Spain, in 1654 he earned a nomination and was knighted by Emperor Ferdinand III. After several years of service in the Tyske Kancelli office, which was responsible for handling the official agenda between Denmark and the Holy Roman Empire, he became an extremely erudite pretendent to the post of the Danish representative in Vienna.8

When Liliencron arrived in 1663 in Vienna, as a fully accredited resident of Danish King Frederik III, he immediately became a protector of the numerous Lutheran community in Vienna. During this year, hierarchically, he was the highest representative amongst all the other Lutheran diplomats who were staying at that time at the Court of Leopold I.9 For Denmark the always competitive Kingdom of Sweden temporarily untied its diplomatic relations with the Emperor during those years and after resolving the problematic issues that the peace negotiations in Oliva had brought about, the Commissioners Per Sparre and David Mevius left the Imperial Court.10 The new Swedish envoy Matthias Palbitzki did not arrive in Vienna until 1666. In his main instruction, however, it was strictly forbidden to organise any unnecessarily long sermons in his house, which could arouse the anger of the Viennese administration and the Catholic elite. Actually the activities of his Embassy Chapel should be restricted for private needs and worship in the Swedish Chapel should not be unnecessarily disrupted by the presence of Imperial subjects.11 Reluctance to Palbitzki’s support for both secret and registered Lutherans was also reflected in the numerous Royal rescripts to Liliencron, who, on the other hand, strategically collaborated with a large Lutheran minority and actively used its services.12

After his arrival Liliencron rented an advantageously located house on today’s Neuer Markt, close to the Capuchin Monastery. Liliencron’s chaplain of many years, who appears

9 Ludwig BITTNER – Lothar GROSS (Hg.), Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648) I. (1648–1715), Berlin 1936, pp. 108 and 486.
10 Reports of these Commissioners written in Swedish and German language bring interesting insights from Prague and Vienna aristocratic environments, characterising the first years of the reign of Leopold I and political activities of the Reichsvizekanzler Wilderich von Walderdorff. See Riksarkivet Stockholm, Diplomatica Germanica, Kart. 288, reports of Per Sparre, David Mevius and Schweder Kleihe from the year 1662 (Hamburg, Leipzig, Prague, Vienna, etc.).
11 Ibidem, Kart. 290, the main instruction for Matthias Palbitzki from 18. 12. 1665 (Stockholm).
in the sources as Father Bartius, was given one spacious room for regular services, which took place every Sunday and occasionally also on weekdays and, of course, during major religious festivals. In several important instructions that were intended for the Danish resident Liliencron, strong orders that govern the relationship between the diplomat and the legation chaplain in the area of the embassy grab our attention. “Since our resident does not participate in the activities of the legation chapel, he must not prevent our pastor in church services. He also must not send him back to Copenhagen because the performance of the chaplain’s activities is subject only to the orders of His Majesty.”

The Legation Chaplain Bartius was not the only Embassy clergyman who, in theory, accepted orders only from the Monarch as being the supreme representative of the “National Church”. Known are for example the instructions that were given to the Danish Legation Chaplain Johann Christian Eckhoff, who operated in Vienna in the years 1778–1782 during the same term as the Ambassador, Johann Friedrich Bachoff von Echt.

This practice was diametrically opposite from that of many Catholic legation chaplains, the names of whom we are familiar with from the Imperial Embassies in Copenhagen or Stockholm. Almost all of them, with minor exceptions, were strictly subject to the orders of the envoy who financially supported their activity, while the extent of the powers of the legation chaplain depended solely on his wishes. These practices even aroused a considerable amount of resentment from the leading representatives of the Catholic world, who criticised the inappropriate methods of confining the Catholic clergy to the exercise of their missionary activities in the areas that were denominationally diverse. For example Papal Nuncio Ercole Visconti in Cologne was outraged about this practice, in accordance with which the inaction of Catholic chaplains in regard to missionary issues caused a significant reduction in the number of secret Catholics in the territory of

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13 Ibidem, the main instruction for Andreas Paul von Liliencron from 9. 1. 1663 (Copenhagen).
15 At this point, however, it should be noted that the Imperial Envoys did not pay for the operation of the chapel exclusively from their own funds. They received contributions from the Hofkammer for equipping the chapel and for paying for the legation chaplain’s activities. The amount allocated for the Nordic countries was cca. 200 florins per annum. Klaus MÜLLER, Das kaiserliche Gesellschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648–1740), Bonn 1976, pp. 162–179. A contribution of 200 florins was also provided, for example, to Franz Anton Count Berka prior to his departure to Denmark and Sweden in the year 1683. Cf. Státní oblastní archiv [State Regional Archive] Plzeň, the section in Klášter (hereinafter referred to as SOA Plzeň, K), Rodinný archiv Nosticů (Sokolov) [the Nostitz Family Archive] (hereinafter referred to as RA Nosticů), Kart. 148, inv. No. 947, sign. AJ1, a financial agreement from 2. 11. 1683 (Linz).
the Kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden.\textsuperscript{16} Which is to say that since 1673 the Catholic activities in the two Lutheran kingdoms had been under the jurisdiction of the Cologne Archbishopric. During those years the local Archbishops held the title of a Scandinavian Protector whose duty was to protect the rights of the Catholic minority in Denmark and in Sweden. The Archbishop’s competencies were minimal, however, with just the same range of powers as the famous \textit{Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide}, which was established in 1622, \textit{inter alia}, to support the missionary policy in the northern areas.\textsuperscript{17}

The principal instruction for Andreas Pauli von Liliencron in the year 1663 also stressed, on several pages, that Frederic III’s new resident in Vienna should support the rights of the local Lutheran community, which apparently without being given a helping-hand would expire within a few years.\textsuperscript{18} During the reign of Leopold I, the situation of non-Catholics in Vienna, and by extension in the entire area of Lower Austria, was extremely distressing. According to the Papal Nuncio in Vienna, the Emperor was extremely involved in religious matters and in private he said that “he would rather go begging than allow the heretics to walk on his hereditary lands”.\textsuperscript{19} While at the same time, in the second half of the 16\textsuperscript{th} Century, the City of Vienna represented a veritable bastion of the Protestant population of the Habsburg monarchy. With the arrival of Cardinal Melchior Klesl and the definitive decision to move the Imperial Court back to Vienna there came a period of permanent repression and later-on also of persecution. The revolution from above was finally completed in 1627 with the expulsion of all the Protestant priests from Lower Austria together with a ban on publicly held worship services. For a short time, with the arrival of the Swedish armies in Central Europe the situation of the Protestants improved and also later on during the negotiations that took place in Westphalia. The Protestant delegates subsequently managed to negotiate for religious freedom for the entire nobility of Lower Austria, who, under Section 39 of the Peace Treaty of Osnabrück, could freely carry-out their worship, though only for their private needs. It was more than clear, however, that with the abatement of the last choral hymns in appreciation


\textsuperscript{18} Rigsarkivet København, Wien – diplomatisk repræsentation, Kart. 105, the main instruction for Andreas Pauli von Liliencron from 9. 1. 1663 (Copenhagen).

\textsuperscript{19} M. SCHEUTZ, \textit{Legalität und unterdrückte Religionsausübung}, p. 227.
of the concluded peace the Protestant rulers would not necessarily be able to guarantee precisely these agreed points of the Westphalian Peace Treaties.20 This gave rise to one of the most serious disputes between the Emperor on one side and Sweden and Denmark on the other side that was to continue for the next sixty years.21 One of the basic points of the political and religious programme of Bengt Oxenstierna and Matthias Biörenklou, the first post-Westphalian Swedish envoys in Vienna, was to oversee the compliance with the freedoms that had been agreed-upon not only in Lower Austria but also in Silesia and in Hungary.22 Emperor Ferdinand III, however, was not going to take any notice of the Swedish envoy’s protests. The recatholisation programme that had started at the turn of the 16th and the 17th Centuries was actually to be accomplished. For this purpose, recatholisation commissions were established in Lower Austria over a wide area to eradicate the still large Protestant community. The decisive moment came with the subsequent issuance of the Imperial Patent in January 1652. The most important point of the patent that closely regulated the relations between the Monarch and his subjects concerning matters of faith was the duty of all the current Protestants to convert to the Catholic faith within a period of six-weeks. Neither the pleading mandate of the Protestant Estates that was presented at the Lower Austrian Provincial Diet nor the vocal displeasure of the Swedish envoy Biörenklou could reverse the issuance of the January rescript.23

There were exceptions, however, to which the rescript did not apply in its entirety. This small detour brings us to the most important members, who initiated the founding of the Protestant community retreating to nearby foreign embassies. The tolerated Lutherans and their families found their spiritual solace mostly in the presence of Swedish, Danish, Saxony and Brandenburg chaplains or in the presence of several less important representatives of the Imperial princes. The Viennese Protestant community was certainly not negligible and the close contacts between foreign diplomats and the prominent

20 G. MECENSEFFY, Geschichte des Protestantismus in Österreich, p. 181.
22 Riksarkivet Stockholm, Diplomatica Germanica, Kart. 278. This source contains several dozen sheets that are exclusively related to religious issues. For example the official protests of Matthias Biörenklou can be found there, by means of which he responded to the complaints of the Hungarian Estates in regard to the violation of the religious freedoms that had been agreed upon during the negotiations in Westphalia (a copy of a letter that was sent to Emperor Ferdinand III on 31. 1. 1652). Additionally we can find there, for example, a report on the re-catholicisation of Czech subjects, a report on the dire situation of the Lower Austrian Protestants and name lists of the Protestants of Lower Austria.
figures of this minority provided a considerable number of benefits. Just to give an idea of this situation, in accordance with an estimate made by the Viennese Bishop, Philipp Friedrich von Breuner, cca. 25,000 non-Catholics and 125,000 Catholics remained in Vienna in the mid-17th Century. Today, we can say with some certainty that these figures were probably greatly exaggerated, but also we certainly cannot downplay the estimated ratio of the two groups nor the extraordinary power of this minority. For comparison, at approximately the same time only a few hundred Catholics lived in Copenhagen and in Stockholm. According to the Jesuit Chaplain Johann Sterck's estimates during the early 1670’s cca. 300 secret and tolerated Catholics were living in Stockholm. Johann von Goess, the Emperor’s envoy in Denmark, in his report on the status of Catholics in Copenhagen in 1661 reached a similar number.

The Lower Austrian Lutheran community in the times of the residency of Andreas Pauli von Liliencron was also recruiting during the next several decades for example from representatives of merchant corporations, whose networks were also expanding in the residence of the Roman Emperors. The Viennese authorities also ensured freedom of religion for the chosen servants and widows who could take over businesses after their husbands had deceased. Around 60 % of Viennese Niederleger, how the Austrian historiography identifies these representatives of business firms by the German equivalent, were formed in the mid-18th Century by the members of Protestant denominations. Other groups of Protestants who numerically were not insignificant comprised some court artists, architects, soldiers, travellers passing through or representatives of some of the Upper Germania banks who did not have their own headquarters in Vienna. Nor should we forget the important booksellers that came from Nuremberg and Leipzig.

So far we have bypassed the most important group of Protestants who functioned in the immediate vicinity of the Imperial Court and whose political influence on some imperial issues was also crucial. The presence of these politicians was also sought after to a considerable extent by foreign Protestant diplomats who were based in Vienna. Although the Habsburg Emperors had to tolerate their presence in his residence, Ferdinand III and Leopold I, on the other hand, used their services widely for communicating with

24 In the mid-17th Century, according to Bishop Breuner’s report the population of Vienna was overstated by cca. 50 % as compared to the actual status, which actually represented cca. 60,000 people. Cf. Thomas WINKELBAUER, Österreichische Geschichte 1522–1699. Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht. Teil I, Wien 2004, pp. 278–281.
the European Protestant rulers. We are talking now about the Protestant members of the Aulic Council (the Reichshofrat).  

The Reichshofrat, as the highest judicial authority, dealt primarily with legal disputes in regard to individual imperial fiefs. During the years 1630–1648 only Catholics sat on the benches of the Aulic Council. After the end of the Thirty Years’ War once again the Imperial Protestant Estates demanded from the Emperor the release of several judges’ benches on behalf of Protestants. The general rescript from 1654, which amongst other issues dealt with the religious obligations of non-Catholic members of the Council, defined the total number of Protestant Aulic Councillors (Reichshofräte) as being six. When scrolling through a list of the Protestant-minded members of the Reichshofrat, that was collected and interpreted by Oswald von Gschließer in his crucial work, we soon come across the names of nobles and of learned lawyers who were in regular contact with both Swedish and Danish envoys. They came to regularly enjoy their mutual presence. From time to time they invited each other to the table for lunch or they took joint tours of the city, played card games – often for considerable sums – and of course met-up with each other on occasions of worship. For the Danish and Swedish envoys the Reichshofräte also represented a valuable source of fresh information from the Court, and in particular from the Reichshofrat. The Danish envoy Liliencron apparently knew some of the news even before the Emperor Leopold I. For example it was the decision of the Reichskanzlei to recommend to the Aulic Council the deployment of the Lutheran Count Gottlieb von Windischgrätz to Sweden or fresh decisions on such matters as the Duchy of Holstein-Gottorp with which Danish Kings had tense relations throughout the entire second half of the 17th Century.  

Some Protestant Reichshofräte who were surrounded by Danish and Swedish envoys were indeed well-known Viennese Court personas and also the actual creators of the Habsburg monarchy’s foreign policy. Among the best known names, for example, was the already mentioned Gottlieb von Windischgrätz, who sat on the Bench of Lords in the Reichshofrat in 1656 and after the death of his second Lutheran wife in 1682 he finally converted to Catholicism, which opened the door to a great career, which for him was crowned by obtaining the post of the Imperial Vice-chancellor. Not by chance

28 Oswald von Gschließer, Der Reichshofrat. Bedeutung und Verfassung, Schicksal und Besetzung einer obersten Reichsbehörde von 1559 bis 1806, Wien 1942. Several pages are dedicated to the activities of the Protestant Imperial Court Councillors in Ines Pepère, Konversionen im Umkreis Wiener Hofes um 1700, München 2010, pp. 90–99.
29 Rigsarkivet København, Wien – diplomatisk representation, Kart. 30, official reports of Andreas Pauli von Liliencron from 22. 11. 1663 (Vienna) and from 4. 9. 1664 (Vienna).
30 Gottlieb von Windischgrätz (1630–1695) represents one of the outstanding personalities of the Imperial Court during the second half of the 17th Century who would certainly deserve a modern monograph.
was the name of another Protestant Councillor, Rudolf von Sinzendorf, featured with extraordinary frequency in Swedish and Danish sources during the second half of the 17th Century, who unlike his brother Johann Joachim (who died in 1665), never converted to the Catholic faith. Additionally we can mention, for example, Johann Friedrich von Seilern, who in his early career made no secret of his frequent contact with the Swedish envoy of the period.31

The Danish and Swedish envoys, however, did not come into contact only with representatives of the highly noble Protestant families. Their network of contacts naturally also comprised the lower nobility and learned doctors of law. Andreas Pauli von Liliencron, for example, highly praised his friendly relationship with Dr. Georg Theodor Dietrich, a lawyer who was recruited from the Empire and who sat on the bench in 1659, thereby reaching the pinnacle of his career.32 Liliencron in his reports even described Dietrich as an extremely open man, one who will still be extremely useful on behalf of the Danish Crown. The Danish envoy Liliencron was also sad because of the death of his good friend Baron Eberhard Wolf von Todtenwarth († 1663), who was his useful messenger within the Aulic Council.33

So far the most complete picture of Gottlieb von Windischgrätz was provided by the Austrian historian Karl Vocelka in his unpublished and, alas, somewhat forgotten work depicting the history of the family in the 17th and the 18th Centuries. See K. VOCELKA, Studien zur Familiengeschichte der Familie Windischgrätz (1630–1802), Wien 1984 (a manuscript). Additionally, there are two methodologically very outdated dissertations that characterise Windischgrätz’ political activities. Marianne PELZL, Gottlieb Windischgrätz, Wien 1935; Robert DROSDA, Die Verhandlungen auf dem Reichstag zu Regensburg von der Ankunft des Grafen Gottlieb von Windischgrätz bis zum Abschluss des zwanzigjährigen Waffenstillstands im August 1684, Wien 1939. Neither of these dissertations, however, reflected the exceptionally extensive family archive of the Windischgrätz family incorporating 1,287 items, which is now stored in the State Regional Archive in Plzeň, at the section in Klášter. See Gustaf HOFFMAN, Rodinný archiv Windischgrätz 1226–1945 [The Windischgrätz Family Archive 1226–1945], Klatovy 1976.

31 Riksarkivet Stockholm, Diplomatica Germanica, Kart. 294, a relation of the Swedish envoy Esaias Pufendorf from 31. 8. 1671 (Vienna). Also editorially processed is the extensive Final Report of this Swedish envoy, in which numerous observations can be found concerning the issue of Protestantism within the territory of the Habsburg Empire. Cf. Karl Gustav HELBIG, Esaias Pufendorf’s königlichen schwedischen Gesandten in Wien Bericht über Kaiser Leopold, seinen Hof und die österreichische Politik 1671–1674, Leipzig 1862. Helbig, however, edited the copy that is now stored in Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, Geheimer Rat (Geheimes Archiv), loc. 10426/16, königliche schwedische Abschickung Esaias von Pufendorf an den kaiserlichen Hof. The original of Pufendorf’s final relation, including many additional appendices, can be found, however, in Riksarkivet Stockholm, Diplomatica Germanica, Kart. 296 and 297.

32 O. von GSCHLIEßER, Der Reichshofrat, pp. 276 and 280.

33 This information is also presented in Liliencron’s report from 22. 11. 1663 (Vienna). See Rigsarkivet København, Wien – diplomatisk repræsentation, Kart. 30.
The Reichshofräte also constituted an important reservoir of imperial envoys who could be seconded to Denmark and to the Kingdom of Sweden. During some extraordinary missions experienced Protestants were appointed to lead the diplomatic legations. It has already been mentioned that the Lutheran Gottlieb von Windischgrätz went to Sweden in this way in 1663 to ask the local Regent Government that represented eight-year old Charles XI for help against the Turks on the Hungarian front.34 For similar purposes in the same year the Lutheran Rudolf von Sinzendorf was appointed in Copenhagen as an Extraordinary Envoy.35 It seems that it was Windischgrätz and Sinzendorf who played important roles during the election of any heads of extraordinary diplomatic missions during the second half of the 17th Century in the non-Catholic areas of Early Modern Europe. They both acted from the position of prominent diplomats of Leopold I, who were deployed to the traditionally Protestant areas, such as they were, for example in the Netherlands, in Hamburg, Hesse, Brunswick-Lüneburg and maybe even in Brandenburg.36

When we talked about the importance of the Reichshofräte as favoured members of the imperial diplomatic missions to Denmark and Sweden, we must emphasise the simple fact that many of them, whether Catholic or Protestant, spent a shorter or a longer amount of time in Copenhagen and in Stockholm. In the case of Denmark six of the eight envoys of Emperor Leopold I whom we know by their names were members of the Aulic Council.37 Although in the case of Sweden this number is somewhat lower, on the other hand, we are registering a high number of Catholic legation secretaries, who sat there in Vienna on a learned or a noble bench of the Aulic Council.38 At this point, it only remains to add that the importance of this office in regard to creating Scandinavian-Imperial diplomatic relations during the Early Modern period has not yet been fully appreciated.

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34 There is more information in regard to Gottlieb von Windischgrätz’ diplomatic mission to Sweden in Johann Christian LÜNIG, *Theatrum ceremoniale historico-politicum oder historisch und politischer Schauplatz Aller Ceremonien […],* Leipzig 1719, pp. 634–635.
35 To date no one has yet seriously addressed Rudolf von Sinzendorf’s diplomatic mission to Denmark in 1664. The archival material in regard to Sinzendorf’s legation is stored in Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereinafter referred to as ÖStA Wien, HHStA), Staatenabteilungen, Dänemark, Kart. 15.
36 L. BITTNER – L. GROSS (Hg.), *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter,* pp. 721 and 747.
37 The Imperial Court Councillors, and at the same time also the Imperial envoys in Denmark were Johann von Goess (Denmark 1657–1661), Rudolf von Sinzendorf (Denmark 1663–1664), Gottlieb Windischgrätz (Denmark 1673–1674), Augustin von Meyerberg (Denmark 1675–1678), Haro von Burkhard Fridag Gödens (Denmark 1686, 1691 and 1693–1695) and finally Sigismund Wilhelm von Königsegg (Denmark 1691–1698).
38 In addition to several Imperial envoys in Sweden, who were also Members of the Imperial Court Council, we also register an equal number of Imperial secretaries who sat on the Imperial Court Council’s Catholic benches. Good examples are e.g. Johann Philipp von Andlern (Sweden 1690–1697), Johann Christoph Pientenrieder von Adelhausen (Sweden 1698–1700), Georg Josef von Keller (Sweden 1720–1721) and Christoph Theodor Antivari (Sweden 1728–1734, 1737–1750 and 1761–1763).
The Lutheran Reichshofräte who met during regular worship services at the Danish and the Swedish Embassies certainly represented the most prominent component of Viennese society at that time. In accordance with the rescript from 1654, although the Protestant members of the Aulic Council could officially carry-out worship in the private areas of their homes, this regulation cut them off from the community of other Protestant-minded members of Viennese society. This rescript summarised a number of additional lesser orders, which, however, were all violated or at least quietly circumvented. A favourite practice of the Lower Austrian Protestants was to travel regularly to worship in Upper Hungary, where long after the Thirty Years’ War far more liberal conditions were applicable to the Protestant community than in Austria. Neither secret nor registered Lutherans hesitated to travel several dozens of kilometres to listen to the local pastor’s Sunday Sermon. This mobility of the representatives of non-tolerated confessions in the specific area could mean shifts of even several hundred kilometres. Amongst the record holders there were certainly secret Catholics in the extraordinarily vast territory of the Kingdom of Sweden, who were willing to travel to the Imperial Embassy several times a year for confession.

In the case of Lower Austria and Upper Hungary it was about a much shorter distances. Throughout the entire Early Modern period Pressburg (Bratislava) enjoyed exceptional status just for its location close to Vienna, where Protestant minority still had numerous representation. The second most important centre was Ödenburg, today in Hungary (Sopron), where Protestant Consistory was even re-established in 1667. Also Johann Heinrich Zedler emphasized importance of Ödenburg for the Lutheran community in his famous lexicon. Regular contacts of Pressburg and Viennese Lutheran communities are also documented by the generous donations of some renowned Lower Austrian Lutherans, which led to the establishment of several foundations or, for example, some

39 Generally about Protestantism in Hungary: Zoltán CSEPREGI, Das königliche Ungarn im Jahrhundert vor der Toleranz (1681–1781), in: R. Leeb – M. Scheutz – D. Weikl (Hg.), Geheimprotestantismus, p. 318. Due to the penetration of pietism into these parts of Hungary, at the turn of the 17th and the 18th Centuries Ödenburg was called “Little Halle”. Also exceptional in this respect was the position adopted by some of the Protestant legation chaplains, who supported the dissemination of pietistic ideas in the Viennese environment. More Z. CSEPREGI in Pietismus in Ungarn 1700–1758, Beiträge zur ostdeutschen Kirchengeschichte 6, 2004, pp. 25–38.

40 The Jesuit legation chaplain Martin Gottseer in his travelogue from Vienna to Stockholm described a situation where the secret Catholics from Jönköping (about 320 km from Stockholm) and Linköping (about 200 km from Stockholm) were willing several times a year to arrive in Stockholm for Catholic worship. More in M. BAKEŠ, Cestopis jezuitského legačního kaplana Martina Gottseera z Vídně do Stockholmu v roce 1690 [Travelogue of the Jesuit legation chaplain Martin Gottseer from Vienna to Stockholm in 1690], Sborník archivních prací (in print).

41 Johann Heinrich ZEDLER, Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexikon, Bd. XXV, Leipzig – Halle 1740, col. 536–537.
posthumous sermons of Pressburg Pastor David Titius, which also included a speech for the deceased son of Count Gottlieb von Windischgrätz.⁴²

Also, for several other reasons, the Lower Austria Lutheran community sought for numerous alternatives in the form of departures to Upper Hungary or participating in worship with foreign diplomats. The Imperial Patent from 1652 intended for subjects of Lower Austria continue to expressly ban Protestant minors from crossing the border between Austria and Hungary. Thereby Protestant parents officially lost the right to take their children to church in Hungary and in the event of their capture they were risking having to pay huge financial penalties. A significant milestone in a regular series of prohibitions was the year 1675, when Emperor Leopold banned the Reichshofräte from going to Mass in Ödenburg.⁴³

This all culminated, however, shortly before the siege of Vienna by the Turks in the winter of 1683. At the beginning of the year, when there was a massive shake-up of the foundations of the Habsburg Monarchy, Leopold I insisted on issuing a rescript covering all Lutherans, without exception. Since January there was a ban to attend Mass at the Danish embassy of Andreas Pauli von Liliencron, at the Swedish embassy of Gabriel Count von Oxenstierna, as well as at the Brandenburg embassy of Bernhard Ernst von Schmettau.⁴⁴ The impetus for this ban was the newly accredited envoy of Sweden, who had probably exceeded the tolerated limit. Of course the Imperial Envoy in Stockholm, Michael Franz von Althann, was closely acquainted with the entire event, who by the unwritten laws of reciprocity could expect a similarly rigorous response from the Swedish authorities, which could lead to restrictions on Catholic worship at the Imperial Embassy.⁴⁵ The rescript from 1683 actually struck a dangerous blow to the Lutheran minority in Vienna, because for approximately forty years the activities of foreign diplomats dampened whoever did not intend to threaten the hard-won political achievements that were attributed largely to their own party.

The conflict, which Gabriel Oxenstierna caused in 1683, was definitely not unique in this respect, however. A similarly dramatic commotion had been caused about twenty

⁴² M. SCHNETTGER, Ist Wien eine Messe wert?, p. 607.
⁴³ G. MECENSEFFY, Geschichte des Protestantismus in Österreich, p. 183.
⁴⁵ “Allhier undt in Schlesien ist man noch ohngeachtet, der vor augen schwebenden grossen gefährlichkeit mit dem reformations werkhs gar efferigst bemühet. Der könig[liche] schwedische abgesandter h[err] graf Oxenstierna, welche etliche wochen hier in seinem logiement in beysein mehr als 1000 persohnen den evangelischen gottesdienst mit predigen, singen, und beten, auch administration des heyll[iges] abendtmahls öffentlich gehalten.” See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Schweden, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Kart. 6, an appendix to a rescript for an Imperial Envoy in Sweden, Michael Franz von Althann, from 10. 1. 1683 (Vienna).
years earlier, also by a resident of Denmark, Andreas Pauli von Liliencron. Unlike his younger Swedish colleague, the Danish diplomat was in his main instruction commanded on several pages to promote the local Lutheran community by all available means.\textsuperscript{46} The motives of Frederick III of the ruling Oldenburg dynasty were obvious. The Danish King, though he was an adamant Lutheran, remained extremely tolerant of the Catholic minority in his Kingdom.\textsuperscript{47} Of course the general rescript of his father Christian IV from 1613 continued to be applicable which was banning all unregistered, or non-tolerated Catholics from remaining in the Kingdom. From 1624 onwards, careless priests were threatened with death for undertaking any missionary activities. Denmark, although in general it was one of the first Protestant countries, in fact it stood-up against the local Catholic community rather mildly. Danish students, for example, could freely attend Jesuit schools abroad. This right was never withdrawn, but since 1604 after returning to their homeland, they could not count with the career of a high-level Royal official. Another extraordinary case, for example, was the Catholic rector of the Latin School in Lund staying in the office from which he had not been deposed until 1605, after some backstage disputes with local Lutheran Professors.\textsuperscript{48}

The most significant highlight of all was the unprecedented tolerance to the Catholic community that had settled in the towns of Altona and Lykstad (Glückstadt). During the Early Modern period Altona, which lies at the mouth of the Elbe River, was in the possession of the Danish Kings. The exceptional position of Danish Altona was crowned by the establishment of the Catholic Church reportedly for several thousand Catholics, who, theoretically, should not be impeded in the exercise of worship. The second “Island of Tolerance” was the town of Lykstad, near Altona, that was founded by Christian IV. Also living there was a large Catholic community that enjoyed extraordinary favour from the Danish monarchs.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46} Rigsarkivet København, Wien – diplomatisk repræsentation, Kart. 105, the main instruction for Andreas Pauli von Liliencron from 9. 1. 1663 (Copenhagen).
\textsuperscript{47} Several letters are stored in the Copenhagen Imperial Archive that were sent between the Danish King Frederick III and the German Jesuit Athanasius Kircher, who at that time was compared to both Leonardo da Vinci and René Descartes. As one of the first of those who had the assistance of a microscope he was studying the microorganisms, to which he attributed the spread of the plague. Rigsarkivet København, Tyske Kancelli, Udenrigske Afdeling, Breve fra udenlandske universiteter og lærde mænd 1530–1770, Kart. 3–057 (F-L). There is more information about this correspondence and about the Danish Kings and their relationship with Catholicism in Andreas SCHUMACHER, Gelehrter Maenner Brife an die Koenige von Daenemark 1522–1663, vol. III, Leipzig 1758.
\textsuperscript{48} Helge CLAUSEN, Konvertiten in Dänemark im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, in: Georg Diederich (Hg.), 300 Jahre katholische Gemeinden in Mecklenburg. Geschichte und Bedeutung in der Nordeuropäischen Diaspora, Schwerin 2009, pp. 34–41.
\textsuperscript{49} Exceptionally detailed in this respect is the work of Lebrecht Dreves, who gathered a large amount of information about how the Catholic minority functioned, not only in Altona and Lykstad, but
But this was far from being the whole story. After losing the war with Sweden and subsequently accepting a disadvantageous peace in Brömsebro in 1645, the Kingdom of Denmark required the support of many foreign experts in order to proceed with the recovery of the state finances. In those years, for the first time in history, diplomatic representatives of the Catholic rulers began to concentrate in Copenhagen and, without facing any restrictions, they took it on themselves to organise the Catholic worship. Amongst the first permanent diplomats at the court of Christian IV was the Imperial Envoy Baron Georg von Plettenberg, who spent nearly two years in Copenhagen before, at the beginning of 1647, he was removed from the post. Also included amongst several clergymen at the Imperial Embassy was Martin Stricker, a Catholic Canon from Hildesheim, who had extensive prior experience of the Danish environment. It is Plettenberg who can be considered as having been the initiator of the subsequent fixed structure of the Catholic clergy while he was moving about in close proximity to the other Catholic embassies in Copenhagen.50

It remains undeniable that the clergy from Catholic Countries in the confessional different environment cooperated closely despite their frequent serious disagreements in regard to political issues. Therefore it was not uncommon for the Imperial legation chaplain, if he could speak French sufficiently well, to serve several masses at the French Embassy. In a similar manner the Portuguese ambassador might willingly “lend” his Chaplain to the Spanish ambassador. The degree of co-operation at the religious level between the two Habsburg Houses in the Lutheran regions remains unprecedented however. We even know about cases in which, after the Imperial envoy has departed from the Royal residence, the Spanish diplomat took over the patronage of the former Imperial legation chaplain.51

A similar incident occurred in 1648, when Count Bernardino Rebolledo, the Spanish Envoy, arrived in Copenhagen.52 In addition to taking Martin Stricker under his wing, also throughout the entire area of Lower Saxony. Special attention was also paid to secret Catholics in Hamburg and to their frequent relationships with the local Imperial ambassadors. Cf. Lebrecht DREVES, Geschichte der katholischen Gemeinden zu Hamburg und Altona. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der nordischen Missionen, Schaffhausen 18662.

51 Of course in the Lutheran regions the degree of co-operation between the Catholics was not always perfect. There was always competition, not only between the various Catholic orders, but also between individuals who belonged to the same Catholic order. Well-known, for example, is the dispute between Martin Stricker, the Imperial legation chaplain in Copenhagen, and the missionaries in the Duchy of Holstein, to whom Stricker gave the title of Missionarii Vagabundi. Cf. M. BAKEŠ, Legační kaplani ve službách císařských vyslanců, s. 947.
52 The diplomatic missions of the Spanish politician and talented poet Bernardino Rebolledo in Copenhagen are very clearly documented in monograph Emil GIGAS, Grev Bernardino de Rebolledo.
Rebolledo also stipulated the participation of the other three Jesuits, whose task would be to ensure that regular Mass was available for Copenhagen's entire Catholic community and even to provide prohibited services outside the embassy. Although the activities of the clergy at the Spanish Embassy awakened regular waves of indignation amongst the burghers of Copenhagen and all of the guarantors of the purity of Lutheran piety, the endeavour to ban the over-the-top activities of the Catholic-minded priests definitive failed. The new King Frederick III was not going to initiate any consistent measures in regard to these issues. The Spanish Embassy's Jesuit members even enjoyed a special kind of respect. Often cited is an isolated (but not unique) record that the Spanish chaplain accompanied by two Jesuits was invited to take part in a philosophical dispute in the University of Copenhagen's Auditorium. Christen Pedersen Schjoldborg's thesis defence was also attended by King Frederick III. The fact that the Fathers of the Society of Jesus did not just sit in silence is evidenced by several of Rebolledo's relations stored in Simancas archive and by the Danish Church historian Erik Ludvigsen Pontoppidan. A professor of philosophy of many years at the Jesuit college in Olomouc and Spanish legation chaplain Gottfried Francken distinguished himself especially during disputation. Similar situations at which Members of the Jesuit Order were present at learned disputations are also known about from Uppsala later.

The imperial envoy Johann von Goess also carried out his activities in an extremely tolerant religious atmosphere. Between 1657–1661 he worked closely with the Spaniard Rebolledo on both political and religious issues. Well known are his contacts with the Catholic community in Danish Lykstad, which he maintained even with the assistance of Johann Sterck, the legation chaplain of the Jesuit order, who later infamously presented himself in Stockholm as the Imperial and later on as the Spanish legation chaplain. From the period of Goess's residency the register of baptised and married Catholics survived,

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55 Martin Gottseer, a Jesuit and a legation chaplain at the Imperial embassy led by Franz Ottakar von Starhemberg, as a recognised expert in algebra participated in a public disputation at Uppsala University. After completing his defence he was even invited for lunch by the Rector, Harrald Valerius (who was also a mathematician). Cf. Joseph STÖCKLEIN, *Allerhand so Lehr-als Geist-reiche Brief, Schrifften und Reis-Beschreibung, welche von denen Missionariis der Gesellschaft Jesu aus beyden Indien, und andern uber Meer gelegenen Ländern, seit Anno 1642 bis 1726 in Europa angelangt sind*, Bd 23/24, Augspurg 1736, pp. 165–173.

56 M. BAKEŠ, *Legační kaplani ve službách císařských vyslanců*, s. 946-948.
to which, in addition to Sterck, several other Jesuits (e.g. Heinrich Kircher, Henrik van den Linden and Sigismund Merkwart) also contributed.\textsuperscript{57}

The highest officials of the Imperial Court were also aware of the favourable conditions that existed for secret and tolerated Catholics in the Kingdom of Denmark. In regular reports to Vienna from time to time the envoys praised the extraordinary tolerance that was primarily guaranteed by the members of the ruling Oldenburg dynasty. Also unusually favourable were the reports of the legation chaplains themselves, who submitted either oral or written reports to their superiors within the Order or placed them directly into the hands of the representatives of the Roman \textit{Propaganda Fide}. In the words of the Danish envoy, Andreas Pauli von Liliencron, even Leopold I himself seriously thought about buying a house in Copenhagen, which could be of service both to his diplomatic apparatus and primarily provide quality facilities on behalf of a large number of the Catholic clergy.\textsuperscript{58} The Habsburg Emperor was overtaken in these plans by his disliked French cousin, Louis XIV, who was represented by his ambassador Hugues de Terlon and in 1671 obtained permission to build the French Embassy in the walls of Copenhagen, together with a spacious chapel and an affiliated cemetery.\textsuperscript{59}

During the second half of the 17\textsuperscript{th} Century doing something similar in Vienna would have been impossible. The foreign policy of Early Modern Europe, however, was strictly governed by the laws of reciprocity and by precedents. In the aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War the Danish side expected from the Emperor similar concessions in matters of religion to those that had made Kings of the Oldenburg dynasty. Powerful levers were represented mainly by tolerating the Catholic Communities in Altona and in Lykstad. Also irreplaceable was the extremely free status of the Imperial legation chaplains in Copenhagen.

Since the beginning of his stay in Vienna similar requests had also been presented by Danish resident Andreas Pauli von Liliencron. Also in his house, where the Neuer Markt is today, throughout May 1663 regular worship sessions were held in the presence

\textsuperscript{57} The legation chapel registers represent a completely untapped source that may reveal the social networks of individual members of the Embassy. The registers of baptised, married and buried Catholic members of the Sjælland Community are exceptional in that they have been preserved in their entirety since the mid-17\textsuperscript{th} Century. Today these registers are stored in Sct. Ansgars Kirkes Arkiv, 1) Copulationsbuch 1647–1771; 2) Liber Baptizatorum Hafniae in Exercitio Catholico per Missionarios Societas Jesu; 3) Liber Defunctorum 1649–1730. Also well-known, though nearly a hundred years younger, are the registers of the Lutheran community that are held in Vienna. See M. SCHEUTZ, \textit{Legalität und unterdrückte Religionsausübung}, pp. 224–225.

\textsuperscript{58} Rigsarkivet København, Wien – diplomatiske representation, Kart. 30, the report of Andreas Pauli von Liliencron from 9. 5. 1663 (Vienna).

\textsuperscript{59} Peter Willemoes BECKER, \textit{Samlinger til Danmarks historie under kong Frederik den tredies regiering II.}, København 1847, p. 73.
of not only the tolerated but also the secret Lutherans. They were preaching and singing loudly, not only in Danish but also and mostly in German. The Danish Lutheran Chaplain Bartius was busy eagerly equipping the Chapel space. Some of the inventory items were brought by the resident and some were purchased on the spot or donated by the Lutheran Community. The Danish legation Chaplain also baptised children, married partners and probably also attended some funerals which always presented an excellent opportunity for actually expanding the visibility of Vienna’s Protestant Community.60 Some form of catechesis for children of Lutheran parents certainly took place at the Danish Embassy which we also recorded in detail at other embassies.61

Already a few weeks after Liliencron’s arrival in Vienna the Obersthofmarschall Heinrich Wilhelm von Starhemberg had visited the Danish embassy to hand-in there an official reprimand that had been issued by the Emperor’s Obersthofmeister Johann Ferdinand, Prince of Porcia. Based on the request of the Papal Nuncio Carlo Carafa and on the orders of Leopold I Liliencron should immediately restrict worshipping at the Danish Embassy, under the threat of a complete ban. Since the Danish resident was not going to restrict anything, Starhemberg reappeared at Liliencron again three weeks later, this time presenting a strict order prohibiting the performance of worship at the Danish Embassy. All of Andreas Pauli von Liliencron grievances can be found summarised in a few words in his official relations. “First, it is illegal in any way to even restrict or to prohibit all Royal Emissaries from the free exercise of their own private religious liturgy and secondly, I have to point out a silently tolerated convention, according to which neither is the Imperial Minister in Copenhagen prevented from excising the Catholic Mass.”62

The whole situation eventually became so serious that throughout June of the year 1663 Liliencron completely ceased conducting Lutheran worship. The legation Chaplain Bartius was transported in a closed carriage, under the cover of darkness, to nearby Pressburg (today Bratislava), where he was to await further orders. The Danish resident also required the issuance of new instructions and meanwhile had written several complaints both to Frederick III and to Emperor Leopold I. Liliencron’s last complaint that was addressed to the Emperor even had an extremely uncompromising and sharp

60 Rigsarkivet København, Wien – diplomatisk repræsentation, Kart. 30, official reports of Andreas Pauli von Liliencron from 25. 4., 9. 5., 16. 5. and 23. 5. May 1663 (all from Vienna).
62 Rigsarkivet København, Wien – diplomatisk repræsentation, Kart. 30, the report of Andreas Pauli von Liliencron from 31. 5. 1663 (Vienna).
tone. “It is more than surprising that all the Danish diplomats, even those who are in the most barbarous countries, are not restricted in such a manner that it negates the free exercising of worship within the private spaces of their embassies, as is the case here in Vienna. In no case is the envoy of His Majesty the Emperor, who freely attends Catholic Mass at the Embassy in Copenhagen restricted. Also extraordinary are the powers of the subjects of the Danish King in Altona in Holstein. This Danish Catholic community, numbering several thousand souls, meets in extraordinary intensity and can exercise Catholic worship without any limitation or restriction. Also, since our King Christian IV, who was accompanied by great memories, Catholic Mass can be served in the newly built Lykstad fort without any restriction.”

After a few weeks the Emperor eventually back-tracked from his extremely strict and unusual opinion, but the original intensity of the Lutheran rites decreased significantly for a longer period. However, disputes between the Danish Embassy and the Imperial authorities dragged-on with a greater or lesser intensity throughout the following years. A similar explosion of animosity occurred two years later, at the end of 1665, when the Emperor again had to respond to the repeated complaints of the Papal Nuncio Giulio Spinola. Nuncio, amongst other things, pointed to the inappropriate dimensions of Protestant worship at the Danish Embassy, which attracted not only the registered but also the secret Lutheran-minded subjects of Leopold I. It seems that a definitive end to the period of large-scale Lutheran worships was brought about by a rescript from 1683 banning all the inhabitants of the Habsburg Monarchy who are not subjects of the Danish or the Swedish King or of the Elector of Brandenburg from attending Mass. This negative impact on the shape and the course of Lutheran worship had a significant cooling effect on Danish-Imperial relations during the 1680’s, which even led to several years of during which diplomatic relations remained terminated.

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When studying Danish-Imperial relations, we would very soon have to conclude that the process of the secularisation of foreign policy between the two countries during the second half of the 17th Century was far from being completed. Something like that was definitely not possible just because of a few paragraphs from “The Peace Treaty of Westphalia”, which partially determined the form of the bilateral relations between the two Scandinavian

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63 Ibidem, Andreas Pauli von Liliencron’s letter to Emperor Leopold I written on 28. 7. 1663 (Vienna).
64 Artur LEVINSON (Hg.), Nuntiaturberichte vom Kaiserhof Leopolds I., Wien 1913, p. 41. This event is also reflected-on by M. SCHEUTZ in Legalität und unterdrückte Religionsausübung, p. 227.
65 L. BITTNER – L. GROSS (Hg.), Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter, pp. 108 and 133.
countries on one side and the Habsburg Empire on the other side. The Imperial envoys tried, to a greater or lesser extent, to protect the rights of the Catholic minority in the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. The diplomats of the Oldenburg Kings in Vienna were evidently trying something similar in regard to the numerous Lutheran-minded population. For this purpose legation chapels were founded at embassies, which greatly attracted both the registered and the secret members of the confessional minorities. Thereby the envoys themselves repeatedly came into conflict with the local authorities, which sought to guarantee providing some form of punishment.

Although the tolerance of legation chapels should be strictly governed by the laws of reciprocity, these requirements were certainly not feasible in practice. The main reason for this was the very different position of secret and tolerated Catholics in Copenhagen, whose number did not exceed a few hundred, with conditions that the Lutheran community in Vienna enjoyed and that comprised several thousand souls. Another important difference was that during the reign of Danish King Frederick III the local Catholic minority enjoyed a considerable degree of freedoms, which had few parallels in Early Modern Europe. The Oldenburg dynasty guaranteed the inviolability of the Catholics in Danish Altona and Lykstad and did not significantly restrict even the Catholic services that were provided at the foreign embassies in Copenhagen.

In contrast with this, however, ultimately all the Protestants in Lower Austria (with very few exceptions) were outlawed from 1654 onwards. Emperor Leopold I, who was also partly under pressure from the Papal Nuncios, was trying to complete the reformation process that his ancestors had initiated in the early 17th Century. The numerous evangelical communities in Vienna then began to lose their members. Registered Protestants were under permanent pressure from the Reformation Commissions and also from the ubiquitous missionaries. Not really in vain the Austrian historian, Martin Scheutz, referred to the Viennese Court as the Konversionsmaschine.66 Finally many adamant Lutherans, who represented the true pillars of the Protestant Community in Vienna, turned to the Catholic faith. They were either unable to endure the ever-present pressure of the Catholic Majority, or their different concept of Faith prevented them from fulfilling higher-level official functions. We register this entire range of examples. In addition to the repeatedly mentioned Gottlieb von Windischgrätz there were also other Reichshofräte, such as Gundakar von Dietrichstein, Johann Joachim von Sinzendorf, Johann Adolf von Metsch and Johann Friedrich von Seilern.67

The Reichshofräte evidently represented important allies for the Danish, Swedish and Brandenburg envoys in regard to the Imperial Court. They became important informers, attended church services regularly and, accompanied by their families, they did not even avoid playing board games nor participate at a fixed table. In the case of the Danish Embassy we are registering a substantial number of those Officials, who frequently visited the local ambassador. After the conversion of these people to the Catholic Faith it is likely that the mutual relationships faltered or were obliged to extinguish completely.

In his instructions the Danish resident, Andreas Pauli von Liliencron, was also urged to establish a social network with leading Viennese Lutherans. In addition to everything else he was also strictly instructed not to prevent his Chaplain from carrying-out Lutheran Worship at his Embassy. The Danish and Imperial diplomats differed considerably in regard to this practice because the right to the possible expansion of the Catholic liturgy into the space of the Imperial Embassy in Copenhagen belonged exclusively to the Imperial Envoy. Representatives of Leopold I in the Scandinavian countries also did not build closer links with the local Catholic minority because its members generally did not belong amongst the political elite. Exceptions to the rule do exist here as well, however. Let’s mention, for example, the numerous contacts that took place between the French Ambassador Pierre Hector Chanut and René Descartes or Pierre Daniel Huet, who, however, also had an irreplaceable influence on the young Queen Christina.68

Religio-political ideas and demands, with which one of the first permanent Danish residents Andreas Pauli von Liliencron arrived in Vienna very soon met resistance of the Emperor, who was known for his uncompromising policy of reconversion. A total ban of Lutheran worship and the transfer of Pastor Bartius to Pressburg represent actual unicum, which vary considerably from accepted agreements of Early Modern international law.69

Leopold I therefore very soon withdrew from his extremely strict opinions because he was not going to jeopardise sizable Catholic minority in the Kingdom of Denmark, with which Liliencron also threatened him in his letter at several places.

The topic of the operation of embassy chapels remains an unexcavated area for further research. The bulk of writers who have dealt with this issue, mostly built their research on diplomatic relations, the instructions and the final reports of the former legation

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68 The friendly relationship between René Descartes and Pierre Hector Chanut was described by O. GARSTEIN in *Rome and the Counter-Reformation in Scandinavia, Vol. III*, pp. 502–510. French polyglot and writer Pierre Daniel Huet, who accepted the invitation of Queen Christina to the Stockholm Court in 1652, also had a great deal of influence on the young Swedish monarch. His quite critical description of the journey and negative connotations related to the operation of the Swedish Royal Court can be found in his memoirs. See John AIKIN, *Memoirs of the Life of Peter Daniel Huet, Bishop of Avranches*, London 1810, pp. 119–183.

chaplains. In combination with the sources of a personal nature we would be able, for example, assess the questions that have not been asked yet, for example: What determined the preference of choice between individual legation chapels? Or what specifically caused the prioritisation of the Danish chapel over Swedish, Brandenburg, Saxony or Hesse by individual members of the Lower Austrian Lutheran community? A very important question that remains for subsequent research is the manner in which the Emperor’s subjects coped with the fact that Danish or Swedish king was lauded during worship; how they responded to regular prayers for the newborn royal offspring or for the health of the royal family. A sort of shock of conscience or loyalty of the imperial courtiers must also inevitably come with the deliberate disclosure of certain important or even secret messages to the foreign diplomats. How did leading Lutherans of the Imperial Court cope with these problems? These and many other questions are still waiting for their answer, which subsequent research will certainly bring about.
Laura OLIVÁN SANTALIESTRA

Judith Rebecca von Wrbna and Maria Sophia von Dietrichstein: Two Imperial Ambassadresses from the Kingdom of Bohemia at the Court of Madrid (1653–1674)

Abstract: This article focuses on the diplomatic activity of two ambassadors’s wives from the Kingdom of Bohemia at the court of Madrid between (1653–1674). In that time, the spouse of a diplomat was called “ambassadress”. Throughout the 17th century, the ambassadresses acquired ceremonial, political and social functions. The Countess of Lamberg and the Countess of Pötting were ambassadresses during a special period: during their ‘embassies’, the “Question of the Succession” marked the Hispanic monarchy relations with the Holy Roman Empire; and a Habsburg Queen, Mariana of Austria, was consort (and after regent) of Spain. Also, the second half of the 17th century coincided with the consolidation of the role of the ambassadresses at European courts. Judith Rebecca Wrbna and Maria Sophia von Dietrichstein paved the way for their successor, set precedents and made it easier for subsequent Imperial ambassadresses to access the diplomatic areas of the Spanish court. At the same time, both ambassadresses helped gain acceptance and legitimacy for the political actions of the ambassadors in court circles, established a good relation with the Queen Mariana of Austria, achieved their ceremonial and social duties (visiting), and acted as brokers at court. In short, these two ambassadresses marked a turning point in the diplomatic life of the following Imperial ambassadresses to Spain.

Keywords: Ambassadresses – 17th century – diplomacy – courts of Madrid – Holy Roman Empire

To Davide Van Vlijmen in memoriam

1 Claire Gaunt has translated this article from Spanish to English. The research for this article was supported by the IEF Marie Sklodowska-Curie project (2014–2016) Imperial Ambassadresses: Diplomacy, Sociability and Culture. During this time I have been also participated in this research project: Servidores del rey, creadores de opinión: biografías y dinámicas políticas en la Monarquía española (1700–1830). Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad. Teresa Nava Rodríguez.

2 This article is dedicated to my translator Davide Van Vlijmen, who died in December 2014. One of his last translations was the paper: “Ceremonial of the Imperial Ambassadresses in the Court of Madrid (1650–1700): Conflict, Equilibrium and Diplomacy”, that I presented in the workshop Ceremonial as a Key to understand Early Modern Diplomacy (1600–1800), celebrated in Prague in November 2014 and organized by Jiří Kubeš, head of the research project Bohemian and Moravian Nobility in the Diplomatic Service of the Austrian Habsburgs (1640–1740), University of Pardubice.
In his work *L’ambassadrice et ses droits*, Charles Moser stated that it was Pope Sixtus V who first awarded the title of “ambassadress” to the wife of a diplomat. The lucky recipient was the Countess of Olivares, wife of the Spanish ambassador to Rome. The pontiff gave her the title of ambassadress when she had her first son in 1587. The title, while meaning that she had not to hold office, came with a series of ceremonial privileges. Soon, giving the name of “ambassadress” to the ambassador’s wife became common practice at European courts. As their ceremonial power increased, ambassadresses became faithful political actors, helping their husbands to carry out their embassy duties.

The wives of the Imperial ambassadors to the court of Madrid in the second half of the 17th century are good examples for analysing this process of the politicisation and ceremonialization of this role. The unofficial functions of the ambassadresses included befriending the queen consort or regent at the court to which they were sent, creating a network of influence to help their husband’s diplomatic work, and complying with their representation responsibilities.

Between 1653 and 1701, seven imperial ambassadresses left their mark on the Spanish court: Judith Rebecca Lamberg, Maria Sophia Pötting, Johanna Theresia Harrach, Maria Elisabeth Trautson, Marie Luise Mansfeld, Maria Sophia Lobkowicz (Pötting’s widow) and Maria Cecilia Harrach, they were the respective wives of Johann Maximilian Lamberg, Franz Eusebius Pötting, Ferdinand Bonaventura Harrach, Paul Sixt V Trautson, Heinrich Franz Mansfeld, Wenzel Ferdinand Lobkowicz and Aloisio Thomas Harrach. The second half of the 17th century is especially important to the history of the Hispanic monarchy as during this interim period, the “Question of the Succession” marked Spain’s external relations with the rest of Europe, especially with the Empire; this stage also coincided with the development and consolidation of the role of “ambassadress” at European courts, especially in Madrid, where the frantic diplomatic activity of ministers and ambassadors led to the dramatic entrance of new figures onto the political scene; given the need to use any means available for the success of their diplomatic missions, ambassadors resorted to their wives, which was how these women began to legitimately influence and take part in political negotiations between the various European powers.

In addition to an international context marked by the Succession, the Habsburg Queen Mariana of Austria was also in Madrid during these years, a fact that contributed

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to the arrival on the diplomatic scene of the seven ambassadresses mentioned earlier. The sources available do not give a reliable or complete picture of all of their political activities, as these were not always registered given the unofficial nature of many of their movements. Nevertheless, it is possible to reconstruct their political profiles, which were marked by intense social, ceremonial, and, in short, political activity.

The following article analyses the diplomatic activity of two imperial ambassadresses from the Kingdom of Bohemia: Judith Rebecca Wrbna, Countess of Lamberg, was ambassadress between 1653 and 1660, and Maria Sophia of Dietrichstein, Countess of Pötting, was in Madrid as ambassadress between 1663 and 1674. I chose to examine this period, from 1653 to 1674, because Mariana of Austria was queen consort and regent of Spain (after 1665) during this time. In these years, both Judith Rebecca and Maria Sophia set ceremonial and political precedents, and paved the way for their successors, namely Johanna Theresia Lamberg, Countess of Harrach; daughter of the former and cousin of the second ambassadress.

Judith Rebecca Wrbna, Countess of Lamberg: Information from the Infanta’s Rooms and Struggles for Precedence (1653–1660)

Judith Rebecca Wrbna was born in 1629. Daughter of Count Georg von Wrbna, a counsellor to Emperor Rudolf II, Judith Rebecca was brought up in the Protestant faith as a young girl. But in 1620, her father was condemned to death for defending Protestantism, an event that changed her life. Georg von Wrbna was pardoned but his goods were confiscated, and he died shortly afterwards, in 1625. His widow, Helena von Wrbna was able to recover some of her husband's property on condition that she would move to Vienna and raise their children as Catholics. So Judith Rebecca was re-converted to Catholicism. Later, her mother remarried, her brother became a Jesuit and after serving as Lady to the Archduchesses at the court of Vienna (1627–1635), she married Johann Maximilian von Lamberg (1635).5

When in 1653 Judith reached Madrid with her husband and children, she was a mature woman. Aged 41, she had acquired considerable diplomatic experience, having lived with her husband in Münster and Osnabrück, where he had served as the ambassador of Emperor Ferdinand III in negotiating the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Judith Rebecca had carried out intense social activities to support her husband's diplomatic work in

these cities. Johann Maximilian Lamberg established relationships with various Spanish ministers during his ambassadorship in Westphalia, both he and his wife caught up with these connections in Madrid.

Lamberg’s main diplomatic missions in Spain were to negotiate the marriage between Emperor Ferdinand III’s son Ferdinand to the Infante Maria Teresa, Philip IV’s first born child, and to secure subsidies for the war. An ambassador’s tasks always included issues of matrimony and war. The emperor wanted to secure Philip IV’s support for his wars on the empire’s eastern borders, in addition to potential access to the Spanish throne – should the Spanish monarch continue without a son – through the marriage between Ferdinand IV, King of the Romans, and the Infante Maria Teresa. This marriage would allow Philip IV to obtain the resources he needed to continue his war against France.

It is very likely that Judith Rebecca assisted her husband with the marriage negotiations by providing confidential information from her discussions with the infante and Queen Mariana of Austria’s ladies. As an imperial ambassador, Johann Maximilian Lamberg had the privilege of being able to enter the monarch’s private quarters and also the queen’s

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7 Oberösterreichisches Landesarchiv (= OÖLA), Herrschaftsarchiv (= HA) Steyr, Familienarchiv (= FA) Lamberg, Kart. 1223, fasc. 12, Akt Nr. 212 and Kart. 1224, fasc. 13, Akt Nr. 213. I am preparing a publication with these documents.
8 The Spanish Habsburg family gave the title “Infante” to the first-born child. If there were not boys, the first-born girl had the title “Infante” (male) and not “Infanta” (feminine) until the birth of a boy. Maria Teresa was “Infante” between 1646 (death of his brother Baltasar Carlos) and 1657 (birth of his brother, the infante Felipe Próspero).
9 The negotiations had started in 1647–1648, see Lothar HÖBELT, “Madrid vaut bien une guerre?”: *Marriage Negotiations between the Habsburg Courts 1653–1657*, in: José Martínez Millán – Rubén González Cuerva (eds.), *La dinastía de los Austria: las relaciones entre la Monarquía Católica y el Imperio*, Vol. III, Madrid 2011, pp. 1421–1436, see p. 1424. See also the letter of Ferdinand III to Philip IV, 20 November 1653, Archivo Histórico Nacional (= AHN), Estado, book 712. Another important article of these marriage negotiations: Rocío MARTÍNEZ LÓPEZ, «La infanta se ha de casar con quien facilite la paz o disponga los medios para la guerra». Las negociaciones para la realización del matrimonio entre la infanta María Teresa y Leopoldo I (1654–1657), Revista de Historia Moderna 33, 2015, pp. 79–99. English version: “The Infanta will marry the person who provides the Peace or the one who gives us the means to continue the War”, Royal Studies Journal III, nº1, 2016, pp. 6–27. This article has received the prize RSJ/CCCU.
quarters. His wife held a similar prerogative but not only to enter the quarters of the queen consort, but also to go into the infante's private quarters. This privilege gave the Countess of Lamberg easily access to the information concerning the marriage discussed in the private chambers of María Teresa, the infante. Lamberg mentioned a conversation between one of the ladies in waiting and the Infante María Teresa in one of his regular letters to Auersperg, the Obersthofmeister of Ferdinand IV: the lady had congratulated María Teresa on the fact that Queen Mariana of Austria was not pregnant, as she [María Teresa] therefore remained “heiress and queen of Spain”, to which the infante had angrily replied: “Be quiet, you don't know what you’re talking about. Let the queen get knocked up, otherwise I'll have to grow old here unmarried.” It seems as though the infante intended to marry, at least in July 1653. Previously, Lamberg had informed Auersperg that Philip IV didn’t want to discuss the marriage for the time being. The ambassador quoted another conversation that his wife could well have overheard: the first lady of the Bedchamber had discussed the infante's marriage with the king and had asked if he planned to marry her to France (to obtain peace, as they were at war), and that he had angrily replied, “Don't talk to me about France. I want to marry the infante as I see fit and will decide for myself.” Philip IV refused to discuss the matter, although only a few months earlier, that April, Don Luis de Haro, the king’s favourite had raised the possibility of marrying the infante to Ferdinand IV’s brother Leopold (to avoid recreating the empire of Charles V if María Teresa inherited Spain and Ferdinand the Empire). According to Haro, Leopold could go to Spain, be educated there and marry the infante to inherit the Spanish throne on condition that he renounced his right to inherit the Empire. However, Ferdinand III wanted to marry María Teresa to his son Ferdinand IV.

While Philip IV decided whether or not to marry his daughter to the Empire, Judith Rebecca Lamberg, supported by her husband, tried to become the queen’s “right hand”.

11 The imperial ambassadors had this privilege since 1639, see Archivo General de Palacio (= AGP), Sec. Histórica, Caja 55, Etiquetas E, s. f. cited by Dalmiro de la VÁLGOMA, Norma y ceremonia de las reinas de la Casa de Austria, Madrid 1958, p. 47. The Marquis of Grana had to renounce to this privilege after the peace of Westphalia (1648), see L. TERCERO CASADO, “Un atto tanto pregiuditiale alla mia persona”, p. 298. Probably, the imperial ambassador recovered this right in the Etiquetas of 1651, AGP, Sec. Histórica, Caja 51.
12 He was very close to the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, see L. HÖBELT, “Madrid vaut bien une guerre?”, p. 1426.
13 Lamberg to Auersperg, 11. 7. 1653. OÖLA, HA Steyr, FA Lamberg, Kart. 1226, fasc. 15, Akt Nr. 248.
14 Ibidem.
16 Philip IV to Ferdinand III, 24. 5. 1654. See AHN, Estado, book 712. See also L. TERCERO CASADO, “Un atto tanto pregiuditiale alla mia persona”, p. 293.
17 About the meaning of precedence in the 16th and 17th centuries see ibidem, p. 288.
i.e. tried to gain precedence over the first lady of Mariana of Austria's Bedchamber, in order to have the best possible court position. This strategy would ensure that her husband's diplomatic petitions gained more respect and attention. According to the Lambergs the infante's nuptial negotiations would progress if the ambassadress demonstrated the empire's power by sitting at the right hand of the queen consort on ceremonial occasions. In autumn of 1653, Judith Rebecca obtained the right hand during the representation of a comedy in the palace. However, this privilege didn't last long: in winter 1653 the new First Lady of the Bedchamber, the Countess of Medellin, was given precedence over the Countess of Lamberg. Humiliated, Judith Rebecca reported the incident to her husband who in the spring of 1654 issued a memorandum to Don Luis de Haro protesting against the treatment of his wife. His letter dated June 1654 states that the first lady of the Bedchamber had never taken precedence over the ambassadress of Spain at the Viennese court in Empress Maria's time, and the imperial ambassadress to Spain should now be accorded the same treatment. Lamberg added that his wife's predecessor at the court of Madrid, the Marchioness of Grana, had been given precedence over the then First Lady of the Bedchamber, the Countess Olivares, when Philip IV was absent due to the Reaper's War in Catalonia (1642–1643). This was affirmed in letters written by the deceased Marquis of Grana, in which he asserted that his wife had succeeded in achieving precedence under Queen Elisabeth of Bourbon.

Lamberg's petitions were presented at a delicate moment: Philip IV was not convinced of the idea of marrying his daughter and sole heir to an imperial archduke. Ferdinand IV's death in June 1654 made him rethink the issue of his daughter's marriage, this time to Ferdinand III's new heir: Leopold Ignaz. Meanwhile, perhaps in hope that Philip IV would finally decide to marry the infante to one of his sons, the emperor agreed that Spanish ambassadress, the Marchioness of Castelrodrigo, could have precedence over

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19 About these conflicts between the first lady of the Bedchamber and the ambassadress see L. TERCERO CASADO, "Un atto tanto pregiudiziale alla mia persona", p. 300.
21 Ibidem.
22 L. TERCERO CASADO, "Un atto tanto pregiudiziale alla mia persona", p. 301.
23 Ibidem.
24 ÖStA, HHStA, Spanien Varia, Kart. 15, fasc. a, Akt Nr. 127. Don Fernando de Fonseca Ruiz de Contreras to the Count of Lamberg, 23. 11. 1654.
the first lady of the Empress’ Bedchamber. At that time, the Marquis of Castelrodrigo was negotiating María Teresa’s marriage, with the assistance of Auersperg, minister of Ferdinand III. This imperial concession was a warning to Philip IV. Auersperg reported the news to Castelrodrigo: his wife’s precedence was accepted “in the hope that they would henceforth attend to the Countess of Lamberg.” The emperor clearly expected Philip IV to give precedence to the imperial ambassadress to Madrid, as a gesture of friendship and grace, and probably also of the acceptance of the marriage between the infante and Leopold. Both Lamberg and the emperor awaited Philip IV’s new answers to their petitions (to accept Leopold and grant the right hand position to the imperial ambassadress in Spain). Meanwhile, Judith Rebecca and her daughters Helena and Johanna Theresia continued visiting the private quarters of the queen and the infantas.

The Spanish monarch took almost a year to decide on both subjects. In April 1655 he agreed to marry María Teresa to Leopold Ignaz, on condition that he renounced his right to the imperial throne as the union of both dynasties could lead to the Spanish monarchy becoming an imperial appendix. In May, on seeing that Philip IV had finally agreed to marry the infante to the emperor’s son, Count Lamberg felt in a strong enough position to again claim his wife should have the right hand, and he submitted the original letters by the Marquis of Grana asserting that his wife had preceded the first lady of Queen Elisabeth of Bourbon’s Bedchamber to the Spanish king. Ferdinand III had sent these documents from Vienna to be delivered to Philip IV. Lamberg was convinced that if the king had conceded over the marriage of María Teresa, he would also grant his wife precedence. But he was mistaken. An unexpected turn of events ended his hopes and jeopardised María Teresa’s imperial engagement. Queen Mariana of Austria was pregnant. If she produced a male heir, Philip IV would no longer be obliged to find an imperial suitor and would be able to marry María Teresa to another, potentially more beneficial candidate, for example, France.

Mariana’s pregnancy was confirmed in July, and at that moment Philip IV issued his opinion on the right of the imperial ambassadress to have precedence at the Court.

26 Ibidem, p. 300. See also letter from Auersperg to Castelrodrigo, 26. 7. 1654, in ÖStA, HHStA, Spanien Varia, Kart. 15, fasc. a, Akt Nr. 83.
27 Duke of Almazán’s private archive, Transcriptions of the letters between the Countess of Salvatierra and the royal family, p. 207.
28 R. MARTÍNEZ LÓPEZ, «La infanta se ha de casar con quien facilite la paz o disponga los medios para la guerra», p. 89.
29 OÖLA, HA Steyr, FA Lamberg, Kart. 1229, fasc. 18, Akt Nr. 272. Original letters of Grana in: ibidem, Kart. 1229, fasc. 18, Akt Nr. 272 and copies of these original letters in: ÖStA, HHStA, Reichskanzlei, Zeremonialakten, Konv. 2b, file 5.
30 R. MARTINEZ LÓPEZ, «La infanta se ha de casar con quien facilite la paz o disponga los medios para la guerra», pp. 92-93.
of Madrid. The monarch concluded that the first lady of the Bedchamber must have precedence, as such proximity would allow her to better serve the queen. Philip IV recognised that the ambassadress outranked the first lady, but this did not give her the right to have precedence because such a position was granted for service rather than the “right of precedence.” Philip IV also added that the oldest ladies in the court testified that the Marchioness of Grana had never had precedence over the first lady of the Bedchamber, and repeated that unlike the first lady, the ambassadress and the other grandee wives, had the right to attend the pillow.

This news (refusal to give the ambassadress precedence and the suggestion that Leopold Ignaz renounced his rights to the imperial throne in order to marry María Teresa) was received badly in Vienna. Ferdinand III showed his displeasure by refusing to send his son to Spain. Johann Maximilian Lamberg issued a forceful reply to Philip IV, asserting that, at a time when the “Queen was the daughter of the Emperor it was a mistake to deprive a German ambassadress of a privilege that had been granted by a Queen who had been the daughter of the king of France [Elisabeth of Bourbon].” For Lamberg, the failure to recognize his wife’s precedence would have “infinite consequences”, especially if the Marchioness of Castelrodrigo, Spanish ambassadress to the Empire in Vienna, continued to enjoy this privilege – it would imply a great humiliation to imperial dignity and represent tremendous “inequality”. The terrible disagreement between Philip IV and Ferdinand III over the management of the marriage of María Teresa to Leopold Ignaz in October 1655 was no doubt behind Lamberg’s fierce ceremonial demand.

Ferdinand III decided to suspend temporarily the Spanish ambassadress to the Empire’s right of precedence. Consequently, the Marquis of Castelrodrigo threatened to leave Vienna if his wife’s right hand position was not maintained. Castelrodrigo decided that his wife wouldn’t set foot inside the Hofburg palace until her precedence was guaranteed. In December, in the middle of these diatribes, Queen Mariana of Austria gave birth to a baby girl who survived only a few days. Ferdinand III then decided to suspend permanently the precedence of the Spanish ambassadress in Vienna until Philip IV recognise that of the

32 Don Luis de Haro to Lamberg, 21. 7. 1655. ÖÖLA, HA Steyr, FA Lamberg, Kart. 1231, fasc. 20, Akt Nr. 310. See also L. TERCERO CASADO, “Un atto tanto pregiuditiale alla mia persona”, p. 303.
33 R. MARTÍNEZ LÓPEZ, «La infanta se ha de casar con quien facilite la paz o disponga los medios para la guerra», p. 91.
34 ÖStA, HHStA, Spanien Varia, Kart. 15, fasc. c, Akt Nr. 44, Copia del memorial presentado a Su Magestad Católica del excelentísimo señor conde de Lamberg.
36 ÖÖLA, HA Steyr, FA Lamberg, Kart. 1231, fasc. 29, Akt Nr. 310.
37 Ibidem.
imperial ambassadress. Ferdinand III believed that this ceremonial punishment would lead his cousin to renegotiate the marriage. Philip IV returned to discussions about the wedding, but would not give way on the ceremonial issue. Castelrodrigo and his wife abruptly left Vienna in the summer of 1656, partly due to the issue of precedence.39

In July 1656, Lamberg recorded another conversation about the marriage involving the Infante María Teresa: Judith Rebecca had given María Teresa the portraits of Leopold and his younger brother, Archduke Charles. On seeing the infante examining the paintings, the ambassadress asked her what she thought, and María Teresa replied that she would prefer the Archduke Charles as her husband. The Countess of Lamberg then asked: "What will become of the king of Hungary [Leopoldo]?", and María Teresa answered that he could have her sister, the Infanta Margarita.40 María Teresa didn’t find Leopold attractive. Perhaps her father’s desire to marry her to an archduke not in line to inherit the Empire (Charles, Leopold’s brother) had influenced her way of seeing. Interestingly, this was not the first testimony regarding the ugliness of the infante’s suitors. Two years earlier, in April 1654, ladies who had served the Empress Maria in Vienna spread rumours in the infante’s quarters in the Royal Alcazar of Madrid that Ferdinand IV was unattractive. According to Lamberg, this view had affected María Teresa, who had taken the information provided by those women at face value.41 Again, it was Judith Rebecca who provided her husband with this information. This confirmed that Philip IV, his ministers and favourites used the palace women to slander suitors who were not to their political liking.

In April 1657, the death of Ferdinand III relaunched negotiations. Rocío Martínez affirms that, unlike his father, Leopold Ignaz was prepared to renounce the imperial throne in order to marry María Teresa.42 One of his first decisions after his father’s death was to inform his uncle Philip IV of this wish. But Philip suddenly changed his mind and decided that it was better for Leopold to stay in Vienna and inherit the Empire.43 In his insightful article, Rocío Martínez also explains the reasons for this change: Philip IV stopped supporting Ferdinand III’s brother, Leopold Wilhelm’s candidacy to the imperial throne due to political disagreements. In addition, Mariana of Austria was pregnant again, and if she were to have a boy, the Spanish king believed that Leopold Ignaz (and

38 L. TERCERO CASADO, "Un atto tanto pregiuditiale alla mia persona", p. 301.
39 He did not allow his wife to go to the Hofburg to say goodbye to the empress-dowager in order to avoid a ceremonial humiliation. ÖStA, HHStA, Spanien Varia, Kart. 23, fasc. c, Akt Nr. 144.
40 Lamberg to the Empress Eleonora, 19. 7. 1656. OÖLA, HA Steyr, FA Lamberg, Kart. 1231, fasc. 20, Akt Nr. 291.
41 Lamberg to Auersperg, 12. 4. 1654. Ibidem, Kart. 1226, fasc. 15, Akt Nr. 248.
42 R. MARTÍNEZ LÓPEZ, «La infanta se ha de casar con quien facilite la paz o disponga los medios para la guerra», p. 94.
43 Ibidem, p. 95.
not Leopold Wilhelm) should accept the imperial crown and abandon his plans to marry María Teresa.\textsuperscript{44}

A few months later, the birth of the Infante Philip Próspero (November 1657) finally led Philip IV to take the decision to marry María Teresa (now infanta) to France, and not to the Empire.\textsuperscript{45} Marrying her to the French suitor allowed him to secure the much desired peace with France. Leopold had to renounce María Teresa and accept the Empire. He was crowned emperor in July 1658. However, angry at his uncle’s affront over the marriage, Leopold withdrew his ambassador, the Count of Lamberg, from the court of Madrid to show his displeasure at his uncle’s change of plans. In 1660, Lamberg and his wife left Madrid, reaching Vienna that August.\textsuperscript{46} Leopold I felt that marrying María Teresa to France to seal the peace was not only a personal betrayal, but also a betrayal to the Austrian branch of the Habsburg family. To calm him down, Philip IV offered him the Infanta Margarita María, sending him letters that demonstrated her affection.\textsuperscript{47} The emperor felt forced to accept his new suitor, Margarita, but left the marriage hanging for months.

The Countess of Lamberg was never given precedence, but this was not due to a lack of effort or disagreements with the queen consort – it was a result of the tense diplomatic relationships between Spain and the Empire. Beyond the issue of precedence, Judith Rebecca Lamberg was an excellent ambassadress, who earned the trust of Mariana of Austria, as we can see in the letters that the queen sent to Vienna after the ambassadors left Madrid. Judith Rebecca also achieved the title of Lady-in-waiting for her daughters (Helena and Johanna) in 1660, and they were given the privilege of not having to live at the palace (the Royal Alcázar in Madrid).\textsuperscript{48} In time, Johanna Theresia would become an imperial ambassadress to Spain, just like her mother had been.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} Ibidem, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibidem, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{46} ÖStA, HHStA, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Spanien, Kart. 44, fasc. 5, Akt Nr. 65.
\textsuperscript{47} OÖLA, HA Steyr, FA Lamberg, Kart. 1234, fasc. 23. Akt Nr. 392: “Copia de la respuesta que dio la reina nuestra señora a la carta del emperador mi señor sobre el casamiento de la infanta Margarita”, 1660.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibidem, Kart. 1228, fasc. 17, Akt Nr. 259, Lamberg to Cardinal Harrach, 16. 2. 1660.
Leopold’s displeasure meant that there was no imperial ambassador to Madrid from 1660 to 1662. This did not mean that diplomatic relations were completely cut off as the emperor had a network of agents who supported him at the court of Philip IV. Several people stood in for the lack of an official Imperial ambassador in Madrid: Johanna Theresia Lamberg, the mentioned daughter of Johann Maximilian Lamberg and Judith Rebecca, sent numerous letters to her father between May 1660 and October 1661, when she married Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach, and returned to the Empire. The Marquis of Mortara and the Duke of Medina de las Torres maintained regular correspondence with Portia, Leopold I’s Obersthofmeister throughout 1662. The Marquis of Mortara and Portia were relatives and shared political strategies. Similarly, Miguel García Romero, Lamberg’s steward in Madrid, regularly informed the secretary Bernardo Smith, who was in Vienna, of events in Madrid during that time. Some authors believe that Mariana’s Jesuit confessor Nithard was the interim representative of the imperial court in Madrid during these years but I have found no letters from him to Vienna dated between 1660 and 1662.

Finally, in 1662, Leopold I decided to send an ambassador to Spain. The man he chose was Franz Eusebius von Pötting. In order to receive the post, the emperor asked him to marry Maria Sophia of Dietrichstein.

Maria Rosina Sophia of Dietrichstein, Countess of Pötting: Conquering the Queen, Managing Wars and Peaces, and Acting as a Broker (1663–1674)

Maria Rosina Sophia was the daughter of Maximilian of Dietrichstein and Sophia Agnes von Mansfeld. She was only 16 when she was offered to Pötting as his wife. Why Leopold (advised by his stepmother, the Dowager Empress Eleonora of Mantua and her favourite minister Portia) ‘suggested’ Pötting marry Maria Sophia is unclear, but it is quite possible that it was due to her kinship with some of the important Spanish families: Aragon,

50 I am preparing an article about these letters.
51 ÖStA, HHStA, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Spanien, Kart. 44, fasc. 5, Akt Nr. 95.
53 They had a common ancestor, a woman: Victoria de Portia.
54 ÖStA, HHStA, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Spanien, Kart. 44, fasc. 2, Akt Nr. 263.
56 Archivo General de Simancas (= AGS), Estado, leg. 2374. I am very grateful to Rocío Martínez López (UNED) for this reference.
Cardona, Mortara and Velasco. Maria’s great grandfather was no less than Adam of Dietrichstein, Imperial ambassador to Spain in the 16th century.57 Adam had married Margarita of Cardona, Spanish Lady in Waiting to the Empress Maria.58 Their children had married into Spanish and Imperial families, and young Maria Rosina Sophia was one of their descendants. Maria Sophia’s brother Ferdinand of Dietrichstein was the Obersthofmeister to the dowager empress at the court of Vienna, and Portia, her favourite, was also a relative.

Franz Eusebius von Pötting married Maria Sophia of Dietrichstein on 14 April 1662.59 During the first months of their marriage young Maria Sophia met the Marquises of Mancera, Antonio Sebastian Álvarez of Toledo Molina and Salazar and Leonor del Carretto, at the court of Vienna before leaving for Spain. Antonio Álvarez de Toledo served as Spanish ambassador to the Empire, and his wife acted as the ambassadress of Spain in Vienna. Leonor del Carretto was the daughter of Francesco Antonio del Carretto, Marquis of Grana,60 who had been the Imperial ambassador to Spain from 1641 until his death in 1651. In her youth, Leonor had been Maid in Waiting to the Infanta María Teresa and Lady in Waiting to Queen Mariana of Austria. Now she had returned to the Imperial court as Spanish ambassadress. Leopold I rescinded her precedence at the request of the dowager empress, who did not want Leonor to come before her first lady of the Bedchamber. Leonor del Carretto angrily protested about this treatment at the court of Vienna and even wrote a letter to Mariana of Austria describing the affronts she had received:61 the Spanish ambassadress asked the queen to intercede on her behalf, arguing that the offense she received was an insult to the queen herself, as ambassadress she considered herself to be Mariana of Austria’s representative at the imperial court. Maria Sophia Pötting was able to witness the nature of the struggles for precedence between the

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59 Moravský zemský archiv v Brně (= MZA), Rodinný archiv Ditrichštejnů Mikulov, Kart. 322, inv. Nr. 457.
61 ÖStA, HHStA, Spanien Varia, Kart. 15, fasc. c, Akt Nr. 111. Letter of Leonor del Carretto to Mariana of Austria, 4. 11. 1661. And about ceremonial problems of Mancera and his wife in 1661–1662, see ibidem, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Spanien, Kart. 44.
ambassadresses and the first lady of the Bedchamber first-hand. The Countess of Pötting probably received advice from Leonor. Having become friends in Vienna, their friendship continued in Madrid. The Pöttings set out for Spain at the end of 1662 and the Manceras returned to Madrid in 1663. As a result, the Spanish embassy in Vienna remained empty. Until 1666, this absence was covered by the presence in Vienna of a chargé d'affaires, the efficient Diego de Prado.62

The Pöttings arrived at the court of Madrid in June 1663. Philip IV held an audience with the count while Mariana of Austria received the ambassadress. Either at the wish of the queen consort, or because the king wished to demonstrate his goodwill towards the marriage negotiations concerning Infanta Margarita that Pötting had come to discuss, the countess was given the queen consort’s right hand at their first public audience. To achieve this, Mariana’s First Lady of the Bedchamber, the Marchioness of Villanueva de la Balduexa, was ordered to fake a cold. Despite some discomfort from her first pregnancy and the hoop petticoat (guardainfante) that all ambassadresses were obliged to wear on arriving at the court of Madrid, the Countess of Pötting successfully accomplished her first representation.63 In the words of a courtier, the ambassadress was “very well received at the palace”.64

Eight months later, in August 1663, Miguel Romero, the former steward of Count Lamberg in Madrid, criticised the way in which the Countess of Pötting performed her ambassadorial duties. His letter referred not to her ceremonial behaviour, but more specifically to the way in which she socialised and mediated. Romero wrote that the Countess of Pötting was “very reserved” and received no more visits than her relatives the Marchioness of Mortara or Andrea de Velasco, although he admitted that the ambassadress frequently visited the palace to see the queen. Romero went on to boast that his former mistress, the Countess of Lamberg, mother of the recipient of his letter, had been a good ambassadress and had left such an impression in Madrid that “many cognoscente say that they had never seen such an effective ambassadress when it came to fulfilling her role”.65 It is true that this comment was not particularly objective as Miguel Romero considered himself the Lamberg’s servant and their relationship with the Pöttings was not particularly smooth. However, despite the fact that they are biased, Romero’s criticisms reveal one of the functions a good ambassadress had to perform: visits. A perfect Imperial ambassadress

62 Miguel Ángel OCHOA BRUN, Prólogo, in: M. Nieto Nuño (ed.), Diario del conde de Pötting, p. XXIX.
63 ÖStA, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (= AVA), FA Harrach, Kart. 321, Mariana de Austria to Johanna Theresia Harrach, 23. 4. 1663.
64 Ibidem, Pater Michael Codella to the Countess of Harrach, 5. 6. 1663.
65 Ibidem, Romero to the Countess of Harrach, 1. 8. 1663.
had to visit regularly the queen and the wives of both nobles working for the Empire and of key ministers, as well as other ambassadressess whose husbands supported Imperial policy. The ambassadress also had to be a good hostess and receive visits at home, not only from the aforementioned women, but also from men. If the ambassadress failed to perform the art of visiting and being visited, then she wasn’t a true ambassadress.

The new Imperial ambassadress’ lack of visiting talent was also echoed by Queen Mariana of Austria. In 1663, she stated in a letter to the Countess of Harrach that the Countess of Pötting was very young, and hardly said a word, which to a certain degree was logical as she had arrived in Madrid speaking barely any Spanish. The consort also reiterated that the previous ambassadress, the Countess of Lamberg, was dearer to her. However, two years later in written response dated 1st July 1665 (two months before becoming queen regent on the death of Philip IV in September 1665), Mariana of Austria qualified her opinion, noting that it was true that the Countess of Pötting barely went out, but that she did visit her frequently and was very kind. In August 1667, the queen, by that time regent, stated that the Countess of Pötting had carved out her niche at the court of Madrid: the ambassadress visited her more often than before and was better known. Queen Mariana’s opinion of the ambassadress seemed to have changed between 1663 and 1667. Knowing the queen’s fondness of Maria Sophia’s predecessor, it is not surprising that she wrote such unflattering opinions, and these must also be understood in the context of the competition between the Pöttings-Dietrichsteins and the Lamberg-Harrach clan. Seen in this light, Mariana’s criticisms lose some of their force, although they must be taken into account; as it is very possible that Countess of Pötting was none too popular in her first year at court.

Other testimonies suggest that Maria Sophia was not as isolated as Mariana had suggested, and that she started fitting into court circles as early as 1664. Her main hostesses were Isabel Manrique de Lara y Luján and Catalina de Guzmán, the respective wives of the two ministers of the Council of State (the marquis of Mortara and the duke of Medina de las Torres), who had covered for the lack of an Imperial ambassador in Madrid from 1660 to 1663, acting as the Empire’s agents in Madrid.

66 Ibidem, Mariana de Austria to the Countess of Lamberg, 18. 7. 1663.
68 ÖStA, AVA, FA Harrach, Kart. 321, Mariana de Austria to the Countess of Lamberg, 1. 7. 1665.
69 Ibidem, 15. 8. 1667.
70 I would like to thank Petr Maťa (University of Vienna) for this information.
Pötting’s diary and correspondence with Leopold also demonstrate that she assisted her husband in two important negotiations during those initial years (1663–1668): the marriage of the Infanta Margarita to Leopold and obtaining the peace between Spain and Portugal. Both missions were completed successfully, suggesting that Maria Sophia wasn’t such a bad ambassadress. On 25 April 1666, the Infanta Margarita was married by proxy to Emperor Leopold I, and in March 1668 peace was signed with Portugal, mediated by the English ambassador and sponsored by the Empire.\footnote{About Portugal in this period see Rafael VALLADARES, La rebelión de Portugal: guerra, conflicto y poderes en la Monarquía Hispánica (1640–1680), Valladolid 1998. About the peace negotiations see the papers of Lisola: ÖStA, HHStA, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Spanien, Kart. 50, fasc. 3, Akt Nr. 103: Artículos de paz entre los reyes de las coronas católica y portuguesa a mediación del serenísimo y muy poderoso rey de Inglaterra, hermano del uno y aliado muy antiguo de ambos, 20. 2 1666.}

The Count of Pötting and his wife had assisted in securing the peace in the hope that the resources used against Portugal would be sent to help the emperor fight the frontiers of France,\footnote{Juan Antonio SÁNCHEZ BELÉN, Las relaciones internacionales de la Monarquía Hispánica durante la regencia de doña Mariana de Austria, Studia historica. Historia moderna 20, 1999, p. 142.} and the Turks.\footnote{Moritz LANDWEHR von PRAGENAU – Alfred Francis PRIBRAM (eds.), Privatbriefe Kaiser Leopold I. an den Grafen F. E. Pötting: 1662–1673, Wien 1904, letter from 25. 2. 1668.} The fact that Queen Mariana of Austria had become regent on the death of Philip IV in September 1665,\footnote{About the regency of Mariana de Austria see Laura OLIVÁN SANTALIESTRA, Mariana de Austria en la encrucijada política del siglo XVII, Madrid, Dissertation, Universidad Complutense 2006. And Silvia MITCHELL, Mariana of Austria and Imperial Spain: Court, Dynastic, and International Politics in Seventeenth-Century Europe, Dissertation, University of Miami 2013.} gave the ambassadress greater protagonism at court. Being close to a regent was more politically productive than standing next to a consort. Both the marriage between Margarita and Leopold and the peace with Portugal were signed during this female regency and under the watchful eye of the ambassadress, one of the queen’s regular visitors during this period.

The Pöttings also fought for the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle which Mariana of Austria signed as regent in May 1668. This treaty ended the “War of Devolution” that had pitted France against Spain for nine months.\footnote{Lucien BÉLY, Louis XIV: le plus grand roi du monde, Paris 2005, p. 115.} The conflict progressed as follows: in May 1667, Louis XIV invaded the Spanish Netherlands under the pretext that he had not received the dowry for his wife María Teresa, Philip IV’s oldest daughter. Mariana of Austria took three months to declare war on France after several attempts at negotiation failed. The regent tried to secure support from England, the United Provinces, Sweden, and naturally, she also asked her brother, the emperor, for assistance.\footnote{Laura OLIVÁN SANTALIESTRA, El fin de los Habsburgo: crisis dinástica y conflicto sucesorio en la Monarquía Hispánica (1615–1700), in: María Victoria López-Cordón – José Manuel Nieto Soria (eds.),} But Leopold remained neutral. The
emperor’s position was heavily criticized in Spain. Given her isolation, the queen regent decided to seek Papal mediation for a peace that could be signed in Aix-la-Chapelle. The emperor refused to help his sister, partly because he was about to sign a secret treaty to share the territories belonging to the Spanish monarchy with France should the king-child Charles II (Mariana’s son) die. This treaty was signed in Vienna on 19 January, 1668.\(^7\) The main architects of this first agreement to share out Spain’s dominions were the French ambassador to Vienna, Gremonville, and Auersperg, Leopold’s leading minister. Naturally, this was all performed behind Mariana of Austria’s back.

To secure peace between Spain and France as soon as possible, Leopold sent Otto Enrico del Carretto, Marquis of Grana, to Spain as an Imperial envoy with one official and one secret mission.\(^7\) His official mission was to promise imperial subsidies to maintain the fight against France in Flanders (to dissipate Spanish resentment towards the Empire for its neutrality) and his secret mission was to persuade Spanish ministers of the need to sign peace with France. The emperor believed that Grana’s mission would be easy as Mariana of Austria seemed inclined to find a rapid solution to the conflict, having failed to secure allies for the war. The emperor didn’t count on the fact that England, Sweden and Holland would form the Triple Alliance of The Hague to halt Louis XIV’s expansionist plans. News of this alliance reached the emperor at the beginning of February, when Grana had already left for Madrid. The formation of the Triple Alliance meant that Mariana of Austria hesitated over continuing with the peace negotiations. However, another turn of events helped the emperor: France invaded Franche-Comté on 4th February, conquering Besançon, a city that belonged to the Spanish crown. On seeing France’s military strength, England and Holland were inclined to peace. Mariana of Austria was again racked with doubt as she believed she could count on the emperor’s support against the French offensive into Franche-Comté.

Grana arrived in Madrid on 27th February, where he was to act “with complete discretion and dependence [on Pötting]”.\(^7\) The Count of Pötting tried to impose his authority and highlight his superior rank over a person he deemed to be a simple envoy. However, beyond the standard and fairly normal arguments between envoys and ambassadors, the Count of Pötting and Maria Sophia adapted their movements to those of de Grana to allow him to complete his mission. We don’t know whether Maria Rosina Sophia was

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\(^7\) Otto del Carretto was the son of Francesco del Carretto.

\(^7\) M. NIETO NUÑO (ed.), *Diario del conde de Pötting*, vol I, p. 360, 27. 2. 1668.
aware of de Grana’s secret mission, but she does seem to have done everything possible to help him. He was Leonor del Carretto’s brother. This former Spanish ambassadress to the Empire was now Vicereine of Mexico. Maria Sophia corresponded with the Marquis del Carretto’s sister, despite the fact that letters were slow to arrive as they journeyed with the fleet and had to cross a whole ocean.

Grana, Pötting and Maria Sophia were a perfect team: the count informed Nithard (the regent’s favourite and confessor) of the Marquis of Grana’s arrival as soon as he reached Madrid, as Maria Sophia headed to the palace (surely to inform the queen of the Imperial envoy’s arrival). Grana moved into the Pötting household in the street of La Luna on the following day. On the twenty ninth, Pötting accompanied Grana to the palace for his first audience with the queen and her son Charles II. On 1st March, the count and the marquis discussed Grana’s instructions at the Pötting house. Maria Sophia was not present for this conversation but she knew it had taken place. The following morning, Grana and the ambassador went to see Nithard. Two days later, Pötting took Grana to the audience with the queen regent. On the same day Pötting wrote to the emperor, informing him that Grana’s arrival had caused a great deal of speculation at court. On the fourth, Pötting visited the Dutch ambassador (the United Provinces were a member of the Triple Alliance, and one of the powers considering signing the peace agreement), while Grana went to see Nithard. On the fifth, Pötting gave the queen a paper on the Marquis of Grana’s brief instructions. On the following days he wrote to inform the emperor that the Duke of Medina de las Torres was suspicious of Grana, noting that he answered to Auersperg (who was known to support France), and suggesting that he had been sent with a secret mission. On 13th March, Pötting and Grana were summoned to the palace to meet the Count of Peñaranda and the Marquis of La Fuente, who were both ministers of the Council of State. Peñaranda was also a member of Mariana’s regency council.

At this meeting, La Fuente and Peñaranda criticised Pötting and Grana for the emperor’s failure to intervene in the War of Devolution. They asked the Marquis of Grana why he had arrived in Madrid to ask what the queen needed for the war now. Grana had to answer

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80 Ibidem.
81 Ibidem, p. 360, 28. 2. 1668
82 Ibidem, p. 360, 29. 2. 1668.
83 Ibidem, p. 361, 1. 3. 1668.
84 Ibidem, p. 361, note 586, 3. 3. 1668.
85 Ibidem, p. 361.
87 About the War of Devolution see: Antonio José RODRÍGUEZ HERNÁNDEZ, España, Flandes y la Guerra de Devolución (1667–1668): guerra, reclutamiento y movilización para el mantenimiento de los Países Bajos españoles, Madrid 2007.
two questions. The first concerned Louis XIV’s invasion of Franche-Comté: the queen regent wanted to know what the Empire would do about France’s invasion of Besançon as the emperor was responsible for defending that Spanish city. The second concerned the English and Dutch proposal to end the war. Both events had occurred during Grana’s voyage to Spain, and so he had no instructions from the emperor on these subjects. So the Marquis gave evasive answers, affirming that he “supposed” that the Empire was willing to assist Franche-Comté as he was raising levies and that he “believed” that the Empire would attend to the “common cause.” The suspicions of the Spanish ministers increased as a result of Grana’s unclear answers, and even more when they learned that Grana came with no official order to offer military support. Nothing was resolved at this first meeting.

Three days after this failed meeting, the Countess of Pötting went to the palace to visit the queen, and then visited again on the 19th March. Only Maria Sophia (not Pötting or Grana) spoke to the regent during those days. Meanwhile, Mariana submitted the items discussed at the meeting to the Council of State. Possibly influenced by Maria Sophia and by her ministers’ response, Mariana summoned Pötting and Grana to a new meeting at the palace. They met the Marquis de la Fuente on 25th March. La Fuente explained that the queen was inclined to accept the English and Dutch offer to mediate peace negotiations with France, with some reservations: if the Empire decided to carry out military intervention to support her in Franche-Comté, she would be prepared to continue fighting. Grana swiftly replied that Leopold could do “little or nothing” in the face of the Triple Alliance’s decision to sign peace and that he would “support the Dutch and the English in everything that was desirable for the Spanish crown and that would best serve the queen.” La Fuente interpreted these words as a promise to help pressure France in the peace negotiations. Mariana was informed immediately of arguments given by Grana and Pötting, and that they had both spoken in favour of peace with France and of the Empire’s potential support to help Spain secure better terms (more territorial gains) from the peace treaty. Presumably satisfied with the results of the meeting, the queen gave the Countess of Pötting, who happened to be at the palace on the same day, “a mink muff that the ambassador of Moscow had given her during his recent visit”.

The third and final meeting was held between the same triumvirate on 28th March – Mariana decided to summon Grana, Pötting and the Marquis of La Fuente once more.

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90 Ibidem, p. 365.
91 Ibidem, p. 369, note 597.
92 Ibidem, p. 368, 25. 3. 1668.
This meeting ended with Grana promise that Leopold I would end relations with France if it failed to respect peace terms favourable to Spain. The Countess of Pötting went to the palace to see the queen on that same day, returning two days later to watch an Easter procession. Her husband was watching from a private household, while she had the privilege of a view from a window of the Alcazar palace. On the 1st April, Easter Sunday, Pötting and his wife went to the palace together, and Maria Sophia went to visit the Queen. Mariana of Austria gave the Marquis of Grana a jewel worth six thousand ducats as a farewell gift. Grana left Madrid on 7th April. The Count and Countess of Pötting bade him farewell “with great affection”.94

The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle ending the War of Devolution was signed on 2nd May, 1668. France returned Franche-Comté (and the city of Besançon) as well as Cambrai, Aire and Saint Omer; but it retained Charleroi, Courtrai, Douai, Furnes, Lille, Oudenarde and Tournai.95 As she wished, Mariana of Austria recovered Franche-Comté, and the emperor was not obliged to enter the fighting. Grana, Pötting and his wife had been successful.

Towards the end of 1668, the Countess of Pötting received a long letter from her friend Leonor del Carretto (Grana’s sister) dating from August. Leonor, who had been Spanish ambassadress to the Empire until 1663 becoming Vicereine of Mexico in 1664, thanked Maria Sophia for “the favours she and Count Pötting had given [her brother]”.96 She also sent a precious gift from the Indies: a box full of chocolate, probably in return for the ambassadress’ assistance to her brother. Leonor’s letter and valuable gift (cacao was exorbitantly expensive at that time),97 demonstrate Maria Sophia’s political support for Grana’s diplomatic mission. Leonor also yearned to return to Madrid, and continued to send her “friend and servant” chocolate over the following months.

As of 1669, coinciding with a period of stable foreign affairs during the regency,98 the ambassadress acted as a broker,99 focusing on mediations that she and her husband carried out together. One of her most assiduous clients was Friar Thomas of Sarria, Archbishop of Taranto (Naples).100 His main demands were to obtain a bishopric in Sicily or, if possible, to return to Spain,101 and to receive a salary for his services to Austria, which

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94 Ibidem, p. 373, 7. 4. 1668.
96 ÖStA, HHStA, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Spanien Varia, Kart. 22, fasc. c, Akt Nr. 67, Leonor del Carretto to the Countess of Pötting, 1. 8. 1668.
97 Bianca LINDORFER, Discovering taste: Spain, Austria, and the spread of chocolate consumption among the Austrian aristocracy, 1650–1700, Food and History 7, no 1, 2009, pp. 35–51.
98 S. MITCHELL, Mariana of Austria and Imperial Spain, p. 265.
100 José FILGUEIRA VALVERDE, Fray Tomás de Sarria, arzobispo de Tarento, teólogo, diplomático, mecenas bienhechor de Pontevedra, Pontevedra 1975, p. 7.
101 ÖStA, HHStA, Spanien Varia, Kart. 23, fasc. f, Akt Nr. 56, Sarria to the Count of Pötting, 29. 4. 1670.
included his decisive role in the election of Ferdinand IV and Leopold I as candidates to the Empire. Throughout 1670, Sarria sent the Countess of Pötting numerous gifts to persuade her to intercede on his behalf to the queen regent. In January 1670, he wrote to the Count of Pötting to enquire about the countess’ tastes, as he wished to send her gloves, herbal essences or votive items. A few months later, the archbishop sent Maria Sophia several pairs of gloves in different sizes and in June he sent her a dress from Naples, a dozen pairs of gloves, four rosaries and several indulgences. In July he sent gloves and fans and promised to send other gifts from Rome, and in August he sent Maria Sophia “things for winter”. In October, the Count of Pötting received another case of “good presents and gifts”, and he answered Sarria, informing him that his wife, the ambassadress, had spoken to the wife of the man who managed the endowment gifts (el administrador de las rentas dotales) and had given her some of the presents that Maria Sophia had received from Sarria to see if she [the wife of the administrador] would be able to “assist her husband” and secure repayment of the amounts requested as a result of this “bribery”.

Friar Thomas of Sarria thanked them for this gesture, hoping to achieve “through the hand of my lady the countess [the ambassadress]” the endowments he requested from the queen’s treasury, and he promised to send more gifts for Maria Sophia and the wife of the manager “whose favour” he so needed. Sarria’s gifts comprising an indulgence for a gold medallion that “the countess wanted”, arrived in December. He also promised to send four silver medals with the indulgence “in articulo mortis” for Pötting’s friends and debtors, and at the end of December he sent another box containing “weapons against the cold”. In January 1671, Pötting again spoke to the queen “about the interests of the Archbishop of Taranto”. He sent more gifts to the ambassadress throughout 1671: agnus dei to hang

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102 J. FILGUEIRA VALVERDE, Fray Tomás de Sarria, pp. 5–6. See also: Lamberg to Auersperg, 13. 5. 1654 in ÖÖLA, HA Steyr, FA Lamberg, Kart. 1226, fasc. 15, Akt Nr. 248, and ÖStA, HHStA, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Spanien, Kart. 44, fasc. 5, Akt Nr. 5. Ferdinand IV to Johann Maximilian Lamberg, 29. 5. 1653.
103 ÖStA, HHStA, Spanien Varia, Kart. 23, Sarria to the Count of Pötting, 18. 1. 1670.
104 Ibidem, Sarria to Pötting, 25. 6. 1670.
105 Ibidem, Sarria to Pötting, June 1670.
107 ÖStA, HHStA, Spanien Varia, Kart. 24, fasc. e, Akt Nr. 68, Pötting to Sarria, 8. 10. 1670.
108 Ibidem, Kart. 23, fasc. f, Akt Nr. 94, Sarria to Pötting, 8. 11. 1670.
109 Ibidem, Akt Nr. 98, Sarria to Pötting, 6. 12. 1670.
110 Ibidem, Kart. 23, fasc. c, Akt Nr. 101, Sarria to Pötting, 20. 12. 1670.
on the bedhead, a medal bearing the image of five saints and more indulgences. The Pöttings tried to satisfy the demands of Thomas of Sarria but all was in vain. The Council of Italy rejected his petition to retire to Sicily for the third time and refused to pay the money that he was owed by the kingdom of Naples. In a letter dated July 1671, the Archbishop of Taranto again petitioned Pötting and Maria Sophia for their help, arguing that the only lady he knew at the palace was the “lady countess”, as “all of the other ladies” he had known in Madrid had died. The Count of Pötting and Maria Sophia continued to help Sarria, leaning on the manager of the endowments and his wife. The last letter we have from Sarria to Pötting mentions the ambassadress’ work to promote the aims of the unfortunate archbishop of Taranto to the queen regent. Thomas of Sarria died in 1682, without fulfilling his desire to be sent to Sicily.

Again in 1671, Maria Sophia and her husband also tried to secure the position of ambassador to Rome for the Count of Albadeliste. Manuel Enríquez de Guzmán was related to the ambassadress through their great grandfather Adam of Dietrichstein, which was one of the reasons why Maria Sophia wanted to support his political aspirations. The Count of Albadeliste visited the Count of Pötting on 15th September and that afternoon Pötting went to the palace to ask the queen to appoint Albadeliste to the Roman embassy as “I believe he would be very suitable” for the position. Six days later, the Countess of Pötting went to “speak to the Queen in support of the Count of Alba”. But the queen named the Marquis of Liche as ambassador to Rome. Nevertheless, the Counts of Albadeliste rewarded the ambassadors’ efforts with a gift: a baby Jesus of Naples that the Countess of Albadeliste gave to her cousin, the ambassadress, during one of her regular visits to the Pötting household in the street of La Luna. They had better luck with the candidacy of the Marquis of Castelrodrigo for the Presidency of the Council of Flanders. In his diary of August 1671, Pötting noted that the Marquis had secured the position

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112 ÖStA, HHStA, Spanien Varia, Kart. 25, fasc. c, Akt Nr. 56, Sarria to Pötting, 11. 4. 1671.
113 Ibidem, Akt Nr. 68, Sarria to Pötting, 20. 6. 1671.
114 Ibidem, Akt Nr. 75, Sarria to Pötting, 18. 7. 1671.
115 Ibidem.
116 Ibidem, Akt Nr. 81, Sarria to Pötting, 15. 8. 1671 and Akt Nr. 79, Sarria to Pötting, 1. 8. 1671.
118 Ibidem, Akt Nr. 87, Sarria to Pötting, 26. 9. 1671.
119 J. FILGUEIRA VALVERDE, Fray Tomás de Sarria, p. 7.
122 About the marquis of Liche (Marquis del Carpio): Leticia De FRUTOS, El Templo de la Fama. Alegoría del marqués del Carpio, Madrid 2009.
through his intervention. There is no documentary evidence that Maria Sophia was involved in the negotiations, but it is likely that she played a part as Pötting recorded his wife’s visits to the Marchioness of Castelrodrigo in his papers.

Maria Rosina Sophia of Dietrichstein, Countess of Pötting, and her husband returned to Vienna in 1674. In spite of her youth, the ambassadress tried to perform her duties with dignity, and she did so with some failure, and some success. Maria Sophia was to return as ambassadress to Madrid with her second husband Ferdinand Wenzel Lobkowicz, the Imperial ambassador to Spain from 1690 to 1697. Maria Sophia was by his side, returning to the role of ambassadress. Mariana of Austria was no longer queen regent, but was now the queen mother, inaugurating a new period for the Imperial ambassadors to Madrid.

Conclusions

Judith Rebecca Wrbna, the Countess of Lamberg and Maria Sophia von Dietrichstein, Countess of Pötting, were two ambassadresses who paved the way for their successors. They both set precedents and made it easier for subsequent Imperial ambassadresses to access the diplomatic areas of the Spanish court.

Judith Rebecca consolidated the imperial ambassadresses’ right to enter the queen’s private quarters. Secured by her predecessor, the Marchioness of Grana, this privilege was probably granted to the Countess of Lamberg thanks to the influence of the young queen consort Mariana of Austria, who wanted to have a mature woman from the Hapsburg Empire, and who spoke German, close to her. Access to the Infanta María Teresa’s most private rooms allowed her to overhear conversations of great political interest, which she faithfully conveyed to her husband. We can find scraps of what she ‘overheard’ in the diplomatic letters of Johann Maximilian Lamberg. She tried and failed to secure the queen’s right hand, in a context of tense diplomatic relations between Spain and the Empire over the negotiations regarding María Teresa’s marriage. However, Judith Rebecca established a good relationship with Mariana of Austria, gracefully achieved her social duties, and received visits. Judith Rebecca’s efforts were rewarded when her daughter Johanna Theresia, became the queen’s favourite lady between 1660 and 1661, and an Imperial ambassadress with the privilege of precedence between 1673 and 1676.

Maria Sophia Rosina of Dietrichstein, Countess of Pötting, worked closely with her husband in both his diplomatic negotiations and mediation activities in the first years of their embassy (1663–1669), which coincided with the beginning of Mariana of Austria’s regency (1665 onwards). The Pöttings were faced with resolving two wars, with Portugal

and France. Maria Sophia contributed to the success of both missions, supporting her husband’s visits and attending the palace to see the queen regent. The Countess of Pötting did not achieve precedence during the initial years of Mariana’s regency as the right hand was given to the governess of the king-child Charles II, and not to the first lady of the Bedchamber. The exceptional circumstances of the regency led to such changes in protocol. While Maria Sophia did not obtain the right hand, she was ambassadress during a female regency, doubling her influence. Her husband, the Count of Pötting, played this situation to his advantage, using his wife to send papers to the queen. He once noted in his diary that, “I wrote the Queen a paper in German, and had the countess deliver it. Pray God she [the Queen] make use of it so we can open our eyes.” Maria Sophia also worked as a mediator, and although she didn’t achieve the desired results, she consolidated a practice that was continued by her successors; obtaining incomes and positions through ambassadors’ wives, became standard practice in the following decades.

The Bohemian ambassadresses helped gain acceptance and legitimacy for the political actions of their husbands in court circles. Judith Rebecca and Maria Sophia marked a turning point in the diplomatic life of the Imperial ambassadresses to the court of Madrid.

The Early Career of the Imperial Diplomat

Abstract: The present study focuses on documenting the beginnings of the diplomatic career of one of the most important imperial diplomats, Dominik Andreas Count von Kaunitz (1655–1705) and on defining the information that was learned within the context of the current research. Researchers have already studied the peak period of Kaunitz’ diplomatic career in the late 1690’s, when he served in the Hague as the imperial envoy and was subsequently appointed as the Reichsvizekanzler. His previous activities, however, have so far not aroused much interest, though it was the 80’s and the beginning of the 90’s of the 17th century that were crucial in regard to his future direction. Based on the research that was carried-out in the Moravský zemský archiv in Brno (Moravian Land Archive, in the Kaunitz and Dietrichstein Family Archives) and in the archives in Vienna (in Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv and Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv) and also in the Munich archive (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv) attention will be paid not only to what, when and where Count von Kaunitz discussed during his journeys, but also the manner in which he acted and the strategies that he chose to employ. This study should therefore reveal not only this diplomat’s mental world but also his everyday life and his social background.

Keywords: Diplomacy – the Early Modern era – the 17th Century – Leopold I – Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz – Bavaria – England – Passau – Mainz

The purpose of this study is to present information about the personality and the diplomatic career2 of one of the most important imperial diplomats at the end of the 17th century, Dominik Andreas Count von Kaunitz, and defining the

1 This study was created within the GACR project No. 13–12939S, Bohemian and Moravian Nobility in the Diplomatic Service of the Austrian Habsburgs (1640–1740).
2 The question of the suitability of the term “diplomatic career” is currently under discussion and in fact it is increasingly being replaced by the term “diplomatic service”. There were very few aristocrats whom we could actually identify as being career diplomats; for most of them their activities in the ranks of diplomacy more likely represented their path to reaching higher posts. The author of this study is aware of these nuances and, while she does use the term “diplomatic career”, she does so at a distance.
information that was learned within the context of the current research.\(^3\) Thereby attention will be focussed not only on what, when and where Count von Kaunitz discussed during his journeys, but mainly on how he acted and what strategies he chose to employ. In association with his everyday life and his social background this study should therefore also reveal this diplomat's mental world and at the same time answer the following questions: What were von Kaunitz' tasks and powers during the missions on which he was sent in the 1680's and early 1690's, i.e. at a time when his diplomatic career began to develop precipitously? With whom, where and in what manner did he act and what strategies did he use in specific cases? With whom did he cooperate personally and who supported his work only from afar and what were the grounds of this cooperation? What was Kaunitz' motivation and what consequences did the missions that he completed have for him?

While the personality of Dominik Andreas, Count von Kaunitz (1655–1705) is not completely unknown to today's scholars, so far it has not raised much interest in them. The first comprehensive information about him was provided in Max Braubach's study entitled *Graf Dominik Andreas Kaunitz (1655–1705) als Diplomat und Staatsmann*, which though it did attract attention to him, basically it did not critically assess his activities within the ranks of the imperial diplomacy. Following-on from this there were other studies, such as the chapter in the still widely cited work from the pen of Grete Klingenstein *Der Aufstieg des Hauses Kaunitz. Studien zur Herkunft und Bildung des Staatskanzlers Wenzel Anton*, which, however, is also not focused closely on this crucial period of Kaunitz' life.\(^4\)

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3. See particularly Jiří HRBEK, *Cesty evropské historiografie k diplomacii raného novověku* [Ways of European Historiography to the Diplomacy of Early Modern Period], Theatrum historiae 13, 2013, pp. 7–30; find further references there. An example of the currently-held concept of research concerning diplomacy and the diplomats of the Early Modern era are studies that have been penned by participants in the grant project that is referred to above; for example: Jiří KUBEŠ, *Jan Marek z Clary a Aldringenu jako vyslanec Leopolda I. u saského kurfiřtského dvora na konci 17. století* [Johann Marcus Count von Clary und Aldringen as the Envoy of Leopold I at the Saxon Court of the Prince-Elector at the End of the 17th Century], Český časopis historický 113, 2015, pp. 346–380, for a brief comparison of Count von Clary und Aldringen's diplomatic mission with that of Count von Kaunitz see pp. 375–378.

Dominik Andreas was born from the marriage of Leo Wilhelm Count von Kaunitz and Maria Eleonore, née Dietrichstein. After his Grand Tour, which took place between the years 1671 and 1674, and during which he visited a number of Italian and French cities, the young Count married Countess Maria Eleonore von Sternberg (1656–1706), whose beauty and charm often significantly helped him during his later diplomatic negotiations. The Count and the Countess participated in the travels of the royal court, during which Dominik Andreas also gained his first political experience. The Count obtained his first major diplomatic post in 1682—it was the post of imperial envoy in Munich. In the current political situation in which the monarchy found itself between Scylla and Charybdis in the form of a Turkish threat on one side and the conquest policy of Louis XIV on the other side, it was necessary for the Emperor to find allies. At the Bavarian court Kaunitz therefore had the task of obtaining the young Elector Maximilian II Emanuel (1662–1726) for the Habsburg case. After about a year of his service in Munich he actually succeeded when the Bavarian troops participated in the victorious Battle of Vienna. In addition Kaunitz also strengthened the Habsburg-Bavarian alliance by mediating the Elector’s marriage to the daughter of Emperor Leopold I from his first marriage, Maria Antonia. The success of the mission, in 1683, was also reflected in the advancement of Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz to the status of a Reichsgraf.

Until 1686 Count von Kaunitz travelled between the Munich and the Viennese courts. Then he was sent to negotiate a potential alliance with England; this mission failed however. Even this time Kaunitz’ capability impressed the Emperor and in 1685 he was appointed to the position of a Geheimer Rat and two years later he was even awarded the high ranking Order of the Golden Fleece. In 1687 Count von Kaunitz returned to Munich to discuss with the Elector the steps necessary for electing a new Cologne coadjutor and also for diminishing the French influence while also strengthening the
The Habsburg-Bavarian alliance.\textsuperscript{6} Despite some initial difficulties eventually this mission was also successful: In early July he finally managed to persuade Maximilian II Emanuel to go to Hungary as the Commander-in-Chief, where he participated in the victorious Battle of Belgrade. After a short stay in Vienna in early November Kaunitz again went to Munich and again tried to lure Bavaria into the pro-Habsburg Camp, which he eventually succeeded in achieving: in May 1689 the alliance treaty between the Bavarian Elector and the Emperor was finally re-signed.

In the late 1690's Dominik Andreas Count von Kaunitz experienced the peaks of both his diplomatic and his political career. During the years 1694–1697 he served in The Hague as the imperial envoy, where, amongst other issues, he also negotiated the provision of military assistance against the Turks and also the readmission of the Bohemian electoral vote; in June 1696 he was appointed as the \textit{Reichsvizekanzler}. Around the turn of the century, however, the Count apparently became involved in a dispute with a group of influential aristocrats who were headed by Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach and Heinrich Franz Mansfeld, Prince of Fondi, and subsequently he was gradually removed from power. Although Count Kaunitz could no longer fully realise himself in politics, this does not mean that he completely withdrew from public life. He made use of the situation for cultivating his estates, reconstructing Slavkov castle, purchasing townhouses and also for establishing a textile manufacturing business in Slavkov.\textsuperscript{7} Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz died in January 1705 and, apart from many debts, he did also leave his successfully developing estate to his two sons and four daughters.\textsuperscript{8} The Count therefore spent his entire active life dedicated mainly to faithful service in the ranks of diplomacy of

\begin{itemize}
\item[6] In regard to Count von Kaunitz' Bavarian mission during the years 1687–1688: Lenka MARŠÁLKOVÁ, \textit{Bavorská mise Dominika Ondřeje z Kounic v letech 1687–1688} [The Bavarian Mission of Dominik Andreas, the Count of Kaunitz, between the years 1687–1688], contribution to the Splendid Encounters IV International Conference, that was held in Budapest (25. – 26. 9. 2015), and also M. BRAUBACH, \textit{Graf Dominik Andreas Kaunitz}, there particularly pp. 227–232 and in regard to Cologne election also pp. 229–231. Before he arrived in England and after returning from there, the Count stopped by to visit the Elector Palatine, L. BITTNER – L. GROß, \textit{Repertorium}, p. 158; in the same publication he is also listed in 1687 and then again in 1697 as the envoy to the Bishopric of Magdeburg; this fact has not yet been documented, however (ibidem, p. 150). Kaunitz visited Bavaria more times, however; in 1695 he stayed there from 30. 3. until May and then from 21. 9. until 10. 12., during which time he was discussing there the readmission of the Bohemian Electoral Vote (ibidem, p. 126).
\end{itemize}
Emperor Leopold I during a difficult period in much of Europe involving fierce fighting for influence and power both in the military and the diplomatic field.

**Table 1**: What has been so far known concerning the diplomatic missions of Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz – A Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of the mission</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1682–1686 Bavaria</td>
<td>The Habsburg-Bavarian alliance against the Turks and France + military assistance; the marriage of the Elector to Maria Antonia von Habsburg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1686–1687 England</td>
<td>The Habsburg-English alliance against the Turks and France + military assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1687–1689 Bavaria</td>
<td>The Habsburg-Bavarian alliance against the Turks and France + military assistance; the election of the Cologne Coadjutor and the Archbishop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1694–1697 The Hague</td>
<td>Peace talks, military assistance against the Turks, the readmission of the Bohemian electoral vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even in this brief introduction there is a series of gaps that deserve to be filled. For example: How the Count achieved obtaining all the aforementioned diplomatic posts – because the Emperor was personally familiar with his previous experience or did he have an influential intercessor? How did he perceive these missions: as a necessary evil, which, however, would guarantee his progression up the career ladder and perhaps even obtaining some court office, or as an honour and a validation of his skills? Did he always set out on an expedition with one major mission, or would he be fulfilling a wide range of smaller tasks at a specific location? How did his diplomatic missions actually go: did he live in the place of his work continuously or did his missions involve his constant travel between the specific destination and the imperial court? How and with whom did he develop useful contacts at the place and what helped him to convince (frequently very hesitant) potential allies? And what was he actually doing during the periods between the individual missions? Based on the research that was conducted in both domestic and foreign archives, I will also try to clarify any other ambiguities or at least suggest answers to the above questions. Attention will be paid to the early 1690’s, i.e. the period during which it is possible to find a lot of blank white spots in the existing research; Kaunitz’ last major diplomatic task – the peace talks in the Hague – will be omitted, as this has already been sufficiently mapped in the literature.9

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Sources directly from the provenance of Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz (or those which relate to him in some way) have been preserved to a greater extent, namely in connection with the beginnings of his work in the service of imperial diplomacy. They are stored mainly either in the rich Kaunitz or in the Dietrichstein family archives in the Moravský zemský archiv (Moravian Land Archive) in Brno and in archives in Vienna (in Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv and Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv) and also in the archive in Munich (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv).

**Bavaria I**

Whether Count Kaunitz had already gained some experience in the diplomatic service even before his first journey to Bavaria, still remains somewhat shrouded in mystery. After marrying Maria Eleonore von Sternberg, the young couple participated in several journeys of the imperial court, but the Count (then only twenty years old!) had apparently caught the attention of the Emperor and his family even before then: for example, in early September 1675, i.e. a few months before the wedding with Maria Eleonore, he apparently went to Poland as a member of the entourage of Empress Claudia Felicitas von Tyrol.10

The first significant diplomatic mission on which Count Kaunitz was sent was directed to the court of the Bavarian Elector and it became greatly prolonged – as it ushered him in following delays and problems which the Count had already had more than enough of during his period of tenure within the ranks of imperial diplomacy. According to the draft of imperial instruction the main task of Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz from the 23rd November 1682 was to obtain the support of Maximilian II Emanuel as an ally that was to be crowned by signing an alliance treaty against the “hereditary enemy” and also against France. In addition to the Elector the Count was to negotiate mainly with the Elector’s Vizekanzler, Baron Leidel, to whom he should explain the Emperor’s motives in detail.11 Also, if possible, he should, continually move about within the Elector’s proximity to him, for example, in Ludwig HÜTTL, Max Emanuel, der Blaue Kurfürst 1679–1726. Eine politische Biographie, München 1976, pp. 105, 118, 138, 165, 176, etc. The Bavarian Leidel family is also mentioned in a few lines of Zedler’s lexicon, J. H. ZEDLER, Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexikon, Bd. 16, col. 1576. The Count had a good overview concerning what Baron Leidel had communicated from Vienna to Munich thanks to the Archduchess Maria Antonia; see Kaunitz’ letter from 12. 2. 1683, ÖStA Wien,
– either in his residence in Munich or on hunting trips and journeys. He should also, of course, inform the Emperor about everything in regular reports and then await further instructions.12

To Munich, to the court of the Bavarian Elector Maximilian II Emanuel, Count Kaunitz arrived on the 11th December 1682.13 He had to wait several days for his first audience with the Elector, however – at that time the Elector and his court were staying in Dachau. The Count therefore accommodated himself14 and, in accordance with the imperial instruction, he turned to Baron Leidel, who, several days after Kaunitz’ arrival, went to the imperial court as an envoy of the Elector.15 The Count finally received his first audience (during which, as he mentioned in his letter to the Emperor, he did not forget anything and everything went to the full satisfaction of all concerned) on the 25th December at five o’clock in the afternoon and then he made courtesy visits with other members of the Elector’s family.16 During the rest of 1682 and early in the next year the Count was invited to a variety of other audiences;17 the issues that needed to be talked about with the Elector were very diverse.

In addition to the issue of a possible alliance, the Count was also negotiating about dynastic issues: in fact he was functioning as an imperial “matchmaker” – he presented to the Elector the option to marry the Emperor’s daughter from his first marriage, Maria Antonia (1669–1692), and also the benefits that would be associated with this marriage and, unobtrusively, but convincingly, he tried to persuade the Elector to consent to this marriage. It was certainly not easy work: the young Elector was reluctant to marry, and in

13 The Count arrived in Munich with his wife. He hardly mentioned her presence in official correspondence, however, and references to her can be found only in his own private correspondence.
14 According to his letter to the Emperor from 22. 12. 1682, he lived in an unspecified "Gesandtenhaus" (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 105, Fasz. 75, Pars 1, fol. 10–11). Later on, during his second mission to Bavaria, however, he stayed at the court and also in rented accommodation in a private house – see below.
15 He left on 1. 1. 1683 (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 105, Fasz. 75, Pars 1, fol. 22–23); he probably did not arrive in Vienna until 27. 1. of that year (ibidem, fol. 44–45). He did additionally appear in Vienna in the spring of 1688, for example; see the Emperor’s letter to the Bavarian Elector dating from 21. 3. 1688 (ibidem, Kart. 107, Fasz. 76, Pars 2, fol. 61). At this time negotiations with him took place at Prince Ferdinand of Dietrichstein’s house (ibidem, fol. 165–166, the draft of the Emperor’s letter dating from 31. 3. 1688).
16 Amongst others, he visited "Duke Max and his wife", i.e. the Elector’s uncle – Maximilian Philipp Heinrich (1638–1705) and Mauricienne Febronie de la Tour-d’Auvergne (1652–1706). See Kaunitz’ letter to the Emperor dating from 25. 12. 1682, ibidem, Kart. 105, Fasz. 75, Pars 1, fol. 14–15.
17 They took place on 27. 12. 1682 and on 1. 1., 15. 1. and 29. 1. 1683, ibidem.
addition a competing matchmaker, Luigi Ballati, the envoy from Hanover, was operating in his court as also was the “Hanoverian clique”, allegedly led by Countess von Krieching. According to Kaunitz’ opinion, Count Friedrich von Preising, Canon in Salzburg, Passau and Augsburg, also belonged to this clique, for example.18 Ballati’s task was to negotiate the Elector’s marriage to the daughter of Ernst August von Braunschweig und Lüneburg and later (from 1692) also the first Elector of Hanover, Sophia Charlotte (1662–1705). From the outset Ballati’s mission did not seem very hopeful, however, and was accompanied by purely “technical” problems: for example, he had to wait a few days for the creditive from his master, until which time he was obliged to act incognito (based on Kaunitz’ surprised and at the same time disgusted observations regarding this situation one can only assume that it was probably not a common practice). Kaunitz still did not succeed in obtaining the Elector’s consent to marry the Habsburg Archduchess until during the year 1684 and even during the following year it was not entirely certain that the wedding would take place without any problems occurring. Eventually everything turned out in the way that the Emperor had imagined. Subsequently Count von Kaunitz helped to negotiate the conditions under which the marriage could be carried-out and also the details of the marriage contract.19

Another marriage, in regard to which Count von Kaunitz had been intervening since 1683 based on the Emperor’s orders, was the planned marriage of the Polish Prince James Louis Sobieski to the Bavarian Princess and the Elector’s younger sister, Violanta Beatrix, who, at that time, was just 10 years old. The Emperor was quite impatient in regard to arranging this marriage: he wished the future Polish King to oblige him and Bavaria and, based on Kaunitz’ reports, he considered that the young Prince was a quiet and stable person who could be beneficial for him in the future, especially in fighting against the Turks. The Elector hesitated again, however; the reason for this was the young age of the

18 The Countess von Krieching (possibly Maria Elizabeth Anna), as the Count noted several times, was not too successful: apparently nobody in the Bavarian court other than her wanted this Hanoverian marriage and even though the Elector based on her wishes sent his man to the Hanover court to take a look at the potential bride, subsequently these talks later ended in failure. Apparently the Countess was actually the wife of the Elector’s Geheimer Rat and the Hauptmann of trabants, who as of 1685 is mentioned as representing an aspect of the Elector’s court, for example in contemporary publications: Christoph BOETHIUS, Ruhm-belarberter triumph-leuchtender und glantz-erhöherer Kriegs-Helms..., Volumes 2–3, Nürnberg 1688, p. 77 and also in the work: Eberhard Werner HAPPEL, Der Bayerische Max, Oder so genannter Europaeischer Geschicht-Roman..., Volume 1, 1692, p. 197.

19 ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 105, Fasz. 75, Pars 2, fol. 168–169. See also numerous mentions in Kaunitz’ correspondence with Count Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach (ÖStA Wien, AVA, FA Harrach, Kart. 254/35, s. f.), additionally also ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 105, Fasz. 75, Pars 1 and 2 and also in regard to the actual wedding, which took place on 15. 7. 1685, see the large folder in ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Obersthofmeisteramt, Ältere Zeremonialakten (hereinafter referred to as OmeA, ÄZA), 14/13.
Princess, due to which any marriage would need to be suspended for many years, and then especially there was the question of the Polish Succession – the Elector wanted to ensure that, thanks to his sister, he would in the future have a guaranteed entitlement to the Polish crown. The negotiations also continued during the following year, even when the marriage contract had been drafted, but the actual marriage had not yet taken place. The marriage of the Bavarian Princess was also one of the crucial factors of Kaunitz’ second Bavarian mission that took place in the late 1680’s. The Princess was to be betrothed to Archduke Joseph, but even this marriage had not been negotiated and Violanta Beatrix was married in Italy.

In addition to the marriage policy Count Kaunitz during his first actual mission to Bavaria also discussed less “romantic” matters: i.e. obtaining military assistance for the fight against the “hereditary enemy” and against France. He was obliged to argue with the Elector about almost any soldier that Bavaria might possibly provide and also about any specific conditions related to this cooperation, regarding which the Elector was, of course, a bit hesitant and nor was hurrying in regard to his own personal involvement in the fighting. But eventually Kaunitz’ persuasion was successful after all: Maximilian II Emanuel as the Commander-in-Chief of the Bavarian troops (amounting to cca. 11,000 men) on the 11th and the 12th September 1683 personally took part in the Battle of Vienna and thereby contributed to a glorious victory over the Turks.

Of course, Count von Kaunitz very closely followed the development of the mood at the Elector’s court, whether in the pro-French cliques (where initially, for example, Kaunitz’ later ally, Baron Johann Friedrich Karg von Bebenburg, also belonged), or in the pro-Habsburg cliques were led by the afore-mentioned Baron Leidel. The Count who was acquainted with the environment of high politics was deftly moving between the two camps and was discovering which additional power would be willing to join the Emperor (or who could eventually conclude an alliance with whom). Already since the early 1680’s, thanks to Kaunitz’ messages, we can trace, for example, the Habsburg and the Bavarian “Courtship” with Sweden as a possible ally against France, though the official founding of the Augsburg alliance did not actually take place until a few years later.

20 See, for example, Kaunitz’ letter to the Emperor from Dachau, 17. 8. 1683, ÖStA Wien, HHSTA, ÖGSR, Kart. 105, Fasz. 75, Pars 1, fol. 238–239, 292–295 and many other letters from this folder.
21 In regard to these negotiations concerning the marriage of the Bavarian Princess see the Bavaria II Subchapter.
22 Habsburg-Swedish relationships are discussed, for example, by Martin BAKEŠ in Mimořádná diplomatická mise Adolfa Vratislava ze Šternberka: Švédské království v polovině 70. let 17. století očima císařského vyslance [Special Diplomatic Mission of Adol夫 Wratislaw of Sternberg. The Kingdom of Sweden in the mid-1670's, as seen by the Emperor’s envoy], Folia Historica Bohemica 29, 2014, Nr. 1, pp. 31–62.
At the Bavarian court the Count was also making friendships – or at least useful acquaintances – with both secular and spiritual dignitaries, which would also come in very handy during his other missions and if, for some reason he could not move about close to the Elector, he would be informed about his conduct at least indirectly; he also did not forget to send news to Vienna about the members of the Elector’s family or about the Bavarian court. During the War of the Reunions that took place in the years 1683–1684 and during the preparations for the peace negotiations in Regensburg, where Emperor Leopold I went personally to negotiate the terms for a much-needed peace, the Count (together with the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, Ottone Enrico del Carretto, Marquis de Grana) apparently provided for the Emperor’s journey a sufficiently representative carriage horses and chariots and also followed, of course, the steps of Maximilian Emanuel, who, despite repeatedly hesitating as to whether to set off on the journey (or if instead he should definitely lean to the side of the Emperor), eventually also went to Regensburg. During the preparation of these peace negotiations in Regensburg, respectively in Augsburg, after which the entire alliance was later called, the Count held several personal meetings with the Elector and in the letters to the Emperor commented on his actions and opinions.

23 Already during his first mission to Bavaria, for example, he noticed the local efforts to secure Prince Joseph Clement: already then, almost still in childhood, he was promised the throne in Regensburg and he was even looking-out for the Cologne Archbishopric, which, eventually with Kaunitz’ help, he achieved in 1688. In regard to these endeavours, see below.

24 The Austrian diplomats were in Regensburg already at that time, which was for the good of the whole Empire to negotiate the concluding of universal peace and which cooperated with the Imperial Prinzipal-Kommissar, Count Gottlieb von Windischgratz (1630–1695) and with a local resident, Baron Johann Ferdinand Stroiber; the Bavarian Elector’s envoy was a doctor of law, Baron Johann Rudolph Wampel. Peace talks, however, were not spared of serious problems of ceremonial nature, which did not miss even those who in theory should be the closest, and which did not diminish even in the coming years. According to Kaunitz’ reports disputes occurred, for example, between the mentioned Count von Windischgratz and Bishop of Eichstätt, Count Marquard II Schenk von Castell (1605–1685). See L. BITTNER – L. GROß, Repertorium, pp. 12, 13 and 137. The task of Count von Kaunitz in this case was to calm the situation and in particular to influence the Elector of Bavaria, who in turn, should calm down the Eichstätt Bishop. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 105, Fasz. 75, Pars 1, fol. 241–244, 249–250, 303–304, etc; ibidem, Pars 4, there, for example, fol. 21–27, 57–58, etc. The copy of the report concerning the ceremony in Regensburg; see Moravský zemský archiv Brno (= MZA Brno), Rodinný archiv Kouniců (= RA Kouniců), Inv. No. 2357 (III), sign. 77 (2), Kart. 266, fol. 44–45.

25 ÖStA Wien, AVA, FA Harrach, Kart. 254/35, s. f.

26 While the Elector went to Augsburg personally, he arrived there incognito and stayed for only one day and immediately went back again to Munich. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 105, Fasz. 75, Pars 1, fol. 292–295.

27 What specifically should the Count at this time negotiate in Bavaria (“foederi Hispanico-Suecico”, additionally also tracts to Regensburg regarding the negotiations with France, and ultimately, of course, “universal concerto zwischen den allyrten” and armistice agreements for 10, 20 or 30 years) is
During 1683 Count von Kaunitz repeatedly visited his estates, or at least the imperial court: for example, in October he (together with the Elector, who came to participate in anti-Turkish fighting for Vienna) made a shorter journey from Munich to Vienna and Slavkov and back – he delivered a report and received further orders and stayed in his Slavkov castle and checked his estates. A longer and in terms of its organisation disproportionately more demanding journey he took in the spring of that year. At that time, he was helping in organising a major event: Maximilian II Emanuel in the last days of April was going to visit the Emperor and therefore there was a great deal of responsibility with the Count (as an expert on the Bavarian environment and on the Elector): to discuss in advance everything necessary and to provide information regarding the Elector’s expectations. Then he travelled to Vienna and Laxenburg at a slight advance of the Elector, and later he joined the Elector’s entourage and even housed and hosted him on his estates and took care of his entertainment and programme. Thanks to the sources stored in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, we have very detailed information regarding the exact course of the entire journey.

We do not know whether or not all the formalities regarding the Elector’s visit were arranged exclusively by Count von Kaunitz, but nevertheless his support for the smooth course of the journey was undeniable and he proved himself to be a very efficient organiser. Not only that he provided necessary information to everyone who needed it in a timely manner, but (either personally or indirectly) he took care of the Elector’s and also of his entourage’s “body and soul” by providing both accommodation and meals for them, as well as regular Mass and entertainment, musical and theatre performances, sightseeing and – speaking in today’s lingo – also tourist attractions. This expedition from Munich to Vienna and then to Prague was not the Elector’s final one; subsequently, during the
coming years he met the Emperor several times and it can be assumed that these trips were also organised in a very similar manner. After the joys and sorrows of travel the Elector and Count von Kaunitz also returned to their diplomatic negotiations, and the Count also returned to Munich.

in front of the residence of our well-known Count von Kaunitz. The meeting with the Emperor was planned down to the smallest detail: it was to take place outside the residence and the Elector was to stop 40 steps in front of the Emperor, who would also be accompanied by the Obersthofmeister Albrecht von Zinzendorf. Subsequently, the Emperor first made his speech and then invited the Elector to board his coach. In Laxenburg the carriages arrived in the interior courtyard and the Elector and the Emperor were greeted by the Cavaliers and the Ministers who were present and the Elector could climb-up the stairs in front of the Emperor. The Elector, together with a part of his entourage, was accommodated with a part of his entourage directly at the court and his safety was protected by an honour-guard. Some members of his entourage arrived later (specifically the Elector's Vizekanzler, Baron Leidel, with his secretary and his physician) and they made use of the Imperial Carriages, were housed and then joined the Elector's entourage. Count von Kaunitz was expected to accompany the Elector. If the Elector participated in any public audience, it was expected that he would be invited to the antechamber, where selected ministers and cavaliers were already awaiting and he could sit on the chair that the Oberstkämmerer Count Gundakar von Dietrichstein offered to him. The first dinner was served in the apartment of the Empress, where members of aristocratic society were served by maids-of honour, while musicians waited at the table and were ready to start their performance. The Elector sat in a chair with armrests that were padded with red velvet, while the chairs of the Imperial Majesty were padded with golden velvet. The seating arrangements were also important: the Elector's place of honour was located on the right side of the Emperor. If the Archduchess, the Elector's prospective bride, participated in dining in common or in other activities, she was expected to always sit on the right side of her future husband. At dinner the Empress offered the Elector a cup and toasted to the health of the Emperor (at which point in time the Elector was obliged to stand up). Then, when sweets were served, the Elector assisted the Empress with her hand-washing by handing her a napkin. After the banquet, everyone went to their rooms, while the Elector was escorted by an honour guard (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, OmeA, ÄZA, 14/13, s. f.; an inventory of the elector's court, servants, horses was made – reportedly, the total number amounted to 455 people and 565 horses – or of consumed wine, etc.). Only after these ceremonies had been completed was it possible to proceed to the actual negotiations that would be taking-place in the coming days. However the Elector, with his people, did not enjoy the beauty of Laxenburg very much and on 22. 5. he already left for Favorita and then went on to Vienna and Slavkov, where he met Count von Kaunitz. Thanks to the care with which he kept his records, we know that the Elector undertook this journey between 28. 5. and 8. 6. 1683 and exactly how this stay went and also that it was actually only an intermediate stop on the Elector's journey from Vienna to Prague from where he then returned to Bavaria. It should also be noted that Count von Kaunitz was not the only person who cared about the Elector's welfare (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, OmeA, ÄZA, 14/13, fol. 1–4). At the beginning of his journey he was accompanied by Karl Eusebius von Liechtenstein and subsequently by Ferdinand von Dietrichstein. The Elector arrived in Mikulov on 30. 5., he attended Mass, looked at the Loreto and the sacristy and then Dietrichstein arranged a breakfast for him at the Capuchins. The expedition did not stay in Mikulov, however, and already on Monday 31. 5. Kaunitz welcomed the Elector in Slavkov. His day began with a Mass and he lunched and dined with the Count and also attended “Judentanz”. The following day passed in a similar manner and in the afternoon the noble guest visited one of the Prince von Liechtenstein's Palaces (probably it was Bučovice Chateau). On 2. 6. the Elector arrived to Brno and was housed in the
England

Until the end of 1686 Count Dominik Andreas spent his time in negotiations with the Elector in Munich and with the Emperor in Vienna; after that he was offered another opportunity, namely the post of imperial envoy to the English King James II, who was leaning towards the side of his cousin, Louis XIV. Before his departure to London, Count von Kaunitz stopped by in Frankfurt, Düsseldorf and then in The Hague and in Brussels. He arrived in the first mentioned place during the first half of December 1686—what he was examining there was how the King of England likes the idea of a possible alliance and also his attitude to the issue of the Palatine Succession. The Count already arrived...
in Dusseldorf in cca. mid-December, where he attended audiences (public and then private) with the Elector Philipp Wilhelm von der Pfalz and also the Kurprinz Johann Wilhelm, with whom he again discussed the issue of the Palatine Succession and also received instructions in regard to his upcoming stay in England.32

The last stop before travelling to England was in The Hague, where he arrived two days before Christmas 1686 and the Elector Palatine graciously lent him carriages for his journey.33 There he discussed England’s inclinations with the Dutch statesmen, who, however, discouraged him in advance from trying to make an alliance with James II, or with the local imperial resident Daniel Johann Kramprich von Kronfeld, who was also not too optimistic.34 Immediately after his arrival in The Hague, first, however, the Count attended an audience with William III, Prince of Orange (who within just two years would be sitting on the English throne) and presented him the creditive. Though Kaunitz had not expected it their meeting took place in a very pleasant atmosphere; the Prince accepted him graciously and talked with him about the current situation in England.35

The tasks for this mission that were assigned to Count von Kaunitz are mapped in the preserved original of the imperial instruction from the Moravský zemský archiv in Brno and its draft and also the original of the Palatine instruction and points prepared that the Elector of Bavaria might find her in Vienna after his return from his military campaign and spend time with her in his absence (MZA Brno, Rodinný archiv Ditrichštejnů (= RA Ditrichštejnů), Inv. No. 21, sign. 10, Kart. 9, fol. 35–36). Additionally he complains about his health (apparently he was suffering from some problems with his legs and, in his opinion, next summer he would need to visit a spa. He was also assailed by waves of sadness and melancholy) and he is sorry for his old mother, whom he had to leave behind (Maria Eleonore née von Dietrichstein died shortly after his departure: on 20. 3. 1687; the Count informed about this sad event in his letter from 24. 3. 1687 that was addressed to Prince Ferdinand von Dietrichstein (ibidem, fol. 29) and in his letter from 28. 3. to Count Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach (ÖStA Wien, AV A, FA Harrach, Kart. 254/35, s. f.). See also MZA Brno, RA Ditrichštejnů, Inv. No. 1925–48, sign. 867, Kart. 467, fol. 73–76.

33 Kaunitz’ report from 24. 12 1686, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen (= StA), England, Kart. 23, reports from Count von Kaunitz and from the legation secretary Johann Philipp Hoffman, s. f. For providing this and other Kaunitz’ reports from England (or from a journey to England) I thank Jiří Kubeš, who currently intensively examines the activities of diplomats in the service of the Habsburgs on English soil.
34 Kaunitz was supposed to stay in touch with Johann Daniel Kramprich von Kronenfeld, who, during the years 1667–1693 served as the imperial resident in The Hague, not only during his English mission; see below the original and also the draft of imperial instruction. Kramprich’s name appears in a series of publications on Early Modern diplomacy; in regard to his personality, see, for example: Volker JARREN, Europäische Diplomatie im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV. Das Beispiel Johann Daniel Kramprichs von Kronenfeld (1622–1693), Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte 3, 2002, pp. 101–131 and numerous mentions in: Daniel LEGUTKE, Diplomatie als soziale Institution: Brandenburgische, sächsische und kaiserliche Gesandte in Den Haag, 1648–1720, Münster 2010.
35 Kaunitz’ report from 24. 12. 1686, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, England, Kart. 23, s. f.
for Kaunitz by the Elector Palatine Philipp Wilhelm are stored in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna. Not only for the Emperor, but also for the Palatine side, of utmost importance for the defence of their interests and territories was to conclude an alliance with most of the major powers of that time, amongst which England undoubtedly belonged. Therefore in this instance Count von Kaunitz was given full trust and support, because, in the words of the Elector Palatine, “wird herr graff von Kaunitz, von selbsten, nach seiner hohen prudentz, und grossen experientz sich aller circumspection zugebrauchen wissen”.

The Count arrived in London on a fishing boat (since because of the inclement weather he could not negotiate for another one) on the 25th January 1687 via Ghent and Bruges in his pessimistic mood: he thought that all his efforts were already doomed to failure and that in England he would only spend money and waste time. Immediately after his arrival he contacted the imperial legation secretary Hoffman and he also found a common language regarding imperial interests and in the case of the Spanish Netherlands it was with the Spanish envoy, Don Pedro Ronquillo. Their collaboration was very fruitful and their relationship was exceptionally friendly – Kaunitz informed him in advance about his arrival and the next day, after Ronquillo had visited him, Kaunitz had reciprocated his visit; in addition to that, he also stopped by the Swedish and the Palatine ministers.

36 See the original version of the imperial instruction for the mission to England from 11. 10. 1686 in MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2454, sign. III, 90–2, Kart. 273, fol. 1–9; for the draft of this instruction see ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Reichskanzlei (= RK), Instruktionen, Fasz. 6, s. f.; the original of the Palatine instruction for the mission to England from 8. 12. 1686 in MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2453, sign. III, 90–1, Kart. 273, fol. 1–7; the letter of Philipp Wilhelm to the Emperor from 7. 12. 1686 in ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Österreichische Geheime Staatsregistratur, Kart. 106, Fasz. 75, Pars 4, fol. 167–172. Extensive official correspondence that the Count received from the Emperor in regard to his English mission, as well as numerous drafts of Kaunitz’ reports are stored in MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2455, sign. III, 90–3, Kart. 273. In the rich Dietrichstein Family Archive there are also other sources associated with Kaunitz’ mission to England; see, for example: MZA Brno, RA Ditrichštejnů, Inv. No. 21, sign. 10, Kart. 9; ibidem, Inv. No. 1925–48, sign. 867, Kart. 467.


38 Kaunitz’ report from London from 27. 1. 1686, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, England, Kart. 23, s. f.

39 Johann Philipp Hoffman served as the legation secretary in England at several different times: in the years 1685–1687, then during Kaunitz’ mission in 1687, in the years 1687–1691 and 1693–1724, L. BITTNER – L. GROß, Repertorium, pp. 139–140.

40 Don Pedro Ronquillo Briceño (1630–1691) was the Spanish envoy in England, first in the years 1674–1676 and then again between 1679 and 1691; he was also in the service of Emperor Leopold I, however. Count von Kaunitz often mentioned him in his letters; see, for example, the letters to Prince Ferdinand von Dietrichstein: MZA Brno, RA Ditrichštejnů, Inv. No. 1925–48, sign. 867, Kart. 467 or ibidem, Inv. No. 21, sign. 10, Kart. 9. A substantial amount of literature can be found in regard to this interesting Spanish diplomat (also including directly from his pen), for all to see his edited correspondence, for example: Gabriel MAURA GAMAZO (ed.), Correspondencia entre dos
After his arrival Count von Kaunitz should also request an audience; the first audience should be public, covering all the essentials, and ideally should take place in Latin: the Count was supposed to pass-on the imperial creditive and also memorials and to express his greetings and compliments. Due to James II’s inclination towards France, the Count had already been forewarned that the King of England might want to speak French during this audience. The main reason for Kaunitz’ arrival, i.e. negotiations regarding a possible alliance (the Count was to encourage James II to join, if possible immediately, the Augsburg alliance) was addressed during his subsequent private audience with the King of England. Using all possible arguments the Count should convince him that the alliance against France and against the Turks and the preparation of the peace talks in the Hague (which were also promoted by the Pope and by other powers, such as Brandenburg) are necessary – otherwise there is a threat of the destruction of the entire Holy Roman Empire and, after that, also of England. The delicate matter of the Palatine Succession should also be addressed, as has already been mentioned. In addition to the diplomats mentioned above Count von Kaunitz should be able to find an ally in the Queen of England herself, whereby he should also attend an audience and convey a creditive to her; on the other hand he should be very fearful of the numerous pro-French ministers at the English court (and ultimately also of the King’s scepticism). That was why he was advised to keep his correspondence secret. In addition to the not very friendly environment of the English court the Count also had to cope with a local and different confession: although King James II was a convinced Catholic (as also were some of his loyal followers), the majority of the country reacted sharply against “papists”, which the Count could certainly feel too. Therefore, in order to not unnecessarily support any animosity, the Emperor prohibited him from allowing the English to enter his private chapel.

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41 While England did eventually join the Augsburg alliance this did not occur until during the reign of William III, Prince of Orange, see the extensive correspondence between the Emperor and the Count, MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2455, sign. III, 90–3, Kart. 273.

42 For example, on 3. 3. 1687 the Count attended an audience with James II at which they discussed the proposals that had emanated from the French side. MZA Brno, RA Ditrichštejnů, Inv. No. 1925–48, sign. 867, Kart. 467, fol. 18–19.

43 See the sources mentioned in Note 36.

44 “… hingegen aber das exercitium religionis Catholicae und capelam zu haß halten und keine Engeländer darzu admittiren”. The original of the Imperial instruction from 11. 10. 1686, MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2454, sign. III, 90–2, Kart. 273, here fol. 7. This fact, for example, is also mentioned by Jiří HRBEK in Barokní Valdštejnové v Čechách 1640–1740 [The Baroque Waldsteins in Bohemia (1640–1740)], Prague 2013, p. 544. Cf. with the maintenance of the Catholic chapels in Dresden and with the often precarious situations of the Imperial envoys: Jiří KUBEŠ, Kaple císařských vyslanců
In the case of any uncertainty the Count should discuss ceremonial matters (i.e. those that were not specifically addressed in the instructions) in advance with his predecessors, Waldstein and Thun, and also with the legation secretary Hoffman. Thanks to Kaunitz’ detailed report and to the accidentally preserved copy of the postscript of his letter from England the description of his first audience at the local court was preserved. It actually took place shortly after his arrival at noon on the 31st January 1687. Cavalier Cotterell, the Master of the Ceremonies, picked the Count up in a royal carriage that was drawn by six horses and drove him to the palace for an audience – here in the Knights’ Hall – where the King’s musketeers and servants were already waiting. Cotterell escorted Kaunitz to meet the Lord Chamberlain and the Vice-Chamberlain and the Count was obliged to wait until the King had been advised of his presence. Kaunitz was then guided through the gallery to the Royal Bedchamber, where Lord Listfield was already awaiting him, who then escorted him to the King’s antechamber. His Majesty awaited the Count standing with his head uncovered in the presence of his lords, his privy councillors and his chamberlains and he even took a few steps towards Kaunitz. Then the Count, in accordance with the instructions that he had been given, carefully handled the compliments and greetings, to which the King replied very politely, thanking him for the honour, and taking off his hat again whenever the person of the Emperor was mentioned. Everything eventually took place in the French language, which the Count had been warned about in advance.

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45 The Count was to contact Waldstein and Thun, the envoys who, even before his own journey to England, already had a lot of experience from their previous stays in England. Karl Ferdinand von Waldstein (1634–1702) was a distinguished diplomat in imperial service, an expert on English affairs and a Knight of the Golden Fleece, and at that time also the Empress’ Obersthofmeister. He had already during previous years (i.e. 1677–1679) undertaken missions to England and also to Poland (there he helped to negotiate for military aid in the fight against the Turks in the fatal year 1683). Karl Ferdinand is mentioned many times in the book by J. HRBEK, Barokní Valdštejnové, in regard to Waldstein’s diplomatic career (especially to his English mission and the journey to Poland) pp. 526–592; additionally, for example, L. BITTNER – L. GROß, Repertorium, p. 139. Franz Sigmund von Thun (1639–1702), a member of the Knights of Malta, an imperial envoy to England (1680–1685) and also to Poland and later a Field Marshal. See the original of the imperial instruction from 11. 10. 1686, MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2454, sign. III, 90–2, Kart. 273, fol. 1–9 or L. BITTNER – L. GROß, Repertorium, p. 139. Count Thun also served in Bavaria as the imperial envoy, in the interim period between Kaunitz’ missions (in 1687); during the same year he also operated in Saxony and in the years 1687, 1688 and 1689 he was the envoy in Salzburg. Ibidem, pp. 125, 163 and 165.

46 In regard to this especially Kaunitz’ report from 31. 1. 1687, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, England, Kart. 23 and also Kaunitz’ letter from 31. 1. 1687, MZA Brno, RA Ditrichštejnů, Inv. No. 21, sign. 10, Kart. 9, fol. 5. Also see ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, England, Kart. 23 and an undated copy of the postscript of Kaunitz’ letter to the Emperor describing his first audience, MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2357 (III), sign. 77 (2), Kart. 266, fol. 34. Cf. with the ceremony that Count Karl Ferdinand von
This was followed by audiences with both the ruling and the widowed queen and with other members of the Royal Family.\textsuperscript{47} He also spent his time in London visiting or receiving other diplomats, negotiating with royal politics (the most frequently mentioned in his reports is the name of the President of the Privy Council, Robert Spencer, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Earl of Sunderland) and especially waiting for a private audience with the King. He finally received it on the 5\textsuperscript{th} February and using all the arguments he tried to persuade the King to the promise of an alliance. The King, however, was answering his questions rather evasively or in a general manner, which only supported Kaunitz\textquoteright s pessimism and his desire to return home as soon as possible (he thought that he could be replaced by the legation secretary Hoffman and the Spaniard Ronquillo).\textsuperscript{48}

Time passed and the Count failed to achieve either his promise of an alliance with England or his withdrawal from this project; the deaths of little children from within the Royal Family – i.e. the descendants of Princess Anne and Prince George of Denmark – also did not contribute to a good atmosphere.\textsuperscript{49} The Count was also plagued by financial distress and by the knowledge that his efforts are completely unnecessary. His budget was affected, for example, by the moving of the royal court to the summer residence in Windsor, in which, of course, he also participated, by spending on grief due to the death of the Empress Dowager in December of the previous year; the considerable expenses that he also faced for the maintenance of his Catholic chapel and with the time passing also with the general costs of representation (though he stated that he would rather ruin himself than to cause shame to the Emperor in this respect).\textsuperscript{50} The Emperor was not

\textsuperscript{47} The Queen, for example, accepted him on 2. 2. at eight o\'clock in the evening and what he noted about it was that the meeting took a similar course to that of the first audience with the King; Kaunitz\textquoteright s report from 3. 2. 1687, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, England, Kart. 23, s. f.

\textsuperscript{48} Imperial diplomats, including Kaunitz, during their stay at the English court should maintain their prevalence over the other envoys; however, with “good-minded” beings, i.e. supporters of imperial policy, the Count should meet in privacy and not stand on ceremony. Although Kaunitz should seek that his English negotiations take place as far as possible in harmony – at all times and in all dealings (i.e. both public and private, with foreign envoys and also with anyone else, in the chapel and in the public areas). He should follow the requisite decorum, however, if it is not possible otherwise, he was advised to take advantage of any disputes that take place between the English Monarch and Parliament. The fact that between James II and the Parliament there are not overly harmonious relations was generally known and Count Kaunitz also noted that detail, of course; see, specifically the postscript to his letter of 21. 2. 1687 (and many other letters) in MZA Brno, RA Ditrichštejnů, Inv. No. 21, sign. 10, Kart. 9, here fol. 12 or Kaunitz\textquoteright s reports from 7. and 28. 2. 1687, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, England, Kart. 23.

\textsuperscript{49} Kaunitz\textquoteright s reports from 14. and 21. 2. 1687, ibidem.

\textsuperscript{50} See Kaunitz\textquoteright s extensive report full of complaints and moaning about expenditures from 17. 3. 1687 with the attached bill for the establishment of the chapel, for which he spent 49 Pounds Sterling (whereby
moved, however, even by these reasons, nor by his original promise (often cited by the Count) that he would not stay in England longer than six months, nor would the death of Kaunitz’ mother or the Count’s pleading for his withdrawal from the mission in order to be able to get back home and put his affairs in order.\footnote{Kaunitz’ reports from 24. and 28. 3. 1687, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, England, Kart. 23.}

In May 1687, however, a surprising turn-around in the King’s approach occurred, which, for the Count, aroused great hopes. The King began to seek for his presence. He enjoyed talking with him and did everything he could to show him his favour; at the table, for instance, and several times he invited him to the parade and he even invited him to visit his retirada. The reason for this was the temporary cooling of relations between England and France, which Kaunitz, of course, wanted to take advantage of. Which is to say that James II begun to suggest that he would be willing to confirm the alliance with the Emperor, who was now all for ensuring universal peace and organising a congress at which the requisite circumstances for peace would be discussed. Kaunitz’ mission would immediately make sense again (as the Count thought a long gone).\footnote{In regard to this see the reports from 9., 12. and 16. 5. and especially from 19. and 23. 5. 1687 (ibidem).}

Kaunitz was also going to make use of this favourable turnaround in Palatine favour as he promised to the Elector. Unsurprisingly, the Palatine instruction that he received in regard to his journey to England urged him to specifically obtain the support of James II in regard to the thorny issue of the Palatine Succession; hitherto, however, James had shunned conquering the Sun King. Philipp Wilhelm left nothing to chance and in his instruction he analysed the past and the current development of the disputed territory in great detail and also the attitude of the other powers to the Palatine issue, to offer the additional costs for the chapel still accumulated over time), and for mourning clothes and other essentials on the occasion of the death of Empress Dowager Eleonore, which cost him 1,620 guldens (ibidem). Cf. this with Count Alois Thomas Raimund von Harrach’s expenditure on the chapel in Dresden in Saxony. The Count established a new chapel there in 1695, for which he spent 200 guldens while its annual operation cost amounted to an additional 200 guldens. J. KUBEŠ, Kaple císařských vyslanců v Drážďanech, here pp. 147–148.

The reason for this cooling of Anglo-French sympathies may have been the affair about the release of a pamphlet by Huguenot Claude, the protégé of William of Orange, that was seen by some as representing a Protestant manifesto, which could additionally, in the French interest of course, undermine the religious policies of the sworn Catholic James II. In England the pamphlet was burned and James took amiss that Louis XIV did not support him in regard to this matter. The primary factor, however, was the dispute over the issue of the Succession to the English throne. James II tried to enforce the recognition of the succession on behalf his daughter Anna, thereby bypassing his older daughter Maria, who was married to William of Orange. James heard, however, that France, nevertheless intended to support the claim of his older daughter, Maria. The situation during the spring and the summer of 1686 is described in detail by Onno KLOPP in Der Fall de Hauses Stuart und die Succession des Hauses Hannover in Gross-Britannien und Irland, Dritter Band: Die Zeit Jacobs II. von England vom Februar 1685 bis zum März 1688, Wien 1876, here specifically pp. 184–213, etc.
Count something to bite on during the discussions. Also he did not even hesitate to think about the military measures against France and against the Turks that would be necessary. The Palatines hoped that based on his authority and on the good relations that James II had with Louis XIV, he would manage to persuade him to make peace and perhaps even to spare the estates that he was claiming. The Palatine interests, as the Elector thought, coincided with those of the Emperor and as a result they actually served “pro bono publico” and supported the maintenance of peace throughout the entire Empire. The Elector Palatine also thought that an appropriately chosen ally at the English court would help the Count; specifically the already mentioned Spanish envoy.53 All the Count’s and Emperor’s hopes faded, however, after the French response to the promised guarantee of peace talks arrived: as Kaunitz feared the French were demanding too large concessions, to which the Emperor could not possibly agree.54

Despite the fact that most of the time that the Count was in England he was obviously very unhappy, he was also worried, amongst other things, about the amount of the costs involved in regard to which he had no illusions that they would ever be paid-back to him in full. He was therefore anxious to attend his last audience (which took place on the 3rd August and was followed by a private audience and also then by a private audience with the Queen too) and to then return to the continent. Therefore he followed developments on the Old Continent closely while also maintaining a regular correspondence with his friends who passed fresh information on to him, or, even from a distance, oversaw his other interests.55 His foresight had paid off; despite all his efforts he failed to persuade James II to support the Emperor and his allies and he left England in August 1687. On his way back home, he briefed the Elector in Heidelberg about the outcome of his mission.56

53 See the original of the Palatine instruction from 8. 12. 1686 (MZA Brno, RA Kouníčů, Inv. No. 2453, sign III, 90–1, Kart. 273, fol. 1–7), in regard to this see also Philipp Wilhelm’s letter to the Emperor from 7. 12. 1686 (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Österreichische Geheime Staatsregistratur, Kart. 106, Fasz. 75, Pars 4, fol. 167–172). Although he talked to James II about the Palatine issue on several occasions, there was no clear answer from him; see, for example, the report from 30. 5. 1687 in ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Sta, England, Kart. 23.

54 See his reports from 16., 26. or 27. 6. 1687 (ibidem). The French King was not too pleased with the idea of organising a peace congress (which supposedly should be mutually guaranteed by the Habsburg Monarchy, Spain and England) and in return for his helpfulness he asked, for example, for the recognition of the succession of Dauphin children in Spain and he would also like to exchange the French estates in Belgium for different ones. O. KLOPP, Der Fall de Hauses Stuart, especially pp. 184–213.

55 One of them was again Ferdinand von Dietrichstein, who at that time was the Obersthofmeister of Leopold I. The correspondence with him is stored in MZA Brno, RA Ditrichštejnů, Inv. No. 21, sign. 10, Kart. 9; ibidem, Inv. No. 1925–48, sign. 867, Kart. 467.

56 According to L. BITTNER – L. GROß, Repertorium, p. 139, the Count left England on 18. 8. 1687; however, the fact that he would finally be able to leave England is already mentioned in the imperial rescript from 4. 5. (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Sta, England, Kart. 23); in regard to his stop in Heidelberg
Already at the beginning of his stay in England, Count Kaunitz was aware that this was just a temporary situation and that after his return another mission would be awaiting him at the court of the Elector of Bavaria, with whom many issues remained unresolved (especially the signing of the alliance treaty). Almost immediately after his return he set off on his second Bavarian mission, which, in fact, proved to be much more dangerous than his previous duties, while, on the other hand, it was also crucial for the further development of his career.

**Bavaria II**

In the case of this specific mission Kaunitz’ main task was to monitor and especially to support the election of the Cologne coadjutor, i.e. the successor to the still living but weak and ill archbishop Maximilian Heinrich of Bavaria (1621–1688). Both the causes

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57 Ibidem, fol. 70–71, 78, 82–83. See mentions of his longed-for return home in almost every letter written to his friend, Ferdinand von Dietrichstein (ibidem). In regard to the last audience and the postponing of its date ibidem, fol. 72, 75, 76, 79 and also Kaunitz’ reports from 26. 6., 28. 7., 1. 8., 4. 8. and 12. 8. 1687 (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA, England, Kart. 23).

58 The electing of the coadjutors (the archbishops), i.e. their successors in office, who were selected during the lifetime of the existing dignitaries, was quite frequent during the 17th and the 18th centuries. A series of requirements was imposed on the candidate; in addition to his reputation and his relevant education (ideally he should be a doctor of theology or a doctor of canon law and also an ordained priest), another important factor was also the age of the applicant, who usually should not be less than 30 years old, while subsequently the minimum age was stabilised at 35. These conditions could be circumvented, however, especially when the appointment of the candidate as an (arch)bishop had been suggested by the Pope himself. The actual election took place in the chapter, whereby the candidate needed to obtain at least two thirds out of the total number of 24 votes. A newly elected (arch)bishop then also had to be confirmed in office by the Holy Father. The ruler or his deputy could also participate in the election as an assessor. In the case of the Emperor it was therefore an imperial electoral commissioner – often a diplomat – who also performed other diplomatic duties at the same place and who was also familiar with canon law and a strict protocol. Other sovereigns, e.g. the Elector of Bavaria, could also send their own electoral commissioners. The two commissioners could work together, but their rivalry and their quarrels were frequent rather than exceptional. Rainald BECKER, *Bischofsernennung (Mittelalter/Frühe Neuzeit)*, in: Historisches Lexikon Bayerns, available on-line at URL: <http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/Lexikon/Bischofsernennung_(Mittelalter/Frühe Neuzeit)> [cit. 28. 10. 2016] and also Helmut FLACHENECKER, *Wittelsbachische Kirchenpolitik in der Frühen Neuzeit. Beobachtungen zur Funktion bayerischer Wahlkommissare bei Bischofswahlen*, in: Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte 56, 1993, pp. 299–316, here especially pp. 304–316, available on-line at URL: <http://periodika-digitale-sammlungen.de/zblg/kapitel/zblg56_kap15>. In regard to the
and the consequences of this election essentially represented the next steps in regard to the distribution of the spheres of influence between France and the Habsburg Monarchy. There is no doubt that this was really a key issue; fortunately, due to the large number of extant sources we do have sufficient information about this election. The election of a coadjutor in Cologne started to be addressed well in advance. The reasons for this were both the declining health of the Elector at that time and also concerns about the impact that one of his potential successors, the dedicated pro-French candidate, Cardinal Willhelm Egon von Fürstenberg (1629–1704) could have on him. Thereby the Emperor became even more committed to the fickle Elector of Bavaria but nevertheless, when he was in Cologne, he had decided to support the election of his younger brother, Prince Joseph Clement (1671–1723). Therefore one of Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz’ first

Bavarian mission of Count von Kaunitz during the years 1687–1688 see also: L. MARŠÁLKOVÁ, Bavorská mise Dominika Ondřeje z Kounic v letech 1687–1688 and also M. BRAUBACH, Graf Dominik Andreas Kaunitz, especially pp. 227–232, in regard to the Cologne election pp. 229–231.

Instructions, rescripts and other documents (both originals and copies) related to the election are preserved in MZA Brno, in Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München (= BayHStA München) or in HHStA, and they are actually quite extensive; the author of some of the instructions is not the Emperor, but the Electors of Bavaria and Palatine. See MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 1–102 (imperial instructions from 14. 11. and 13. 12. 1687, 23. 6., 24. 6. and 26. 6. 1688, 8. 8. and 13. 9. 1688 and the instructions from the Elector of Bavaria from 14. 9. 1687 and 7. 12. 1687); two additional instructions (from 26. 3. and 31. 10. 1688) in regard to Kaunitz’ mission to Bavaria can be found ibidem, Inv. No. 2587, sign. 117 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 1–20. The first folder (ibidem, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 1–102) also comprises the Emperor’s letters or creditives to the different stakeholders from 16. 6., 19. 6., 23. 6., 25. 6. and 26. 6. 1688. The additional creditive that comes from 4. 11. 1688 is in the form of a draft that is stored in ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 107, Fasz. 76, Pars 2, fol. 179–180. Drafts of instructions can also be found in ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Instruktionen, Fasz. 6, s. f. In all the above archives we can of course also find other types of documents, especially extensive correspondence.

Prince Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg (1629–1704), the Prince-Bishop of Strasbourg (since 1682), a Cardinal (since 1686) and the Abbot of Saint-Germain-des-Prés during the years 1657 and 1658 was an envoy of Cologne during the election of Leopold I as an Emperor, but already at that time he was working as an agent on behalf of Louis XIV. See Erwin GATZ – Stephan M. JANKER (Hg.), Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches 1648 bis 1803. Ein biographisches Lexikon, Berlin 1990, pp. 141–143 or, for example, L. HÜTTL, Max Emanuel, pp. 171–174, 191.

In the period of the fight for Cologne, Maximilian II Emanuel was well aware that the conditions under which he was negotiating the election of his younger brother were far from ideal. Above all, he had to admit that Joseph Clement did not meet the basic requirements of the future Elector of Cologne: Prince had not yet received his priestly ordination, and especially he was too young for this function (for these reasons it was later necessary to obtain permission from the Pope). The counterparty at the Bavarian court represented by Marquis Louis Hector Villars (1653–1734), a French diplomat and Marshal, additionally spread rumours that the Prince manifests considerable reluctance to the sacred spiritual state – although the Elector dismissed these allegations, it is possible that there was a grain of truth. L. HÜTTL, Max Emanuel, pp. 171–174. In regard to Villars see frequent mentions ibidem or for example his published memoires: Mémoires du duc de Villars, pair de France, Maréchal général des armées de S. M. T. C, I–III, The Hague 1734–1736. While Kaunitz met Villars several times, their
tasks – immediately after his return from England – was to not only to try to win-over the still living Cologne Elector Maximilian Heinrich and to obtain his support for the forthcoming election of his successor, but also to achieve a stronger attachment both to the Elector of Bavaria and to the Habsburgs.\(^{62}\) Despite the considerable empathy that Maximilian Emanuel had with France, he did not perceive the concept that the Cologne throne should be denied to his brother enthusiastically. That in fact greatly facilitated the work of Count von Kaunitz and the Elector additionally promised him that if everything went according to plan, both his willingness and his assistance would be richly rewarded.\(^{63}\) The fact that it was not only his loyalty to imperial and Bavarian matters that was behind Count von Kaunitz’ efforts, but also his own purely private interests, is evidenced from the Bavarian archives in Munich by certain sources. The Count asked Provostry of Altötting for one of his sons and the Elector fully supported his efforts and, thanks to his advice and in return for his services and his influence, Kaunitz’ wishes were listened to.\(^{64}\)

The Count arrived to Munich at the end of 1687 (probably on the 19\(^{th}\) December) and was housed directly at the court; later, however, since the beginning of 1688, the Count lived at the house of Jean Chateauneuf, whose services he used in the coming years several times.\(^{65}\) Since Kaunitz represented the Emperor, he was treated respectively – upon his arrival an honour guard apparently stood everywhere and the Elector’s Obersthofmeister accompanied him from his coach all way to his apartment. He did not have to wait long for his first audience: he received it on the 20\(^{th}\) December at eight o’clock in the morning and was again accompanied by the Obersthofmeister and other officials. The Oberststallmeister joined them in the gallery, who apparently represented the absent Obersthofmarschall, and at the doorway to the Ritterstuben he sent Kaunitz ahead to the Oberstkämmerer to

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\(^{62}\) The Plenipotenz for dealing with Maximilian II Emanuel from 26. 3. 1688 is stored in MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2589 (3), sign. 117 (3), Kart. 285, fol. 1.


\(^{65}\) BayHStA München, Abteilung I, Personenselekt Kart. 168, Kaunitz, s. f.
meet Count Ferdinand von Fürsten. The latter finally escorted him into the antechamber and into the presence of the Elector himself for the audience. There the negotiations, for which the Count had arrived, immediately took place, and (as instructed) he presented the Emperor’s wishes.66

Count von Kaunitz began to travel between the two electoral courts (Cologne and Munich) and tried to get the two parties to the agreement; apparently during one of the private audiences he presented to Maximilian Heinrich the Emperor’s and the Elector’s good intentions and concern for the future welfare of the Cologne See.67 The whole Empire intently watched the negotiations: the Elector Palatine with his sons, headed by Franz Ludwig, Bishop of Wrocław, also arrived to Cologne, for example, to support the election of the Bavarian Prince. Kaunitz’ task, therefore, was not only lobbying for Joseph Clement, but also the monitoring of the situation and providing information to the Emperor and to Bavaria and Palatine and to process on the basis of agreement between all these parties who were very well aware of the branched flow of information.68

Contacts that the Count made in Bavaria in previous years now became very handy:69 a very fruitful proved to be particularly the cooperation with the Bavarian envoy, Baron

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66 The copy of the Kaunitz’ report to the Emperor from 20. 12. 1687 (ibidem, Abteilung I, Kasten blau 14/13, s. f.). For comparison, see the work of Henriette Graf, who provides a description of the ceremony, which Count Tarini experienced at the Munich court: after he arrived in Munich, he even had to find accommodation, send his credentials to the Oberstkämmerer and discuss with him the date of the first audience. Then a carriage was sent for him drawn by six horses, in which the envoy arrived to the broad stairs. From there he was escorted to the first antechamber (or maybe the Ritterstuben) and to a newly constructed Alexanderzimmer where an honour guard was standing. He spent some time in the antechamber and then continued into the audience room. Here under the canopy the Elector was waiting, who greeted the envoy by taking off his hat. After the envoy delivered his speech, his way from the audience room was the same, but in a reverse order. The purpose of the envoy’s visit was addressed during a private audience (or audiences). In regard to ceremonies in the period of Maximilian II Emanuel see more in: Henriette GRAF, Die Residenz in München. Hofzeremoniell, Innenräume und Möblierung von Kurfürst Maximilian I. bis Kaiser Karl VII., München 2002, especially pp. 70–144, here p. 120.

67 Obtaining the Cologne archbishopric is actually presented in the Elector’s instructions as a matter of fundamental importance and this impression is also supported by referring to it in the text as the “gem of the whole Empire”. See the Elector’s instructions for Count von Kaunitz from 14. 9. 1687 and 7. 12. 1687 (MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, here fol. 42–48 and fol. 49–58) and the imperial instruction from 14. 11. 1687 (ibidem, fol. 81–88).

68 The Elector’s instructions for Count von Kaunitz from 14. 9. and 7. 12. 1687 (ibidem, fol. 42–48 and 49–58) or the imperial instruction from 13. 12. 1687 (ibidem, fol. 28–34). During his second Bavarian stay, Count von Kaunitz visited Palatinate court several times – always with the confirmation of mutual support and sympathy; see, for example, Philipp Wilhelm’s letter to the Emperor from 24. 11. 1688 or Kaunitz’ letter from 30. 11. 1688. See ÖStA Wien, HHSTA, ÖGSR, Kart. 107, Fasz. 76, Pars 2, fol. 185–186 and 187–188.

69 Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz, of course, was not the only imperial envoy; his activities were complemented by the activities of many other envoys and secret agents, some of whom are mentioned...
Johann Friedrich Karg von Bebenburg, who was also moving between Cologne and Bonn, one of the residences of the Cologne Electors. The cooperation of these two gentlemen was so narrow that they were both familiar with the wording of instructions that they individually received from the Elector and they could therefore act in concert and be helpful for each other (if it was not been possible for both of them to stay in Cologne, at least one of them should expeditiously arrive there to not leave the situation without any supervision).

Based on imperial orders Count von Kaunitz found himself at the centre of the action: the creditives that he received authorised him to negotiate with all of the electoral courts and also with the Electors of Bavaria and Palatine. He also attended the actual electoral assembly, where he was to stretch all his forces and convince the Electors about Prince Joseph Clement’s suitability. Despite these extensive powers that were entrusted to the
Count, he needed to strive again to ensure that, if possible, all the negotiations took place smoothly, without any scandals or squabbles and he should be prepared to counteract any personal sympathies or antipathies and, on the contrary he should strive to ensure the most favourable representation of the Imperial Majesty.\textsuperscript{75} The Count should also slowly start, with all due discretion, preparing for the eventual withdrawal of Fürstenberg from the election and he should assist him to obtain the Bishopric of Luttych, whose superior at that time was still Maximilian Heinrich of Bavaria.\textsuperscript{76}

With the advent of 1688, however, all the efforts of the imperial diplomats proved futile: Maximilian Heinrich (with substantial support from France) appointed Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg as his successor and the Chapter affirmed his nomination on the 7\textsuperscript{th} January.\textsuperscript{77} Emperor Leopold refused to accept it however, and even Pope Innocent XI enable him to function until such a time that the Prince reaches the required age and also that, in the meantime, his negotiators will achieve a sufficient number of votes in the Chapter (i.e. at least two thirds of the total number of 24). Both the imperial side and the Bavarian side were thereby relying on the adjournment or at least the delaying of the election and also counting that they would be able use this time to obtain the Papal approval, without which it was not possible to occupy the See. Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{75} The imperial instruction from 14. 11. 1687 (MZA Brno, RA Kouníčů, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 67–78). Even Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz himself was not spared from ceremonial disputes, however. For example in the extensive report to the Emperor from 16. 11. 1688 he complained about the conduct of the Florentine envoy to the Bavarian court, who had come there to negotiate the terms for the marriage of the Elector's sister Violanta Beatrix to Ferdinand, the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Apparently the envoy acted superciliously to one-and-all, which the Count perceived as representing unforgivable insolence: he was very much attached to his privileged position, which, as an emissary of the Emperor himself, belonged to him by right and he was not going to accept any reproaches (neither his own nor the Emperor's). Later, for the occasion of this Tuscan wedding, Count of Kaunitz was going to purchase a gala suit and additionally livery for his servants in the amount of 1,000 guldens. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 106, Fasz. 75, Pars 4, fol. 93–94 and 186–187.

\textsuperscript{76} The imperial instruction from 14. 11. 1687 (MZA Brno, RA Kouníčů, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 81–88). Eventually Prince von Fürstenberg did not obtain the Bishopric of Luttych: after the death of Maximilian Heinrich its management was assigned to Johann Ludwig von Elderen (1620–1694) and when he also died a few years later, Fürstenberg's old enemy Joseph Clement of Bavaria who at that time was already the Elector of Cologne, also became the Bishop of Luttych. In regard to Johann Ludwig von Elderen see: Ernst Heinrich KNESCHKE, \textit{Neues Allgemeines Adelslexikon}, Bd. 7, Leipzig 1867, p. 455. See more about Fürstenberg's futile struggle for Luttych in 1694 and the difficulties of organising elections at that time, during which the Bavarian Elector Maximilian Emanuel intervened in favour of his brother in: \textit{Theatrum Europaeum XIV./I.}, Frankfurt am Main 1702, here especially pp. 653–660. Also the election there took place by voting in the Chapter and the future Bishop had to obtain at least two-thirds of the 24 votes; in general, in regard to elections, see Note 58.

\textsuperscript{77} In regard to this see Kaunitz' correspondence with the Elector Palatine: setting the date and the last pre-election meetings and the actual election of Cardinal Fürstenberg were all very obviously carefully monitored. See the relevant letters, especially those from December 1687 and January 1688. BayHStA München, Abteilung I, Kasten blau 14/13, s. f. It behoves mention that according to Palatine correspondence Count von Kaunitz was ill at this time, but he still fulfilled his duties conscientiously and reliably. He stated, for example, that he is very “matt” and has “Kopffwehe”; Kaunitz' letter to the Elector Palatine from 29. 11. 1687, ibidem.
was not in a big hurry to confirm this choice. A few months later (on the 6th June) the old Elector Maximilian Heinrich died and in accordance with Canon Law it was necessary to choose his successor again, because the Pope had failed to confirm the previous election. The dispute concerning the Cologne See therefore erupted again with unprecedented force. Fürstenberg, who at that time moved between Cologne and Bonn, began to fortify Bonn with intensive support from France and in this manner to prepare for a new conflict.

Therefore Count von Kaunitz’ mission did not also end during the second election in which he was to act as the main imperial envoy and to whom the other diplomats were subject (for example Baron Christian von Eck und Heugersbach from Luttych). The instructions that were issued in the course of 1688 were reflecting the disappointment that was felt about the current developments. The imperial party therefore had to strive for the early implementation of a new election and also for securing votes for the Bavarian Prince. The date of the second election was eventually established for the 19th of July and therefore the negotiators did not have a lot of time. Additionally it was necessary

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78 However, Max Braubach already provided, as the date of death of Maximilian Heinrich, 4. 6. See M. BRAUBACH, Graf Dominik Andreas Kaunitz, here p. 230 (in regard to the Cologne election see pp. 229–231).
80 Count von Kaunitz’ activities during that time are recorded, for example, in his correspondence with the Elector Palatine, which is stored in a rich archive in Munich. At the beginning of 1688 the Count stayed in Cologne or Munich, while he spent February and March in Vienna, where he passed-on to the Emperor information that had not yet been discovered while he was preparing for another journey. In May, he left Vienna again for Munich, where he stayed until about mid-June; then he returned again briefly to Vienna to discuss with the Emperor and obtain further instructions and at the end of June he set off again on another journey – this time he stayed mainly in Cologne, but he also visited other electoral courts. In the autumn of 1688 (probably during early September) Kaunitz returned to Vienna again and then in November he returned to Munich, where he usually stayed until April of the upcoming year (with a few exceptions, of course: for example his letter to the Emperor from 17. 1. 1689 was drawn in Augsburg, from 20. 1. 1689 in Vienna and from 25. 1. in Vaihingen an der Enz: ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 106, Fasz. 75, Pars 4, fol. 1–221). Also see: BayHStA München, Abteilung I, Kasten blau 14/13, s. f.
81 Baron Christian von Eck und Heugersbach (1645–1706) is mentioned in the imperial instruction dating from 26. 6. 1688 (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 106, Fasz. 75, Pars 4, fol. 1–2) and in the imperial instruction dating from 13. 9. 1688 (MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 20–24). He is mentioned as an envoy to Cologne as of the year 1688 and then again in 1693 in L. BITTNER – L. GROß, Repertorium, p. 146; also in regard to him: J. H. ZEDLER, Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexikon, Bd. 8, col. 133.
82 See the imperial instruction from 13. 9. 1688 (MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 20–24). The Emperor tried to influence the Electors not only through his envoys, but of course he also used handwritten letters – see, for example, a copy of one such letter designated for the courts of Mainz, Trier, Bavaria, Palatine, Brandenburg and Saxony dating from 16. 6. 1688 (ibidem, fol. 11–12). Additionally see the copy of the Emperor’s letter to the Chapter from 25. 6. 1688 (ibidem, fol. 6–10).
to consider the fact that this time there might be some problems on the part of Rome; although the Pope continued to support Joseph Clement there were only a few weeks left for ensuring that all the requirements were fulfilled; the Holy Father also began to fear that the case of the election of the Archbishop of Cologne might become a precedent for future elections.\footnote{The Pope – according to Kaunitz’ letter to the Elector Palatine – commented that this election may serve as “\textit{pro exemplo in futurum}” and that therefore nothing should be rushed. BayHStA München, Abteilung I, Kasten blau 14/13, s. f. Additionally also: a secret imperial instruction from 23. 6. 1688, MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 91–101.}

Even now, Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz could rely on co-operating with the Bavarian envoy Baron Karg and also with the Palatinate side. The aforementioned Baron von Eck additionally operated there as a secret diplomat (or perhaps rather as an agent), who should not enjoy any public honours (these were intended only for Kaunitz as the main envoy), but should work as an informant for the Emperor and the Count von Kaunitz, to whom he should always provide a copy of the letter to the Emperor.\footnote{See the \textit{credenz schreiben} for Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz from 23. 6. 1688, which was intended for the Elector Palatine (ibidem, fol. 13) or the copy of the Emperor’s letter to the Chapter from 25. 6. 1688 (ibidem, fol. 6–10).} After the Count had learnt all the useful information he was required to officially present himself to the Chapter as an imperial envoy and to express his deepest condolence regarding the death of the former elector. Then he was required to pass-on his credentials to the members of the Chapter and to await whatever opinion the Pope would adopt, which somewhat hampered Count von Kaunitz.\footnote{Even before his official introduction to the Chapter the Count was required to visit the local dean, who, at that time, was Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg (he should visit him immediately – even without due pomp), and only afterwards could a public audience follow. Ibidem, fol. 6–10.}

Equally (if not more) important at this time therefore appeared to be Kaunitz’ unofficial activity as was evidenced by the secret instruction from the end of June 1688,\footnote{A secret imperial instruction from 23. 6. 1688 (MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 91–101). Information regarding the identification of suitable persons who would support the election of Joseph Clement is already listed in a copy of Kaunitz’ report to the Emperor (ibidem, Inv. No. 2598, sign. III, 119 (2), Kart. 285, fol. 1–5).} namely the re-securing of the votes for Joseph Clement.\footnote{The Emperor advised Count von Kaunitz to carry-out private visits with relevant persons and also to monitor the behaviour of Prince Joseph Clement and to report about everything that took place. Apparently some secret negotiations took place in the Cologne apartment of the Bishop of Wrocław where Count von Kaunitz, Baron Karg and other diplomats were designated to meet him. See the copy of Kaunitz’ report to the Emperor from 25. 12. 1688, BayHStA München, Abteilung I, Kasten blau 14/13, s. f.} Electors, or those who could significantly influence the election in a different manner, he should approach with an offer of significant sums, prestigious offices for them and their relatives, various other benefits and privileges.
and, of course, imperial grace and gratitude;\textsuperscript{88} the costs should be paid from the funds that flowed-in from the United Provinces.\textsuperscript{89}

The most frequently occurring attraction was undoubtedly represented by the prestigious offices from which adequate security flowed, whether for the electors and their relatives or for those entities who were influencing the successful course of the election from a distance. The Count therefore promised Count Philipp Karl von Fürstenberg-Möskirch a position in the Reichshofrat and the Chamberlain’s key. Count Hohenzollern,\textsuperscript{90} whose passion was hunting and everything associated with it, should be supported for obtaining the Office of the Oberstjägermeister. Also those who wanted a prestigious military function for themselves or for a family member, such as Count von Salm\textsuperscript{91} and the Prince of Croÿ\textsuperscript{92} should get their own. Another kind of motivation was the sums of money that were promised (as we saw above in the case of Count von Salm), or the attractive land that could be offered, as was the case with Johann Heinrich von Anethan.\textsuperscript{93}

Of course all those involved could also count on undying imperial favour, gratitude and support for their interests, which was the capital that could certainly be very beneficial in the future.

Despite the abovementioned tempting offers up till the date of the new elections imperial and Bavarian diplomacy only succeeded in providing nine votes for Joseph Clement out of a total number of 24. 13 electors voted for Fürstenberg; however, this

\textsuperscript{88} The bribing of Electors (albeit indirectly or allusively – and without providing specific names) has already been mentioned in Kaunitz letters since the end of 1687 (i.e. a copy of Kaunitz’ report to the Emperor from 25. 12. 1687, ibidem).

\textsuperscript{89} See the imperial rescript from 13. 9. 1688, MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 20–24.

\textsuperscript{90} The identity of this count has not yet been verified, nor whether he is actually a spiritual or a secular person. Theoretically, Count Herman Friedrich von Hohenzollern-Hechingen (1665–1733) could still come under consideration; see: Rudolf Graf von STILLFRIED-ALCÁNTARA, Beschreibung und Geschichte der Burg nebst Forschungen über den Urtstamm der Grafen von Zollern, Nürnberg 1870, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{91} Unfortunately it is not entirely clear who he actually was – in Kaunitz’ letters from the following years Count Paris von Salm is mentioned (i.e. the Canon in Salzburg, Passau and Olomouc) and it is therefore possible that he was also in contact with him during the course of his Bavarian mission; see: ÖStA Wien, AVA, FA Harrach, Kart. 254/35, s. f., Kaunitz’ letter to Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach out of 16. 5. 1689.

\textsuperscript{92} Most likely Philipp Heinrich, the Canon in Wroclaw and Cologne. J. H. ZEDLER, Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexikon, Bd. 6, col. 1738 or Jakob Christoph BECK – Jakob Christoph ISELIN – August Johann BURTORFF, Neu-vermehrtes Historisch- und Geographisches Allgemeines Lexicon…. Bi-C, 1742, p. 979.

\textsuperscript{93} Johann Heinrich von Anethan (1628–1693), during the years 1680–1693 an Auxiliary Bishop and the Vicar General in Cologne; during the Cologne election he actually voted for Joseph Clement and after his election he was commissioned by the Pope with the temporary administration of the Cologne See (owing to the low age of the Prince). For more about him see: E. GATZ – S. M. JANKER (Hg.), Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches, p. 12.
was not enough to elect him – he did not obtain a two-thirds majority and therefore, in accordance with Canon Law his rival was elected, i.e. our already well-known Bavarian Prince.\footnote{Of course the election was also mentioned in other sources, for example in Kaunitz’ Palatine correspondence (there specifically the letter from 28. 7. 1688 and also an undated copy of a letter – probably from a similar period). BayHStA München, Abteilung I, Kasten blau 14/13, s. f. Celebratory Latin prints about the election are stored ibidem. Also in regard to this see: M. Braubach, Graf Dominik Andreas Kaunitz, here p. 230 (in regard to the Cologne election pp. 229–231). How the two remaining electors voted has not yet been determined.} Even then not everything had yet been completely won over: the negotiations with Pope Innocent XI (or with his commissioner, Cardinal *Protector Germaniae* Carlo Pio di Savoia) became somewhat stretched.\footnote{In his letters the Emperor understandably also turned to the Pope in order to persuade him to approve the election of Joseph Clement as quickly as possible. See a copy of the Emperor’s letter to the Pope from 26. 7. 1688, MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 3. The helplessness of all the stakeholders while they were awaiting the Pope’s decision is also vividly illustrated in other sources, such as the Count’s correspondence with the Elector Palatine. BayHStA München, Abteilung I, Kasten blau 14/13, s. f.} Also now Kaunitz watched over everything and in this case cooperated with Baron Karg, who even went to Rome to personally move the Pope to make the decisions and to keep the pro-Emperor party directly informed right from the centre of the negotiations.\footnote{The imperial rescript from 8. 8. 1688, MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 38–40.} Both the imperial and the Bavarian efforts were eventually crowned with success: the Pope spoke favourably in regard to the election and on the 20th September 1688 he confirmed it; the ceremonial proclamation took place in Cologne Cathedral on the 11th of October.\footnote{See the Latin prints that were published on the occasion of the election (MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2605, sign. III, 119–9, Kart. 285, fol. 1–15) or, for example, sincere thanks for the support that the new Elector of Cologne sent to the Emperor in his letter from 16. 11. 1688 (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 107, Fasz. 76, Pars 2, fol. 183–184).}

Cardinal von Fürstenberg was not about to give up his claims, however, so he gathered his followers and sought to prevent Prince Joseph Clement from taking office by military force, which France had provided for him. An important Kaunitz’ task during the autumn and winter of 1688 and at the beginning of the following year was therefore searching for a military aid, negotiations with representatives of the City of Cologne,\footnote{The Count was already busy in the summer of 1688 discussing his reflections regarding negotiations with representatives of the City of Cologne in his letters to the Elector Palatine (ibidem). See also the letters from the City of Cologne in 1688 to Emperor Leopold (MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2601, sign. III, 119–5, Kart. 285, fol. 1–12) and the letter from the City of Cologne to Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz (ibidem, Inv. No. 2602, sign. III, 119–6, Kart. 285, fol. 1–8).} which the Cardinal plunged into the hands of France, negotiations with all the parties and slow preparation of the ground for his successor to the post of imperial diplomat in Bavaria.
At that time Baron Christian von Eck und Heugersbach, with whom Kaunitz worked previously and who was proficient in regard to the local conditions, was considered.99

The Cologne election was not the only task that the Count should deal with at the turn of 1687–1688. Equally important was the long-anticipated conclusion of the treaty of alliance, which the outcome of the election should also help,100 and finding the information about the French and Turkish armies and their progress and negotiations on military aid (military affairs and concerns of the French and Turkish threats indeed intertwine almost all available sources). The Emperor was well aware of intensive preparations for the clash of the two opposing camps and also of poor status of his troops, which suffered heavy losses and moreover were decimated by the weather; so to avoid fight of the Monarchy on two fronts, the Emperor wished at the time of the election to conclude a truce with France (with the preservation of the status quo); the power of attorney to negotiate the truce was awarded to Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz.101

Another of Kaunitz’ key tasks in Bavaria was to secure support of Maximilian Emanuel in regard to upcoming election of the Emperor’s elder son Joseph as the King of Romans (or he should dissuade the Elector in regard to his ambitions, if by chance he would consider running).102 Additionally Kaunitz was endowed with power of attorney103 to negotiate Joseph’s marriage to the Elector of Bavaria’s younger sister Violanta Beatrix. This marriage, however, was conditional on Maximilian II Emanuel giving his vote to Joseph and nobody else during the election of the Roman King.104 In this case the Emperor (in his own words) granted Kaunitz an extraordinary trust and full power to decide as he deemed appropriate: should be a marriage contract or a wedding present, all negotiations and conclusions he was to kept secret and any agreement was to bear, amongst others,

99 The imperial instruction from 13. 9. 1688, MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2597, sign. 119 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 20–24. Baron Eck was also in contact with the Bavarian envoy, Baron Karg, as evidenced by Kaunitz’ correspondence with the Elector Palatine (specifically, for example, the letters from 8. or 21. 8. 1688). BayHStA München, Abteilung I, Kasten blau 14/13, s. f.
100 A treaty of alliance between the Emperor and the Bavarian Elector was eventually concluded on 4. 5. 1689—in regard to this see: L. HÜTTL, Max Emanuel, pp. 195–196. Already in December 1688, however, letters of the Elector Palatine to Count von Kaunitz talk about the need for concluding an alliance between the Emperor, the Elector of Bavaria and the Elector Palatine (e.g. a copy of the letter from 7. 12. 1688, BayHStA München, Abteilung I, Kasten blau 14/13, s. f.). Additionally see the draft of points for Kaunitz in regard to an alliance with Bavaria (MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2588 (3), sign. 117 (2), Kart. 285, fol. 4–7) and a proposal for an alliance between the Emperor and the Bavarian Elector (ibidem, Inv. No. 2595 (3), sign. 119 (9), Kart. 285).
101 See L. MARŠÁLKOVÁ, Dvě instrukce pro Dominika Ondřeje z Kounic.
102 In regard to the support for the election of Joseph (I) as the King of Rome briefly ibidem.
103 The Plenipotenz from 26. 3. 1688 for negotiations of Count von Kaunitz regarding the marriage of Joseph (I) to Violanta Beatrix is stored in MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2588 (3), sign. 117 (2), Kart. 285, fol. 2.
104 See the imperial instruction from 31. 10. 1688, ibidem, Inv. No. 2587, sign. 117 (1), Kart. 285, fol. 1–7.
also his signature.  

At the turn of the years 1688–1689, i.e. at the time when the Nine-Years War or the War of the Palatine Succession erupted, Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz’ second Bavarian mission was slowly coming to an end. Almost all targets and tasks, which the Count should achieve in Bavaria, were met (although some only temporarily). Elector Maximilian II Emanuel after a long hesitation set off to Hungary, where, as Commander-in-Chief of the Christian armies, he took part in the famous victory near Belgrade. The demanding Cologne election also did eventually end exactly as the anti-French faction led by Emperor Leopold I imagined. Bavarian Prince Joseph Clement was elected to the Cologne See, which, however, was “the last straw” for Louis XIV: when he failed to dominate Cologne electorate through a legitimately elected Archbishop he resorted to a military solution. In this he was relying on the Emperor’s preoccupation with the struggle against the Turks. In September 1688, French troops invaded Rhineland and occupied a series of imperial cities, such as Philipsburg, Mainz and Cologne. Attacks against his own brother sponsored by France for some time considerably cooled the Elector of Bavaria’s sympathy to the Sun King and therefore long negotiations about an alliance with Bavaria brought its fruit, which was a long prepared alliance treaty from the 4th of May 1689.

105 For the negotiations of marriage, see the points dedicated to Kaunitz (without dating), ibidem, fol. 9–14.
106 Count von Kaunitz had to wait for his return home (despite his numerous pleas for release) until April 1689 (see ÖStA Wien, HHStA, ÖGSR, Kart. 106, Fasz. 75, Pars 4, fol. 1–221). One of the triggers of the war (known as the Nine-Years War, the War of the Augsburg League or of Grand Alliance) was the death of the forerunner of the current Elector Palatine Karl II (1651–1685), the last male member of the Protestant-Reformed Wittelsbach branch of the Pfalz-Simmern. After his death, the Catholic line of the Pfalz-Neuburg family took over the reign. The war broke up in 1688 and lasted until 1697, its first signs, however, could be seen already in 1685 or 1686 (i.e. at a time when Kaunitz was preparing for his English mission and for speaking in London not only in favour of the Emperor but also the Elector Palatine). After concluding the Nijmegen Peace Treaty in 1678 and after the Wars of Reunions in the years 1683–1684, Louis XIV (although he agreed to the terms of the long-prepared armistice signed in Regensburg in 1686) was looking for a new target. This time he found it in Rhineland Palatinate. The spark that ignited the fire was the forthcoming election of the new Elector of Cologne in the years 1687–1688. The horrors of war brought to an anti-French camp a number of existing Louis’ allies, including the Elector of Bavaria, and an Alliance of Augsburg was formed against France. The situation began to turn around in 1694: the reason was the unfavourable economic situation and the great famine, which affected parts of Europe, especially the French territories, and also the death of one of the ablest French generals, Marshal Luxembourg. Peace negotiations were launched by a separate peace with France entered into by the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus; in May the following year in the palace of William III of Orange in Rijswick peace talks were commenced. After difficult and lengthy negotiations, on 20. 9. 1697 (or on 30. 10. – between Louis XIV and Leopold I) a peace treaty was finally concluded, whereby the situation should return to the period after concluding the peace of Nijmegen. The person who had the greatest benefit from the war was probably William III of Orange, because Louis XIV finally recognised him as the legitimate King of England and, moreover, pledged
Passau

Although after his exhausting Bavarian mission Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz might like to indulge in peace and quiet to be able to organise his affairs at home, he was not vouchsafe to do so. Already during the last months of his stay in Bavaria he knew where his next steps would lead him. This is to say that he capitalised the experience that he gained in regard to the Cologne election during his next mission. After a short stay at home the next task was already awaiting him, namely the election of the Bishop of Passau, where on the 16th March 1689 the then Bishop Count Sebastian von Pötting, the Emperor’s favourite diplomat, died, for whom it was necessary (with regard to the next planned election, this time in Mainz) to find a suitable replacement. The aristocratic society, however, was aware of the Bishop’s frail health already some time before his death. Count von Kaunitz also was aware of these news and in January 1689, still during his mission in Munich and Cologne, he was thinking that in Passau a new election would have to be taken, in which he would – after considering the impact of another (as hoped successful) mission – he would like to participate as an imperial envoy. The Count in addition hoping that Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach could intercede for his appointment to Passau, who most likely did so and later supported the Count during his mission and


108 The Bishop apparently died early in the morning, between two and three o’clock, as the Emperor was the next day informed by the Chapter. The letter from 17. 3. 1689 in ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Geistliche Wahlakten (Passau A-D), 30 a). Sebastian von Pötting (1628–1689), first the Provost in Passau and then (since 1665) the Bishop of Ljubljana. In 1675, based on the recommendation of the Emperor Leopold I he was elected Bishop of Passau and a year later he married there the Emperor to Princess Eleonore Magdalene von Pfalz-Neuburg; since 1683 he worked as an imperial envoy to the *Reichstag* in Regensburg.

109 The future Bishop of Passau should in accordance with ideal requirements support the election of the Coadjutor of Mainz, which took place two years after, but already then it was necessary to prepare the ground for the imperial candidate (see below). Also see MZA Brno, RA Kouníč, Inv. No. 2640, sign. III, 130–2, Kart. 288, fol. 9–10. The importance of the Passau election in regard to future events is also confirmed by other sources; see an undated and unsigned draft (presumably of Kaunitz’ letter or report to the Emperor, apparently from May 1689), ibidem, fol. 31–32.

110 In the letter to Count Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach from 15. 1. 1689 from Munich Kaunitz mentions, that he would like to be sent to Passau. See ÖStA Wien, AVA, FA Harrach, Kart. 254/35, s. f.
provided him with information. Due to Kaunitz’ experience with the election of high-ranking religious dignitaries it was not necessary to persuade the Emperor too much. The decision that Count von Kaunitz should lead the negotiations in Passau was made at the end of March or early April 1689; anecdotal reports of Count’s appointment as an imperial envoy probably circulated in aristocratic society much earlier. The pro-Emperor party was clear from the beginning who should win the election in Passau: he was another protégé of the Emperor and experienced diplomat, Count Johann Philipp von Lamberg. Only a few sources survived in regard to this mission from Count von Kaunitz, so we have to be satisfied with indirect reports, i.e. the letters addressed to the Count during his Passau mission and the drafts that the Count drew up.

As was the custom of that time, initial preparations for occupation of the Passau See and the election began well in advance, still during the life of Count Sebastian von Pötting. The first concrete debates on this issue that have been preserved in the Kaunitz family archive date to the beginning of 1687: already then Lamberg was referred to as a clear favourite. These were not just debates, however – Count Lamberg himself left nothing to chance and was obtaining detailed information on how the Emperor and prominent spiritual dignitaries (his potential electors) see his chances and also timely began with securing votes.

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111 See Kaunitz’ pleas for the intercession, ibidem.
112 See, for example, the letter of Count Ferdinand Maria Franz von Neuhaus from 28. 3. 1689 from Regensburg to Count von Kaunitz (MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2640, sign. III, 130–2, Kart. 288, fol. 7–8), additionally see the drafts and the copies of letters ibidem, fol. 9–10.
113 Johann Philipp von Lamberg (1651–1712) was an important diplomat in imperial service. As an envoy he stayed in Düsseldorf, Dresden, Berlin and Regensburg. Later (in 1697) he went to Warsaw, where he participated in the election of August of Saxony, the King of Poland, and two years later he received the rank of the Prinzipal-Kommissar in Regensburg; he also participated in the election of Joseph I and Karl VI. The peak of his career was his appointment as Cardinal in 1700, again at the instigation of Emperor Leopold I. Franz NIEDERMAYER, Johann Philipp von Lamberg, Fürstbischof von Passau (1651–1712). Reich, Landesfürstentum und Kirche im Zeitalter des Barock, Passau 1938, etc.
114 See Kaunitz’ letter from 23. 5. 1689, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Geistliche Wahlakten (Passau A-D), 30 a), s. f.
115 MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2640, sign. III, 130–2, Kart. 288.
116 See, for example, the copy of the Emperor’s letter to Archbishop of Salzburg from 15. 9. 1687, in which the Emperor interceded for the support of Count Lamberg and convinces Archbishop for cooperation in this matter. Ibidem, fol. 33–34.
117 See the excerpts from the letters to Count Lamberg from Count Friedrich von Preising, Canon in Salzburg, Passau and Augsburg, as well as the excerpts from the letters to Count Harrach from Bishop of Leitmeritz Jaroslav Ignaz von Sternberg (who several times expressed his friendship and support in obtaining Passau to Lamberg – as well as one of the possible candidates for the post of
The instruction for Count von Kaunitz’ Passau mission has not been found unfortunately so far; this mission, however, in this respect, certainly was not exceptional. The Count was certainly provided with the instruction and proved himself at the Chapter by the imperial creditives.118 Due to his workload during his previous mission Count von Kaunitz went to Passau at the last moment, so to speak. He arrived there on the 15th May 1689119 and the date of the election was set for the 24th May. It is therefore clear that the Emperor’s allies had to prepare the ground there (on-site or from a distance) well before his arrival.120 Although there was complete trust in Kaunitz’ ability at court and in the highest circles, Lamberg’s appointment was still far from a certain issue.121 Kaunitz was

Bishop Count Rudolf von Thun), and also the excerpts from the encrypted messages related to the Passau election, all from October 1687 and from January, March and April 1689. Ibidem, fol. 9–10.

118 See the letter in French to the Count from the Hofkanzler Count Theodor Heinrich Althet von Strattman from 12. 5. 1689 (ibidem, fol. 1). Count Strattman in his letter even commented that the instruction might not be necessary and Kaunitz’ would receive only a copy of the imperial letter and the credentials. Creditives or their drafts were not drawn up until the beginning of May 1689 (on 4. or 6. 5.) and the Emperor in a handwritten letter turned to the Chapter, and announced Kaunitz’ arrival and asked for cooperation and also more than strongly recommended Lamberg’s election since the latter has “sonderbahr Vernunft” and also “rare qualiteten”. Another Emperor’s letter (from 11. 5. 1689) was delivered to individual canons; their list is stored in HHStA and comprises 22 names (addressees were, for example: Provost Franz Anton von Losenstein, Walter Xaver von Dietrichstein – despite the fact that at that time he already had no much in common with the spiritual environment, Franz Anton von Harrach, Bishop of Leitmeritz Jaroslav Ignaz von Sternberg, Bishop of Ljubljana Sigmund Christoph von Herberstein, Rudolf von Thun, Ferdinand Franz von Pratto, Johann Philipp von Lamberg himself and many others). ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Geistliche Wahlakten (Passau A-D), 30 a), s. f.

119 Ibidem, Kaunitz’ letter from 16. 5. 1689.

120 About the specific names of diplomats, agents or other persons involved, who worked in favour of Lamberg’s election in a greater advance of the election date, sources keep silent, with a few exceptions. It is sure that some of the possible candidates for this function already previously voiced in favour of Count Lamberg; for example, the above mentioned Count Rudolf von Thun, Count Paris von Salm and Bishop of Leitmeritz (who, however, is mentioned as Lamberg’s supporter, while in other sources as his rival), etc. See (probably) Kaunitz’ draft from 18. 5. 1689 in MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2640, sign. III, 130–2, Kart. 288, fol. 15–17. During Kaunitz’ mission the number of votes for Lamberg was gradually increasing about which the Count informed the Emperor and his friends in detail; see below and also see Kaunitz’ draft from Passau from 23. 5. 1689 (ibidem, fol. 19–20).

121 The letter from Count Harrach from 16. 5. 1689 (ibidem, fol. 5) or Kaunitz’ response from the same date (ÖStA Wien, AVA, FA Harrach, Kart. 254/35, s. f.), also his letters to the Emperor from 16., 18. and 23. 5. 1689 (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Geistliche Wahlakten (Passau A-D), 30 a), s. f.). For example, as of 18. 5. 1689 only seven votes were secured for Lamberg, while the next four to six electors seemed to also speak for him, but according to Kaunitz’ words at least eight votes were necessary, although already after securing the ninth vote he in advance congratulated the Emperor for winning this election (the letter from 18. 5. 1689, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Geistliche Wahlakten (Passau A-D), 30 a), s. f.). Additionally see also the draft from 18. 5. 1689 in MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2640, sign. III, 130–2, Kart. 288, fol. 15–17. Ibidem on fol. 29–30, there are two undated lists of candidates and electors, who are divided according to their ‘nationality’ (from Austria, Bohemia, Tyrol, Bavaria, etc.) and also according to which faction they belonged.
therefore responsible for securing critical voices and for persuading hesitant electors; as the biggest Lamberg’s rivals were generally considered Count Franz Anton von Losenstein and especially Count Sigmund Christoph von Herberstein; other serious candidates were Count Jaroslav Ignaz von Sternberg and Rudolf von Thun. In the few days that remained to the election, Count therefore undertook everything possible so that his mission was a success and he could leave as soon as possible. At the Chapter, where he arrived with his creditive, he delivered his message and the reasons why the electors should adopt the will of the Emperor; in his apartment in the episcopal princely residence (today’s Old Residence), where he was staying, he received and reciprocated the visits, while offering various benefits and gifts, which, based on his words, did not work very well.

Thanks to Kaunitz’ letter, which he wrote after returning from his mission, we can get some idea of what his first official meeting with the canons looked like. Already on the day of his arrival he sent his creditive to the dean and on the day later to the Chapter. On the 17th May, the Bishop’s Hofmarschall Baron Berg sent for him three princely carriages with six horses and six lackeys to arrive timely to the Chapter Assembly, which took place at ten o’clock in the morning. When the Count got out of carriage at the gate of the residence, he was received by the Hofmarschall and, of course, awaiting him was the entire princely court. The dean and the senior were waiting by the so called Österreichische Ritterstuben and brought him into the room where the Chapter gathered; there a large black padded chair was ready for Kaunitz. In the audience room he was first respectfully welcomed by all the dignitaries (they did not shake hands, however) and then he delivered his message. After the audience, about which he apparently wanted to report the Emperor personally, because he did not describe it, he returned to his apartment: the older canons accompanied him to the end of the Ritterstuben and the younger ones

122 Franz Anton von Losenstein (1642–1692), first Canon and later (from 1673) Provost of Passau. The peak of his career was his appointment as the successor to Bishop of Olomouc. Alfred A. STRNAD, Der letzte Losensteiner aus der Sicht römischer Quellen, in: Ecclesia peregrinans. Josef Lenzenweger zum 70. Geburtstag, Wien 1986, pp. 209–221. Sigmund Christoph von Herberstein (1644–1716) was Canon in Passau and later (1683) he became Bishop of Ljubljana. He is briefly mentioned by Rudolf VIERHAUS (Hg.) in Deutsche biographische Enzyklopädie, 2. Ausgabe, München 2008, p. 462.

123 Stored in ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Geistliche Wahlakten (Passau A-D), 30 a), s. f., there is an undated copy of the creditive intended for the Chapter in Passau.

124 According to some reports the Count had the entire floor available in his residence. He described his first days of negotiations in the letters from 16. and 18. 5. 1689 (ibidem). According to these reports some Electors apparently offered their votes themselves because they supported the imperial case and were just waiting for news from the imperial envoy. See also the draft from Passau from 16. and 18. 5. 1689 in MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2640, sign. III, 130–2, Kart. 288, fol. 21–22, 15–17.

with the part of the court all way to his apartment. Part of the honour guard went with him, while another part was already waiting outside his room and guarded his door. In the evening the chair with a backrest was prepared for him in the dining room and the Hofkanzler May gave him a panatiera (apparently it was an ornate box for bread) and also passed him water to wash his hands and the Stallmeister Mornberg handed him a towel; during the banquet he was served by butlers and toast was made with the first cup, then and also in the coming days, to the health of the Emperor.  

In the following days he was diligently attending individual electors and foreign envoys and was forwarding them the Emperor’s will and he also accepted visits (the first came to him the envoy of Bavaria, Baron Neuhaus, whom he knew from before). He made some visits incognito because he was not equipped with a sufficiently representative carriage (he used the carriage with two horses and two lackeys). During his entire stay he enjoyed, as the Emperor’s envoy, the highest esteem and respect. When he travelled in the episcopal carriage, sitting with him were the most important dignitaries (such as the Bishop of Leitmeritz) and his carriage was accompanied by six lackeys on foot. In churches and elsewhere he was provided with a velvet-upholstered chair with gold tassels and he also had his own oratory available, where he sometimes undertook unofficial discussions – he talked there, for example, with the Bavarian envoy.  

Kaunitz’ negotiations, for which he had so little time, were, fortunately, successful and two days prior the election the Count and the whole court could be already relieved – in accordance with the letter of Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach already then it was clear that the outcome of the election will be as the Emperor wished. Harrach therefore did not hesitate in advance to pass on the Emperor’s satisfaction and also that the whole court applauds Kaunitz’ good negotiations. The Hofkanzler Count Theodor Heinrich von Strattmann and the Oberstkämmerer of the Kingdom of Bohemia Count Johann Friedrich von Trauttmansdorf, apparently commented that: “habemus pontificem, en fin dem graffen von Kaunitz ist nichts unmögliches, wann er sich darumtes ainnimbt”.  

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126 The Count obviously noticed that he was accepted there considerably warmer and more respectfully (e.g. compared with England) and in his report he stated that he felt there at home and that respect for the Emperor was clearly evident from the Chapter’s approach. Ibidem.  
127 It could be Ferdinand Franz Maria von Neuhaus, with whom the Count was in contact already during his previous mission; see, for example, their correspondence in MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2640, sign. III, 130–2, Kart. 288, fol.7–8, additionally see the drafts and copies of the letters on fol. 9–10.  
129 Harrach’s letter to Kaunitz from 22. 5. 1689, ibidem, fol. 3.
Kaunitz again did not describe the actual election – he probably wanted to report to the Emperor himself; however, he might be satisfied with the outcome in any case. The new Bishop Lamberg accepted Kaunitz’ official congratulations and to honour the election a festive banquet was held at which Count von Kaunitz sat on the privileged right side of the new bishop; sitting near to him were the other (electoral) envoys. The Count met Lamberg again in the evening. He arrived incognito to his house, where a banquet was held in honour of the election and to celebrate Lamberg's birthday, which he had on the following day; Kaunitz was warmly welcomed by the host. Celebrations both at the court and in private lasted another two days, Kaunitz always sat at the right hand of the new bishop. Eventually the Count attended his last audience, after which Lamberg escorted him to his apartment. On the day of his departure the new bishop invited him into the carriage and rode part of the way with him (Kaunitz again sat to his right) and they were accompanied by many carriages occupied by prominent aristocrats and clerics; then they got off the carriage and said their goodbyes. A boat was already prepared for Count von Kaunitz, but Lamberg awaited Kaunitz’ departure before he set off on his own return trip.

After returning from Passau, which took place shortly after the successful election at the end of May, Count von Kaunitz finally devoted more of his time to his own affairs – especially managing the estates – and to family which he always greatly missed during his travels. The Count already previously thought of setting up Familienfideikommiss and now, after completing several missions during which he showed the Emperor his abilities and loyalty more than enough, he thought that it was an appropriate time to initiate steps to the establishment of Fideikommiss and also to obtain some prestigious office (if possible directly at the court). In regard to obtaining this function he relied on the intercession of his friends, especially of Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach. He

130 See the two Kaunitz’ congratulations to the Emperor to the successful election from 25. 5. 1689, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Geistliche Wahlakten (Passau A-D), 30 a), s. f. This election is also briefly mentioned by Joseph SCHÖLLER, Die Bischöfe von Passau und ihre Zeitereignisse..., Passau 1844, pp. 229–230, however the election date is defined as being a day earlier.

131 The new bishop was well aware that his election is due to the Emperor and his envoy, Count von Kaunitz. He therefore did not forget to express his undying gratitude and willingness to serve the Habsburg Family and praised the Count highly in his letters. See Lamberg’s letters from 25. and 26. 5. and 11. 6. 1689, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Geistliche Wahlakten (Passau A-D), 30 a), s. f.

132 Just a few days after the election the Count was already writing to Count Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach from Vienna (specifically on 29. 5. 1689) and later from Slavkov. ÖStA Wien, AVA, FA Harrach, Kart. 254/35, s. f.

133 Ibidem. Also see MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 1717, sign. 3a, Kart. 191, fol. 173–195. As is evident from these references concerning the information flow between Kaunitz and Harrach and also about requests for intercession, the relationship between these two nobles was still good in the early 1690’s. Their correspondence bears quite a friendly spirit and Kaunitz in his letters shared the impressions
had to wait a few more years, however, both for *Fideikommiss* and for the office, since the Emperor had other plans with him.

**Mainz**

The last mission of Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz, that will be briefly addressed here, concerned (not surprisingly, given his previous experience) another election in the highest imperial ecclesiastical circles. This time it was about the occupation of the Electoral See in Mainz, which he briefly visited during the election of the Coadjutor or Archbishop of Cologne. Preparations for the elections traditionally took place well in advance – still during the life of the current elector, Anselm Franz von Ingelheim. Significantly less sources survived in regard to this mission than from the previous expeditions directly from Count von Kaunitz, so we have to accept more mediated reports. But one can assume that in terms of organisational and ‘technical’ aspects (for example as regards the ceremony or the manner of negotiations with high-level spiritual dignitaries) this mission was not very different from the two previous ones, i.e. the Cologne and Passau elections. Somewhat surprisingly, however, a significant number of originals of creditives were preserved generally addressed either to Mainz and Trier, to the Chapter in Mainz as a whole or to its individual members (in this case it is a total of 38 pieces). The name lists will not tell us a much about Kaunitz’ mission, however. The fact that all the

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136 Ceremonial issues are not addressed at all in the below mentioned instruction (nor in the instructions issued in regard to election of the Coadjutor of Cologne) – the reason may be numerous previous experiences of Count von Kaunitz both with the elections in the highest ecclesiastical circles and also his knowledge of this part of the Empire and useful acquaintances that he had made during his earlier diplomatic visits. Do not forget that by the time of the Cologne election the Count travelled based on the instructions *inter alia* also to Mainz.

137 MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2596, sign. III, 118 (there are 73 folios and 38 letters, while the original number of letters was certainly even higher). Preserved were the letters (sometimes only one
creditives (with few exceptions) were drafted either on the 24th December 1690 or on the 12th April 1691 and that many capitulars should receive the creditives from both of these dates suggests that Count von Kaunitz went to Mainz twice (one time well ahead of the election, which was announced to take place on the 19th April 1691, and then again just before the election) and during both visits he always handed over a letter to the same dignitaries; in the meantime he probably stopped by at the court for new instructions.138

Information on how the Mainz election should ideally take place and what role Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz should play in it can be drawn from the instruction.139 Already its title clarifies that the Count should not act and persuade electors or potential supporters of the imperial policy only in Mainz but also in Trier (the local elector, Johann Hugo von Orsbeck would become Kaunitz’ main ally).140 This should conclude his journey through the clerical electoral courts. As in his other instructions, the Emperor did not omit to mention the Turkish danger and of course the need to enforce his will as the sole correct. This time the Emperor wished for the good of the whole Empire to establish in Mainz as Ingelheim’s successor “his beloved cousin” Ludwig Anton von Pfalz-Neuburg, Provost of Ellwangen (1660–1694). The Emperor thereby imposed difficult task on Count von Kaunitz, because as he acknowledged himself, his candidate did not have many followers; he therefore advised Kaunitz to act more privately than publicly, to scrupulously avoid any problems and if they occur to immediately inform him.

The conference report in regard to Kaunitz’ journey to Mainz does not differ significantly from the text of the instruction. Since Ingelheim (at that time already very ill) did not leave any instructions concerning his successor, the Emperor decided to take matters into his own hands and through Count von Kaunitz to enforce the election of his man. Kaunitz’ task there was to observe and especially to influence the situation – despite any resentment of the Chapter or the Pope himself he was supposed to secure sufficient

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139 There are eight sheets of the draft instruction for Mainz and Trier from 24. 12. 1690 (ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Instruktionen, Fasz. 6, s. f.) and especially its original which, including the creditives from the years 1690–1691, is stored in MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2360, sign. III-78, 1, Kart. 267, instructions in fol. 2–8, creditives in fol. 8–10. Although a note was added to the original instruction that this is a secret instruction, this fact is not mentioned in the text and it is also consistent with its draft from Vienna, which also does not mention secrecy of the instruction.
140 In regard to Johann Hugo von Orsbeck (1634–1711), who was the Elector of Trier from the year 1676 until his death in 1711, see Max BRAUBACH, Johann Hugo von Orsbeck, in: Neue Deutsche Biographie, Band 10, Berlin 1974, pp. 540–542.
number of votes for the Emperor’s protégé. All participants were aware that it was a post of extraordinary importance; the winner of the election should in fact play his role, for example, in regard to concluding the Emperor’s alliances with Bavaria, Palatinate, Spain and others. The Emperor unlike Kaunitz did not have a doubt that Ludwig Anton von Pfalz-Neuburg would win (on this occasion, he promised to give him a cross or another gem worth ten to twelve thousand guldens), his election, however, he conditioned by him joining his side in battle against France.\footnote{Protocolum conferentiae from 2. 12. 1690, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Geistliche Wahlakten (Mainz Erzbistum A-G), 24 a), fol. 291–296.}

Formalities probably took place as it was expected: Kaunitz probably experienced at both electors (Mainz and Trier) a festive welcome similar to those in previous missions; he asked for an audience at the Chapter, where he presented his credentials, delivered a speech and passed on the Emperor’s requirements. The actual audience he had with Anselm Franz von Ingelheim whom he managed to persuade for the Emperor’s case.\footnote{After Kaunitz’ audience Ingelheim announced to the Emperor that he intends to support his candidate. See his letter and congratulations on the successful election of Ludwig Anthon von Pfalz-Neuburg from 20. 4. 1691, ibidem, fol. 330–331 and 332–333.} Then the Count presented his creditives to the individual capitulars and dealt with them and also with other influential people (in addition to the Elector of Trier, he should seek, for example, the Landgrave of Hessen\footnote{Maybe Karl Landgrave of Hessen-Kassel (1654–1730) or Ernst Ludwig von Hessen-Darmstadt (1678–1739) – unfortunately, it is not specified in the instruction, which ancestral branch is concerned.} ). Chapter members who before the election stayed elsewhere, he should, if possible, find and convince them of the suitability of the Emperor’s protégé.\footnote{See the original and also the draft of the instruction for Mainz and Trier from 24. 12. 1690, MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 2360, sign III-78, 1, Kart. 267, fol. 2–7 and ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Instruktionen, Fasz. 6, s. f.} Kaunitz was very carefully preparing for his meetings in advance; certainly because of saving the time and also for the modest popularity of the imperial candidate.

Also this Kaunitz’ mission was eventually crowned with success: Ludwig Anton von Pfalz-Neuburg was on the 19th April 1691 indeed elected to succeed still living Ingelheim, although it should be noted that he did not reach to the Mainz See – he died before Ingelheim and therefore, in 1695, a re-election had to be undertaken, which Count Lothar Franz von Schönborn won and served there until his death in 1729.\footnote{In regard to the election see also Maria LEHNER, Ludwig Anton von Pfalz-Neuburg (1660–1694). Ordensoberhaupt, General, Bischof, Marburg 1994, pp. 161–164.} Count von Kaunitz experienced uneasy moments in Mainz. Promoting not very popular Ludwig Anton certainly was not an easy task and, moreover, he faced many problems. He arrived to the election late and Mainz was not a very safe place, similarly as earlier during the siege of Cologne (it was almost impossible to leave the city due to French forces and men of
Cardinal Fürstenberg). Additionally, as he claimed, he suffered greatly in regard to the development of his own business; mainly because of his long absence – he was receiving the permissions to return home too late.  

**Financial Background**

In regard to financial background of Kaunitz’ missions in the 1680’s and early 1690’s we, unfortunately, have to rely only on random and incomplete surviving fragments. Moravský zemský archiv does not store any complete accounting for all the missions and we are therefore unable to determine the exact amount that they consumed, although there is no doubt that like all diplomatic journeys of that time there were extremely costly and that the Count would have to pay a substantial part of the costs himself to cover expenses for the representation of his and thereby also the Emperor’s. He also had to borrow money – mostly from the famous Viennese banker and lender to many important people, Ottavio Pestalozzi, as evidenced by a number of memoranda signed by either the Count or his wife Maria Eleonore. Although his actions always lead to “civilised” countries, he was purchasing some of his equipment in Vienna; for example, luxurious fabrics for fashion clothing, which he picked up during his infrequent visits home.  

The Hofzahlamtsbuch from 1692 also slightly expands knowledge about Count von Kaunitz’ next mission: this year he was paid more then 2,700 guldens for his journey to the court of the Elector of Saxony, specifically for mourning clothes. The Count therefore undoubtedly went to condole the ruling Elector Johann Georg IV von Sachsen on the death of his father Johann Georg III, who had died in the autumn of the previous year. Due to Kaunitz’ previous experience the mission to another electoral court does

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146 Although the Emperor promised the Count extra 5,000 guldens for his mission to Mainz, the payment of which should be taken care of by the Hofkammer. Reimbursement probably not happened, however (Protocolum conferentiae from 2. 12. 1690, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, RK, Geistliche Wahlakten (Mainz Erzbistum A-G), 24 a), fol. 291–296). Additionally also the decree for the Hofkammer from 11. 4. 1691 (ibidem, fol. 327). Hofzahlamtsbücher do not mention those 5000 guldens for “extra Spesen” to Mainz, however. Kaunitz, unfortunately, does not mention a specific amount of loss, nor what undertaking it concerned, nor the date on which he could set off on the return trip. See MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 1717, sign. 3a, Kart. 191, fol. 173–195.

147 For example MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 3720, sine sign., Kart. 408.

148 ÖStA Wien, Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv Wien (= FHKA), Hofzahlamtsbücher (= HZAB), Bd. 137, pp. 126, 250.

149 No sources were found in regard to this mission so far; future studies, however, should provide more detailed information.
not seem surprising and it is also possible that by the time he went to the Hague he had already made several similar journeys.\textsuperscript{150}

The table 2 shows the amounts that the \textit{Hofkammer} expended on Kaunitz’ diplomatic missions during the period monitored.\textsuperscript{151} They are neither small nor too large amounts; \textit{Hofzahlamtsbücher} also do not always indicate the precise purpose for which the money was provided. During the first year of his diplomatic service Count von Kaunitz received for his current expenses (i.e. \textit{Subsistenzgelder}) 500 guldens per month; since 1683, however, this sum was increased twofold and 1000 guldens per month he was receiving throughout the entire period monitored. The data contained herein also suggest that the amounts intended for individual missions were usually paid with a delay and also that the Count was often forced to borrow the necessary amount of money from one of the bankers whom this money was subsequently refunded (or rather, he was always cashed interest on this amount out of the \textit{Hofkammer}, which mostly ranged around three or four per cent, but sometimes reached up to twenty per cent). In total, between the years 1682 and 1693 Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz received from the \textit{Hofkammer} 92,827 guldens and all the bankers received a total of 3,204 guldens as interest, while Ottavio Pestalozzi received the largest sum (more then 2,879 guldens).\textsuperscript{152}

As Kaunitz stated in his application for permission to establish a \textit{Fideikommiss} and for the imparting of a high courtly or provincial office (he would prefer the post of the \textit{Oberststallmeister} or of the Moravian \textit{Landeshaubtmann}), the total amount that he apparently lost during his missions reached 200,000 guldens. Additionally he did not fail to mention the damage to the estates that occurred during his absence (for example, his estate in Uherský Brod was during the “Hungarian rebellion”, i.e Thököly’s Uprising,

\textsuperscript{150} Cf. with another diplomatic mission which was also directed to Saxony: J. KUBEŠ, \textit{Jan Marek z Clary a Aldringenu}; and also with the instruction for Franz Maximilian von Mansfeld, who in 1667 went to condole on the death of Elector of Brandenburg, Louise Henriette d’Orange, see: IDEM, \textit{Instruction for Franz Maximilian von Mansfeld as the Imperial envoy to Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg to Berlin, 13\textsuperscript{th} July 1667}, available on-line at URL: <http://uhv.upce.cz/cs/documents-and-editions/> [cit. 29. 7. 2016].

\textsuperscript{151} Depending on the destination, where they were sent, imperial ambassadors received 1,000 or 1,500 guldens per month and the envoys of the lower order (Residents) only 200–250 guldens – in this respect, Count von Kaunitz, in theory, had nothing to complain about, but the fact is that for example, even in 1693, he demanded the payment of the promised money and salary for previous years (starting from the year 1688). See Kaunitz’ letter to the \textit{Hofkammer} (undated based on its wording the letter was written in or after 1693) in ÖStA Wien, FHKA, Autographensammlung, Kart. 156, s. f. Cf. with financial situation of Johann Marcus von Clary und Aldringen, who was paid first 250 and later 500 guldens monthly, J. KUBEŠ, \textit{Jan Marek z Clary a Aldringenu}, pp. 372–374.

\textsuperscript{152} See Table 2.
The question remains, however, how (or whether) these numbers are exaggerated. While his officers certainly maintained his accounts carefully, the evidence is preserved only fragmentarily; a more detailed study of these fragments should in future provide more information.

Table 2: The expenditure table for the missions of Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz – payments made by the Hofkammer (in guldens = fl.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/Destination</th>
<th>The aggregate amount paid to Kaunitz</th>
<th>The amount paid for Kaunitz to others</th>
<th>N.B.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1682¹ Elector of Bavaria</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td></td>
<td>A monthly subsistence allowance in the amount of 500 fl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1683² Elector of Bavaria</td>
<td>$1,500 + 5,500 + 2,000 = 9,000$</td>
<td>20 (interest for Ottavio Pestalozzi from the amount of 500 fl.)</td>
<td>Including the amount of 2,000 fl. for a kitchen, a cellar and other similar expenses. From 1683 his monthly subsistence allowance was increased to 1,000 fl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1684³ Elector of Bavaria</td>
<td>$1,500 + 13,000 = 14,500$</td>
<td>300 (interest for Ottavio Pestalozzi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1685⁴ Elector of Bavaria</td>
<td>$7,000 + 6,000 = 13,000$</td>
<td>210 (interest for Ottavio Pestalozzi from the amount of 7,000 fl.)</td>
<td>Subsistence allowance in the amount of 7,000 fl. for expenses between 21. 10. 1684 and 21. 5. 1685 (paid after seven months), the amount of 6,000 fl. to cover the expenses between 21. 5. and November 1685 may also represent a subsistence allowance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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¹ See an undated draft petition to the Emperor, in which the Count summarises his previous diplomatic activities, draws attention to his merits and also mentions his financial losses. Based on its wording the draft was prepared after 1696 and it indicates that at that time Kaunitz’ expenses certainly were not reimbursed in their entirety. MZA Brno, RA Kouniců, Inv. No. 1717, sign. 3a, Kart. 191, fol. 173–195. ² ÖStA Wien, FHKA, HZAB, Bd. 126–138.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sender(s)</th>
<th>Expenses (fl.)</th>
<th>Interest (fl.)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1686</td>
<td>The King of England</td>
<td>3,000 + 5,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>10,000 fl. for the period 21. 11. 1685–21. 9. 1686.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>= 8,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Including the amount of 3,000 fl. for expenses for travel, equipment, establishment of a chapel and provision of two clerics and the amount of 5,000 fl. for “Extra Spesen” that were spent in Bavaria in the previous year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1687</td>
<td>The King of England, Elector Palatine, Elector of Cologne</td>
<td>9,375 + 1,000</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>9,375 fl. for the management of the chapel in England in the period 1. 12. 1686–31. 8. 1687 and the amount of 1,000 fl. for a journey to the Elector Palatine (for the period 17. 11. – 17. 12. 1687).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>= 10,375</td>
<td></td>
<td>Including the amount of 9,375 fl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1688</td>
<td>Elector Palatine, Elector of Bavaria, Elector of Cologne, Bishop of Passau</td>
<td>2,000 + 3,100</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>2,000 fl. for the bills between 1. 6. and 30. 9. 1688 and the amount of 2,000 fl. for expenses (mail, travels, etc.) at the courts of the Electors of Bavaria and Palatine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1,000 = 6,100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Including the amount of 2,000 fl. for current expenses at the court of the Elector Palatine in the period 17. 12. 1687–17. 2. 1688.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Including the amount of 2,666 fl. for the bills between 1. 6. and 30. 9. 1688 and the amount of 2,000 fl. for expenses (mail, travels, etc.) at the courts of the Electors of Bavaria and Palatine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1689</td>
<td>Elector of Bavaria, Elector of Cologne, Bishop of Passau, Elector of Trier</td>
<td>2,666 + 4,000</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>16,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+ 2,000 + 7,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Including the amount of 2,666 fl. for the bills between 1. 6. and 30. 9. 1688 and the amount of 2,000 fl. for expenses (mail, travels, etc.) at the courts of the Electors of Bavaria and Palatine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>= 16,166</td>
<td></td>
<td>Including the amount of 2,666 fl. for the bills between 1. 6. and 30. 9. 1688 and the amount of 2,000 fl. for expenses (mail, travels, etc.) at the courts of the Electors of Bavaria and Palatine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Including the amount of 2,666 fl. for the bills between 1. 6. and 30. 9. 1688 and the amount of 2,000 fl. for expenses (mail, travels, etc.) at the courts of the Electors of Bavaria and Palatine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1690</td>
<td>Elector of Mainz</td>
<td>2,000 + 500</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+ 3500 + 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Including an amount of 500 fl. for expenses still from Bavaria and the sum of 3,500 fl. for equipment and for travel to Mainz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Person</td>
<td>Amounts (fl.)</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691</td>
<td>Elector of Mainz</td>
<td>2,000 + 864</td>
<td>= 2,864</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1692</td>
<td>Elector of Saxony</td>
<td>2,000 + 702</td>
<td>= 2,702</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Including the amount of 702 fl. for expenditure on a journey to the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elector of Saxony and on mourning clothes at his court.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1693</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Maybe an additional payment for some of the previous missions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusions**

Let’s pause once more to look at the questions that were asked in the introduction to this study. Regarding the social background, Count von Kaunitz did not set off to his missions unprepared – whom he should contact at a specific place, who could provide him with important information and introduce him into local society or help him in any other way; all of these details have already been clearly defined in the instructions for the individual missions. During his first mission to Bavaria he should, even before meeting the Elector, contact Baron Johann Baptist Leidel, the Elector’s Geheimer Rat, the Hofvizekanzler and diplomat, to whom he should be prepared to explain the Emperor’s motives. At that time he had already met Baron Johann Friedrich Karg von Bebenburg, a Doctor of Law and a Geheimer Rat, who later on was to become very helpful for him. Prior to his mission to England he was to contact those envoys who had a lot of experience of residing in England, namely the above-mentioned Counts Karl Ferdinand von Waldstein and Franz Sigmund von Thun, who had been detailed to introduce him to the situation and to advise him in regard to ceremonial matters. He was expected to

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155 Ibidem, Bd. 126, p. 234.
158 Ibidem, Bd. 129, pp. 176, 234 and Bd. 130, p. 203.
162 Ibidem, Bd. 134, pp. 73, 196, 197, 206, 297.
165 Ibidem, Bd. 137, pp. 126, 250.
finding common ground in regard to the imperial interests and in the case of the Spanish Netherlands specifically with the Spanish envoy, Don Pedro Ronquillo, and last but not least he should also listen to the advice of the legation secretary Johann Philipp Hoffman. In the case of his second Bavarian mission he again collaborated with Baron Karg and also with other imperial envoys, such as Baron Christian von Eck und Heugersbach and Johann Friedrich von Mayersheim.

Count von Kaunitz also initiated friendly, or at least mutually beneficial, relationships with representatives of the territory to which he had been sent and with their families. He also succeeded in initiating a very friendly relationship with the Bavarian Elector Maximilian II and also with Philipp Wilhelm, the Elector Palatine, and his sons (specifically with Franz Ludwig, the Bishop of Wrocław, and with Johann Wilhelm, the future Elector). In England he found an ally in Mary Beatrice d’Este, the Queen of England, while in Passau he also managed to establish a close relationship with the future Bishop Johann Philipp von Lamberg and, probably before even travelling to Mainz, he had an opportunity to become acquainted with the current local Elector whose successor was to be chosen, i.e. with Anselm Franz von Ingelheim. We should not forget his friends back home (in the Czech lands and in Vienna), who during his absence supervised his interests and also interceded on his behalf – primarily Prince Ferdinand von Dietrichstein and Count Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach.

In addition to Kaunitz being in regular contact with important people (if it was possible he was constantly moving around in their vicinity and even travelled or at least corresponded with some of them or collected information about them), his tactics also included perfect preparedness and awareness regarding the customs, the people and their environment and not only where he should go but also the potential risks. Some of his missions additionally required obtaining information well in advance (e.g. his mission to Passau).

The Count was sent on all these aforementioned missions as “envoyé extraordinaire”, i.e. a special envoy, who, within a certain fixed period of time should fulfill one or more specific tasks. As the main imperial envoy (albeit a special one) he mostly functioned officially, but this did not prevent him, if the situation demanded it, to act incognito while within the pro-Habsburg camp – he “traded” information (i.e. he exchanged it for other information). Gifts represented an important argument for him and also a means of persuasion. For most missions we can only assume that the norm was offering gifts or benefits, however, the preserved original of the secret instructions for his second mission to Bavaria and to the election of the Cologne Coadjutor and later the Archbishop represents both important evidence and also an example of what such gifts and benefits might look like. To the Electors and to those others who could significantly influence
the election in some other manner he offered considerable sums of money, together with prestigious offices for them and their nearest and dearest, a variety of other benefits and privileges and, of course, also the imperial favour and gratitude. Most attractive for the recipients were the prestige offices – whether for the Electors themselves and their relatives or for those whose influence actually affected the successful course of the election from a distance. Also those who wanted for themselves or for their relatives to obtain a prestigious military function could obtain it. Financial sums and ultimately land as well also served as incentives. All those who voted in favour of the imperial and Bavarian candidate could also count with an intangible and indefinable, but equally significant capital: i.e. with the imperial favour and gratitude and support for their future interests.

Count von Kaunitz was required at all times to ensure that this form of decorum was respected during all negotiations. Though if it was not possible otherwise, he was advised to take advantage of various points of disagreement and thorny issues, such as benefitting from any rifts that might occur between the King of England and Parliament. According to the sources studied, Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz’ mission took place in an entirely standard manner: before leaving for the mission he received instructions from the Emperor, credentials and other important documents and information (memorials, etc.) personally, while he also had to find a lot of information for himself in advance. After his arrival sometimes he stayed directly at the court and sometimes in private houses. After he first arrived in Bavaria he lived in a “Gesandtenhaus”. He asked for his first audience and contacted the legation secretary, if he or the resident would be operating in that specific area. He never had to wait long for his first audience; sometimes it took place on the day following his arrival and sometimes within several days. The first or the final audience was public; the main reason for Kaunitz’ arrival was usually addressed during a private audience, of which were always a few (in addition to this the Count also participated in other audiences or visits, e.g. such as with family members of the Electors or of the King of England).

All Kaunitz’ missions have one thing in common; namely constant travelling. During his missions he never stayed long in one place, and we can say for certain that over the years he became very well acquainted with a large part of the Empire. Leaving aside the fact that he often accompanied important people on their travels and shared their entertainment (he willingly participated in balls, hunts or military parades), during his second Bavarian missions, for example, in addition to Munich and Cologne he also visited Mainz and the court of the Elector Palatine while during his Passau mission he made a journey to Mainz and, prior to the election of the Elector of Mainz he also went to Trier. In addition, if a mission lasted longer, he would also return to Vienna to personally refer
to the Emperor and thereby receive further orders from him, and rarely he could also even take a look at his estates.167

Count von Kaunitz’ motivation should certainly be taken seriously: he always accepted the tasks that were entrusted to him by Emperor Leopold I with the best of intentions and also with knowledge of his aristocratic honour. He longed for the edification of his own family name and also, of course, for his good reputation in the eyes of the Emperor and of aristocratic society. It would be mistake, however, to assume that his motivation was totally selfless and that his only reason for accepting and being retained on missions was his loyalty to the interests of the Emperor and of his allies. His strongest personal motivation was certainly the prospect that his successful completion of missions would open-up a path to his career progression (which did also happen and eventually he achieved the post of the Reichsvizekanzler in regard to which the Elector of Bavaria and especially Palatine were both very instrumental on his behalf) and he also very much longed for Fideikommiss establishment, which he finally achieved, though not until 1702. However, it is also necessary to mention the fact that neither was he himself spared of obtaining further rewards that he probably accepted without remorse. Maximilian II Emanuel, for example, promised him a financial reward if all went according to plan. This is mentioned directly as one of the instructions for his second Bavarian mission; the fact that during his missions he received other valuable gifts, with minor exceptions, is not mentioned in the studied sources, but it is certain that, like other diplomats, he was also given a valuable gift at the end of the mission. A significant role was also played by the Count’s endeavour to provide for his own children; for one of his sons he asked the Provostry of Altötting and thanks to the influence of the Bavarian Elector his wish was later heard and that is how Franz Karl Joseph Anton von Kaunitz began his spiritual path.

How Kaunitz perceived his diplomatic missions is not easy to track, but some documents that shed light on it did survive. Essentially these mentions occur in his personal correspondence (for example with Prince Ferdinand von Dietrichstein) together with the preparatory materials for his application for the establishment of Fideikommiss and also other less important notes. On one hand the Count expressed that the service to the Emperor and prosperity of the House of Habsburg constituted a sufficient reward for him and that he wanted nothing more than to be actively on his missions and far away from court intrigues. On the other hand he admitted, however, that he would very

167 Here cf. with an untypical course of the mission of Johann Marcus von Clary und Aldringen, the envoy at the court of the Elector of Saxony in Dresden, who for much of his diplomatic mission was living at his estates in Teplitz. This situation, however, was related to the favourable location of his estates and, in addition, the Emperor expressly authorised this exception. Therefore this did not mean that he would neglect his function; the Elector, together with his family, actually often visited the Teplitz Spa. For additional information see: J. KUBEŠ, Jan Marek z Clary a Aldringenu, the itinerary of Johann Marcus’ stays on pp. 358–360.
much have liked to receive the Emperor’s permission to establish *Fideikommiss* and that he also hoped to obtain some high office, preferably one of the four highest court offices (already in cca. 1690 he considered that he had proved satisfactory and that, consequently, he would receive his consent, but these hopes were mismatched and instead he still had to go to Mainz and eventually to The Hague).  

During his missions, which essentially followed up on each other without pause, he had almost no free time that he could spend with his family or use for carrying-out the administration of his affairs and thereby he suffered from his separation from his family, especially from his beloved Lenorl, which is the name that he called his wife. On his journeys he was not spared any health problems (mostly fever, headaches or stomach problems) nor the melancholy that can be caused by homesickness or missing the family, yet he never dared to waver and he continued fulfilling his obligations even during times of illness. During his weak moments (which already started occurring after his first Bavarian mission!) he confessed to his friends that he needed a break in order to take care of his affairs; he was not sure whether or not to remain in such a demanding service and asserted that in the future – should he continue to act as an imperial envoy – he would like to take his family with him.

Finally he was plagued by jealousy because of the affection of the Elector of Bavaria for his wife and he also feared that because of her close relation with him, to the Emperor he could start appearing suspicious.  

It was his friends who helped him to overcome the challenging period during which he worked in the imperial diplomatic service. Especially mentioned many times was Prince Ferdinand von Dietrichstein, whose officials apparently partially supervised the management of Kaunitz’ estates, who was informing him about the Emperor’s intentions of and who also interceded on his behalf with both the Emperor and the court. Apparently, therefore, Count von Kaunitz perceived his service in imperial diplomacy as being somewhat exaggerated, that is to say simultaneously both a validation of his skills and also as a necessary evil, rather than as his main objective – which was obtaining high office and the establishment of *Fideikommiss*.

Although Count von Kaunitz entered into all of his missions during the period monitored both prepared and informed as much as possible, this definitely was not an easy task (either in Bavaria or maybe in Mainz he was even threatened with physical harm), even though in most cases he moved about in a familiar cultural milieu and he often managed to make friends with those with whom he was supposed to be negotiating. Almost all his missions were successful, however, and during them the Count managed to achieve everything that was asked to (e.g. a treaty of alliance with Bavaria was signed,

169 MZA Brno, RA Ditrichštejnů, Inv. No. 1925–48, sign. 867, Kart. 467, fol. 73–76.
though not until 1689; Maximilian II Emanuel provided military assistance to the Emperor and even participated in the fighting himself, and he also married the Emperor’s daughter Maria Antonia; the highly spiritual tenures that were mentioned here were occupied in accordance with the Emperor’s wishes, etc.). Exceptional was his mission to England, about which, however, Kaunitz had previously suspected that it did not offer many opportunities, which was also confirmed.

Although he had no certainty that his wishes concerning obtaining high office and the establishment of Fideikommiss will be fulfilled in the future, Count von Kaunitz sacrificed a lot to the success of his missions (and therefore also to his own future): i.e. the time that he could have spent with his family, his own plans for the cultivation of his estates and he even risked his own life. Eventually, however, he lived to experience success, even though it came about a little later than he had expected and thanks to the intercession of the Electors of Bavaria and Palatine, both of whom he had befriended during his missions, in 1696 he was appointed to the position of the Reichsvizekanzler. After demonstrating his skills during the intensive peace negotiations that took place in the Hague – i.e. this was to be his last major diplomatic mission – in 1702 he finally received the Emperor’s permission and from his estates in Slavkov, Uherský Brod, Moravské Prusy, Velký Ořechov and Bánov he could also establish his longed-for Fideikommiss.

**Table 3:** Missions and tasks of Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz – adding new findings and a summary (compare Table 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of the mission</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Count von Kaunitz’ tasks and activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1682–1686</td>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>The Habsburg-Bavarian alliance against the Turks and France + military assistance; the marriage of the Elector to Maria Antonia von Habsburg + negotiating the details of the marriage, the marriage of the Polish Prince to the Elector’s sister Violanta Beatrix, organising the Elector’s visit of the Emperor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1686–1687</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>The Habsburg-English alliance against the Turks and France + military assistance, the Palatine succession issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1687–1689</td>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>The Habsburg-Bavarian alliance against the Turks and France + military assistance; the election of the Cologne Coadjutor; the truce with France; support for the election of Joseph (I) as the King of Romans, the marriage of Joseph to the Elector’s sister Violanta Beatrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1689</td>
<td>Passau</td>
<td>Election of the Bishop of Passau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1690–1691</td>
<td>Mainz</td>
<td>Election of the Elector of Mainz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691–1693</td>
<td>Empire</td>
<td>Various minor tasks within the Empire (search for potential allies, shorter trips – condolences, etc.); endeavours to obtain the courtly or provincial office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1694–1697</td>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>Peace talks, military assistance against the Turks, the readmission of the Czech Electoral Vote, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz’ Diplomatic Mission in Warsaw in 1695. 
A Contribution towards the Travel Arrangements of Imperial Diplomats¹

Abstract: This paper examines the previously unknown diplomatic mission of Hermann Jakob Count Czernin von Chudenitz in Warsaw in 1695. Neither Polish nor Czech nor Austrian historians paid any attention to it. Based on this, however, it is possible to demonstrate perfectly how tense the relations between Emperor Leopold I and the Polish King John III Sobieski, who, at the end of their lives, were officially allies in the Holy League. The author first briefly introduces this mission and then, using it as an example, attempts to show how the travels of the imperial ambassadors of that time were organised and also unveils other additional aspects of the diplomatic service. Above all he reconstructed the court of Count Czernin, who was surrounded by over 80 people, and also located the place of his accommodation in Warsaw and showed which apartment the Count possessed as an ambassador. Finally, he examined the question of the financial costs of this stay, and documented the fact that the ambassador had to pay many expenses from his own pocket, and that this mission had cost him cca. 50,000 guldens.

Keywords: diplomacy – 17th Century – Poland – Leopold I – John III Sobieski – Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz

Up till now neither in the Czech nor in the Polish nor in the Austrian historiography has any work in regard to the diplomatic mission of Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz to Poland in 1695 originated. In the Czech environment this is not surprising, because until recently almost no one there was actually dealing with the diplomacy of the early modern period and this situation has only improved during the last five years by the publication of the results of the systematic research work that was carried...
out by authors from České Budějovice, Pardubice and Prague. In 2017, the first Czech scientific monograph concerning the imperial diplomats during the years 1640–1740 should be completed in collaboration of researchers from Pardubice and Prague. This has all been made possible not only through archival research, but also through inspiration that has been engendered especially by Anglo-Saxon and German historiography that have been engaged in researching early modern diplomacy over the long term and since the 1970's their approach to this issue has developed and changed markedly. Especially by now the new views and works of Klaus Müller and William J. Roosen have already

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2 The state of knowledge in the Czech environment was summed up by Jiří HRBEK in Cesty evropské historiografie k diplomacii raného novověku [The Ways of European Historiography to Early Modern Diplomacy], Theatrum historiae 13, 2013, pp. 7–30. Since then, several specialised studies have originated that have significantly widen our understanding of this subject matter. See Jiří KUBEŠ, Jan Marek z Clary a Aldringenu jako vyslanec Leopolda I. u saského kurfiřtského dvora na konci 17. století [Johann Marcus Count von Clary und Aldringen as the Envoy of Leopold I at the Saxon Court of the Prince-elector at the End of the 17th Century], Český časopis historický 113, 2015, pp. 346–380; IDEM, Kaple císařských vyslanců v Drážďanech v druhé půli 17. století [Chapels of Imperial Legates in Dresden in the Second Half of the 17th Century], Folia Historica Bohemica 30, 2015, pp. 127–156; Martin BAKEŠ, Diplomatika mise jako nejistá investice. Antonín Jan z Nostic u stockholmského královského dvora (1685–1690) [The Diplomatic Mission as a Non-guaranteed Investment. Anton Johann von Nostitz at the Stockholm Royal Court (1685–1690)], Český časopis historický 113, 2015, pp. 714–747; IDEM, Mimořádná diplomatika mise Adolfa Vratislava ze Šternberka do Rosice [Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission of Adolf Vratislaw von Sternberg. The Kingdom of Sweden in the mid-1670’s, seen by the Emperor’s Envoy], Folia Historica Bohemica 29, 2014, No. 1, pp. 31–62; Rostislav SMÍŠEK, Anton Florian von Liechtenstein und Rom. Selbstpräsentation eines kaiserlichen Gesandten zum Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts, in: Marek Vařeka – Aleš Zářický (Hg.), Das Fürstenhaus Liechtenstein in der Geschichte der Länder der Böhmisichen Krone, Ostrava – Vaduz 2013, pp. 197–212; Monika KONRÁDOVÁ – Rostislav SMÍŠEK, Jan Kryštof z Fragsteinu a jeho diplomatická cesta do Ruska v letech 1657–1658 [Johann Christoph von Fragstein and his Diplomatic Mission to Russia 1657–1658], Opera historica 16, 2015, No. 2, pp. 247–268; Monika HRUŠKOVÁ, Každodenní život císařských vyslanců v Polsku v druhé polovině 17. století [Everyday Life of the Imperial Diplomats in Poland during the Second Half of the 17th Century], České Budějovice 2012 (thesis at the Faculty of Arts of the University of South Bohemia); Anežka HREBIKOVÁ, Štěpán Vilém Kinský jako císařský vyslanec v Rusku Petra Velikého v letech 1721–1722. Acta Legationis Moscoviticae aneb Diplomatiké relace jako raně novověký pramen [Stephan Wilhelm Kinsky as the Imperial Envoy in Russia of Peter the Great, 1721–1722. Acta Legationis Moscoviticae or Diplomatic Relations as an Early Modern Source], Prague 2016 (thesis, the Department of Auxiliary Historical Sciences and Archive Studies, the Faculty of Arts of Charles University in Prague) and several others.

3 See the basic information about the project Bohemian and Moravian Nobility in the Diplomatic Service of the Austrian Habsburgs (1640–1740) available at URL: <http://uhv.upce.cz/cs/gacr-project-nobility-and-diplomacy/> [cit. 7. 11. 2016].

4 The current discussions have been summarised, for example, by Matthias KÖHLER in Neue Forschungen zur Diplomatiegéschichte, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 40, 2013, No. 2, pp. 257–271; Sven EXTERNBRINK, Internationale Politik in der Frühen Neuzeit. Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung zu Diplomatie und Staatensystem, in: Hans-Christof Kraus – Thomas Nicklas (Hg.), Geschichte und Politik: Alte und Neue Wege, München 2007, pp. 15–39 or Michael ROHSCHNEIDER, Neue Tendenzen der diplomatiegeschichtlichen Erforschung des Westfälischen Friedenskongresses, in: Inken
become standard,\(^5\) which have since been followed-up by various culturalist studies,\(^6\) on which today’s new political history draws. All of these viewpoints and the results of Austrian historiography\(^7\) provide a new impulse to research the early modern diplomatic service within the environment of the Habsburg emperors, in which high-status, noble and wealthy aristocrats have played the key roles. Thanks to this development today we are gradually learning about the Emperor’s representatives’ individual diplomatic journeys, not only from the perspective of classical political history; instead we are dealing with this issue within the wider context of a perceived history of the diplomatic service, in which diplomatic ceremony, diplomatic immunity, faith in countries that follow other religions (raising the issue of ambassadorial chapels and chaplains), the communication networks of diplomats, gifts, the financial demands of diplomatic service, dealing with otherness and many other aspects have also played a key role. However, not always does our source base allow us to learn the answers to all these questions, but as the present study attempts to show, the mission of Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz that took place in Poland in 1695 is still hiding a large – and as yet unappreciated – potential.

The relationships between the Austrian Habsburg Monarchy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the second half of the 17th Century are certainly not unknown. Research, however, has long been dominated by the issue of the Polish participation in the liberation of Vienna from the clutches of the Ottoman Turks’ forces in 1683 and therefore this important historical event has indeed been explored in great detail.\(^8\) Taking a closer

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8 Production currently, as of 1683, is essentially disorganised and, at the same time, multilingual. Cf. at least the monograph by Jan WIMMER, *Odsiecz wiedeńska 1683 roku* [The Polish Help to Besieged Vienna in 1683], Warszawa 1983; the anthology Robert WEISENBERGER (Hg.), *Die Türken vor Wien. Europa und die Entscheidung an der Donau 1683*, Salzburg – Wien 1982; Andrew WHEATCROFT, *The Enemy at the Gate: The Habsburgs, the Ottomans, and the Battle for Europe,*
look it becomes evident that other issues did not receive such thorough attention. There are not many specific contributions regarding the links between sovereigns, their families, foreign policy and individual diplomatic missions.\(^9\) In terms of the history of diplomacy the Polish \textit{Sejm} elections, at which the imperial diplomats were always present, aroused the greatest interest,\(^10\) but mutual relationships during times of the rule of individual sovereigns remained, with exceptions, outside the interest range of researchers.\(^11\) The Polish, Czech and Austrian historiographies are thereby noticeably missing a treatise on imperial ambassadors and their positions in the Polish Royal Court because even a cursory peek at the standard list of diplomatic representatives reveals that the Emperor regularly sent his diplomats to his northern neighbour paradoxically, however he did not maintain an ordinary ambassador there, as did the French King Louis XIV.\(^12\)

As also happened in other instances the diplomatic relationships between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Polish Kings reached a new phase during the second part of the Thirty Years’ War, when the Emperor was slowly but surely expanding his network to spread

\(^{9}\) Cf. the overview study by Michael KOMASZYŃSKI, \textit{Die Rivalität zwischen Habsburgern und Bourbonen am polnischen Hof im 17. Jahrhundert}, Österreichische Osthefte 32, 1990, pp. 116–128. The author defined the basic contours of the issue throughout the entire century.


\(^{11}\) Only the activities of John III Sobieski during the Holy League in the 1680’s received a certain amount of attention. See Kazimierz PIWARSKI, \textit{Między Francją a Austrią: Z dziejów polityki Jana III Sobieskiego w latach 1687–1690} [Between France and Austria: History of Politics of John III Sobieski between 1687 and 1690], Kraków 1933. Although he treats the subject in the spirit of the classic history of diplomacy the author reflects the interests of both the imperial and the French parties and therefore he is primarily interested in the subject matter of the specific negotiations and in the treaties that were concluded. From the perspective of the Austrian Habsburgs this issue was addressed by Albert RILLE (Hg.), \textit{Aus den letzten Jahren der Regierung des polnischen Königs Johann Sobieski 1689–1696. Berichte des kaiserlichen Ministers Geöge von Schiemunsky an Ferdinand Fürst von Dietrichstein, Präsidenten der geheimen Konferenz, im Archiv Nikolsburg}, in: Zeitschrift des Deutschen Vereins für die Geschichte Mährens und Schlesiens 15, 1911, pp. 312–338, 430–465; M. HRUŠKOVÁ, \textit{Každodenní život} or Martin BAKEŠ, \textit{Kryštof Václav z Nostic a jeho diplomatická cesta na území Polsko-litevské unie v roce 1693} [Christoph Wenzel von Nostitz and his Diplomatic Journey to the Polish-Lithuanian Union in 1693], Východočeský sborník historický 24, 2013, pp. 99–119.

\(^{12}\) Cf. Ludwig BITTNER – Lothar GROSS (Hg.), \textit{Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648)}, I. Band (1648–1715), Berlin 1936, pp. 159–160. Unfortunately the list of imperial residents and ambassadors is incomplete, however.
his permanent representation to other European countries. From 1635 onwards, with short breaks, the Habsburgs sent their resident representatives to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, i.e. they did not maintain a diplomat of the first rank there over the long-term as they had done during the 17th Century in Madrid. This did not mean, however, that the Emperor would completely underestimate the Polish issue. This is to say that the local imperial resident, if necessary, would be accompanied by an extraordinary ambassador, whose legation would most likely be restricted time-wise to the period of the Sejm, which traditionally was held at least once every two years. A special chapter, of course, is represented by the afore-mentioned electoral Sejms, that always took place after the death of the monarch and at which Habsburg diplomacy was always very visibly represented.\(^{13}\)

The Emperor, however, did not send his extraordinary ambassadors to every Sejm – he sent them there only when he was forced to do so due to problems that were occurring in the international arena. It could be seen beautifully during the period of the long Turkish War from 1683 to 1699. At the outset Ambassador Karl Ferdinand von Waldstein concluded a treaty of alliance and subsequently the Poles also entered into the Holy League.\(^{14}\) Then during the 1680’s they were mostly helping the Emperor so that there was no need for greater diplomatic efforts to ensure that the cooperation would take place. In the late 1680’s and the early 1690’s, however, the situation began to change under the influence of some Turkish achievements and based on French diplomacy, that sought to dismantle the anti-Turkey alliance.\(^{15}\) The Poles had become less and less willing to participate in the Holy League struggles and instead they were listening to French diplomats. In this situation, it was vital for the Emperor to ensure the cooperation of the Polish King, and therefore it was not acceptable for a diplomat of the lower rank to take care of all the Emperor’s issues and therefore ambassadors appeared during the Sejms, which enjoyed a far greater degree of seriousness in the contemporary society and whose legation received greater privileges and honour on the basis of their degree of importance for the host court. Therefore in the 1690’s an imperial ambassador would attend every Polish-Lithuanian Sejm and sometimes he even arrived at times when the Sejm was not


\(^{14}\) Both of the treaties were made available, for example in the work of Zbigniew WÓJCIK (ed.), *Traktaty polsko-austriackie z drugiej połowy XVII wieku* [Polish-Austrian Treaties from the Second Half of the 17th Century], Warszawa 1985, pp. 104–122 (Warsaw, 31. 3. 1683), 123–134 (Linz, 5. 3. 1684).

\(^{15}\) K. PIWARSKI, *Między Francją a Austrią*, esp. pp. 111–156. Vienna rebounded from the first onslaught of French diplomacy when it succeeded in pushing through the marriage of Prince James Sobieski with the Emperor’s cousin, the Princess of Palatinate-Neuburg (1689–1690). Then in 1691 the King again went into the field. After an unsuccessful campaign, however, French diplomacy had increasingly become about scoring points.
taking place. This position was sequentially occupied by eminent noblemen, all of whom came from the Czech lands.\textsuperscript{16} They included Franz Sigmund Graf von Thun (spring 1691 in Warsaw), Christoph Wenzel Graf von Nostitz (at the beginning of 1693 in Grodno), Georg Adam Graf von Martinitz (at the turn of 1693 and 1694 in Warsaw) and the last regular \textit{Sejm} during the reign of John III Sobieski that took place at the beginning of 1695 in Warsaw was participated in by Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz.\textsuperscript{17}

Count Czernin (1659–1710), who in 1695 was the Bohemian \textit{Oberlandmarschall}, belonged to the elite Czech nobility and, relatively speaking, we know a lot about him. His Grand Tour, for example, was described in great detail;\textsuperscript{18} we know about his contribution to the construction and the equipping of the Czernin Palace in Prague’s Hradčany;\textsuperscript{19} we know that he was lending a lot and often to the Habsburgs\textsuperscript{20} and that by the end of his life he had become the \textit{Oberstburggraf} of the Kingdom of Bohemia.\textsuperscript{21} No one paid great attention to his career or his diplomatic service, however, and erroneous information is even now circulating in Czech literature that he spent three years in Poland (\textit{sic}).\textsuperscript{22} This is in part due to the fact that the Czernin family archive in Jindřichův Hradec has not yet been organised in a modern format, nor has it been provided with an inventory. It does contain, however, six extensive Kart.\textsc{es} of materials that document his diplomatic activities in Poland in detail.\textsuperscript{23} Preserved there are the original of the imperial instruction,
rescripts, copies of 19 reports, a portion of the accounting documentation, lists of the members of the Ambassador’s court, the house rules of the Ambassador’s palace and also a portion of the personal correspondence received, including the concepts of Czernin’s responses.24 Unfortunately the section Polen in the Staatenabteilungen fund of Haus-, Hof- and Staatsarchiv in Vienna is not in the same condition because almost nothing from the 1690’s was preserved there.25

In this study we are seeking not only to present basic information about the hitherto unknown mission, but also to reveal additional aspects of the diplomatic service. This will mostly be about the reconstruction of the Court of Hermann Jakob Czernin as an imperial ambassador and to see to what extent it resembles the Court of Emperor Leopold I, whom he represented (during his mission the Polish King was required to behave to the Count as if he himself was the Emperor). It is also important in this context to know where this man was housed and what spatial and social backgrounds in Warsaw he possessed. Usually not much attention is paid to these issues, whereby most of the authors are satisfied with the laconic statement that most of the ambassadors had rented a house, and that when they came a few dozen servants arrived with them, but what they do not choose to address is how large the diplomat’s abode was, which spaces the diplomats occupied there and who had actually stayed at his Court. We believe, however, that both the social and the spatial background of the embassy represented keys to understanding the manner in which the mission functioned. To put it simply we will be looking at the embassy as representing a spatially anchored social unit, one that is created by an ambassador, his servants, together with other diplomats and a number of their friends and acquaintances who supported the Habsburg policy. Thereby, right in front of our eyes, appears the “team” that Czernin had available to enforce the Emperor’s ideas. In

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24 These are the letters from the Reichshofratspräsident Gottlieb von Windischgrätz, the Oberstkämmerer Karl Ferdinand von Waldstein, the Bohemian Oberstkanzler Franz Ulrich Kinsky and Bohemian Vizekanzler and also the Ambassador’s brother, i.e. Thomas Zacchaeus Czernin von Chudenitz. Additionally correspondence is also taking place with some allies in Poland (e.g. Nuncio Andrea Santacroce) and also with certain people who had been indispensable for Czernin’s legation, i.e. the Legation Secretary Johann Eberhard von Hövel from Głogów and the Imperial Resident in Poland Georg Schiemunsky.

25 Czernin’s legation is documented there only through a few letters sent by the Ambassador to the Bohemian Oberstkanzler Franz Ulrich Kinsky and the letters of a certain Baron Piccinardi (a secret imperial agent perhaps?) to Emperor Leopold I. See Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien (hereinafter referred to as ÖStA Wien), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereinafter referred to as HHStA), Staatenabteilungen, Polen I, Kart. 82, fol. 22–83. Kart. 84 and 87, contrary to expectations, do not contain any documents that are related to Czernin’s mission. Unfortunately neither the originals of Czernin’s reports nor his diary – which he demonstrably kept – have been found in this fund.
this way we will “populate” the otherwise relatively simple story about the Ambassador’s negotiations with the Polish King and his courtiers.

**Czernin’s mission, viewed from the perspective of international relations**

Hermann Jakob Czernin was to arrange in Warsaw that the Polish King John III Sobieski should continue to actively support the activities of the Holy League against the Turks, i.e. to support the recruitment of troops in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and their transference to Hungary or elsewhere and, notably, to prevent the King from stepping outside the League or signing a separate peace treaty with the Turks to resolve this ongoing long war (1683–1699). This is to say that after Belgrade had fallen-back into Turkish hands in 1690 they had already captured signals in Vienna that some of the influential Polish magnates, including the Queen Marie Casimire de La Grange d’Arquien herself (she was of French origin), listened more and more frequently to French diplomacy, which was actually attempting to engender the disintegration of the Holy League. Czernin spent cca. three months during the first half of 1695 in Warsaw in the rank of an imperial ambassador. He set off from Vienna on the 12th January and he had arrived in Warsaw via Prague and Wrocław incognito not till after the 1st February 1695. After his ceremonial entry, during which the first ceremonial problems appeared on the 10th February, he subsequently underwent his first public audience with John III Sobieski on the 17th February. The Queen gave Czernin his first audience a day later and

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27 The journey is summarised in Czernin’s first report to the Emperor which is stored in the SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 284, fol. 93–101, Warsaw, 3. 2. 1695, here fol. 93.


29 The basic data about the first audiences have been collected by K. MÜLLER, *Die kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, esp. pp. 129–137; W. J. ROOSEN, *The Age of Louis XIV*, pp. 117–119. In regard
it was held in an ambience of slight tension.30 Thereby the Imperial Ambassador became accredited in the Court and was able to engage in its life on a formal basis.

Czernin’s tasks were basically the same as those of his predecessors, who were legated by Leopold I to work in his favour as ambassadors during the meeting of the Polish-Lithuanian Sejm, whether they were held in Warsaw, Grodno or somewhere else. Eventually Ambassador Czernin did not arrange anything about the Sejm, because his activities were paralysed by internal divisions, with which the Ambassador was forbidden to interfere by the Emperor.31 Although the Sejm began in mid-January, its first two weeks were filled with arguments without even proceeding to the election of the Marshal of the Sejm who should be elected at the very beginning to preside over the subsequent proceedings.32 When he arrived in Warsaw in early February Czernin himself found the Sejm in such a state, and since even the following days did not bring any improvement of the situation,33 he was not surprised when the Sejm was dissolved on the 19th February, which meant that he could not – in contrast to his predecessor, Count Nostitz – present his official speech either then or there.34 According to the Ambassador and his people, so far nothing was lost yet, however, because it was expected that the King would convene a senatus consultum, i.e. a committee of the most prominent senators who were to advise the King during a period in which the Sejm was not convened. Also the pro-Emperor member of the mighty noble families Sapieha and Lubomirski should have been present there so that the opinions of the opponents of French diplomacy could thereby be heard.35

30 SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily Kart. 284, Czernin’s report to the Emperor, Warsaw, 24. 2. 1695, here fol. 141–142. On the same day the Ambassador’s official audiences with the King’s sons took place.
31 The events that took place on the Sejm and the King’s policy in that period are summarised by Zbigniew WÓJCIK, Jon Sobieski 1629–1696 [John Sobieski 1629–1696], Warsaw 1983, pp. 488–503.
35 The experienced legation secretary Hövel was calming Czernin down in this respect. Cf. SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 283, fol. 30–31, Hövel to Czernin, Warsaw, 27. 1. 1695. The reasons for the cooperation of the initially pro-French Lubomirski with the Emperor and Sapieha during this period are discussed by Kazimierz PIWARSKI, Hieronim Lubomirski: hetman wielki koronny [Hieronymus Lubomirski: Great Crown Hetman], Krakow 1929, esp. pp. 48–54.
Although the strength of the Sapiehas or Lubomirskis should not be underestimated since 1691 a significant part of the Royal Court and of the Polish magnateria had already begun to accept the French ambassador’s view that the war depletes the country and that it is necessary to suspend fighting and withdraw from the League while continuing to maintain neutrality. In this situation sentiment towards concluding a separate peace treaty with the Turks and Tatars increased, which was fully manifested primarily in the King’s meetings with the senators (senatus consulta) and also at sessions of the War Council that took place in the spring of 1695. According to Czernin the attitude of John III Sobieski was also slowly changing. And so it is no surprise that the sessions had a somewhat explosive atmosphere from the outset and while the monarch attempted to strengthen his position there he ran into opposition from some senators and in early March the atmosphere came to a head. Then simply an informal meeting between the King and Cardinal Radziejowski together with several senators was held, whereby the completely differing opinions of the Poles and the Lithuanians immediately surfaced.

During Czernin’s stay no decision had been made concerning the recruitment of troops to Hungary because everything else was drowned in April not only by the internal Polish-Lithuanian disputes, but also by the problem of granting a final audience to the Imperial Ambassador, thereby ensuring that further negotiations would be completely impossible. One specific pretext for denying a final audience with the King of Poland was an incident that occurred on the 1st March. On that day Count Czernin went on one of his customary visits to the Royal Castle and left his carriage guarded by his servants in front of the castle. Suddenly, however, someone started throwing various items from the upper floors of the castle and one of Czernin’s hajduks fired at the attackers and hit and fatally injured one of them. He was a Squire of Polish nationality, who subsequently succumbed to his injuries. Although it was very unpleasant situation for the Ambassador,
by the end of March everything seemed to have been resolved thanks to an intermediary intervention by the Royal Confessor. Czernin had made an agreement with the injured party, in which he pledged to provide financial compensation while the King expressed himself in the manner that he would not require any additional compensation from the Ambassador.  

41 Things changed in the second half of April, however, when Czernin wished to complete his stay in Warsaw and began negotiating the terms for his final audience with the King. Despite the initial assurance that he would be granted an audience shortly in fact everything turned out differently. The King now demanded satisfaction for the March incident, wanted the hajduk’s head and refused to grant an audience to the Count.  

42 The Imperial Ambassador was writing desperate letters to Vienna, complaining that it now looks to the world as if he is in prison there, and asking for advice. Additionally, he was trying to influence the King through various prominent people. This had remained fruitless for a long time and in early May it even appeared that he would have to leave without any official farewell. Only after a sequence of mediations by influential clerics was his journey to the coveted audience finally settled and the date was set for Saturday the 8th of May at Wilanów Chateau. The final visit of the King would take place in the morning and of the Queen in the afternoon, as also happened. Apparently not a word was uttered during either of the two very short visits concerning the contentious issue because it was expected that the Polish King would deal with the matter directly with the Emperor. Both the parties generally assured each other of their mutual affection and of their cooperation within the Holy League. From few details it was still possible, however, to feel the tensions that prevailed between the Ambassador and some of the Poles.  

43 It is interesting that no detailed news dealing with the activities of the Imperial Ambassador in Poland that spring were occuring in the most important contemporary Central European newspapers and the tensions between both the neighbours was not discussed in public.  

44 According to the Munich newspapers the Imperial Ambassador “ist

SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 285, fol. 8–13, an undated concept of a letter. I will deal with this matter in another article of mine that will be published in Poland during 2017.  

41 Cf. J. WOLIŃSKI (ed.), Kazimierz Sarnecki, p. 207. Only then did Ambassador Czernin inform Emperor Leopold I of the matter in a special report. Cf. SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 284, fol. 153, a list of the people from Czernin’s entourage who were with him on 1. 3. 1695 at the Court; Ibidem, fol. 155–179, 216–217, 230–234, deeds concerning the course of the dispute in March 1695.  


43 SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 286, Czernin to the Emperor, Lubochnia, 10. 5. 1695, fol. 297–309.  

44 See Hamburger Relations-Courier, Die Europäische Relation (Altona), Ordentliche wochentliche Post-Zeitungen (Munich), Braunschweigische Post-Zeitung, Saltzburgische Ordinari-Zeitungen, etc.
sehr vergnügt abgereist” and nearly the same news appeared in Salzburg. Count Czernin supposedly “mit höchster Satisfaction von dem Königlichen Hoff seine Abreiß widerumb alhero nacher Wien angetreten”.\(^45\) However, we can learn from the ambassador’s report to the Emperor that in the evening of the 8\(^{th}\) May angry Czernin was already on his way from Warsaw and his mood was improved only shortly afterwards by his heartfelt farewell from Cardinal Radziejowski on the 9\(^{th}\) and the 10\(^{th}\) May at his country estate in Radziejowice.\(^46\) Then he travelled through his Silesian estates to Bohemia, where he was going to see his sick wife.

Czernin eventually arrived in Vienna in mid-July 1695, to report to Leopold I personally on his diplomatic mission. Though we do not know anything yet about the course of his audience, we can assume that Czernin was not accepted so enthusiastically at the Court. Although in regard to the ceremonial aspects he received the appropriate honours in Poland, he brought with him an unresolved dispute with the King, who continued to demand satisfaction for the March incident. Even though eventually the Polish King did not conclude a separate peace treaty that year and nor did he secede from the Holy League, at the same time he did not send any help to the Emperor to Hungary. French diplomacy thereby managed to reach its own, because in practice John III Sobieski basically stopped helping the Emperor. Typical of this situation was that shortly after the departure of the Imperial Ambassador for home, the French ambassador prepared a banquet for the Royal Couple at Służewiec Chateau, which belonged to the pro-French oriented Polish Crown Secretary,\(^47\) while from other sources we learn that the King spent a lot of time in the summer of 1695 in the company of the French Ambassador Polignac.\(^48\)

\(^{45}\) See *Ordentliche wochentliche Post-Zeitungen*, Num. XXIV, 11. 6. 1695 and *Saltzburgische Ordinari-Zeitungen auß Wienn*, Num. XLIII, 31. 5. 1695.

\(^{46}\) SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 286, Czernin to the Emperor, Lubochnia, 10. 5. 1695, fol. 309–310. Czernin wrote that “auch gestern abentß von selben mit einen schönen Mariae muttergottes bilt und türkischen tapet regaliret worden, welcheß mich dan heint biß zu dessen aufwachung alldorten annoch aufgehalten, umb mich persönlich zubedancken, deme dan in gegengedechtnuß eines von meinen handpferden verehret und alßo in genzlicher vertreüligkeit mit ihme mich geschiden.”

\(^{47}\) See *Theatrum Europaeum, Volume 14 (1691–1695)*, Frankfurt am Main 1702, p. 822. The banquet was held on 23. 5. 1695.

\(^{48}\) Cf. A. SKRZYPIETZ, *Francuskie zabiegi o koronę polską*, p. 53.
Personnel, spatial and financial backing for Czernin’s embassy

As we already know, Hermann Jakob Czernin spent the greater part of the first half of 1695 in Warsaw as an imperial ambassador. Because this was a very politically responsible and ceremonially demanding function (a crowned head sending its representative to another crowned head, should in accordance with the law at that time obtain a royal admission) an ambassador without certain customary social habits and with only a little background could not be sent to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This function required a wealthy nobleman who was accustomed to moving around in courtly society and who was surrounded by an appropriately large court. All of these requirements Count Czernin satisfied abundantly, but – like most imperial ambassadors – he had never been in Poland before (his Grand Tour had taken him only to countries located in Southern and Western Europe), so additionally he had to be accompanied by more experienced men who helped him with everything and who knew a country from their own eye-witness observation.

Usually within the embassy the legation secretary used to be a true professional and an expert in diplomacy though often in the second half of the 17th Century none was appointed. If the Emperor assigned him to any mission, it was evident that its outcome would be of great importance for him. Legation secretaries had always been chosen from the ranks of educated, experienced and proven men who – ideally – had already visited the land into which they were to head at least once more. An ambassador usually did not interfere with their selection himself but it was also in his interest to get along well with them. In fact, they were partly following his written agenda, but in addition they also alleviated the ambassador’s day-to-day life by representing him at meetings of lesser importance. The legation secretary of Czernin’s mission was Johann Eberhard von Hövel, then already an older and very experienced man, who, during the previous 25 years, had travelled throughout almost all the Northern and the Eastern states. First, however, he had been in Sweden twice (in 1670–1671 and in 1673–1674) and after his return he had worked in the Reichskanzlei in Vienna. He also visited the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth twice (in 1683 and 1693) and Russia once (in 1684). He was knighted for his merits in 1686, but then he left Vienna and was active in the Duchy of Głogów, where he served as the secretary of the local authority at the same time that Christoph Wenzel von Nostitz was working there as the Landeshauptmann. With him he also visited the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the year 1693. However, after 1695 we did not

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49 In regard to legation secretaries in detail see K. MÜLLER, Die kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen, pp. 94–101.
have any fresh news from or about him.⁵⁰ His contemporaries welcomed his selection for
the post of the legation secretary in Czernin’s mission. One nobleman wrote about him
approvingly, saying: “Das der herr secretarius von Hövel seine herrn gesandten hoffstatt
vermehren sollen, glaube gar wohl, er hat wissenschaft und derentwegen die priora im
copf…”⁵¹

In this case it is evident from sources what we usually do not learn, and this is how
Hövel found out that he should go with Czernin to Poland. Surprisingly he did not learn
it from the Reichskanzlei nor from any other authority, but from a personal message from
a man whom he had apparently never seen in his life and did not know – i.e. directly
from Count Czernin. He wrote to him on the 8th December 1694 from Vienna, that after
his arrival at the Court he learned that he was to become an Ambassador to the Sejm
and that Hövel had been assigned to him as his secretary. Therefore although they do
not know each other, he is writing to Hövel to announce this news to him and he hopes
that he will significantly assist him on the journey with his “villberihmbter capacitet”. At
the same time he is also promising him that in the future he will reward him for all his
“treuer assistenz”.⁵² Originally Czernin planned that Hövel would join his entourage in
Wrocław but the situation eventually evolved in such a manner that the secretary went
to Poland ahead of him. What was to blame was waiting for an instruction that delayed
Czernin’s departure from Vienna, and also direct orders that Hövel received from the
Reichskanzlei. On Twelfth Night he therefore left Głogów and by the 15th of January he
was already in Warsaw, where he joined a local imperial resident and together they were
preparing everything that was needed for the arrival of the Ambassador.⁵³

This brings us to another very important character of the mission, i.e. to the imperial
resident in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He was then Georg von Schiemunsky
(† 1696), who as well as Hövel was not any beginner, because he had already been

⁵⁰ For the basic information see ibidem, pp. 183 and 210; while Martin BAKEŠ documents individual
missions in his Habsbursko-švédské diplomatické vztahy v období vlády Karla XI. (1672–1697)
[Swedish-Habsburg Relations during the Reign of Charles XI (1672–1697)], a thesis for the Institute
of Historical Sciences, the Faculty of Arts of the University of Pardubice, Pardubice 2014, pp. 27–28;
IDEM, Kryštof Václav z Nostic, p. 107. Additionally cf. L. BITTNER – L. GROSS (Hg.), Repertorium,
p. 165 including his correspondence with Czernin in SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in
Kart. 283.
⁵¹ SOA Plzeň, the section in Klášter, RA Nosticů (Planá), Kart. 49, a letter from Johann Jakob von
Gastheim to Christoph Wenzel von Nostitz, 2. 2. 1695, Vienna.
⁵² SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 283, fol. 3, Czernin to Hövel (a concept), Vienna,
8. 12. 1694.
⁵³ Ibidem, fol. 6, Czernin to Hövel (a concept), Vienna, 15. 12. 1694 and ibidem, fol. 26–27, Hövel to
Czernin, Warsaw, 20. 1. 1695.
operating in this country since the turn of 1683 and 1684.\textsuperscript{54} During the time of Czernin’s legation he had proved indispensable both for the logistic securing of the embassy and for his knowledge of the local environment, although at that time he was thinking about his departure from office.\textsuperscript{55} Czernin had already written his first letter to him on the 4\textsuperscript{th} December 1694 in which he informed him about his appointment as an ambassador and his scheduled arrival in Warsaw. Because he did not know the City the newly appointed ambassador was asking the resident to help him with the provision of adequate accommodation and catering. In particular, he was interested in renting an imposing house and therefore he was asking Schiemunsky to send him a groundplan of the building that he had selected including the dimensions of the rooms. For representing his position he required not only suitable premises but he also needed to know where and how he would accommodate his large number of servants.\textsuperscript{56}

An diplomat’s entourage and servants – this is another relatively largely unknown part of the history of diplomacy.\textsuperscript{57} From previous research it is obvious that the ambassador’s household fulfilled a relatively large number of different tasks. Not only did it take care of the personal needs of its master, but also of his family, which in the case of longer missions, followed the ambassador abroad. It had to also ensure the communication between the ambassador and the host environment – the servants were in charge of catering and care of the ambassador’s guests and various other representative activities (entries, audiences and celebrations), so there had to be enough of them there and reasonably experienced and noble people had to be at their head.\textsuperscript{58} All this can also be observed at Czernin’s Court.

\begin{footnote}{54}{Basic information is provided by L. BITTNER – L. GROSS (Hg.), Repertorium, p. 160, according to whom he was operating there, with some breaks, from March 1684 till January 1695. This is not entirely accurate, because Emperor Leopold I had already appointed him to an office in Linz in December 1683 (Acta historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia ab anno 1507 usque ad annum 1795, Volume 6, 1883, pp. 572–573) and he had demonstrably worked in Warsaw even for the whole year in 1695 and he died there of dropsy on Saturday 11. 2. 1696. In more detail M. HRUŠKOVÁ, Každodenní život, p. 15 and elsewhere; A. RILLE (Hg.), Aus den letzten Jahren; J. WOLINSKI (ed.) lists the date and the cause of his death in Kazimierz Sarnecki, p. 324.}

\begin{footnote}{55}{Cf. his correspondence with Czernin from December 1694–February 1695 and from May 1695–January 1696 in SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 282, fol. 212–223 and ibidem, Kart. 285, fol. 175–286.}

\begin{footnote}{56}{Ibidem, Kart. 282, fol. 212, Czernin to Hövel (a concept), Vienna, 4. 12. 1694.}

\begin{footnote}{57}{Cf. K. MÜLLER, Die kaiserliche Gesandtswesen, pp. 88–111. The author, however, was mainly focused on legation secretaries and additional diplomatic personnel, while in regard to the actual Courts of the ambassadors (including their wives and servants) he only referred to ibidem, pp. 108–111. Additionally also, for example, there was Phyllis S. LACHS, The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II & James II, New Brunswick 1965, p. 66–79.}

\begin{footnote}{58}{See also, for example, Martin KRUMMHOLZ, Gallasovský hofmistr Johann Heinrich Dienebier (1677–1748) [The Hofmeister of the Gallas Family Johann Heinrich Dienebier (1677–1748)], Theatrum historiae 9, 2011, pp. 375–395, here pp. 379–382.}
The Count had probably originally planned to take his wife Maria Josepha, born Countess Slavata, with him to Poland. She arrived with him from Vienna to Prague in January 1695 but in the end she did not actually accompany him on his mission.\(^59\) Probably it was thought that the Polish legation would not last too long (the Sejm always sat for just a few weeks), so Hermann Jakob Czernin left her behind in Prague. Despite remaining in Bohemia the Ambassador’s wife claimed ceremonial precedence in Prague noble society.\(^60\) Notable individuals were surprised by that, pointing to examples from the past and did not want to admit this precedence to her. Therefore Maria Josepha sometimes did not go out in society.\(^61\) Yet eventually, in a Prague church, she got into a dispute and all of this had to be resolved at the Court in Vienna. She was ordered to apologise.\(^62\) Czernin’s wife then moved from Prague to Carlsbad.\(^63\)

Although Count Czernin did not bring his wife to Poland, albeit he did take care to have sufficient, though not an exaggerated number of servants, supervised, if possible, by noble people who should occupy some significant functions that normally did not exist at his court. He acted as did his predecessors. The surviving lists of courtiers and

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\(^59\) Cf. SOA Plzeň, the section in Klášter, RA Nosticů (Planá), Kart. 47, a letter from Prince Ferdinand von Dietrichstein to Christoph Wenzel von Nostitz, 15. 12. 1694, Vienna (“Gr. Czernin liese ihme waß kosten, nicht in Pohlen zu gehen, daß negotium alda ist schwer, weilenn die Galli alda praevaliren, die zeit ist kurz und die spessen werden nicht klein sein, dan der graff wird sich sehen laßen wollen. Stehet annoch an, ob er sein fr. gemahlin mitnehmen wird.”) and ÖStA Wien, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (=AVA), Familienarchiv Harrach, Kart. 304, a letter from Wenzel Adalbert von Sternberg to Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach, 19. 1. 1695, Prague (“Vorgestern ist anhero kommen per posta herr graf Czernin sambt seiner gemahlin.”)

\(^60\) To the character of “ambassadress” see Charles MOSER, *L’Ambassadrice et ses Droits*, Berlin 1754 and the article of Laura Oliván Santaliestra in this volume.

\(^61\) “Nous avons icy mientenant beaucoup des princesses, la palatine, la dovariece marggrave de Baden, la duchesse de Saxe et une jeune princesse de Hessen. La comtesse de Czernin evite de se trouver dans les companies, parce qu’elle pretendit le rang comme feme d’un embassadeur et crain, que les autres ou luy (?) le disputeroit, parce qu’icy elle n’est pas embassadrice, ou que les autres chercheroit sens (?) assimble à part. Jousqu’à present elles n’ont pas esté ensamble et comme elle est niepce de ma feme ainsy elle vien chez nous à la petite table. Nous avons l’exemple du C. de Colowrat capitaine de Moravie [Franz Karl Liebsteinsky von Kolowrat], qui avoit esté deux an embassadeur en Pologne, avoir laissé sa feme icy sens pretandre le rang qu’une embassadrice, n’à pas en Pologne mesme. Je me suis informé aupres de M.r le grand chancellor [Franz Ulrich Kinsky], mais il ne me repons pas sur ce chapitre.” ÖStA Wien, AVA, Familienarchiv Harrach, Kart. 304, a letter from Adolf Wratislaw von Sternberg to Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach, 2. 2. 1695, Prague.

\(^62\) “Unsers nach den pohlnischen hoff spedierten bottschafters herren graaffen Czernins fraw gemahlin hat unlangst allhier in einer kirchen mit der verwittitben pfalzgrafin [Elisabeth Amalie, nee von Hessen-Darmstadt] oder sachslauenburgischen prinzessin einige competence angefangen, worüber sich dieße bey hoff beklagt, undt hat die erste destwegen auß key. befelich der pfalzgräffin satisfaction geben undt eine abbitt in dero behaußung thun müssen.” SOA Plzeň, the section in Klášter, RA Nosticů (Planá), Kart. 57, Daniel Mayer to Christoph Wenzel von Nostitz, 3. 3. 1695, Prague.

\(^63\) Ibidem, Mayer to Christoph Wenzel von Nostitz, 5. 6. 1695, Prague: “Unßer herr gesandter auß Pohlen ist noch zu Schmideberg, von wannen er nach Carlsbaad gehen, von dori seine gemahlin abholen undt mit derselben sodann ferner nach Wien gehen will.”
servants suggest that the Count brought with him more than 80 people, including several nobles (three Barons) and therefore he had available essentially the same entourage as Georg Adam von Martinitz who was heading to Rome at the same time (see Table 1).64

**Table 1:** The Court of Hermann Jakob Czernin when he was an imperial ambassador to Poland in 1695

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hofstatt</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz</td>
<td>Botschafter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baron Wenzel Czernin von Chudenitz</td>
<td>Kavalier</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baron Tarolt</td>
<td>Kavalier</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baron Dillherr</td>
<td>Marschalk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johann Eberhard von Hövel</td>
<td>Legationssekretarius</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ludolph Bockelkamp</td>
<td>Confidan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jesuit Priest</td>
<td>Beichtvater</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eberl from Mladá Boleslav</td>
<td>Leibmedicus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberofficer</td>
<td>Franz Xaver Locher</td>
<td>Hofmeister</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zesner; Kirchstehrer; Keller</td>
<td>Aufwarter</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karl Schubert</td>
<td>Sekretarius</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Küßwetter</td>
<td>Referendarius</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hans Ernst</td>
<td>Stallverseher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hans</td>
<td>Kammerdiener</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kaspar</td>
<td>Barbier</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph</td>
<td>Oberkoch</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unterofficer</td>
<td>Öhm</td>
<td>Kammerschreiber</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kammerdiener of Baron Czernin</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kammerdiener of Baron Dillherr</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schreiber of Mr. Hövel</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Giovannino</td>
<td>Paucker und Zwerg</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karl; Baltzer; Christoph; Hans Jakob</td>
<td>Pagien</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pagie of Baron Czernin</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karl; Hans; Paul; Andres</td>
<td>Trompeter</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64 Martinitz was accompanied by 90 people – see K. MÜLLER, *Die kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, p. 127. In regard to Czernin in detail in SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 282, fol. 157, 159, 161–162 (lists of the people from Vienna and Prague who accompanied Count Czernin) and 192 (an undated list of Czernin’s servants whom he took with him to Poland).
Some of them he knew well, as was the case with Wenzel Czernin von Chudenitz, his
distant relative.65 On the other hand, some of them he hired newly and only because of
his mission, such as a certain Baron “Tyllherr” – apparently a member of the old imperial
Dillherr von Alten family. He then entrusted him with the function of the Marshal of his
Court, and therefore behaved in the same way as Ambassador Schaffgotsch had thirty
years ago, who at the outset of his legation also requested a man with a Baron title to be

65 It was probably Wenzel Wilhelm Czernin von Chudenitz (1652–1698).
his Marshal.66 No Ambassador as a representative of the Emperor could do without this function, because although usually in the aristocratic courts this function did not exist,67 at the Viennese Court the Obersthofmarschall performed several vital functions. As the second highest-ranking man in the hierarchy of courtiers he could act as a deputy for the Obersthofmeister; he was in charge of accommodation for both his master and his visitors and during official visits he had to welcome and greet the guests. Additionally, he was entrusted with jurisdiction not only over the members of the court, but also in relation to foreign diplomats and their staff. Therefore, the two crowned heads and their respective ambassadors always communicated primarily through their marshals.68 Later on, however, Czernin regretted his choice because at the end of the Warsaw residence he broke-up badly with Dillherr and departed without him.69

Most of the others had already worked in the service of Hermann Jakob before this mission, since it is noted in partial lists that they had been taken from Czernin’s households in Vienna and in Prague. This applies in particular to the kitchen staff (11 people led by a chief cook), to the stable staff (16 persons led by the Stallmaster [Stallverseher]) and to a majority of the lackeys. Count Czernin had brought eight of them; one was brought by Baron Tarolt and the Doctor, while the Ambassador hired two more in Poland. As a representative of the Emperor Hermann Jakob was also obliged to have a guard. For this purpose, he brought with him 12 hajduks who were equipped with small-calibre

68 Mark HENGERER, Kaiserhof und Adel in der Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts. Eine Kommunikationsgeschichte der Macht in der Vormoderne, Konstanz 2004, pp. 418–419 talks about the status of a Obersthofmarschall being precarious for various reasons. That is certainly true, but perhaps the author somewhat underestimated his power – it is also important to acknowledge his powers in regard to his contact with foreign diplomats. L. AUER points it out in Diplomatisches Zeremoniell, pp. 42–43.
69 During the mission a dispute broke out between Czernin and his marshal that each of the parties involved interpreted differently. According to Dillherr Czernin was jealous that the Marshal had reported better news to Vienna than the Ambassador had and therefore he did not like him and finally also left him imprisoned. Resident Schiemunsky saw it differently, however – the reason that Czernin disliked Dillherr was the debts that the Marshal did not want to pay and eventually the Ambassador was obliged to pay them himself. The rift had gone so far that Dillherr simply left Czernin’s service but after his departure he remained in Warsaw and even became friends with the French ambassador. Eventually the Imperial Resident considered him to be a traitor and reported back to Czernin that Dillherr wanted to become an imperial resident in Poland instead of him. Cf. SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 285, esp. fol. 261–263, Schiemunsky to Czernin, Warsaw, 18. 5. 1695.
hunting rifles (so called Teschinken). The representative character of the entourage was also enhanced by a drummer and four trumpeters.\(^70\)

Count Czernin placed great emphasis on the composition and the size of his entourage and although it was not exactly the greatest of all those that the imperial ambassadors were bringing at that time to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (the largest were brought for electoral Sejms),\(^71\) we can assume that they were from amongst those who were exceptionally large and well equipped. This is evident both from the recognition of some contemporaries and also from the problem that arose regarding accommodating Czernin’s entourage in Warsaw. In his very first letter, which he wrote to the Imperial Resident Schiemunsky to Warsaw, the Count asked about ensuring that there would be adequate accommodation for himself and his people. The resident then replied that he was counting with it and had booked the same accommodation as another imperial ambassador had got recently, i.e. the already mentioned Georg Adam von Martinitz (who visited Poland at the turn of 1693 and 1694).\(^72\) He praised its great location near the Royal Castle and also the settlements of all the supporters of the imperial policy and sent to Czernin the requisite groundplan of the first floor of the house together with the room dimensions.\(^73\) However, when the Count looked at it, he adopted a clear and uncompromising position towards it – i.e. he could not stay in this house because its representative rooms on the first floor are too small (the dining room was apparently too small to be able to fit a large round table there for cca. 20 people that would still enable walking around it comfortably), there are also too few of them and in addition his servants could not also fit in this house. Therefore he asked the resident to find for him “eine etwas geraumbere behausung”, if necessary in the suburbs, because he had clear priorities: “Lieber die ungelegenheit der gassen als alzueeng zue wohnen…”\(^74\) From this decision it is possible to sense, amongst other things, Count Czernin’s rivalry with

\(^{70}\) Ibidem, Kart. 282, fol. 157, 159 and 161.

\(^{71}\) K. MÜLLER, *Die kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, p. 127 notes that Count Schaffgotsch (1669) came with 158 persons and Count Lamberg (1697) even with 200 people. In both cases the electoral Sejm was taking place. The size of the entourage for less significant events was usually smaller, as can be seen in the case of Schaffgotsch – in 1667 he took with him 80–100 people. In more detail L. ZIĄTKOWSKI, *Pozesłtwa Krzysztofa Leopolda Schaffgotscha*, p. 37.

\(^{72}\) L. BITTNER – L. GROSS (Hg.), *Repertorium*, p. 160 reported that he was in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in January 1695, but this is not true. Although not much information was preserved about this mission, there are the first and the last pages of his instructions from 7. 12. 1693. Cf. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Polen I, Kart. 82, fol. 20–21.


\(^{74}\) Ibidem, fol. 222–223, Czernin to Schiemunsky (a concept), Vienna, 29. 12. 1694.
Georg Adam von Martinitz, because it was originally Martinitz who had intended to go to Poland again, but eventually the Emperor sent him to Rome instead.

The resident was not pleased with that decision (any better accommodation in Warsaw had been booked long ago now) and his opinion was also shared by Hövel, the legation secretary, who arrived at the place in mid-January 1695 and immediately tried to persuade Count Czernin to reconsider it. His argument was that everything was heated and ready for his arrival, that the table would fit in the dining room, that it would also be possible to secure the neighbouring house, that the majority of palaces in the suburbs are not finished and that it will take a long time for them to heat it up. He also added that Count Martinitz was satisfied with this accommodation and that the Polish magnates also do not live in the suburbs, but in smaller houses located in the town. Hermann Jakob remained adamant, however – apparently he did not consider such housing worth while because when building his own projects he was really generous, but mainly it was about his position as an ambassador defining him as the embodiment of his sovereign. Eventually the resident and the legation secretary found a spacious but still unfinished palace for him in the Krakow suburbs belonging to the Denhoff family (which is now known as the Palace of Potocki) and thereby Czernin, of all the imperial ambassadors to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the second half of the 17th Century, had probably the most representative dwelling.

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77 Cf., for example, V. LORENC – K. TŘÍSKA, Černínský palác.

78 SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 284, fol. 122, Czernin to Leopold I, Warsaw, 10. 2. 1695. The Palace, which originated in the early 1690’s at the request of Ernest Denhoff (cca. 1630–1693) and that since the Baroque period has been rebuilt several times, is now the seat of the Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage.
The first floor housed an apartment that similarly to the Vienna Hofburg consisted of a hall, two anterooms, the audience room and a retirada.\textsuperscript{79} This composition of the apartment was not usual for the nobility – mostly nobles did not have an audience room and only had one anteroom,\textsuperscript{80} so it appears that even in his style of housing the Ambassador attempted to imitate his sovereign. According to the contemporary theorists of diplomacy it belonged to the standard rules every ambassador should fulfil.\textsuperscript{81} This is also reflected in the fact that at the end of December 1694 Count Czernin borrowed equipment for his audience room from the imperial warehouse tapestries, including the imperial canopy.\textsuperscript{82} Since his people were apparently not accustomed to the intricate layout of rooms in the manner of an imperial apartment, on that occasion Czernin issued new house rules that briefly defined the basic responsibilities of his groups of servants that clearly determined who is subject to whom (also highlighted in these rules is the function of the Marshal who should be responsible for the “\textit{standtsparada}”) and the Count also stipulated which rooms of his suite may be accessed by the different groups of his servants (cf. the Appendix with the edition of house rules). The house rules refer to Czernin’s entourage as representing a complex entity in which everyone involved has a clearly defined area in which s/he has to operate and cooperate with other servants. None of the rooms of the Ambassador’s suite should ever be left empty and everything was set so that any access to Count Czernin was graded (see Table 2) in order to maintain the relatively private character of the retirada. It could be unrestrictedly accessed by the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[82]{SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 282, fol. 164, Count Czernin’s loan certificate, 31. 12. 1694. The certificate states that Czernin borrowed the same equipment as Count Martinitz did before he went to Poland: “Ich unterschriebener bekhenne, das ich von dem kayerlichen tapezirer von der kayerlichen tapezerey nacher Pohilen habe mitgenohmen, auff ein zimmer domasko nemblch neun stuckh halten in blath zwey undt füntzig und drey sommete teppicht mit goldenen frantzen, zwey sammete pölster, einer hat vier quasten, der ander hat droy quasten, einen valdagin von domasko samt den ruckhblath und die zwey darzugehörige schnur, mehr einen türchischen banckh teppicht.”}
\end{footnotes}
Ambassador’s closest persons, e.g. his relative Wenzel Czernin, his long-term confidant Ludolph Bockelkamp, his chamberlain Hans and four pageboys.

**Table 2:** The accessibility of the individual rooms in the Ambassador’s suite in Warsaw for his servants in 1695

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>hall</th>
<th>1st anteroom</th>
<th>2nd anteroom</th>
<th>audience room</th>
<th>retirada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lackeys,</td>
<td>lackeys,</td>
<td>lackeys,</td>
<td>higher officers,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people from the stable,</td>
<td>trumpeters,</td>
<td>trumpeters,</td>
<td>chamberlain,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hajduks,</td>
<td>officers</td>
<td>officers,</td>
<td>pageboys</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>higher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>officers,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>chamberlain,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pageboys</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wenzel Czernin,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ludolph Bockelkamp,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>chamberlain,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pageboys</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After what was said it is evidently clear that Czernin’s lodgings in Warsaw were very expensive. During four months he paid rent amounting to 1,200 guldens, while he also additionally invested 360 guldens for the necessary adjustments and 60 guldens for stabling the horses that did not fit in the Palace. Under the pressure of circumstances other ambassadors, however, resigned themselves to better housing and stayed in inconvenient buildings – especially in Lithuania. This is illustrated, for example, by the legation secretary Hövel who, remembering his visit to Grodno with Count Nostitz, wrote that he must warn Czernin regarding the accommodation there. There are not many large houses in Warsaw that are completed and usable and therefore “*wir auch vor zwey jahren in einem gantz holtzernen haufe sowohl zu Warschau als zu Grodno haben wohnen und für lieb nehmen müssen*.” Nostitz, however, then eventually tried to improve the substandard housing at his own cost and apparently also invested 1,500 guldens in a house in Grodno.

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83 They had known each other for nearly two decades. It was Czernin’s steward from the time of his Grand Tour (1678–1682), who, since then, had remained at his side and had dealt with the important stuff on his behalf. Now he was referred to in the lists as a “confidant”. Cf. Z. HOJDA – E. CHODĚJOVSKÁ (eds.), *Heřman Jakub Černín*, I, pp. 124–126.

84 Cf. SOA Zámrsk, RA Colloredo-Mannsfeld, non-inventoried, temporarily in Kart. 31, an undated list of items that the Ambassador Czernin needed in Poland (this material was created for the needs of Hieronymus Count Colloredo when he was preparing for his mission to Poland, which eventually did not happen but probably dates from the year 1715): “…*der graf von Czernin hatt logirt ausser Cractauischen vorstatt in einen woywoda hauff, welches obschon unmobiliret geweßen, so hatt er gleich wohlen hiervon monthallich 200 specie thlr geben müßen undt das holtz seye von einem unvergleichlichen hohen preiß geweßen*. Additionally cf. a summary account for extraordinary expenses that is preserved in SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 285, fol. 29.

85 Ibidem, temporarily in Kart. 283, fol. 21, 24, Hövel to Czernin, Głogów, 4. 1. 1695.

This brings us to the question of financing. The literature agrees that usually we are not aware of how much of their own money ambassadors had to invest. It is considered as certain, however, that their expenses exceeded the revenues that they had been promised by the Hofkammer, because the Emperor mostly only allocated to his representatives money for the journey and equipping the mission (Reise- und Ausstaffierungsgelder), then a monthly amount to ensure their stay (Subsistenzgelder), which ambassadors received retroactively for the quarter and then occasionally they also received money for various exceptional expenses (Extraordinariausgaben) depending on how close they were to the sovereign and how important their mission was considered to be. Often, however, the money did not arrive regularly and therefore ambassadors had to rely on their own resources and on credit.87

Czernin’s mission was rather well ensured by the Emperor because he not only obtained the aforementioned funds, but also something more than that. In this case, the Ambassador’s expenses should have been paid by the Silesian Chamber, which, at the very end of December 1694, received an order from the Hofkammer to secure for Ambassador Czernin 6,000 guldens for the journey and equipment, 1,000 guldens for his monthly salary and additionally also 6,000 ducats (i.e. 24,000 guldens) in advance for the anticipated additional “secret” expenses. Because in terms of the Imperial Court this was an extremely important diplomatic mission, Hermann Jakob was also provided with an additional 2,000 ducats (“in cassu necessitatis 2000 duggaten in bereitschaft zuhalten”). In addition to this money he also brought with him funds for paying the pensions of two Polish nobles (amounting to a total of 7,000 thalers, i.e. 10,500 guldens). Altogether therefore for three months he had 48,000 guldens available, but he could not spend them all for his own needs because most of these funds had already been allocated for a specific purpose. Of this amount he could only use about a quarter on his own behalf (i.e. cca. 10,000 guldens for the journey, necessary equipment and a four-month stay plus a small margin for extraordinary expenses). All this depended on what extra spending his sovereign approved and was willing to reimburse.88 For comparison, in the 1680’s the imperial envoys to the English and the French Kings received 3,000 guldens for their


88 ÖStA Wien, Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv (hereinafter referred to as FHKA), Alte Hofkammer, Hoffinanz Österreich, Bücher, Bd. 999, Protokoll Registratur 1694, fol. 693, a record of 31. 12. 1694. Eventually, he did not spend all of these funds – he returned to the Hofkammer not only 760 of the original 6,000 ducats that were allocated for secret expenses, but also a bill of exchange with a value of 2,000 ducats. Ibidem, Bd. 1003, Protokoll Registratur 1695, fol. 530, a record from 10. 10. 1695.
journey and equipment and an additional 750 guldens as a monthly salary. But these were not diplomats of the first rank, only envoys (Abgesandte), who did not have to undertake any kind of festive entry. Count Czernin was also an ambassador, so he received more, but again this amount could not compare with what the ambassadors of the Emperor to the Spanish King received, who went on their missions provided with 20,000 guldens and an additional salary of 1,500 guldens per month. 89

In Czernin’s case we are extraordinarily fortunate that a relatively complete accounting document survived (though some summary accounts only as a concept), so that we can at least estimate how much of his own money Hermann Jakob spent (see Table 3). Although the Emperor allocated 6,000 guldens to him for the journey and equipment, he additionally spent over 30,000 guldens (sic). The highest expenditures were for transportation means. For a large new representative coach and eight horses (“leiptziger rappen”) and their harnesses that were designated for the festive entry and two smaller carriages for routine use the Count paid a total of cca. 13,400 guldens. The second largest item comprised the servants livery “von sauberen carmesin tuch und mit reichen sielbernen porten außstaffiret”, which cost more than 8,500 guldens. In accordance with the monthly salary he was entitled to 4,000 guldens (for four months of the mission), but even here he expended extra funds, in this instance nearly 6,000 guldens. Then for the extraordinary expenses Czernin demanded an additional payment of nearly 4,000 guldens. 90 Although we do not have the final accounts available, it is clear that the Ambassador spent cca. five times the amount of the funds that were paid for journey and equipping the mission and about twice the amount of money that had been allocated for his stay in Warsaw. In short, from the monarch he had 10,000 guldens available for equipment, travel and his salary, but for these items he spent nearly 46,000 guldens. After the completion of the mission Hermann Jakob himself estimated his own expenditure in autumn 1695, when he complained to the Hofkammer that he had not yet been paid the promised 10,000 guldens, as almost 50,000 guldens. 91 This clearly shows that Czernin did not spare on this mission; many

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89 ÖStA Wien, FHKA, Hofzahlamtsbücher, Bd. 124, 1680, fol. 189 (The Marquis de Grana, the Ambassador in Spain), fol. 190 (Count Mansfeld, the Envoy to France) and Bd. 125, 1681, fol. 193 (Count Thun, the Envoy to England).
90 SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 285, fol. 29–32; temporarily in Kart. 286, fol. 12–14; Detailed specifications of Ambassador Czernin’s expenditures.
91 Ibidem, temporarily in Kart. 286, fol. 6–9, Hermann Jakob Czernin to the Hofkammer, two undated concepts: “zu … dero kay. hohen ehren über die zur equipir- und subsistirung mir ausgeworffene etlich tausent gulden von dem meinigen bey der gantz eilfertig zu solcher bodtschafft zumachen bemüesigter einrichtung und gegenwehrtigen unerhert teüren zeithen nicht weith 50 000 fl treülich verzehrten summa...”
items were provided at his own expense and his contemporaries were right when before his departure from Vienna they noted that the Count was preparing for the journey "sehr stattlich". At the same time they were adding, however, that as one of the richest Bohemian aristocrats he – unlike others – could afford this expense without any problems.92

Table 3: Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz’s expenditure during his diplomatic mission (January – May 1695)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The type of expenditure</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hofstaat Equipierung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) for the Count</td>
<td>a bed and two chaises longues</td>
<td>1,561 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>clothes from Vienna</td>
<td>2,332 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) for his servants</td>
<td>livery</td>
<td>8,958 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>furniture, dishes and other household items</td>
<td>1,193 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>food supplies</td>
<td>3,118 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) for the stable</td>
<td>8 black horses from the Viennese merchant Wolf Daubenberger</td>
<td>1,600 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 pearl horses from Count Windischgrätz</td>
<td>2,000 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a ceremonial coach</td>
<td>2,981 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a carriage</td>
<td>430 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a carriage</td>
<td>400 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the harnesses for four carriages</td>
<td>2,773 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accessories for the carriages and the harnesses</td>
<td>994 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel costs</td>
<td>travel costs for the kitchen staff, the stable staff, the steward, the secretary and for their people travelling from Vienna to Warsaw and back to Bohemia</td>
<td>8,352 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Summation</td>
<td>36,692 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistenzgelder</td>
<td>the steward’s bills from February to May</td>
<td>7,919 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>furniture for the palace that was purchased in February</td>
<td>408 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the stallmaster’s expenses for February to May</td>
<td>1,336 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Summation</td>
<td>9,663 guldens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*An Contribution towards the Travel Arrangements of Imperial Diplomats*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extraausgaben</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the transportation of the imperial gift</td>
<td>135 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a carriage and a horse) to Warsaw</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for the originally booked house</td>
<td>400 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the gratuity during the festive entry and the first audience</td>
<td>389 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for the palace in which the Ambassador lived</td>
<td>1,200 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>adjustments made to the palace</td>
<td>360 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the rent for the additional stable</td>
<td>60 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the provision for the confidant, the doctor and the marshal</td>
<td>123 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the provision for resolving the dispute between the Polish squire and the hajduk</td>
<td>600 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the gratuity during the final audience</td>
<td>154 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the carriage and the Mělník wine for the wife of Prince Jakob</td>
<td>400 guldens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>office expenses</td>
<td>26 guldens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Summation**  
3,847 guldens

**Summa summarum**  
50,202 guldens

Although the Ambassador Czernin was housed in a Viennese manner and in a very representative abode and it was anticipated that the Poles would appreciate this costly behaviour, this strategy did not help him much in regard to establishing contact with the Polish King and his court. His main opponent, the French Ambassador Melchior de Polignac, was housed in Warsaw’s Royal Castle and enjoyed the great affection of Queen Marie Casimire who spent a lot of time with him. Czernin could therefore hardly fight with him because he could not really get the Queen on his side. As we know, he eventually

93 “…alß ich darvon hier habe discurriren gehört, wird er [ambassador] in Pohlen einen schenen train machen und denen Pollackhen zeigen, daß sich der keyser noch nicht verblüthet, wie sy einmahl noch dem baron de Lisola zu verstehen gegeben”. SOA Plzeň, the section in Klášter, RA Nosticů (Planá), Kart. 49, a letter from Johann Jakob von Gastheim to Christoph Wenzel von Nostitz, 2. 2. 1695, Vienna.

94 See J. WOLINSKI (ed.), *Kazimierz Sarnecki*, p. 185, a journal entry from 20. 2. 1695. Sarnecki is documenting two visits of Kazimierz Jan Sapieha on that day. After the audience with the Imperial Ambassador Sapieha with a large entourage “do Zamku przyjachat; tam oddawski wizytę drugą jmp. posłowi francuskiemu w stancyjej jego na gankach będącej…”. The Habsburg party was very well aware of this advantage that the French Ambassador had and some members of it prophesied significant problems for Czernin because of this: “E. E. erstatte schuldigen dank vor alle mir communicirte zeitungen, bey deren beschaffenheit herr gr. Czernin in Pohlen noch viel ungelegenheiten ausstehen dörffe, zumahlen der frantzösische gesandte bey dem könig einlogiret.” SOA Plzeň, the section in Klášter, RA Nosticů (Planá), Kart. 55, a letter from Karl Maximilian Łažanský von Buková to Christoph Wenzel von Nostitz, 6. 2. 1695, Prague.

failed even with the King, despite some of his nearest and dearest (e.g. the eldest son Jakub Sobieski with his wife) and including such major Polish clergy as the Archbishop of Gniezno and Cardinal Michał Stefan Radziejowski and the Bishop of Poznań, Stanisław Witwicki, powerful magnates (Hieronim Augustyn Lubomirski and other members of his family and, in addition, the Lithuanian brothers Kazimierz Jan and Benedykt Paweł Sapieha) and also several foreign diplomats (esp. the Papal nuncio Andrea Santacroce) belonged amongst the Emperor’s supporters. However, the Imperials lost a key player on the Polish power board, the great Polish crown hetman Stanisław Jan Jabłonowski. In 1695 this man had sided with the Queen and with French diplomacy.

Conclusions

Hermann Jakob Czernin von Chudenitz was the last ambassador that Emperor Leopold I sent to the Court of the Polish King John III Sobieski. When comparing his mission with those of his predecessors at the turn of the 1680’s and 1690’s, it is evident that they were all trying to ensure the continuation of the military cooperation between the two sovereigns who were active within the Holy League. All of these missions were relatively short because the Emperor only sent his deputies of the first rank to Poland for the length of the duration of the Sejm. Therefore Czernin spent just a little over three months in Warsaw (from the 1st February to the 8th May), and if there were not problems with the final audience, he would have left still a few weeks earlier. From a factual standpoint, it was an unsuccessful diplomatic mission, because Count Czernin never actually spoke

96 The previous ambassador Count Nostitz promised Cardinal Radziejowski 1,000 ducats (i.e. 4,000 guldens) and, according to the Emperor’s orders, a luxury coach would be purchased that had been promised to the Cardinal’s confidante, Lady Towiańska. See the instructions in SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 284, fol. 15–16.

97 Czernin had prepared a pension for him amounting to 3,000 thalers, i.e. 4,500 guldens. ÖStA Wien, FHKA, Alte Hofkammer, Hoffinanz Österreich, Bücher, Bd. 999, Protokoll Registratur 1694, fol. 693, a record of 31. 12. 1694.

98 Cf. a list of visits that is unexpectedly stored in SOA Zámrsk, RA Colloredo-Mannsfeld, non-inventoried, temporarily in Kart. 31; see more in regard to the dispute concerning the first audience with the Cardinal in J. WOLIŃSKI (ed.), Kazimierz Sarnecki, p. 204.

99 Cf. the Ambassador’s instructions from 3. 1. 1695 in SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 284, fol. 11–24, here esp. fol. 15–17. Jabłonowski had already been promised a pension from the Emperor in the amount of 4,000 thalers per year. Czernin brought this money with him and was supposed to pay it to him provided that he continued to support the imperial policy. This did not happen, however, so when he was departing he left it with the Imperial Resident. See ÖStA Wien, FHKA, Alte Hofkammer, Hoffinanz Österreich, Bücher, Bd. 1003, Protokoll Registratur 1695, fol. 550, a record from 10. 10. 1695.

100 His mission therefore did not end prematurely, as is believed by Z. HOJDA – E. CHODĚJOVSKÁ (eds.), Heřman Jakub Černín, I, pp. 124–126.
to the Sejm (since the Sejm had prematurely dissolved) nor did he later negotiate any military aid from the King for the Hungarian front. In regard to its ceremonial aspects the mission nearly ended as a fiasco when the Polish King refused to grant the Ambassador his final audience for a long time. Eventually though he did agree to provide it; in any case Czernin’s mission had definitely contributed to the escalation of tension between the two rulers, because John III Sobieski was demanding satisfaction from the Emperor based on the incident that occurred in Warsaw Castle at the beginning of the March, during which a Polish Squire died after being hit by the Imperial Ambassador’s hajduk.

Count Czernin cannot be seriously blamed for these failures, however, because he did everything that he could that was in his power. He prepared systematically for his mission and he did not hesitate to invest considerable resources from his own pocket. The Emperor gave him 10,000 guldens, while during his mission Czernin himself spent approximately 50,000 guldens. In many ways he also tried to act as if the Emperor himself had arrived in Warsaw. This is apparent not only from the innovative composition of his Court, but also in the manner of his accommodation. Hermann Jakob Czernin was surrounded by cca. 85 people, while with the connivance of the Emperor, it was just for this mission that introduced the function of Marshal to his court. His court also included two very experienced diplomats – the Legation Secretary Hövel and the Imperial Resident Schiemunsky both of whom had knowledge of the local environment. He also had a personal guard comprising 12 hajduks. He definitely did not shame the Emperor even by his Warsaw dwelling when he refused a smaller house that was located in the city centre and instead rented a large palace in the suburbs, which cost him 1,200 guldens. The first floor of the palace housed a large suite composed, in accordance with the Vienna Hofburg, of a hall, two anterooms, an audience room in which a canopy was installed and a retirada. Because of all these changes he also issued new house rules to his servants to inform them how they should behave in these premises and who would be able to access which rooms. Then he received in this apartment the first visits of prominent Polish and Lithuanian ministers and magnates and attempted to use their influence on the King. He did receive strong support from the Princes Lubomirski and Sapieha, from the Polish Primate and Cardinal Radziejowski and from the Papal Nuncio Santacroce. However, he was not able to get the King’s closest associates, who indulged themselves by listening to French diplomacy, on his side and this also contributed to the failure of his mission.

So after leaving the country Czernin had no good reason for rejoicing because the mission had cost him a lot of money from his own pocket and it had failed but nevertheless he assumed that this “sacrifice” on behalf of the Emperor would eventually be paid back somehow. He had not only spent his money but he had also served the Emperor despite the health problems that had befallen him. During his relatively short stay in Warsaw
twice he proved to be so ill that he had to lie down and to avoid participating in social life. In February he felt cold for the first time. For his first audience with the King he already arrived with a cold, and during the second half of February for a few days he had to lie down to recover. As soon as he had recovered a different malady had already shown up. During the second half of March 36-years old Czernin suffered from a leg-pain that was similar to gout – his left leg was causing him such torment that he was not even able to get out and about socially. And as if that was not enough, in early March the Ambassador accidentally pinched his thumb when getting into a coach, so that he was unable to write for a few days. But Czernin endured all of this happily because he was anticipating the Emperor’s reward. He did indeed long for higher positions and for prestigious titles. Apparently he was even thinking about the Order of the Golden Fleece. Although he never did receive this Order (because of the War of the Spanish Succession), the Monarch eventually came to appreciate his diverse merits (including his huge loans, his diplomatic service, his assistance at the Bohemian Landtag, etc.) and Hermann Jakob was later to become the Obersthofmeister of the Kingdom of Bohemia and eventually the Oberstburggraf of the Kingdom of Bohemia, i.e. the top provincial official in Bohemia. Czernin thereby joined the ranks of many other wealthy and influential nobles whose diplomatic service helped with their progress at the Court or in the ranks of the provincial administration.

101 SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 287, fol. 35, a letter from Hermann Jakob Czernin to Gottlieb von Windischgrätz, a concept, 3. 3. 1695, Warsaw. He is apologising that he had never reacted before, but this is because “mein bieshero allzeit habende stek huesten undt febrile alterationes, die mich auch einige tag betliglich gehalten”.


103 Ibidem, fol. 35, Post scriptum to a letter from Hermann Jakob Czernin to Gottlieb von Windischgrätz, a concept, 3. 3. 1695, Warsaw.

104 SOA Plzeň, the section in Klášter, RA Nosticů (Planá), Kart. 55, a letter from Karl Maximilian Lažanský von Buková to Christoph Wenzel von Nostitz, 16. 12. 1694, Prague: “Diese ietzige application des hiesigen herrn landmarschallen Exc. soll, wie man sagt, mit seinen zimblichen zuebuß und verschonung der cammer eine beförderung zum toison in das künfftige seyn.”

Text Appendix:

The edition of the house rules that Hermann Jacob Czernin von Chudenitz prepared for his servants during the period of his diplomatic mission to Poland in early 1695 (SOA Třeboň, JH, RA Černínů, temporarily in Kart. 285, fol. 33–35; there is a copy in SOA Zámrsk, RA Colloredo-Mannsfeld, non-inventoried, temporarily in Kart. 31, fol. 283–286).106

Ordnung, so ich in haus gehalten haben will107


2. Die loquaien werden ihren standt in den sahl haben, alwo sie die gelegenheit des camins zuer wermung haben, 4 loquaien sollen täglich den dienst haben undt zwahr dergestalten, das 4 loquaien, welche den dienst haben, nie ausser haus geschieken, sondern nur die haus schickungen verrichten, und so viel meglich bey den zimmeren des tags bleiben, damit der sahl nie ohne leit seie, die 4, so nicht den dienst haben, zuer ausschiekung gebraucht werden, die zwei laufer sollen allemahl tag ein tag aus bey handen sein, umb solche etwas geschwiendt vor mich zue haben laufen khonnen, 2 loquaien werden aber destiniret, die vrembde zue bedienen. Wan ich aber ausfahre, sollen alle samendtlich mit mier der ihnen befelender ordnung nachgehen undt wan kein parada geschiet, auf die zwey, so die frembde zuebedienen destiniret, mit gehorsamb werden diese samendtlich kleich denen heyduken an den h. marschalk undt hoffmeister gewiessen. NB. Die loquaien

---

106 Cf. Jiří KUBEŠ, Reprezentační funkce sídel vyšší šlechty z českých zemí (1500–1740) [The Representative Function of the Residences of the Higher Nobility in the Czech Lands (1500–1740)], České Budějovice 2005 (An unpublished PhD thesis that was defended at the Institute of History of the Faculty of Arts of the University of South Bohemia), pp. 346–349.


108 The Marshal at Czernin’s Court during his mission was a certain Baron Dillherr.

109 The Steward was Franz Xaver Locher.
werden den zuetriedt zu mier bies in die andere anticamera haben, nach verichter post, oder was zue thuen were, siech wieder in sahl kleich retiriren.

3. Trompeter undt unterofficier haben ihre aufundthaldt in der ersten anticamera, auch die trompeter in sahl, besonders wan sie plassn undt sollen sich offens da sehen lassen, besonders wan visiten siendt, in functionibus publicis werden mich solche in ausfahren bekleiten undt bedienen. Die trompeter werden auch von den h. marschalk alle abendt undt sonst die ordinantzien, welche er bey mier zuevernemen hat, abholen undt die dienste, so ihnen anbefohlen werden, fleisig beobachten, ausser haus ohne erlaubnus nicht gehen, weniger plassn. Die trompeter werden mit den gehorsamb als zuer hofstadtparada geherigen den h. marschalk angewiesen, die übrigen unterofficier dahien ihr dienst sie zeigt. NB. Den zuetriedt sollen diese weuters nicht haben als in mein andere anticamera.

4. Der hoffmeister, aufwarter undt stalverseher werden ihre aufundthaldt in der anderen anticamera haben, der hoffmeister seinen hausdienst obsicht, wie er particuliter instruiert, beobachten, die aufwarter allendthalben mier die cur machen, bey viesiten allen in der anticamera, sonst aber taglich einer, der den dienst in setzung, der speissen, mit welchen der hoffmeister aus der khuechl vorangehet, auch haben wierdt, sich befinden, damit in aller verfalenheit iemanden an der handt habe. Der stolverseher aber auch die anticamera frequentiren, principaliter aber den stol beobachten, ohne anmeldung solle kheiner ausser ausser haus gehen, umb das ich sie, es seye wehme, zuem gebrauch beyhanden habe, der hoffmeister des haus- undt der stolverseher des stolwesens wegen sollen alle abendt bey mein schlaffengehen ordinantz begeren. In ceremonialibus werden disse sich auch bey dem h. marschal anmelden, welcher siech bey mier zuebelernen hat. NB. Diese haben der acces zue mier bies in mein audientz cimer, nach verichter sach sich aber in die anticamera zue retiriren haben.

5. Khammerdiener undt pagien, wan ich mich in audientien befinde, sollen bey der tier in der anderen anticamera sein, so aber in der retirada bey der tier in audientz ziemer, die camerdiener sollen, ein tag nach den anderen, ihren dienst haben, die pagien aber taglich ohne exception alle 4, jedoch solle khein camerdiener ohne erlaubnus ausser haus gehen. Diese werden, wer zue mier viel, solchen ansagen, besonders wan ich in der retirada bien, wo ich rue haben mues undt solle khein mensch ohne anmelden zue mier gelassen werden, ausser meines h. vetters\textsuperscript{110} undt h. Bokelkamp.\textsuperscript{111} NB. Die khammerdiener undt pagien haben den zuetriedt zue mier bis in die retirada, nach verrichter sach sie sich aber vor die tier retiriren sollen.

\textsuperscript{110} Baron Wenzel Czernin von Chudenitz.

\textsuperscript{111} Ludolph Bockelkamp, Czernin's old friend and confidant.
6. Die stolleit haben zwahr ihr verbliben in dem stollen bey ihren pferden, wan ich aber in publico ausgehe, sollen besonders die reitknechte zue meiner parada stadt loquaien auch mit mier gehen. Die 8 rapen werden destiniret vor die 2 schwartze wagen zue bedienung der cavaglier, den marschalk undt wer solche wagen zue brauchen hette, mein postwagele khan auch gebraucht werden, worzue bey der nacht die 7 braun undt 6 kleinere scheken (?), bey dach aber die 4 kleine breindl gebrauchet werden khonnen, damit die schek- und braunzuech durch fierung der officier nicht in discredito gelangen, die reitroß aber durch den Hans Ernest, kleich ich ihme instruiren werde, exertiert werden undt sollen solche auch gebraucht werden, wan ein officier auszueschiken, welcher reiten khan, kleich es bey h. graffen Carl Waldtstein¹¹² gebrauchlich gewessen, der Hans Ernest solle fleisig die anticamera frequentiren, damit ich ihme offters bey henden habe undt sonsten seinen stel treu fleisig beobachten, auch wan was von pferden zue verkhaufen oder zue verhandlen were, mit profit nachsehen, warzue er sich des h. doctors¹¹³ diener gebrauchen konte als ein roshandler undt wan was vorfiele, miech avisiren, allein indeme behuetsamb gehen, das nichts unter meinen sondern seinen oder des drieten gehe, wie ich mit ihme weithers mindtlich reden, also hat es auch sein verstadt, mit denen wagen principaliter umb geldt zue verkhauffen, secundario umb etwas reiscalessen, raren futterwerck oder anderen neuen nitzlichen waren ohne schaden, sondern ehender mit profit zuverhandlen, jedoch die paradawagen ehender nicht als bies geendichten reichstag wekzugeben, warumb sich unter der handt zue bemiehen. NB. Der stolleite zuetrit solle sein gleich loquaien, nicht aber weiter als denen heyduken zuegewissen.

¹¹² Karl Ferdinand von Waldstein, who served as the Imperial Ambassador in Poland in 1683.
¹¹³ Dr. Eberl from Mladá Boleslav, Czernin’s doctor during the period of the Polish mission.
The Extraordinary Imperial Ambassadors to the Conclave during the 1667–1730 Period*

Abstract: This study focuses on the practice of the appointing of extraordinary imperial ambassadors and representatives for papal elections during the years 1667–1730. To describe the development and the changes in the approach to this issue during the period monitored the author selected three model cases – the last mission of Cardinal Ernst Adalbert von Harrach at a conclave in 1667, the appointing of the extraordinary secular ambassador to the conclave, Anton Florian von Lichtenstein, in 1689 and the mission of Antonio Rambaldo di Collalto who, in 1730, collaborated with the ordinary Imperial Resident, Cardinal Cienfuegos. The study is based on the family archives of Harrach (held in the Österreichisches Staatsarchiv in Vienna), and of Collalto and Kaunitz (both are held in the Moravský zemský archiv in Brno) and on the diplomatic correspondence and the recorded agenda of the Imperial Embassy in Rome that is preserved in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna.

The period in question can be divided into three different sections. For the papal elections in 1667, 1669 and 1676 Emperor Leopold I appointed those cardinals who favoured the House of Habsburg. After the death of Pope Innocent XI in 1689 the situation changed to the detriment of the Habsburg dynasty and Leopold I decided to appoint an extraordinary secular ambassador. Anton Florian von Liechtenstein, in cooperation with Cardinal Johann von Goess, was supposed to correct the steps of the not so reliable Cardinal Protector Germaniae et Hispaniae Francesco Maria de’Medici. Liechtenstein’s task was to build-up prestige and to establish a permanent embassy at the Holy See. During the years 1691–1730 the practice of appointing extraordinary secular ambassadors to the conclave had already stabilised – mostly they were imperial counts who intervened with total respect in the events that took place around the papal election.

Keywords: Imperial Diplomacy – Conclave – Papal Elections – Early Modern Era – Leopold I – Charles VI – Antonio Rombaldo Collalto – Anton Florian von Liechtenstein

The conclaves that took place during the years 1667–1676 were different in many ways from those that took place later in the years 1689–1691 and in the years 1700–1730, specifically in regard to the manner in which the imperial interests were represented.1 Therefore, for the Holy Roman Emperor, the papal election

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was serious for multiple reasons. These were primarily related to the territories of the Apennine peninsula subordinated to the Roman Emperor and comprised his fiefdom, his cooperation with the Spanish branch of the Habsburg dynasty, which, until the year 1700, dominated much of today’s Italy (specifically Kingdom of Naples). The Roman Emperor had also an interest in cooperating with Pope in the recatholicisation (and the Catholic reform) of its imperial possessions. From the late 1670’s papal subsidies were needed for the war against the Ottoman Empire.

I restricted the period selected to the years between 1667 and 1730 in order to be able to describe the different attitudes that Leopold I (1640–1705, Roman Emperor since 1658), Charles VI (1685–1740, Roman Emperor since 1711) and their envoys and representatives adopted to the conclave.

The Emperor’s representation at the Holy See was not only through his imperial diplomats. Often a more important role was played by the cardinals-protectors of Germany and Austria. Those were the cardinals, to whom were confided a particular solicitude

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1 Very little has been written in Czech historiography regarding the history of papal elections and the relations between the Kingdom of Bohemia and the Papal State. This is also why it is necessary to specifically emphasise the usefulness of those compendia that do pay attention to this topic. They should not really suffice, however, even though the impression may be given that all the “grand narratives” of political history have already been written. František X. HALAS, Fenomén Vatikán. Idea, dějiny a současnost papežství: Diplomacie Svatého stolce. České země a Vatikán [The Vatican Phenomenon: The concept, the history and the current status of the papacy: the diplomacy of the Holy See. The Czech Lands and the Vatican], Brno 2013; Tomáš ČERNUŠÁK et al., The Papacy and the Czech Lands. A History of Mutual Relations, Praha 2016. When I was preparing this paper this publication was not available to me. From the early modern conclaves Czech historiography paid increased attention for the last time to the election of Pope Innocent X in 1644. Ferdinand MENČÍK, Volba papeže Innocence X. [The Election of Pope Innocent X], Prague 1894; Zdeněk KALISTA, Císař Ferdinand III. a papež Innocenc X. v prvních letech pontifikátu [Emperor Ferdinand III and Pope Innocent X during the early years of the latter’s pontification], Český časopis historický (hereinafter referred to as ČČH) 33, 1927, No. 3, pp. 548–579 and its continuation in ČČH 34, 28, 1928, pp. 280–321, 574–612. From the Austrian environment it is necessary to mention a thorough treatise regarding the election of Clement XI and the subsequent imperial representation in Rome during the early years of the 18th Century. Friedrich POLLEROß, Die Kunst der Diplomatie. Auf den Spuren des kaiserlichen Botschafters Leopold Joseph Graf von Lamberg (1653–1706), Petersberg 2010. In regard to Lamberg’s mission to Rome see pp. 302–504; ibid. in regard to the conclave in the year 1700.

2 A lot has already been written about the history of papal elections. For basic bibliography see, for example, URL: <https://www.csun.edu/~hcfll004/Conclave-Bibliography.html> [cit. 15. 8. 2016].

3 The territories of Mantua, Milan, Parma, Modena and Mirandola were dependent on the Holy Roman Empire to varying degrees.

4 During the period monitored the function of the Cardinals Protectores Germaniae was carried-out sequentially by Girolamo Colonna (1644–1666), Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt (1666–1682), Carlo Pio di Savoia (1682–1689), Francesco Maria de’Medici (1689–1701), Leopold von Kollonitsch (1701–1707), Johann Philipp von Lamberg (1707–1712), Christian August von Sachsen-Zeitz (1712–1725) and Wolfgang von Schrattenbach (1726–1738). The Cardinals Protectores Austriae were Ernst Adalbert
for the interest of some nation (state). Since the 13th century Cardinal Protectors served as representatives or orators of sovereigns, religious orders etc. in then Roman Curia. Popes have repeatedly tried to ban this practice, pointing out that the cardinals primary loyalty should be given to the Bishop of Rome and that they should not serve any of the reigning monarchs. The first of these prohibitions had already been declared by Martin V in the year 1425, while forty years later Pius II, after he had been considering favouring the monarchs as being incompatible with the responsibilities of the Roman Curia echoed his opinion. He did allow some exceptions, however. Starting with Innocent VIII and Alexander VI this function gradually became recognised – including through a written confirmation, whereby the Pope approved of this function and accepted the Cardinals Protectors as representatives of their own countries at the same level as those of an ambassador. Yet even Clement IX himself repeated his objections to this function. However what it really represented was more a protest against the inconvenient Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt (1616–1682).\footnote{Ulrich KÖCHLI, ‘Trophäe im Glaubenskampf? Der Konvertit und Kardinal Friedrich Landgraf von Hessen-Darmstadt (1616–1682), in: Anne Karsten (Hg.), Jagd nach dem roten Hut, Kardinalskarrieren im barocken Rom, Göttingen 2004, pp. 186–204, here p. 200; Arkadiusz WOJTYLA, “Cardinale langravio” i “Conte savio” – dygnitarze Rzeszy w barokowym Rzymie, Quart 2, 2007, No. 4., pp. 28–33.}

Leopold I relied on them entirely and until 1689 he did not appoint any extraordinary ambassadors to the conclave. Also, during the papal elections in 1667, 1669 and 1676, there were not even any ordinary imperial ambassadors in Rome. Although Charles VI’s manner of procedure differed in many respects, even during his reign the Cardinals Protectors had not lost their importance. In several cases the Emperor appointed as his trustee another cardinal. In this manner, during the conclave in 1691, the role of the

\textit{von Harrach (1655–1667) and Carlo Pio di Savoia (1673–1689). After 1689 the Cardinals Protectores Germaniae also held this function. There is a summary work in regard to this topic by Josef WODKA, \textit{Zur Geschichte der nationalen Protektorate der Kardinäle an der römischen Kurie}, Innsbruck – Leipzig 1938. For basic biographical information and the confirmation of participation at the conclave, unless it is stated otherwise, in regard to individual cardinals I am utilising the following source: Salvador MIRANDA, \textit{Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church}, URL: <http://www2.fiu.edu/~mirandas/cardinals.htm> [cit. 13. 7. 2016]). For the biographical data concerning the church dignitaries I refer to URL: <http://www.catholic–hierarchy.org/> [cit. 13. 7. 2016]; Erwin GATZ – Stephan M. JANKER (Hg.), \textit{Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches: Ein biographisches Lexikon}, Bd. III (1648–1803), Berlin 2001; \textit{Dizionario biografico degli Italiani} (URL: <http://www.treccani.it/biografico/presentazione.html>) [cit. 14. 8. 2016]. For data concerning the sojourns of ambassadors at various courts and also for personal information concerning them – unless stated otherwise: Ludwig BITTNER – Lothar GROß, \textit{Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648), I. Band (1648–1715), Berlin 1936; Friedrich HAUSMANN, Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648). II. Band (1716–1763), Zürich 1950; Heribert STURM, Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte der böhmischn Länder, München 1984; Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (ADB), Leipzig 1875–1912 (available online at URL: <https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/ADB>).}
Emperor’s trustee was played dually by the Cardinal and the experienced diplomat Johann von Goëss, the Bishop of Gurk (1612–1696), while the Cardinal Protector Germaniae, Hispaniae et Austriae at that time was Francesco Maria de’Medici (1660–1711). Similarly the protector of Germany and Austria and Bishop of Olomouc, Wolfgang Hannibal von Schrattenbach (1660–1738), repeatedly left the initiative to Álvaro Cienfuegos Villazón (1657–1739). Many of the cardinals understood their role as representing “providing service to the Emperor at the conclave”.

Unlike the ordinary ambassadors these cardinals did not have to be resident in Rome. Many of them only came to Rome on specific occasions – of which the conclave was one of the most important. They were often the ones who headed the faction that discussed and voted in the Emperor’s interest. It was also they who actually pronounced the royal veto (vota exclusiva) against uncooperative candidates. The decision regarding its applicability was ultimately their responsibility. It was frequently an art of the possible, however. The conclaves that took place in the 17th and the 18th Centuries (and subsequently) comprised very complex negotiations, whereby between 50 and 70 cardinals participated in voting of whom more than a two-thirds majority was needed for electing a successful candidate. In several instances the cardinals actually unanimously agreed about the person who was to become the future pope. In 1655, prior to the conclave, Ernst Adalbert von Harrach evaluated such a situation as follows: “I regard any prediction made about the outcome of the upcoming election in this conclave as being all dubious and uncertain…” Twelve years

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6 Johann von Goëss was already supposed to lead the negotiations during the conclave in 1689. However, he failed to arrive in Rome on time and was not permitted to even enter the conclave. In regard to the more informations see below.

7 For example, in 1730 Cardinal Schönborn was talking about “il servizio di Sua Maesta al Conclave” (service to the Emperor on conclave). Cardinal Schönborn to Antonio Rambaldo di Collalto, 18. 4. 1730 at the Moravský zemský archiv [Moravian Land Archive] in Brno (hereinafter referred to as MZA Brno), G 169–The Collalto Family Archive, Brtnice (hereinafter referred to as G 169), Kart. 113, inv. No. 2140, sign. VII 2 3, fol. 5r.


9 “Dico dunque esser molto dubioso il pronostico et incerte giudizio della futura elezione nel presente Conclave…” Discorso sopra il conclave della sede vacante d’Innocentio X. nell’anno 1655, Österreichisches
later he considered the Spanish faction, with which he was then working, as being so weak that at best it could only prevent the election of a Pope hostile to the Habsburgs. In the years 1655, 1689 and 1730 more than ten papabili were involved in the game. The actual imperial instructions were to repeatedly suggest a large number of alternatives and only rarely did they manage to succeed in pushing through the first one chosen.

Some of the other cardinals were suggested to the Pope by the Emperor with the purpose of their interference in the politics of the Roman Curia and in the conclave itself, while he was obliging others in various different ways. During the elections that took place between the years 1667–1676 Leopold I relied solely on the cardinals and did not send any extraordinary secular diplomat to the conclaves of 1667, 1669 or 1676. When during the years 1689 and 1691 issues concerning Anton Florian von Liechtenstein’s accession as an extraordinary ambassador were repeatedly addressed during the conclave, the fact that in 1655 Ferdinand III had appointed Marc-Antonio V. Colonna as an extraordinary ambassador – an observer – was overlooked. Since 1689, however, in every case an extraordinary ambassador had been coming there to both support and instruct the cardinals.

Apart from the “political”, “crown” or “national” cardinals who were acting in the interests of the various superpowers, in the Cardinal College itself frequently a more important role was played by the cardinals-nephews of the former popes, who usually led the factions that were assembled from amongst the cardinals who were created in the time of the pontificate of their relatives. During the second half of the 17th Century the most important role was played specifically by the nephews of Alexander VII and Clement

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11 This term is commonly used for such cardinals (other priests or also secular persons), which have enough chance (thanks to a larger count of potential voters), prerequisites (due to their personal quality), power and support of statesman and nobility to become a pope.

12 P. Scarlatti to Leopold I, 20. 3. 1691: *Replica alle proposizioni del Principe Antonio di Linchtestein in ordine al modo, che egli dovrà tenere in congiuntura d’assumere il cararattre di Ambasciatore di Sacra Maesta Cesarea in Roma*, ÖStA Wien, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (= HHStA), Staatenabteilungen (= StAbt), Rom Korrespondenz (= Rom Korr.), Kart. 70, fol. 180r–183v; for the letters of Pompeo Scarlatti, Johann von Goëss, Giacomo Emerix de Mathiis and Antonio Florian de Liechtenstein in regard to both conclaves see ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart.es 67 and 70.

13 Alexander VII, i.e. Fabio Chigi (1599–1667, pope since 1655); his nephew Flavio Chigi (1631–1693).
X\textsuperscript{14} and of Urban VIII.\textsuperscript{15} Innocent XI\textsuperscript{16} and Innocent XII\textsuperscript{17} refused to support nepotism and therefore additional groups of their cardinals were still being recruited – the zelanti – and also of some of Alexander VII’s cardinals – the squadrone volante.\textsuperscript{18} All of these “apolitical” groups more or less declared their desire for independence from the current international political situation in Europe and, in regard to the candidates for the tiara they highly-rated their personal piety, their “pastoral quality” and the efforts by means of which their candidate was willing to defend religious liberty and independence from the secular superpowers. In some cases they even refused to respect the royal veto and consistently voted for those candidates who had been excluded.\textsuperscript{19} The national cardinals thereby tried to find ways in which to bring the cardinals nephews, the zelanti and/or also the squadrone volante onto their side, or to choose the most suitable cardinal from amongst them more frequently, relatively speaking.\textsuperscript{20}

The purpose of this study, however, is not to describe the changes that took place in the individual factions during the period monitored nor all the peripeteia of a total of nine conclaves that took place during it. We must also abandon the possibility of being able to pay attention to the missions of all the representatives and imperial crown-cardinals during the 1667–1730 period. The extreme cases are represented by the last mission of Ernst Adalbert von Harrach, by the secondment of Anton Florian von Liechtenstein as the first extraordinary secular ambassador to the conclave and of Antonio Rambaldo di Collalto (1681–1740), who, in 1730, was working in cooperation with the experienced Cardinal Cienfuegos. In regard to these missions we monitor both the overall developments and the differences in the approaches of Leopold I and Charles VI to the selection of their representatives in the papal election.

\textsuperscript{14} Clement X, i. e. Emilio Bonaventura Altieri (1590–1676, pope since 1670); his nephew Paluzzo Paluzzi Altieri degli Albertoni (1623–1698).

\textsuperscript{15} Urban VIII, i. e. Maffeo Barberini (1568–1644, pope since 1623); his nephews Francesco Barberini and Antonio Barberini, Jr. (1607–1671).

\textsuperscript{16} Innocent XI, i. e. Benedetto Odescalchi (1611–1689, pope since 1676).

\textsuperscript{17} Innocent XII, i. e. Antonio Pignatelli (1615–1700, pope since 1691).


\textsuperscript{19} Benedetto Odescalchi in the years 1670 and 1676, when he was actually elected; Gregorio Barbarigo in the years 1689 and 1691 and Renato Imperiali in the years 1724 and 1730. Other examples would also be numerous.

\textsuperscript{20} For the relationships systems in the Cardinal College in the Early Modern Age see Christoph WEBER, *Senatus Divinus, verborgene Strukturen im Kardinals kollegium der frühen Neuzeit (1500–1800)*, Frankfurt am Main 1996; S. TABACCHI, *Cardinali zelanti*. 
Table 1: The List of the Imperial Representatives and Imperial Ambassadors to Conclave, 1667–1730

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclave</th>
<th>Imperial Representative / Ambassador</th>
<th>New Pope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. – 20. 6. 1667</td>
<td>Cardinals</td>
<td>Giulio Rospigliosi – Clement IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ernest Adalbert von Harrach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friederich von Hessen-Darmstadt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. 12. 1669–29. 4. 1670</td>
<td>Cardinals</td>
<td>Emilio Bonaventura Altieri – Clement X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carlo Pio di Savoia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 8. – 21. 9. 1676</td>
<td>Cardinal</td>
<td>Benedetto Odescalchi – Innocent XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carlo Pio di Savoia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. 8. – 6. 10. 1689</td>
<td>First Secular Extraordinary Ambassador</td>
<td>Pietro Vitto Ottoboni – Alexander VIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anton Florian von Liechtenstein</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. 2. – 12. 7. 1691</td>
<td>Anton Florian von Liechtenstein</td>
<td>Antonio Pignatelli – Innocent XII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 10. – 23. 11. 1700</td>
<td>Leopold Joseph von Lamberg</td>
<td>Gianfrancesco Albani – Clement XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. 3. – 8. 5. 1721</td>
<td>Franz Ferdinand Kinsky</td>
<td>Michelangelo Conti – Innocent XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in cooperate with Cardinal Michael Althann</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. 3. – 29. 5. 1724</td>
<td>Maximilian Ulrich von Kaunitz</td>
<td>Pietro Francesco Orsini – Benedict XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 3. – 12. 7. 1730</td>
<td>Antonio Rambaldo di Collalto</td>
<td>Lorenzo Corsini – Clement XII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ernst Adalbert von Harrach (1598–1667) in the year 1667

The personality of the Archbishop of Prague and, since 1626, Cardinal Ernst Adalbert von Harrach does not need any introduction within the Czech environment.\(^{21}\) He attended in total three conclaves – in the years 1644, 1655 and 1667. During the last two of these he achieved partial success in several scrutinia. For example on the 9\(^{th}\) June 1667, when a total of seven cardinals voted for him, his opportunities seemed very promising. During the entire prior monitoring period, none of the imperial cardinals had ever received such a large number of votes. At the same conclave, Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt also received two and four votes (on the 8\(^{th}\) and the 13\(^{th}\) June), but his chances still remained pretty slim.\(^{22}\)


\(^{22}\) ÖStA Wien, AVA, FA Harrach, Fam. in spec., Kart. 173.
In 1667, Leopold gave all of the three Imperial Cardinals the instructions in accordance with which they should proceed. A month before Alexander VII’s death the Viennese Reichskanzlei instructed both Harrach and Guidobald von Thun (1616–1668)\textsuperscript{23} to travel as soon as possible to Rome and, before entering the conclave, to meet with the Cardinal Protector of Germany Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt for a mutual consultation and also to visit the Spanish Ambassador, Cardinal Federico Sforza (1603–1676), the other Spanish cardinals and the extraordinary ambassador,\textsuperscript{24} to reach agreement on their subsequent joint procedure. At that time Leopold I was talking only about the pope, who would be able to stabilise the situation and to unite the Church during these difficult times.\textsuperscript{25} Apparently specific names were not mentioned until the actual meeting, which took place on the 1\textsuperscript{st} June, i.e. the day prior to the joint entry of the Imperial and the Spanish cardinals to the conclave.

Harrach was welcomed at the gates of Rome on the 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1667 by his agent, Michele Orsucci, and also by Johann Friedrich von Waldstein (1642–1694, Archbishop of Prague since 1675) with two six-horse carriages. One of the carriages belonged to Waldstein and the other to Johann Friedrich von Trautmannsdorff (1619–1696), who had remained in Rome during that time. The procession met Cardinal Sforza’s carriage at the Porta del Popolo. From there, they went together to Waldstein’s apartment where Harrach was housed. On the same day he visited the Cardinals Sforza, Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt, Lorenzo Raggi (1615–1687) and also the Spanish Ambassador.\textsuperscript{26} He then spent the next day receiving visitors.

\textsuperscript{23} Thun did not attend the election. He excused his absence by his being occupied with the details of the course of the Imperial Diet in Regensburg, which had escalated, especially after Louis XIV had invaded Flanders. Katrin KELLER – Alessandro CATALANO (Hg.), Die Diarien und Tagzettel des Kardinals Ernst Adalbert von Harrach (1598–1667), Bd. 4, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2010, pp. 391; this record is from 16. 6. 1667.

\textsuperscript{24} This was Antonio Pedro Sancho Dávila y Osorio, Marquis de Astorgay Velada (1615–1689). He arrived in Rome on 26. 4. 1667. In his instructions Leopold I did not directly identify him.

\textsuperscript{25} “…talem suffragiis suis Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae Pontificem elegiant, qui afflictae Religionis Catholicae, totiusque Christianae salutem et tranquillitatem sibi quam maxime propositam habeat, et in Nos Augustanque Domum nostram peculiari benevolentiae sensu inclinet. In quo quantum momenti atque praesidii situm sit, tum ad turbulentissimum fidei in Romano Imperio statum restaurandum, tum ad authoritatem eiusdem ac nostram, unde Religionis quoque catholicae securitas dependet, stabilendam…” Instructions for Cardinal Harrach from 24. 4. 1667, ÖStA Wien, HHSTA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 59, fol. 119r–122v.

\textsuperscript{26} Harrach’s Diary of 1667 commences with his arrival in Rome. It also ends on 24. 7. while he was still staying in Rome. As in previous instances, Harrach was making quite detailed records about the events that were taking place during the conclave. K. KELLER – A. CATALANO (Hg.), Die Diarien und Tagzettel, Bd. 4, pp. 378, 380–396. The Conclaves from the years 1644 and 1655: Ibidem, Bd. 2, pp. 520–625 (1. 8. – 14. 9. 1644); Bd. 4, pp. 25–91 (7. 2. – 7. 4. 1655). Simultaneously he was making
During the election he wished to have the assistance of Waldstein and of Maxmilian Ernst von Scherffenberg (1643–1713) as his conclavists. The papal bull prohibited him from doing so, however, thereby preventing him from appointing a relative as a conclavist. 27 Both of them then continued to observe the events taking place in the conclave but only from outside.

On the following day Harrach, together with Raggi and Sforza and already in his own carriage, visited the Spanish Ambassador *incognito* to discuss the candidates for the tiara again and also the joint procedure. In the course of these prior considerations the name of Cardinal Giulio Rospigliosi (1600–1669) had already been sounded-out as representing the second option, 28 while in fact it was not an ideal option at all. Harrach was confirming that for two or three years he himself had been talked about as potentially representing a provisional solution. This was essentially based on one specific factor – the exclusion of the possibility that a pro-French cardinal could emerge from the conclave. 29

The conclave was concluded in the early evening of the 2nd June 1667. When, after only eighteen days, it was Rospigliosi who emerged from the unanimous vote, the Spanish-Imperial party was able to talk about its success. 30 The first scrutiny took place on the 3rd June after the Opening Mass had been served by Francesco Barberini (1597–1679), the Dean of the Conclave. In accordance with the prescribed rules two scrutinia – morning and afternoon – were held every day, while the future pope could emerge from any of them.

To attend the conclave it was necessary to get-up early in the morning. Immediately after the cardinals had offered-up the prescribed prayers and served the mass, they had reached the period of the morning scrutinium, which usually lasted until lunchtime. After lunch they had two hours of rest prior to the afternoon scrutinium, which this time lasted until dinnertime. Thereby the cardinals did not have a lot of free time and had no other choice than to meet each other, to write letters and for other activities, stealing time from their sleep. 31

So far the first scrutinium had not brought even a hint of a result. The most votes were awarded to Giovanni Battista Maria Pallotta (1594–1668), while lined up behind him in

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28 In addition to him they talked in the first place about Girolamo Farnese (1599–1668) and then about Scipione Pannocchieschi D’Elci (1600–1670), Girolamo Buonvisi (1607–1677) and Giambattista Spada (1597–1675). The most ardent support for Farnese came from Cardinal Sforza. Harrach commented that in such a situation he would have acted independently. The record of 1. 6. 1667. Ibidem.
29 Ibidem, Bd. 7, p. 801, the record of 14. 6. 1667.
31 K. KELLER – A. CATALANO (Hg.), *Die Diarien und Tagzettel*, Bd. 7, p. 797, the record of 4. 6. 1667.
close succession were Francesco Barberini and Carlo Carafa Della Spina (1611–1680). Only Harrach actually voted for Rospigliosi. Also added to the votes (vota) were the accessions (accessi) that the electors carried out at their own discretion after handing their votes to the scrutineers (i.e. the election adjudicators), who were appointed individually for each scrutinium. That day, however, the situation did not seem any clearer even after they had all been added together. Therefore fresh negotiations and discussions commenced, during which new figures appeared and also new coalitions were formed that supported the different candidates, together with the participation of additional conclave electors and then what was awaited was who could direct their actual development towards one party or towards the other.

The cardinals’ decisions more or less constituted a “public secret” that was also influenced by news of world events and both personal and open letters that were sent either by individual rulers or by their representatives. At the same time messengers carrying news about the latest developments were leaving from the gates of the conclave on a daily basis. In June Harrach himself corresponded, amongst others, with his relatives Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach (1636–1706), Johann Friedrich and Karl Ferdinand von Waldstein (1634–1702), Johann von Goëss and also with the Emperor Leopold I.

Resisting against the election of Cardinal Rospigliosi was mainly cardinal-nephew of Alexander VII Flavio Chigi. Harrach in cooperation with Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt did not manage to persuade him otherwise until the 17th June. On that day he recorded that Rospigliosi’s conclave had brought him cold chocolate to taste. Harrach, however, refused it, saying that he does not drink chocolate.

During the morning scrutinium on the 20th June there was not much that would suggest a successful outcome of the elections however. When it ended Cardinals Barberini and Chigi met with their supporters (“con le loro creature”) and during an hour-long meeting they agreed that henceforth they would consistently support Rospigliosi. Probably some of their conclave caught up with Harrach with this information at lunchtime. Then they locked themselves in their cells again and did not accept any other visits. Harrach rushed this news to Sforza and subsequently also to Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt. The Imperials then also visited the members of the other factions and called for them to cast their votes during the afternoon scrutinium. From that activity Rospigliosi received 31 votes. Prior to the actual accession the 32 remaining electors voted variously – some for Barberini, others for Farnese and even one for Harrach. After counting the accessi

32 Ibidem, Bd. 4, pp. 381–382.
33 Ibidem, p. 392.
the result was clear, however – Rospigliosi emerged from the conclave with a majority of 31 votes and 30 accessi and adopted the name Clement IX.34

Approximately at this moment the later extraordinary ambassadors to papal elections ended their sessions concerning the conclave, whereby they did not have any direct access to it and only indirectly learned about the individual twists and turns that occurred and also about the actual outcome. Harrach continued, however, and recounted (again for each conclave) the course of the solemn ceremonies that traditionally concluded the conclaves. Unlike in the case of the previous conclave now he could feel satisfied. He did not have to worry about the confrontations that had taken place in the years 1644 and 1655 due to the repeated Spanish veto against Cardinal Giulio Cesare Sacchetti (1586–1663). In 1655, it was he who was supposed to negotiate with Francesco Barberini to ensure that his supporters would stop voting for Sacchetti. It was also for him that the Spanish and the Imperial factions even casted 14 votes, just for the purpose of weakening Sacchetti’s support.35 In 1667 the veto was not discussed and, compared to previous instances, the conclave went smoothly. Harrach already arrived for an audience with Clement IX on the 23rd June and on the 9th July Leopold I expressed his official thanks to Clement for his services to the Imperial Throne.36

The procedure in cooperation with the Spanish party was a tactic that Imperial ambassadors and cardinals chose repeatedly. Until the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession37 it was also the same in the upcoming conclaves.

After the end of the conclave none of the ambassadors, nor any of the papal election commissioners, immediately left Rome. Harrach, together with Johann Friedrich von Waldstein, stayed there until the 19th September 1667.38 Additional important meetings were held which concerned, amongst other things, the representation of the Viennese Court at the Holy See. At the beginning of July Clement IX had accepted Cardinal Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt as being a protector Germaniae and accredited him as an ordinary Imperial Ambassador to Rome. Cardinal “d’Hasia” remained in this function until 1676, when he left for his diocese in Wroclaw. This case of the accumulation of the function of an ordinary ambassador and of the Cardinal protector Germaniae was rather unique. De facto it means the absence of a secular imperial resident in Rome. This situation lasted until 1689, when Anton Florian von Liechtenstein arrived in Rome.

34 Ibidem, p. 394.
38 K. KELLER – A. CATALANO (Hg.), Die Diarien und Tagzettel, Bd. 7, p. 889.
Anton Florian von Liechtenstein and the conclaves in the years 1689 and 1691

When Pope Innocent XI died on the 12th August 1689, it became very important for the Habsburg monarchy that his successor should favour the monarchy as much as possible. A lot was connected with the name of the recently deceased pope – first of all the diplomatic, military and financial support for the war with the Turks, who, in the summer of 1683, had besieged Vienna but by 1689 under pressure from the troops of the anti-Turkish coalition they had been forced to retreat to Belgrade and even further towards the southeast. The formation of the “Holy League” that was led by the Polish King Johann III Sobieski (1629–1696) and the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I was largely influenced by the papal diplomats who were supervised by the curia of Innocent XI. Since 1688 the Habsburg Empire was additionally threatened by attacks of both the Ottoman Empire and the France of Louis XIV (1638–1715). Concern about the fate of the Spanish branch of the Habsburgs was also increasing. The Habsburgs made a claim against the Bourbons for the throne of the Empire Over Which the Sun Never Sets. It was not all just about Spain, however – its colonies were also at stake and because of the papal throne also other important areas on the Apennine peninsula that were subject to the Spanish crown. This also involved the issue of future cooperation with Spanish diplomats and with other cardinals during the upcoming papal elections.

The Bavarian Envoy (minister primae audientiae) Pompeo Scarlatti,39 who, from the beginning of September 1689 had regularly reported to the Imperial Court about any new developments at the conclave, in that context emphasised the need for the occupying (or in many cases the reoccupying) of the ordinary diplomatic posts at all the Italian Courts.40 This was necessary for preventing the election of a pro-French candidate, which could significantly reduce the current papal subsidies as well as diplomatic support for the Habsburgs’ efforts. Both of the two trends – the pro-Habsburg and the anti-French – needed to be maintained however. At the turn of the 1680’s and the 1690’s, as the ambitions of the French King were increasing, the imperial negotiators and diplomats were well aware of this too. The credentials for the Imperial Ambassador to the conclave of the 7th September 1689 expressed the wish that the future pope should be as similar

40 Reflessioni sopra la commissione del Signor Prencipe Antonio di Liechtenstein, e suo arrivo in Roma, Pompeo Scarlatti to Leopold I, 24. 9. 1689, Roma. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Kor., Kart. 67 (hereinafter referred to as Reflessioni), fol. 324v–325r.
as possible to the deceased one.\textsuperscript{41} The same concept was mooted in January 1691 by the Bavarian Envoy in an introductory session for the extraordinary Imperial Ambassador to the conclave, when he noted that Leopold I “has no desire other than to see in the successor to Alexander VII the return of the spirit of Innocent XI”,\textsuperscript{42} while “the spirit of Innocent XI” was also discussed in association with the conclave that took place in the year 1700.

During the entire 17th Century the influence of pro-French politicians and cardinals in Rome was increasing, who were becoming – not only at conclave – ever-stronger opponents to the Spanish party, which from the time of Charles V (1500–1558) considered a right of veto and also other ways of influencing elections, as an aspect of their traditional eminent domain. The possibility that two rivals might gradually (or perhaps even suddenly) become collaborators, certainly did not please the Imperials and the less they liked it the more likely it appeared. It was also necessary to prevent the breakup of the Spanish party, as well as its inclination towards supporting the French interests.

For all these reasons Leopold I changed his former approach to the conclave and for the first time he seconded his extraordinary secular ambassador – Anton Florian von Liechtenstein,\textsuperscript{43} who also exercised the same function in the year 1691.

For more than twenty years since the retirement of Jacob Lombardi in the 1660’s, no imperial secular resident had lived in Rome. After 1676, after Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt had left Rome for Wrocław, nor did even any other German cardinal reside there. He was replaced in the office of Cardinal Protector by Carlo Pio di Savoia (1622–1689). After his death in February 1689 this post also remained vacant for several months. At the instigation of Grand Duke of Tuscany Cosimo III Medici (1642–1723), only shortly before the death of Pope Innocent XI, Leopold I commissioned this function to his brother Francesco Maria de’Medici, to whom the \textit{de facto} ruler of Spain, Maria Anna von Habsburg (1634–1696), also entrusted her confidence. Despite all these intentions it

\textsuperscript{41} “Successor defuncto quam similius.” Sigismund Freiherr von BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, Papst Alexander VIII. und der Wiener Hof (1689–1691), Stuttgart – Wien 1900, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{42} “…l’importanza di farsi un’elezione profittevole al bene della Santa Chiesa, e della Religione Cattolica, conforme al desiderio dell’Augustissimo Leopoldo, il quale nient’altro brama, che di vedere riuscito lo spirito d’Innocenzo XI. nel successore di Alessandro 8……” Per informazione dell’Eccellentissimo Signore Principe di Linchestein, 27. 1. 1691, Roma. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 70, fol. 37r–v.

was a compromise that gave preference to the Tuscan rather than to the imperial or the Spanish interests. The Medici family also had good relations with France and Francesco Maria himself attended to the needs of the cardinal-nephew of Alexander VII, Flavio Chigi. His position between the two competing superpowers is well illustrated by the fact that later on, during the years 1702–1709, he served as protector Franciae. Nevertheless 1689 Medici was to become the head of the imperial and the Spanish parties at the Cardinal College. It appeared more important that imperial appointee should cooperate with him (or perhaps direct him?). Also the German cardinals were supposed to travel to Rome as soon as any message arrives concerning the death of Pope Innocent XI, inter alia, because it was not possible to rely on Medici.

Giacomo Emerix de Mathiis (1626–1696), the Dean of the Rota Romana Tribunal had been informing Leopold I about the damaged health of Pope Innocent XI since June 1689. The summer months were marked by feverish preparations for negotiations. The conclave was closed on the 23rd August and on the 6th October the close associate of Pope Innocent XI, Pietro Vito Ottoboni (1610–1691), came triumphantly from it and assumed the name Alexander VIII.

When, on the 10th September 1689, Liechtenstein set off on a journey to Rome, he was no longer a novice in the diplomatic world. He had seen Rome for the first time during his Grand Tour during the years 1674–1676. He had already in 1687 been present at the coronation of Joseph I as the King of Hungary as an imperial representative. Scarlatti regarded his selection for this mission as primarily being in consideration of his noble origin, his polite demeanour and his casual easiness during discussions.

He travelled incognito with the mail courier and in ten days he had already reached the gates of Rome. He was met there by two six-horse carriages belonging to Cardinal Medici, which brought him to the Cardinal’s Palace on Piazza Madama. Also between the 20th and 24th September he was acting incognito. What that meant in this case, however,

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44 Correspondence of Giacomo Emerix de Mathiis with Leopold I from the year 1689. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 67.
45 In regard to the conclave in 1689 see in detail S. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, Papst Alexander VIII., pp. 1–53.
47 Reflessioni, fol. 325r–v.
was as a so far non-accredited representative, since he was not hiding his name in any manner whatsoever.

His secretary meanwhile visited Leopold Kollonitsch (1631–1707), the only German cardinal who was already in Rome,\(^{50}\) to pay him tribute and to arrange a personal meeting. With the same intentions he also visited the Spanish Ambassador, the Marquis de Cogolludo (1660–1711), who had already been living in Rome with his wife since July 1687.\(^{51}\) He also went to the other cardinals, who were closed in conclave, and to visit important officials of the Holy See to negotiate Liechtenstein’s accreditation.

Already on the second day Liechtenstein personally visited both of the cardinals (Medici and Kollonitsch) and in the evening the Spanish ambassadorial couple too. On that occasion he accepted the already prepared accreditation, by which the College of Cardinals accepted him as an extraordinary ambassador and gave their assent that during the coming days he could step-up to its gates for an official audience.\(^{52}\)

Scarlatti evaluated the first days of Liechtenstein’s mission using the following words: “This mission was praised a lot, everybody had applauded it, and especially the persons who love the glory, the service to Emperor, who care heartily the dignity of The Empire, but also the zelanti who love reputation of Apostolic Throne and the Court of Rome have been satisfied a lot.”\(^{53}\) He was hoping that Liechtenstein’s current progress would lead to a consensus during the upcoming negotiations between Cardinal Medici, the Imperial Court and the Spanish Ambassador.

Shortly thereafter the French Ambassador, Charles d’Albert d’Ailly Duc de Chaulnes (1625–1698),\(^{54}\) arrived, accompanied by the French cardinals. While the cardinals were able to enter the conclave on the 27th September 1689, the College refused to accept the ambassador while Louis XIV remains unwilling to budge from the territory of Avignon. His audience was also held two days after that of Lichtenstein’s.

\(^{50}\) Leopold Karl von Kollonitsch was originally the Bishop of Nitra. In 1669 he became the Bishop of Wiener Neustadt. In 1686 Innocent XI promoted him to a cardinal and appointed him the Bishop of Győr.

\(^{51}\) Luis Francisco de la Cerda y Aragón, Marquis de Cogolludo, was the Spanish ambassador at the Papal Court in the years 1687–1696.

\(^{52}\) Reflessioni, fol. 322r–328r.

\(^{53}\) “Questa missione … e stata generalmente lodata, et applaudita, non meno dalle persone che amano la gloria, et il servizio di Sacra Maesta Caesarea, e che hanno a cuore il bene e la dignità dell’Imperio, ma anche dalli zelanti della reputazione della Sede Apostolica, e di questa Corte di Roma.” Ibidem, fol. 323r.

\(^{54}\) Duc de Chaulnes (1625–1698) already first arrived in Rome back in 1666 as an ambassador. His visit in 1689 was already his third mission.
Liechtenstein should follow the modified instructions, originally addressed to Cardinal Medici, with whom he was supposed to closely cooperate. According to this instruction had Liechtenstein to choose which of the Cardinals he should promote, which he should only tolerate and which completely exclude. First, the diplomat should prevent the election of the former Cardinal Secretary of State Alderano Cybo (1613–1700), Gasparo Carpegna (1625–1714) and Angelo Maria Ranuzzi (1626–1689), all of whom appeared to be too pro-French. On the other hand Leopold I nominated ten cardinals – those whom he deemed to be the most appropriate, or at least sufficiently so. Of these, to the Imperials, Carlo Cerri (1610–1690) seemed too old, Gianfrancesco Ginetti (1626–1691) evidently had failing health and Giannicolò Conti (1617–1698) was suspected of excessive favouritism towards the French side. The most suitable appeared to be Carlo Barberini (1630–1704). They also evaluated highly the ultimately successful Pietro Vitto Ottoboni, whom the Imperials were barely able to tolerate. Also to his detriment was the fact that he came from the Venetian Republic. Liechtenstein was supposed to discourage Cardinal Medici’s affection for Cardinal Flavio Chigi. The Imperials considered him to be too close to Giovanni Delfino (1617–1699), whom they considered as being totally pro-French.

The actual methods that Cardinal Medici and Liechtenstein should use for fulfilling imperial requirements were left largely at their discretion. The instruction did suggest however, that they had discussed the listed candidates with the Spanish Ambassador – the Marquis de Cogolludo. Thereby Cardinal Medici could base his decision on satisfying the requirements of both the Austrian and the Spanish parties. Together with Liechtenstein they were also required to listen to the opinions of Cardinal Johann von Goëss. Unlike with the others, probably because he also had a much richer experience of diplomacy

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55 The instructions of Leopold I to Anton Florian von Liechtenstein, 4. 9. 1689. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 77, fol. 82r–83v. The original instructions for Cardinal Medici dated 29. 8. 1689 were looser in many respects. As compared to the adapted version that was prepared for Liechtenstein, for example, it contained the names of the 21 cardinals who could be supported. S. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, Papst Alexander VIII., pp. 17–22; L. WURMBRAND, Das Ausschliessungs-Recht, pp. 280–281.

56 “Optimos vero aut saltem bonos putamus Barberinum [Carlo Barberini], [Carlo] Cerri, [Giannicolò] Conti, Spinulas ambos [Giulio and Gianbattista Spinola], Acciaciolum [Nicolò Acciaioli], Nerlium [Francesco Nerli], Ginettum [Gianfrancesco Ginetti], Pallavicinum [Opizio Pallavicini], Duratium [Marcello Durazzo] et quipsquis eorum eligeretur, gratum nobis accideret, modo ita res processisset, ut debere se Nobis exaltationem sentiret.” None of these was elected, however. The instructions of Leopold I to Anton Florian von Liechtenstein from 4. 9. 1689. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 77, fol. 82r–83v.

57 A variant manuscript that comprises the same instructions. Ibidem, fol. 84r–v.

58 “… ut Venetus, non omnino esset gratus”. Ibidem, fol. 84r.
than they did, they could openly discuss with him concerning the procedure. In the instructions related to Liechtenstein Kollonitsch is not mentioned, while in the guidelines intended for his team he is placed on the same level as Goëss, though he did not meet either his diplomatic qualities nor have his geopolitical knowledge. Unlike him, however, he had entered the conclave on the 13th September and therefore could participate directly in the top-level talks.

Apart from the cardinals who were excluded by the instructions, Liechtenstein, Medici and Cogolludo also decided about the possible exclusion of other candidates for the tiara only after they had heard their views and together assessed their quality.

The Viennese Reichskanzlei also directly recommended to Liechtenstein the persons in Rome on whom he could rely, and, if it was necessary, turn to for help. These included the Dean of the Rota Romana – Giacomo Emerix de Mathiis, the Roman Senator and the Count of Ferrara Giulio Cesare Nigrelli, the Bavarian envoy Pompeo Scarlatti, “Father Slavata”, i.e. the General Definitor of the Order of Discalced Carmelites, Carolus Felix of St. Theresa (1640–1712), and the Secretary of the Cardinal College Lorenzo Casoni (1645–1720).


60 Giacomo Emerix de Mathiis (1626–1696) had been the auditor of Sacra Rota Romana since 23. 1. 1668, after his uncle Giovanni Emerix († 1669) ceded the post that he had held which had been presented to him by the Emperor Leopold I to him, which took place in 1660 (and also later, in 1668, to his nephew). Subsequently, from the year 1686, he was the Dean of Rota Romana. When, in 1689, the concept of a new pro-Austrian Cardinal was considered, his name, amongst others, was also in the pot. Niccolò del RE, La Curia Romana, Lineamenti storico-giuridici, Città Del Vaticano 1998, p. 232; Mirella TOCCI a cura di, Il diario di Jacob Emerix de Mathiis, decano della Sacra Romana Rota, Napoli 1982; Richard BLAAS, Das kaiserliche Auditoriat bei der Sacra Rota Romana, Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 11, 1958, pp. 37–152; Zdeněk HOJDA – Eva CHODĚJOVSKÁ et al. (eds.), Heřman Jakub Černín na cestě za Alpy a Pyreneje, Kavalírská cesta českého šlechtice do německých zemí, Itálie, Francie, Španělska a Portugalska [Herman Jakub Czernin on his journey over the Alps and the Pyrenees; the Czech Nobleman’s Grand Tour of the Germanic Countries and Italy, France, Spain and Portugal], Prague 2014, I., p. 268; Jiří M. HAVLÍK, Jan Fridrich z Valdštejna, arcibiskup a mecenáš doby baroka [Johann Friedrich von Waldstein: the Archbishop and a Patron of the Baroque Period], Prague 2016, pp. 40, 83–84, 157.

61 His credentials can be found in Pompeo Scarlatti’s correspondence folder and also mentioned in it as being his addressee are Giacomo Emerix de Mathiis, Alfonso Litta, Giulio Cesare Nigrelli and the as yet undetermined Geiger. Pompeo Scarlatti’s credentials, as of 7. 9. 1689, comprised ÖStA Wien, HHSTA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 77, fol. 109r.

62 Johann Karl Joachim Slavata made a solemn vow to the Carmelite Order on 12. 7. 1663 in Rome and adopted the religious name of Carolus Felix of St. Theresa. He became the General Definitor of the
The imperial appointees were also expected to cooperate with Duke Livio Odescalchi (1652–1713), who, as the nephew of Pope Innocent XI, was the head of the cardinals that he had established (who were also referred to as the zelanti), and although he did not pertain to Cardinal College Leopold I was trying to oblige Odescalchi amongst other things also by introducing him on the 28th August 1689 into a state of Imperial Princes.63 Liechtenstein was to secretly inform the Reichskanzlei – and specifically its head, the Reichsvizekanzler Leopold Wilhelm von Königsegg-Rothenfels (1630–1694) – about the course that the negotiations were taking and about the entire mission.

Three days later, additional instructions were provided that clearly specified the guidelines in regard to the recent developments in the conclave, whereby Cardinal Medici had reached an agreement with Chigi and with Altieri.64 At the same time he was turning his back on the zelanti, who at that time were breaking away in favour of the French party. Thereby, to unify the zelanti, Liechtenstein was obliged to negotiate intensively with Odescalchi in order to deter their inclination towards accepting the French proposals. The instructions received stressed the need to veto Cybo and Ranuzzi as well as Carpegna and Lorenzo Brancati di Lauria (1612–1693) all of whom Cardinal Medici had ceased to trust. Of those cardinals whom the previous instructions had identified as being acceptable, it was Giambattista Spinola (1615–1704), Opizio Pallavicini (1632–1700), Gianfrancesco Ginetti and Marcello Durazzo (1633–1710) who probably enjoyed the highest level of joint-support from the Imperials, the Spaniards, Chigi and Odescalchi. Ottoboni was still just referred to in the same manner – i.e. he should just be tolerated. Therefore this instruction did not directly determine a single best candidate, thereby, within the boundaries outlined leaving the possibility of Liechtenstein’s independent judgment being accepted, based, however, on reaching a consensus with the other supporters of the Imperial and the Spanish interests.

In addition to attending their individual consultation meetings the prime duty of the ambassador in regard to the papal election was his audience before the conclave (alloquio ad Conclavem, audienza al Conclave, visita al Sacro Collegio). Its date was supposed to be arranged by the Cardinal-protector of Germany in association with both the Dean of the Cardinal College and the Marshal of the Holy Roman Church (Il maresciallo di Santa Romana Chiesa) who conducted the surveillance of the conclave. During both of

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63 S. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, Papst Alexander VIII., p. 12.
64 The instructions for Anton Florian von Liechtenstein from 7. 9. 1689. See ÖSTA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 77, fol. 89r–90r. See also L. WURMBRAND, Das Ausschliessungs-Recht, pp. 282–283; S. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, Papst Alexander VIII., pp. 23–25.
these negotiations these functions were exercised by the Cardinals Alderano Cybo and Giulio Savelli (1626–1712). Savelli’s family, which held the Secular Office of the Marshal of the Holy Roman Catholic Church during the entire 1503–1712 period, was favourable towards the imperial politics. During the pontificate of Urban VIII the father of Giulio Savelli, Bernardino (1604–1658), was an Imperial Pro-legate. During the years 1642–1649 Federico Savelli (+ 1649) was an Imperial Orator while Giulio himself was the Spanish Ambassador at the Papal Court during the reign of Philip IV (1605–1665).65

In the year 1689 the term of audience was determined for the 29th September 1689. Its course can be reconstructed on the basis of the reports from Giacomo Emerix de Mathiis and Liechtenstein himself.66 The extraordinary Imperial Ambassador came to the Vatican in the festive carriage of Cardinal Medici, accompanied by twenty carriages containing other members of the Medici family, Tuscan courtiers and other nobles, together with two of Cardinal d’Este’s carriages and 76 additional two-horse carriages in which the imperial representatives rode – i.e. the Counts, Bishops, Prelates and Nobles of the Empire who were residing in Rome at that time. When entering the colonnade at St. Peter’s Square the ambassador was welcomed by the Guard and Marshal Savelli received him at the gates of the conclave, and brought him to the hall where the door to where the audience was taking place was located. Greeting him there were the cardinals who were presiding over the conclave – Dean Alderano Cybo, Dominican Philip Thomas Howard of Norfolk (1616–1694) and Urbano Sacchetti (1640–1705). Liechtenstein took off his hat, knelt and received a blessing from the Dean of the Conclave and then appeared in front of the Cardinal College. Next, already standing, he handed to the Secretary of the Conclave a letter from Emperor Leopold I that was addressed to the cardinals. The secretary read it out loud and then Liechtenstein continued by presenting his own celebratory speech in Latin. He first expressed his regret concerning the death of Pope Innocent XI. Then he requested the election of a worthy successor who would continue in Pope Innocent’s footsteps and would also contribute both to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and to peace in Europe. In his speeches he described the Emperor as being the protector of the entire Church (“advocatus totius Ecclesiae”), whom the new pope should be helping in his tasks. The Dean of the conclave replied to him solemnly and Liechtenstein then passed-on one more letter. It referred both to the recent victory of Louis of Baden (1655–1707)

66 A. F. von Liechtenstein to Leopold I, 1. 10. 1689, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 67, fol. 165r–168v; Giacomo Emerix de Mathiis to Leopold I, 1. 10. 1689, ibidem, fol. 134r–135v.
over the Turks in Serbian Moravia and to the recapture of Mainz. This message was
timed to be delivered exactly and precisely in order to highlight the role of the Emperor
as a protector of the Church and victorious in battles with its enemies. However, with
regard to the French party this letter was not accepted. Liechtenstein said farewell to
the cardinals and Marshal Savelli then escorted him back up to his coach, in which he
returned to the palace in which he was staying.67

During the first days of the conclave it was Cardinal Capizucchi (1615–1691), supported
by the zelanti, who had the greatest chance. On his side they pulled the cardinals around
Chigi and Altieri. The Imperials were also satisfied but France stood in opposition and
the number of votes for him began to drop even before the arrival of the ambassador who
was to convey his exclusion. Chigi and Altieri suspended the negotiations and together
with Medici and César d’Estrées (1628–1714), the Head Cardinal of the French party,
they awaited the arrival of all the other ambassadors and cardinals.

Meanwhile the preference for one of the most respected members of the College,
Gregorio Barbarigo (1625–1697), had started to increase. Liechtenstein in his first report to
Leopold I on the 24th September 1689 had communicated that Barbarigo’s name resounds
everywhere and that the City is looking forward to his success. Barbarigo himself rejected
the idea of his own candidacy and thereby fortune was gradually leaning towards Ottoboni.

Despite all the efforts that he had instigated, Liechtenstein had the feeling that Cardinal
Medici was somewhat avoiding any mutual contact and that the conclave was continuing
quite independently of his presence. During one of the meetings he did at least manage
to convey the imperial vetos of Cybo and of Ranuzzi.68 Actually, in the end, none of
these activities needed to be announced at the conclave, because Cybo had not gained so
many supporters and Ranuzzi had died on his way to Rome. Even in regard to the notice
about Carpegna and Lauria, Medici could answer with a smile that their names are out
of the question anyway. Neither Cogolludo nor Odascalchi were seeking a meeting with
Liechtenstein, however. The strategies that this imperial ambassador evolved, fell on deaf
ears. He evaluated himself as representing an astonished onlooker.69

As had been anticipated Cardinal Medici cooperated with Flavio Chigi and agreed
with him in regard to Ottoboni’s candidacy.70 While Liechtenstein also approved this
variant, in accordance with the instructions that he had been given he did not personally

68 Relation of A. F. von Liechtenstein to Leopold I, 1. 10. 1689, Roma. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt,
Rom Korr., Kart. 67, fol. 166r.
69 A. F. von Liechtenstein to Leopold I, 16. 10. 1689. Ibidem, fol. 181r–190v; S. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN,
Papst Alexander VIII., p. 49.
70 A. F. von Liechtenstein to Leopold I, 1. 10. 1689. OStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom
participate with his support. Initially the French party had been refusing to accept Ottoboni. Things subsided, only based on the promise of a relative and probably him being a cardinal-nephew of the future pope, Pietro Ottoboni (1667–1740), that the bishops who signed Declaration of the clergy of France in 1682 would be recognised and that French entitlement for a law- and tax-freedom of apartment would be acknowledged (see below) and that the Bishop of Beauvais, Toussaint de Forbin de Janson (1631–1713) would become a cardinal.\(^{71}\) On the 6\(^{th}\) October Pietro Vito Ottoboni assumed the title of Alexander VIII.

Liechtenstein remained in Rome in anticipation of the papal audience that he had been granted for the 10\(^{th}\) December 1689. Meanwhile the possibility of his accreditation as an ordinary ambassador to the Papal Court or as an imperial commissioner in Rome – possibly with responsibility for Italy in its entirety – was discussed.\(^{72}\) Before these issues had been resolved Liechtenstein once again had the opportunity to engage in frantic negotiations concerning the election of a new Pope during the first half of 1691. Indeed in discussions regarding the support for Ottoboni it was frequently said that this would be a temporary solution for just two or three years.

During the second half of January Pompeo Scarlatti informed Leopold I of the fact that Alexander VIII was terminally ill and that he was preparing an extensive account of this in regard to Lichtenstein in which he would interpret the imperial proposition concerning the forthcoming conclave at the end of the month.\(^{73}\) If the Pope dies a courier with a message should set off promptly to the Viennese Court. Even if he recovered, Lichtenstein should slowly and quietly (“pianpiano”) prepare everything that is necessary for a future conclave so that this time he would also be acting in concert with Cardinal Goëss. He was also expected to pay his respects to the Spanish cardinals Pedro de Salazar (1630–1706) and José Sáenz de Aguirre (1630–1699), the latter being the only one who specifically resides in Rome.\(^{74}\) It was they who could have the greatest impact on the cardinals of the Spanish possessions that were located in the Apennine peninsula. Scarlatti was reminded of peripeteia in regard to the election of Benedetto Odescalchi in 1676, when the French party excluded all the cardinals who had been appointed under Clement X, without having to use a direct veto, and thereby placed emphasis on the fact that Liechtenstein was talking with Cardinals Chigi, Barberini, Altieri and Bandino Panciatichi (1629–1718)


\(^{72}\) “il titolo d’Inviato nell’altro di Commissario Imperiale in Roma, o in tutta Italia...”, P. Scarlatti to Leopold I, 10. 12. 1689. See ÖSTA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 67, fol. 388r.

\(^{73}\) P. Scarlatti to Leopold I, 20. and 27. 1. 1691. Ibidem, Kart. 70, fol. 13r–14r, 35r–38r.

\(^{74}\) *Per informazione dell’Eccellentissimo Signore Principe di Linchtestein*, 27. 1. 1691, Roma. Ibidem, fol. 35r–38r.
regarding a similar process. According to Scarlatti Altieri had been ruled-out of the hope of a tiara by his very great age – while all those who were appointed could have a great influence on the forthcoming election. Scarlatti again attributed particular importance to his festive speech in Latin – he wanted Liechtenstein to present it even before the cardinals actually entered the conclave and, when doing so, to claim the position of being the Ambassador of the first Christian Ruler. He should also express regret concerning the death of Alexander VIII and demand that the cardinals, when they are choosing his successor, above all keep in mind the good of the Church and choose the candidate “in accordance with the requirements of Emperor Leopold I, who has no desire other than the return of the spirit of Innocent XI”.

Cardinal Goëss should bring with him the Secretary of the Imperial Embassy, Francisco Chassignet, as his assistant at a closed meeting. Scarlatti considered him to be very reliable and especially suitable for mediating the negotiations between himself and Cardinal Medici. He also recommended establishing a strong coalition comprising Livio Odescalchi and the Cardinals Goëss, Salazar and Aguirre.

The Pope died on the 1st February 1691 and on the 12th February the conclave was closed. It was only shortly afterwards that Scarlatti reported on the success of Liechtenstein’s appearance before the Cardinal College. At that time nobody could have known that the largest electoral contest of the entire 17th Century, for the papal tiara, had begun! On the 19th February 1691 Leopold I appointed Anton Florian von Liechtenstein to the post of his Ordinary Ambassador at the Papal Court. Together with this the Reichskanzlei also addressed the credentials of Scarlatti and of Giacomo Emerix de Mathiis so that they could be fully available to him. At that time the preference for having Gregorio Barbarigo at the conclave was increasing again. The imperial cardinals established a veto against him however. Some of the electors persisted nevertheless and thereby the negotiations started to become more complicated again. The Imperials were glad to be able take advantage of an actual audience before the conclave, which Chassignet tried to negotiate for the 17th March 1691. Some cardinals stated, however, that they would not permit an audience unless Liechtenstein would officially waive his right to a freedom of apartment as the Duke de Chaunlnes had done in 1689.

75 “conforme al desiderio dell’Augustissimo Leopoldo, il quale nient’altro brama, che di vedere riuscitato lo spirito d’Innocenzo XI.” Ibidem, fol. 37v.
76 P. Scarlatti to Leopold I, 17. 2. 1691. Ibidem, fol. 79r.
77 Ibidem, fol. 118r. Liechtenstein stayed in Rome until 11. 9. 1694.
80 An unsigned letter of 18. 3. 1691 that was delivered by Cardinal Medici’s Messenger. Ibidem, fol. 105r–v.
This included the requirement that houses that were inhabited by representatives and their associates should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Rome Courts and from paying the duty and the taxes that are normally applicable for accommodation in Rome. Often it was a whole part of the City that was outside the range of the Roman jurisdiction. When Innocent XI declared that in the future he would not accept any envoy who refused to resign over this entitlement in 1687 the French Ambassador Henri Charles Lavardin de Beaumanoir († 1701) reacted to this by entering the City in the manner of an armed parade. Throughout his stay he cruised through the City daily with a military escort and threatened to punish anyone who refused to acknowledge him as being the high official Ambassador.81 From the equally hard-headed Innocent XI he obtained just one result: excommunication. Whereas when the Duke de Chaulnes arrived in 1689 with 28 galleys, which were moored close to Rome, the Spanish Ambassador Cogolludo reacted to their presence indignantly and, in response, he called in up to 500 soldiers. Another 3 000 remained gathered on the borders of the Kingdom of Naples. De Chaulnes did not require the freedom of an apartment however but instead stayed in Cardinal d’Estrée’s Palace. In 1689 Liechtenstein, as an extraordinary ambassador to the conclave, could not make any similar claim; especially when his instructions had not even mentioned it. The instructions that he received two years later also did not talk about the freedom of apartments and once again he decided not to make it a requirement.82

He set off on the 19th March 1691 for his audience before the conclave, accompanied by a total of 290 carriages. The first three, with six horses, carried Liechtenstein’s delegation, while the other carriages held a total of 44 prelates and 84 nobles of the Empire, followed by 64 carriages bearing representatives of the cardinals’ entourage. Apparently each of the cardinals sent one decorated carriage.83 Subsequently everything else happened in the same manner as it had during the first audience before the conclave that took place in

81 S. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, Papst Alexander VIII., p. 34. Lavardin stayed in Rome from 16. 11. 1687 until 30. 4. 1689.
82 A. F. von Liechtenstein to Leopold I, 24. 3. 1691. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 70, fol. 84r–v.
83 Anton Florian von Liechtenstein started his diary entries with this event, from which it results, inter alia, that the sessions were far from actually listing the entire equipment that was designated for the processions. Scarlatti, in his session, talked only about the 112 guides (apparently these were all imperial prelates and nobleman). The Diary of Anton Florian von Liechtenstein from the years 1691–1694 is otherwise quite scanty in terms of the information that it provides about the events that took place during the elections, whereby it almost exclusively simply records the names and the ranks of the prelates, the ambassadors and the secretaries whom Liechtenstein met during this period. Also included are the instances of the visits of cardinals and/or of conclavists coming to the door (porticella) to attend the conclave. Only rarely does he actually describe the nature of the visit. There was nothing to learn about their content and the results of the negotiations until 12. 7., when Antonio Pignatelli emerged from the conclave victorious. Ibidem, fol. 182r. The Diary of Anton
1689. Giulio Savelli introduced Liechtenstein to Cardinal Altieri, who had presided over the conclave and, after receiving a blessing from the hands of the Dean of the Conclave, Liechtenstein gave a short oration. However it did not have any significant nor any direct impact on the negotiations.

After the exclusion of Barbarigo many other alternatives became available and in early April Liechtenstein reported: “The outcome of this election is still not in sight and it still continues to be postponed. There are many candidates, but there is not too much difference between them. None of them can overcome any of the others without becoming a detriment to them.” He saw the strongest rivals as being Altieri, Barberini, Niccolò Acciaioli (1630–1719), Panciatici and Barbarigo. At the end of March the French cardinals had also opposed the latter. In mid-April, the imperial ambassador delivered two letters to Cardinal Goëss. In the first one Leopold I disavowed Barbarigo’s exclusion. In the second he subsequently admitted that he had not wanted him, but he refused to take-on a real share in ensuring that he would not be elected. In actual fact this should have been the responsibility of two of the pro-French cardinals, Ottoboni and Altieri. The whole issue came-out right and the zelanti believed that they could still achieve Barbarigo’s election. As was anticipated, Altieri and Ottoboni, with the support of the French cardinals expressed themselves as being strongly against this. Cogolludo and the representatives of the Spanish possessions in the Apennine peninsula also intrigued together against Barbarigo. Barbarigo himself eventually acted in the same manner as he had on the previous occasion – i.e. he resigned his candidacy. From the end of April the possible candidacy of Antonio Pignatelli, who was the papal nuncio in Vienna during the years 1668–1671, had started to be talked about. In May, it seemed that the Imperials would agree with the Spaniards on this alternative. In actual fact, however, the negotiations only continued until the 12th July 1691.

After Pignatelli’s election Pompeo Scarlatti also attributed the merit for it to Goëss and Liechtenstein. In the spring and the summer months of 1691 Liechtenstein finally

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Florian von Liechtenstein 1691–1694—see LIECHTENSTEIN. The Princely Collections, Vaduz – Vienna, Hausarchiv, HA2036. I thank Michaela Buriánková for providing a copy of the Diary.

84 A. F. von Liechtenstein to Leopold I, 31. 3. 1691. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 70, fol. 127r–128v, 126r.

85 “Nondum ita maturus videtur huius Conclavis exitus imo ulterior prostrahendus, Candidati enim plurimi sunt, nullus autem inter istos Summae distinctionis, qui aemulis praevaleat, nisi ut alter alteri noceat ne desideratum lauream adipiscatur.” A letter from A. F. von Liechtenstein to Leopold I, 7. 4. 1691, Roma. Ibidem, fol. 1r.


87 Ranuzio Pallavicini to Leopold I, 19. 5. 1691. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 70, fol. 15r.

achieved what he had hoped for two years previously – that he would actually be able to involve in the election of a new Pope. During the next conclaves it had already become a common praxis. To illustrate the course of these negotiations, I chose the prior mission of Antonio Rambaldo, Conte di Collalto, which resembled the above scenarios in many different ways.

Álvaro Cienfuegos Villazón and Antonio Rambaldo, Conte di Collalto in the year 1730

During the years 1720–1730 three conclaves were held sequentially in rapid succession in the course of which the imperial Cardinal and native-son of Asturias, Álvaro Cienfuegos Villazón SJ played a significant role. He was educated at the Universities of Oviedo and of Salamanca, which is where he joined the Jesuit Order. Subsequently he worked at the Universities of Santiago de Compostela, Avila and Salamanca. He also served as a theologian at the Court of the Count de Melgar (1646–1705), the Spanish Ambassador to the papal election in 1676, whom he also accompanied until he was on his deathbed. During the War of the Spanish Succession he was in the service of Joseph I (1678–1711) on behalf of whom he also undertook diplomatic missions not only in Lisbon and London but also in the United Provinces. It was in this context that after the Bourbons had taken-over the reign of Spain, he was forbidden from returning to his homeland. From 1702 he therefore resided in Portugal, adopting the role of a Minister of Emperor Charles VI, for whom he also carried-out other diplomatic tasks. In 1715, however, he moved to Vienna where Charles VI appointed him to the position of a cardinal. His negotiations with Pope Clement XI (1649–1721, pope since 1700) concerning establishing himself were lagging however and in fact Cienfuegos was not to wear the purple robe until the 30th September 1720. Less than a year later, for the first time, together with Cardinal Friedrich Michael von Althann (1682–1734) and Franz Ferdinand Kinsky (1678–1741), he was helping with the decision-making regarding a new Pope and it was Althann who had prevented the election of Cardinal Fabrizio Paolucci (1651–1726) in 1721. From the 27th April 1722, as an imperial plenipotentiary (plenipotentiarius), Cienfuegos also headed the Imperial

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Embassy. Interesting in regard to this is that most of the correspondence that he wrote by hand was in Spanish. His letters that were apparently intended for the officials of the Reichskanzlei and also of the Embassy are generally accompanied by Italian translations.

Alongside Cienfuegos there was always another extraordinary ambassador to the conclave – in 1721 it was Franz Ferdinand Kinsky, in 1724 Maximilian Ulrich von Kaunitz (1679–1746) and in 1730 Antonio Rambaldo, Conte di Collalto. The first two had gained their experience in the Roman environment for the first time during their Grand Tours. Certainly, in respect of both of them, it was their kinship with experienced imperial diplomats that also played a significant role. Franz Ferdinand Kinsky’s uncle was Franz Ulrich Kinsky (1634–1699), who was famous amongst other things for his participation in the Peace Congresses that took place in Nijmegen, Rijswijk and Sremski Karlovci, while the father of Maximilian Ulrich von Kaunitz was Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz (1655–1705), a former imperial plenipotentiary, who had been present at meetings that took place in the Hague and in Rijswijk. Maximilian Ulrich von Kaunitz could additionally draw on the experience of his older brother Franz Karl von Kaunitz (1676–1717), who had lived in Rome during the years 1699–1704, first during the course of his studies and later as the Imperial Auditor of Rota Romana. Therefore neither of them was on a diplomatic mission for the first time. Franz Ferdinand Kinsky attended the meeting regarding the election of Charles VI as the Roman King that took place in 1711 in Frankfurt am Main and in May 1716 Maximilian Ulrich von Kaunitz was sent to Lower Rhine-Westphalia and to Upper Saxony to negotiate for obtaining military aid against the Ottoman Empire.

Antonio Rombaldo, Conte di Collalto had an indisputable advantage in comparison with any of the previous imperial ambassadors to the conclave, from the fact that he was

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Nový Mars Moravicus aneb Sborník příspěvků, jež věnovali Prof. Dr. Josefu Válkovi jeho žáci a přátelé k sedmdesátinám, Brno 1999, pp. 506–507.

90 P. VOKÁCOVÁ, Příběhy o hrdé pokoře, pp. 369–411.


92 Maximilian Ulrich von Kaunitz was on a journey together with his brother Franz Karl in the years 1696–1700; he stayed in Rome from 19. 11. 1699 to 5. 5. 1700 (with the exception of a trip to Naples that he made in February). Jiří KUBEŠ, Naročné dospívání urozených. Kavalírské cesty české a rakouské šlechty (1620–1750) [Challenging Adolescence of Nobles. The Grand Tours of the Czech and the Austrian nobility], Pelhřimov 2013, p. 373.

93 Some marks about his dealing in diplomatic service of Austrian Habsburgs see David Martin MARCOS, El papado y la Guerra de sucesión Española, Madrid 2011, pp. 94, 116n, 140, 144.

94 Jiří KUBEŠ, Volba a korunovace Karla VI. Římským císařem v roce 1711 [Election and Coronation of Charles VI to Holy Roman Emperor in 1711], ČČH 111, 2013, pp. 805–841.
a native Italian.\textsuperscript{95} In 1707 the last member of the Moravian Antonio branch, Leopoldo Rambaldo, Conte di Collalto had died. The Moravian Collalto estates with their residences in Brtnice and Rudolec were then taken over by Vinciguerra V di Collalto (1647–1719), who lived in the ancestral castle of San Salvatore in northern Italy, and he then passed them on to his eldest son – Antonio Rambaldo.

His mother was Eleonora Teresa Countess della Torre-Tassis (Thurn-Taxis, † 1726), while her brother Ferdinando († 1721) held the hereditary office of the Imperial Postmaster in Venice. Collalto maintained a correspondence with his cousin Leopold († 1728), who took office after his father. This also facilitated Collalto’s way to mission in Rome.

His education had begun in his native castle in San Salvatore, which he subsequently left for the Jesuit College in Brescia, where he graduated in the year 1700. Four years later he became a member of the \textit{Maggior Consiglio} of Venice. Expected of him was a clerical career in the service of the Venetian Republic. After the tragic death of his relative, however, he moved to Vienna to take over the management of the Moravian Estates and of the customs in Ybbs an der Donau. He subsequently settled in Brtnice near Jihlava. At that time he was also engaged to Maria Eleonora, Countess of Starhemberg (1691–1745). The mediators of both the betrothal and the marriage that followed in 1708 were, amongst others, the Venetian representative in Vienna Daniele Dolfin (1688–1762), the \textit{Obersthofmeister} of Joseph I (and later also of Charles VI) Leopold Donat Trautson (1659–1724) and the Bohemian \textit{Oberstkanzler} Johann Wenzel Wratislaw von Mitrowitz (1669–1712). In 1709 Vinciguerra Tomaso, the first son of the marriage, was born.

Even after the departure to Moravia and to the Imperial Court in Vienna Collalto kept in touch with many Italian Princes, cardinals and scholars. He also maintained his ties to the Accademia dell’Arcadia in Rome. From his correspondence we can follow his relationships with Ludovico Antonio Muratori (1672–1750),\textsuperscript{96} Francesco Ercolani SJ

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{96} Letters of L. A. Muratori to A. R. di Collalto from the years 1708–1712. MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 118, inv. No. 2212, sign. VII 10 7.
\end{footnotesize}
(1659–1731)\textsuperscript{97} and with Charles VI’s Court Poet in Vienna, Apostolo Zeno (1688–1750),\textsuperscript{98} the Cardinals Prospero Marefoschi (1653–1732), Alessandro Albani (1692–1779), the prefect of the Congregation de Propaganda Fide – Vincenzo Petra (1662–1747)\textsuperscript{99} and many others. In 1719 he also brought together his Moravian and his Italian possessions.

In 1716 Charles VI bestowed upon him a golden key with the \textit{wirklicher Kämmerer} title. He then especially won over the Emperor when in 1723 he hosted him with his whole family in Brtnice twice, both when he was travelling to and returning from his Coronation as the King of Bohemia.\textsuperscript{100} His status rose to its highest point in 1729, when he was appointed as the \textit{wirklicher Geheimer Rat}. At that time, according to the testimony of steward of Cardinal Leandro di Porzia (1673–1740), Collalto was referred to in Roman circles as the possible future Governor of Milan or as the Naples Viceroy.\textsuperscript{101} These intentions, however, were cancelled because of the news concerning the deteriorating health of Pope Benedict XIII (1649–1730, pope since 1724). The Imperial Court started to search for an extraordinary ambassador.

In February 1730 Cardinal Cienfuegos advocated for Prince Scipione Publicola di Santa Croce († 1747),\textsuperscript{102} while Eugene of Savoy (1663–1736), for a change, proposed Franz Josef Czernin von Chudenitz (1697–1733).\textsuperscript{103} The fact that the choice eventually fell on Collalto was partly due to Gundakar Thomas, Count of Starhemberg (1663–1745), who had offered his services to the Emperor immediately after the announcement of the death of Benedict XIII.\textsuperscript{104} In comparison with Czernin, Collalto possessed an undoubted advantage in terms of his origin and his associated linguistic and social capital. He outweighed both of his competitors by his promise that he would carry out the mission at his own expense. He received the instructions to set off to Rome on the 4\textsuperscript{th} March 1730 and, in connection therewith, he was also promoted to the status of an Imperial Count.\textsuperscript{105}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{97} MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 118, inv. No. 2209.
\bibitem{99} MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 113, inv. No. 2138, sign. VI 2 8.
\bibitem{100} Š. VÁCHA – I. VESELÁ – V. VLNAS – P. VOKÁČOVÁ, \textit{Karel VI. a Alžběta Kristýna}, pp. 94–97, 251–256.
\bibitem{102} Cardinal Cienfuegos to Charles VI, 21. 2. 1730. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 27r–v. Finally he worked for Imperial Embassy. He was in contact with Cardinal Davia and his conclaveists and gave their reports to Collalto. See MZA Brno, Knihovna Collaltů [Collalto Family Library], Memoria del Ambasciata di Roma del Antonio Rombaldo di Collalto, inv. No. 55, sign. MS II B 1, 2. Vol., fol. 161r–162r.
\bibitem{103} P. VOKÁČOVÁ, \textit{Příběhy o hrdé pokoře}, pp. 413–465.
\bibitem{104} Ibidem, pp. 450–451.
\bibitem{105} A. R. di Collalto to Charles VI, 4. 3. 1730. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 1r.
\end{thebibliography}
In the winter of 1730 everyone in Rome was keeping a watch on the health of Benedict XIII. To the session from the 21st February Cienfuegos added a postscript that the Pope had suddenly weakened and received the last rites. Apparently he died just hours after Cienfuegos had sent his letter. When considering the upcoming conclave he was reminded of the last one, from 1724, when, due to the absence of some “German” cardinals, Cardinal Giulio Piazza (1663–1726), whom he and Maximilian Ulrich von Kaunitz both supported, did not succeed.106

In Rome in the 18th Century the expression German cardinal (cardinale tedesco) basically corresponded to imperial – a cardinal who favours the Emperor. In addition to the native Spaniard Cienfuegos in 1730 they also included the Bishop of Speyer – Damian Hugo Philipp von Schönborn (1676–1743), the Bishop of Vác – Michael Fridrich von Althann, the Archbishop of Vienna – Sigismund von Kollonitsch (1677–1751) and the Bishop of Győr – Philip Ludwig von Sinzendorf (1699–1747), while absent were the Bishop of Olomouc and the Cardinal protector Germaniae et Austriae Wolfgang Hannibal von Schrattenbach, the Archbishop of Kalocsa and Bács Imre Csáky (1672–1732) and the Archbishop of Mecheln in Belgium Thomas Philip d’Alsace-Boussu (1679–1759). The Milanese, the Neapolitan and some other cardinals also cooperated with the Imperials.

Already in 1729 the Emperor had commissioned Cardinal Cienfuegos to reorganise the inventory of the current cardinals papabili, including their labelling, as being “too young and therefore hardly eligible”, “too old and therefore weak”, “suspicious”, “devoted to the Emperor” and/or “indifferent”. The list of candidates of tiara was very extensive, as also was the number of factions that clashed during the election. Although Benedict XIII only reigned for six years, he managed to establish 29 cardinals, of whom 22 were still alive. Twenty five of Clement XI’s cardinals had stood against them, headed by his nephew Annibale Albani (1682–1751).

Under the leadership of his brother Alessandro a new Savoy faction had formed. In concordance with the Imperials and the zelanti they rejected the Tuscan candidates and, on the contrary, preferred the French cardinals who were under the leadership of Melchior de Polignac (1661–1741). Also in the game was the danger of war of succession in Tuscany between the Empire and France. The ageing Grand Duke of Tuscany Gian Gastone de’Medici (1671–1737) had no male offspring and many of the Tuscan cardinals had direct ties to him. The Spanish cardinals, led by Cornelio Bentivoglio (1668–1732), had already not been cooperating with the Imperials for a long time. Lengthy negotiations were anticipated, during the course of which it would not be easy to find any solution.107

107 For more information in regard to this see L. von PASTOR, Geschichte der Päpste, XV, pp. 607–624.
The conclave was closed on the 5th March 1730. Cienfuegos was accompanied by two of his officials (as fellow conclavists) – i.e. the auditor Giovanni dell’Aquila and the secretary Francesco Galante. The Secretary of the Imperial Embassy, Bartolomeo Antonio Passi, had already adopted the role of the principal imperial rapporteur on the 4th March.108 His letters were frequently delivered by special couriers, whom apparently Passi appointed from time-to-time.109

Already during the first days Cardinals Polignac and Bentivoglio converged while the French and Spanish parties also began to cooperate. The zelanti, at the very beginning of the negotiations, had suggested Cardinal Giuseppe Renato Imperiali (1651–1737). Just as had happened in 1724, however, the French and Spanish cardinals again excluded him. The Albani brothers did not support him either, because apparently they assumed that he would be acting against their own private interests. Cienfuegos did not reject Imperiali’s election; however, he maintained a compromise opinion in regard to the two camps while awaiting instructions from the Imperial Court.110 He tried to take advantage of the fragmentation of the Imperiali’s faction to negotiate concerning other possible options.111 The zelanti, however, could not be discouraged so easily and they requested direct confirmation from the mouth of the Spanish King that he really did insist on the exclusion. They also tried to obtain support from Cardinal André-Hercule de Fleury (1653–1743), who had stayed in France, while from the Imperials they expected a clear stance. At the scrutinium, that took place on the 20th March, Imperiali again received 18 votes. At that time Cienfuegos was negotiating in favour of Cardinal Tommaso Ruffo (1663–1753).112

Sigismund von Kollonitsch and Michael Friedrich von Althann entered the conclave on the 1st April. On the same day Antonio Rambaldo di Collalto arrived in Rome incognito.

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108 Bartolomeo Antonio Passi was born in Pressano near Trento, where he was ordained a priest in 1716. He was a Canon of Trent and the Secretary of the Imperial Embassy in Rome. In 1744 he was appointed as an auxiliary Bishop of Trent and a titular Bishop of Pelle (now Jordan). He is also the author of an Italian biography of St. John of Nepomuk that was published on the occasion of his canonisation. Bartolomeo Antonio PASSI, La Istoria Della Vita, del Martirio, e de’ Miracoli Di S. Giovanni Nepomuceno Canonico Di Praga, Con gli Atti della sua Canonizzazione, Roma 1729.

109 In the letter of 18. 3. he appoints a certain Dreiling, while on 22. 3. also Giuseppe Osso, who travelled with messages from the Viceroy of Naples Aloys Thomas Raimund von Harrach. Letters of B. A. Passi to Charles VI from 18. and 22. 3. 1730. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 8r–12r, 30r.

110 B. A. Passi to Charles VI, 22. 3. 1730. Ibidem, fol. 8r–12r.

111 B. A. Passi to Charles VI, 18. 3. 1730. Ibidem, fol. 16r. See also the instructions for Cardinal Cienfuegos of 8. 3. 1730. All the attached lists with the names of excluded and recommended cardinals were lost. The instructions for A. R. di Collalto are also of the same date. L. WURMBRAND, Das Ausschliessungs-Recht, p. 320.

112 B. A. Passi to Charles VI, 25. 3. 1730. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 39v.
Like Liechtenstein, even in this case it did not mean that Passi and Cardinal Cienfuegos would not be informed about his arrival. They had already been watching his steps closely since the 13th March, when, equipped with the instructions, he set off on a journey in the postal coach through Venice, Ferrara, Bologna, Ancona and Loreto. In Narni he was reached by a fast courier, who, on behalf of Cardinal Cienfuegos offered him the latter’s palace, which at that time stood on the Piazza della Pilotta at the site of the Pontifical Gregorian University’s present building and transmitted to him the information about the people in Rome who will be available to him. Passi himself rode to Castelnuovo to meet him, where he reported on the developments in recent days. Collalto then asked him to be available as his personal secretary. Upon his arrival at the Ponte Molle Cardinal Cienfuegos’ carriages awaited him. He was greeted by his future steward Cesare Ercolani di Santo Stefano and accompanied by him, still incognito, he entered, the gates of Rome. Immediately after lunch he sent Ercolani to brief his arrival directly to the conclave and to arrange an accreditation there together with the earliest possible date for an audience. On the same evening he appeared in the anticamera of the Palace of Francesco Barberini, Jr. (1662–1738), the Dean of the Conclave, where the Cardinal’s Steward officially welcomed him. In the following days he met with many nobles and diplomats. He also discussed in writing the most immediate joint approach with Cardinal Cienfuegos, who then, almost daily, reported to him in detail about what was happening at the conclave. On the 6th April he hosted an official welcoming ceremony in Cardinal Cienfuegos’ Palace with the participation of many prelates, ambassadors and nobles and announced to them that on the 10th April 1730, after the morning scrutinium, he would be admitted to the audience before the conclave. He was also inviting his guests to accompany him in a festive parade to St. Peter’s Square.

113 B. A. Passi to Charles VI, 11. 3. 1730. Ibidem, fol. 8r–12r.
114 Most of Collalto’s sessions were written by Passi’s hand. From June 1730 Giovanni Battista Ruele took over the agenda. Ibidem.
115 Correspondence of Cardinal Cienfuegos sent to A. R. di Collalto. MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 113, inv. No. 2139, sign. VII 2 2. B. A. Passi, 1. and 11. 4., and A. R. di Collalto to Charles VI, 4. 4. 1730. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 56r, 58r–59v, 4r.
The audience took place in accordance with the already well-known scenario. At the head of the procession came the gold-decorated six-horse carriages of Cardinal Cienfuegos, led by the Secretary of the Imperial Embassy Francesco Antonio Spada (1688–1736). Behind him, at a distance of about sixty steps, came Collalto himself, surrounded by five archbishops. Alongside him were a dozen armed men and two canons who were supposed to inform him about the people whom they had met along the way. Collalto’s Stallmeister Giuseppe Gonzalez de Sepulveda († 1741) followed them on an ornately clothed horse, together with two richly gilded carriages holding prelates and twelve other nobles. Outside the gates of Vatican Collalto was received by Marshal Augusto Chigi (1662–1744), who escorted him to the door of the conclave. He opened the door window and the secretary Spada submitted Collalto’s authorising letters to the dean of the conclave. Cardinal Cienfuegos who on that day chaired cardinals-priests and Cardinal Carlo Maria Marini (1677–1747), as a superior of the cardinals-deans, subsequently checked those letters and then handed them over to the Secretary of the Conclave to read them out loud in front of everyone. Collalto then doffed his hat and bowed, put his hat back on his head and delivered a solemn speech in Latin.

In his speech he urged the electors to elect such a pope who will be “a burning lamp before thy people and who will be all for all”. Already, traditionally, he referred to the Emperor as “the eternal advocate and the most powerful and resolute protector of the Church”. However, in any way he suggested the name of any preferred candidate. He ended with a deft quip: “Let the clergy posses leading position in the Empire and let the Empire posses the leading position in the clergy.” Cardinal Barberini replied briefly in Italian and Collalto received compliments from the cardinals who were present. He then left for the Basilica of St. Peter to pray there and he looked at St. Peter’s tomb, the altar of the Virgin and Child and that of St. Wenceslas and the family patrons, Apostles Simon and Jude. After his return to the palace a banquet was held for forty-six guests.

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118 “qui sit lucerna ardens coram hominibus, et omnibus omnia sit…” Relazione dell’audienza pubblica, MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 143, inv. No. 2320.


121 Ibidem.
Even at that time many still hoped that the Spanish party would withdraw its veto against Imperiali. Ruffo, Antonfelice Zondadari (1665–1737) and other candidates were also mentioned. Cienfuegos won for his interests Cardinal Armand-Gaston-Maximilien de Rohan (1674–1749), who negotiated with the other French and with Barberini about the possibilities of an agreement with the Imperials. His attempts proved unsuccessful, however, because the French maintained their coalition with Barberini and waited for the messenger from Paris. The messenger arrived with the confirmation of Imperiali’s exclusion at the beginning of May.122

In mid-April Cardinal Schönborn crossed the Ponte Milvio and complemented the number of the Imperials in the conclave. From the letters that Schönborn’s conclavists had been sending regularly to Collalto since the 18th April, it is apparent that he, as well as Collalto, was in permanent contact with the Prinzipalkommisar of the Imperial Diet in Regensburg, Frobenius Ferdinand zu Fürstenberg-Möskirch (1664–1741), and also with his brother, Reichsvizekanzler Friedrich Karl von Schönborn (1674–1746).123 The Reichskanzlei was thereby putting pressure on several places at the same time.

Cienfuegos failed to promote Ruffo against the wishes of Cardinal Barberini. The latter seemed to be more willing in regard to the candidacy of the former nuncio in Vienna Gianantonio Davia (1660–1740). Cienfuegos was putting him in second place however, and was negotiating with the Spanish party for possible support for Ruffo. A certain part of the Imperials, together with the cardinals of Benedict XIII, agreed on Alessandro Falconieri (1657–1734); Cienfuegos hoped, however, that they would not obtain the requisite majority.124 When, on the 24th April, the Spanish courier arrived with the confirmation of the veto against Imperiali,125 Cienfuegos managed to obtain support for Ruffo from Cardinal Bentivoglio. Meanwhile Collalto was negotiating with the Spanish and the Savoy representatives about possible cooperation and intervened with the Milan Governor Wirich Philipp von Daun (1669–1741) to put pressure on the Milan cardinals. The result of the election was not yet in sight however, because neither of the acceptable candidates had the possibility of winning a majority.126

122 A. R. di Collalto to Charles VI, 10. 5. 1730. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 75r–v.
125 A. R. di Collalto to Charles VI, 24. 4. 1730. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 55r.
Already in April the Cardinal Lorenzo Corsini’s (1652–1740) star was gradually rising, supported by Clement’s and the French cardinals, while during the first half of May nearly half of the conclave had been standing on his side.\textsuperscript{127} Therefore the Imperials gathered at a secret night meeting in Althann’s cell to agree on a unified procedure against him. They intended to use the veto only in extreme situations. Cienfuegos characterised Corsini as being a very old and nearly blind man who suffers from severe gout and thereby is incapable of managing the World Church, “\textit{apart from which the fact is that he is even from Tuscany}”.\textsuperscript{128} Imperial resistance caused the growth of Cienfuegos’ importance when Cardinal Barberini tried to convince him in regard to Corsini, saying that it will be he who will create the Pope (“\textit{un Papa fatto da me}”).\textsuperscript{129} When Alessandro Albani also anti-voiced\textsuperscript{130} Corsini in mid-May he suddenly lost.\textsuperscript{131} The interviews that Collalto, Cienfuegos and Schönborn organised suggested that the Imperials would have to give up their hopes of Cardinal Ruffo’s success.\textsuperscript{132}

In May Collalto’s son, Vinciguerra Tomaso, came to Rome to participate in the festive life of the Eternal City.\textsuperscript{133} The time was filled with ceremonial visits and also worshiping on various specific occasions – whether it was the celebration of St. John of Nepomuk, which was held on the 20\textsuperscript{th} May in the church of St. Maria dell’Anima and continued with a banquet in Collalto’s residence, or the feast of Corpus Christi, about which the contemporary Viennese newspaper also reported because they carefully followed the events in Rome.\textsuperscript{134}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[127] Cardinal Cienfuegos to A. R. di Collalto, 15. 5. 1730. Ibidem, Kart. 113, inv. No. 2139, sign. VII 2 2, fol. 79r.
\item[128] Cardinal Cienfuegos to Charles VI, 18. 5. 1730. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 56r–58r.
\item[129] Cardinal Cienfuegos to A. R. di Collalto, 14. 5. 1730. MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 113, inv. No. 2139, sign. VII 2 2, fol. 75r.
\item[131] Since May A. R. di Collalto began to attach to his sessions printed summaries of votes from scrutinia that he received from Cienfuegos’ conclavists. Scrutinia of 15. and 16. 5.; Corsini 15. 5.: 15 votes / 16. 5. 5 votes; Falconieri 16 / 19; Ruffo 14 / 12; Zondadari 6 / 12; Imperiali 5 votes. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 96r, 97v.
\item[132] Cardinal Cienfuegos to A. R. di Collalto, 20. 5. 1730, MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 113, inv. No. 2139, sign. VII 2 2, fol. 87r; Dullard, Cardinal Schönborn’s conclavist, to A. R. di Collalto, 19. 5. 1730, ibidem, inv. No. 2140, sign. VII 2 3, fol. 37v.
\item[133] Cardinal Cienfuegos to A. R. di Collalto, 6. 5. 1730. Ibidem, inv. No. 2139, sign. VII 2 2, fol. 66r.
\item[134] \textit{Fernerer Bericht dessen, was währenden Conclave zu Rom von dem 9ten Junii bis den 13den Junii 1730 sich merkwürdig zugetragen}, Wienerisches Diarium, An Appendix to No. 54, 8. 7. 1730. Available at URL: \texttt{<http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi–content/anno?aid=wrz&datum=17300708&seite=9&zoom=33>} [cit. 18. 8. 2016]. In regard to festivities and representation during A. R. di Collalto’s stay in Rome Z. KAZLEPKA, \textit{Ostrov italského vkusu}, pp. 96–98.
\end{footnotes}
That time Collalto started to write about the course of the conclave much more extensively. He was describing turns and coalitions of individual cardinals day after day and also cited correspondence and conversations that he had with his rapporteurs, conclavists, lobbyists of individual parties and also cardinals. It was just then, when a disagreement occurred between the Imperials. It was mainly up to Cienfuegos and Collalto to once again reunite so that they could decide on the final outcome of the conclave.

At the end of May, the Spanish party in accordance with French vetoed Zondadari and the fortune began to turn towards Davia. However the French together with Barberini, who preferred Pier Marcellino Corradini (1658–1743), lined up against. Collalto characterised him latter as a choleric man with attacks of rage, who hates the Germans. Cienfuegos therefore preferred the return to the previous support of Ruffo. While Cardinal Althann inclined to Corradini. In response to Kollonitsch’s appeal for loyalty to the Emperor he was referring to the freedom of choice. Austrian historian Ludwig von Pastor (1854–1928) claimed on part of the French faction it was only about the manner of how to break the imperial unity, to discredit Cardinal Althann and to intimidate the Imperials so that they opposed vetoing Corradini thereby making it easier to subsequently promote another candidate. Cardinal Schönborn later also inclined to Corradini’s election, but he fell ill in late June and left the conclave for health reasons on the 1st July. Cienfuegos thereby remained the main opponent and claimed that the Emperor will not let Corradini to become a pope. Together with Collalto they had to make every effort to find another alternative. To this end Cienfuegos said about Collalto that he proceeds with extreme wisdom and admirable manners (“con particolare prudenza, zelo, e maniera ammirabile”).

135 Cardinal Cienfuegos to A. R. di Collalto, 26. 5. 1730. MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 113, inv. No. 2139, sign. VII 2 2, fol. 95r.
137 A. R. di Collalto to Charles VI, 20. 6. 1730. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 163r.
138 Cardinal Cienfuegos to A. R. di Collalto, 8. 6. 1730 in MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 113, inv. No. 2139, sign. VII 2 2, fol. 107r. Similarly also the letter of the conclavist Schönborn to A. R. di Collalto of 9. 6. 1730, ibidem, inv. No. 2140, sign. VII 2 3, fol. 64r.
139 The session of the conclavist Kollonitsche is attached to the letter of A. R. di Collalto of 1. 7. 1730, MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 113, inv. No. 2139, sign. VII 2 2, fol. 5r–6r. Likewise in April Althann apparently belonged to the cardinals, who refused to respect Spanish veto against Imperiali. A. R. di Collalto to Charles VI, 24. 4. 1730, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 51r; L. WURMBRAND, Das Ausschliessungs-Recht, p. 321.
140 A. R. di Collalto to Charles VI, 1. 7. 1730. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 22r.
Althann claimed that the Emperor would not contradict any pope to which most of the conclave agree to ensure an untouchable freedom of decision-making of the Cardinal College. Together with Barberini and with others he sent on the 19th June a messenger to the Emperor with a question of whether or not he insists on his opposition against Corradini. Collalto only hoped that his intentions were good, even if his behaviour is rather to the detriment of imperial intentions. By contrast he considered the main rival of Corradini, Falconiere, who was a longtime enemy of Cardinal Barberini as much better, whole “ours” and suitable for the tiara.\(^{143}\)

The imperial faction throughout June abated, Ruffo also fell ill and Collalto stated that the situation is turning worse and worse.\(^{144}\) Corradini’s preferences fortunately eventually dropped even before the answer to Althann’s letter arrived, in which the Emperor confirmed his exclusion. It was the pro-French Cardinal Antonio Banchieri (1667–1733) who had now the greatest hope for success. Nevertheless the Imperials together with the zelanti were against him, because they did not find him sufficiently morally upright and virtuous.\(^{145}\) In the night of the 5th July, hopes returned back to Zondadari and Corsini who was particularly favoured by former Corradini’s supporters. The Imperials continued to insist on their opposition to the Tuscan cardinals and tried to promote Ruffo again. Collalto’s moment came.

In the evening of the 6th July Cienfuegos asked him to immediately attend the conclave. On the site he then told him that Barberini was fully determined to support Corsini. Since Collalto could not avert this step of the Dean of the Conclave, it was necessary to discuss what next.\(^{146}\) A day later a messenger arrived to Cienfuegos with instructions based on which the Imperials were to resign on resistance in the event of a new candidacy of Corsini.\(^{147}\) On the same day Collalto therefore met the nephew of favoured candidate Neri Maria Corsini (1685–1770) and spoke with him extensively about a possible support of the Imperials, who accepted it only “\textit{in order to avoid the greater evil}”.\(^{148}\) Collalto started slowly to talk about something else and mentioned the conversation that they had two months ago. He said that even today he would respond the same way. However, the conclave had lasted too long, and it is necessary to decide as soon as possible. Therefore, there is a possibility of agreement between the French, imperial and Savoy parties. The

\(^{143}\) “\textit{molto più perche è nostro affatto, ed è degnissimo del Papato}...” A. R. di Collalto to Charles VI, 1. 7. 1730, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 21v, 27r, 34r, 35r.

\(^{144}\) Ibidem, fol. 37r.

\(^{145}\) Ibidem, fol. 230v.

\(^{146}\) Ibidem, fol. 238r–v.


\(^{148}\) “…\textit{solo per evitare un male molto maggiore}…” A. R. di Collalto to Charles VI, 12. 7. 1730. See ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 113, fol. 50v.
imperial party did not propose Corsini, but they chose him just to avoid a greater evil. The Imperials will therefore not take any redundant steps. Corsini primarily had to prove his loyalty to the Emperor and this was a fact in regard to which Cienfuegos had not trusted him much. When Neri Corsini promised it, Collalto went to see the Savoy diplomat Carlo Francesco Ferrero di Roasio, the Marquis d’Ormea. He was quite surprised by this development in the turn of events; although he had assured himself that he always acted in accordance with the Imperials, after May’s rejection of Corsini’s candidacy it now seemed hard for him to agree with him.

Alessandro Albani, who headed the Savoy faction, was also not enthusiastic about the current situation. The French now insisted on having Banchieri and Cardinal Rohan even talked about excluding Corsini. Eventually, on the 11th July, they did express their consent. However, they did make it conditional on Banchieri actually becoming a Papal State Secretary. Their wish did come true just three days after Corsini had been elected to become the Pope. Collalto’s cautious approach towards him did pay off. In many ways these events resembled the situation in 1689, when the Imperials chose the lesser evil, while the French achievement was that their chosen candidate became the Papal State Secretary. In this case too, the Imperial Ambassador negotiated with the potential papal nephew in regard to finally achieving success and also tried to commit him, and especially his uncle, by means of them taking an oath of loyalty to the Emperor.

The sessions of diplomats and their secretaries at the conclave often revealed that during these missions what went on was not only about the papal election. Already during the sede vacante period what loomed out was the roles that the individual cardinals would be playing during the next pontificate. For example in 1689 Pompeo Scarlatti revealed that Liechtenstein carried out his activities with regard to Cardinal Colonna, who had been excluded in accordance with instructions that emanated from the papabili circle, and also with other important persons, who in the future would be negotiating with a new Pope.

After the end of the conclave, the Imperial Embassy official, Giovanni Battista Ruele, prepared an extensive report for Emperor Charles VI. On the 12th July 1730 even Collalto’s mission had not yet been completed. He received the instructions for the next meeting, in accordance with which he was supposed to conclude his mission on the 9th August 1730. It was mainly the audience before Pope Clement XII, which took place.

149 Ibidem, fol. 50v–51r.
150 There was a sharp dispute between them, during which they almost “drew their swords” (“così dire, sfoderata la spada”). Ibidem, fol. 43r–47r.
151 P. Scarlatti to Leopold I, 24. 9. 1689. ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Korr., Kart. 67, fol. 323r.
152 La storia del conclave in cui è stato eletto il Cardinale Lorenzo Corsini Fiorentino, orà Papa Clemente XII il di 12 luglio 1730, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StAbt, Rom Varia, Kart. 39, fol. 1r–123v.
on the 23rd August 1730, late in the evening. Collalto recorded it in his (fake?) letter of the 29th August, which he published.\textsuperscript{153} The Count again invited the noble guests to accompany him to the papal palace at Colle Quirinale. There the Papal Chamberlain Troiano Acquaviva D’Aragón (1696–1747) greeted him to first bring him to the private audience, during which Collalto had a festive speech in Latin, in which he expressed the Emperor’s joy concerning the election of a new Pope. He also admitted him to the audience were then Vinciguerra Tomaso di Collalto, Francesco Antonio Spada and other participants in the parade. He received numerous gifts from Clement XII for playing his part in the election – amongst them were the reliquary Kart. with the relics of St. Fidelio or a tapestry in a gold frame depicting St. Peter by Guido Reni (1575–1642).\textsuperscript{154}

A few days later Collalto visited Antonio Banchieri in the Quirinal Palace and also other members of a newly built Corsini’s Curia. Collalto highly esteemed experience gained during his mission and conscientiously work on preservation of commemorating it. Part of his correspondence from the Roman era mission was arranged and bonded in three volumes.\textsuperscript{155} Carefully retained is also the number of letters from Cardinals Cienfuegos, Schönborn, Porzia and Camillo Cybo (1681–1743), but also from Eugene of Savoy, Wirich Daun and other notables. Folders with the correspondence from 1730 occupy almost three Kart.es in the family archive. The accounting records of the journey to Rome have also been preserved carefully. This chapter of our study cannot be more than a call for a more detailed processing of these valuable materials.\textsuperscript{156}

\section*{Conclusions}

Taking into account a number of imperial diplomats to the conclave in the years 1667–1730, it is certainly not surprising that they all belonged amongst the closest collaborators of the Emperors Leopold I and Charles VI. They came from the richest families in the Emperor’s circle – not for nothing was Franz Josef Czernin von Chudenitz considered, not unnecessarily did financial capital and the promise of private funding play an important role in the final selection of Anton Florian von Liechtenstein and Antonio Rambaldo di Collalto. It is probably unnecessary to give more weight to the fact that in their youth they

\textsuperscript{153} Lettera, colla quale un Personaggio di Roma ragguaglia un suo Amico nella Corte di Vienna intorno l’audienza, ch’ebbe da Papa Clemente XII. a 23. di Agosto 1730 … Antonio Rambaldo del Sagro Romano Imperio Conte di Collalto. See MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 143, inv. No. 2321.

\textsuperscript{154} Z. KAZLEPKA, Ostrov italského vkusu, p. 99.

\textsuperscript{155} Memorie del Ambasciata di Roma del Antonio Rambaldo di Collalto. See MZA Brno, Knihovna Collaltů [Collaltos’ Library], inv. No. 51/Ms II B 1.

\textsuperscript{156} MZA Brno, G 169, Kart. 125, inv. Nos. 2282–2283, sign. VII 18 1 and VII 18 2; Kart. 126, inv. Nos. 2285–2290, sign. VII 18 4–VII 18 9. For the purposes of this study, I left these materials aside.
had all spent at least a few months in Italy during their Grand Tours. Only exceptional in this respect is the case of Liechtenstein himself, who spent over a year and half there, and that of Collalto, who lived in Italy throughout his entire twenty-six years. After the experience with the previous elections, when only a few cardinals arrived in Rome and the imperial ambassadors acted with only a little support from inside the conclave, the imperial politicians wanted to be sure that the negotiations would be conducted by a person who has a deep knowledge of the Italian environment. The significance of Kinsky and Kaunitz (and during his time also of Liechtenstein) was rather more evident in the office itself and Roman agents and ambassadors approached them somewhat *ex officio*.

Collalto's case was different thanks to the immediacy of his relationships with Roman, Venetian and Tuscan diplomats. The permanent correspondence contacts with the Milan Governor Wirich Daun and with the Viceroy of Naples, Aloys Thomas Raymund von Harrach (1669–1742),157 confirmed Collalto's deep knowledge of both countries in the administration of which he could serve during this time. Even Cienfuegos was recommending Prince di Santa Croce, who had strong ties to the Albani family. Charles VI, however, decided for Collalto, who was significantly closer to the Viennese Court and simultaneously internally combined the qualities of an Italian prince and of a servant of the Imperial Court.

The imperial representatives appointed to the papal election usually acted in the rank of extraordinary ambassador (*ambasciatore straordinario*), even if they were in the same time accredited as ordinary ambassadors or even if there were some other ordinary ambassador or imperial representative. The first case is documented by the second mission of Anton Florian von Liechtenstein, 1691. The second strategy was used during the legacies of Counts Kaunitz (1724) and Collalto (1730), when the dignity of ordinary ambassador was represented by Cardinal Cienfuegos. The imperial ambassadors to the conclave had not enjoyed real respect till 1691, i.e. during Anton Florian von Liechtenstein's second mission. Only then did Cardinal Goëss veto Gregorio Barbarigo. Leopold I, in accord with Liechtenstein, eventually chose a more cautious approach and thereby withdrew his veto. Charles VI's ambassadors and representatives acted with much less compromise. The conclave in 1721, during which Cardinal Althann contacted all the members of the Cardinal College to personally remind each individual elector about the veto against Paolucci, was etched into the memory of many cardinals and it certainly played a part in the respect that the imperial party had in the course of both these negotiations – especially when its real strength was also increasing due to the growing number of its cardinals and to Collalto's position. The French tried to break it up and they did actually manage

to drive it into a corner. But this was not the first time that the Imperials chose the lesser evil – they had also acted in the same manner in many previous cases.

When selecting his diplomats Leopold I first betted on the experienced Harrach, for whom Cardinal Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt was available (or rather being a nuisance) who had stayed in Rome over the long-term. In both the latter's and in Liechtenstein's case the Emperor appointed the participants to the conclave as his ordinary ambassadors at the Holy See. In regard to both primarily it was all about representation that, according to Leopold I, only imperial counts would be capable of providing on behalf of the Imperial Court. Also similar was the case of Leopold Josef von Lamberg (1653–1706), who stayed in Rome for several years. In contrast Charles VI elected his representatives from the Count’s families. This was probably not so much about lower expenses for representation – the ambassadors to the conclave often paid the expenses for the mission themselves plus, like Liechtenstein, they frequently came to the City incognito. However, they might have been more tightly bound to the Emperor after he had promoted them to the status of Imperial Counts before their travels. Additionally neither Kinsky, Kaunitz, nor Collalto reckoned from the outset that their mission could somehow be significantly prolonged. They were leaving for just a few months and they returned to their estates shortly after having an audience with the new Pope, in whose election they had participated. Therefore they did not have to consider such expenditures as building the embassy, which instead of being held by them was held by Cardinal Cienfuegos who resided in Rome permanently. After the departure of Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt to Wrocław and the death of Carlo Pio, Leopold I did not have a permanent cardinal in Roman. It was therefore advantageous for him when Franz Karl von Kaunitz became an Auditor of the Rota Romana and could cooperate with Lamberg in the role of an ordinary ambassador. Despite this the starting positions of Kinsky, Kaunitz and Collalto were much improved when they could rely on the strength of the Cardinals Cienfuegos and Althann.

In none of these cases was the Emperor represented by a diplomatic novice in the papal election. Still, many times this was a mission that the ambassadors considered as being a springboard for their further career advancement at the Imperial Court. It can be seen like this especially in regard to Anton Florian von Liechtenstein, who in 1691 was accredited as an ordinary ambassador to the Papal Court in Rome. In the cases of Kinsky and Collalto this was rather the peak of their diplomatic careers, which only confirmed their eminent positions in the imperial environment.

Of all the ambassadors who between 1667–1730 stood before the conclave in the service of the Emperor, the strongest positions were those of Harrach and Collalto – the

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158 F. POLLEROß, Die Kunst der Diplomatie, pp. 302–504.
experienced cardinal with solid ties to the Curia and an Italian noble, living close to Venice, with ambitions for managing Milan or Naples, in relationships with many Italian families, including Torre-Tassis who controlled the mail service, as well as secure anchoring in the Empire because of his kinship with the Starhembergs and the Sinzendorfs with their domains in Moravia, which in addition always reminded the Emperor of his route to his coronation as the King of Bohemia. Similar efforts of double bonding (i.e. both to the Italian environment and to the Empire) might be found in the selection of the cardinal’s representatives, starting with Goëss, who, in Nijmegen proceeded to collaborate with the papal diplomats who were led by Cardinal Bevilacqua and via Althann and Schönborn, who were bound to the Imperial Court by their kinship ties, to Cienfuegos, who, during his exile from Spain, was the Emperor’s protégé in Portugal.
The Fall of an Imperial Ambassador:
Count Georg Adam von Martinitz and His Recall from Rome

Abstract: The paper discusses the changes in the diplomatic relations between Rome and Vienna during the embassy tenure of Count Georg Adam von Martinitz (1696–1700). The series of his conflicts with the Holy See (e.g., the scandal at the Corpus Christi procession, the affairs of the imperial feuds in Italy and finally a poisoning attempt) deteriorated his situation at the Roman Curia. That resulted in his being denied Papal audiences and the recall of Martinitz from Rome. But it should have been anticipated by his relatives in Vienna. Martinitz received another Imperial Court posting, although he was not satisfied with it. Although he inherited most of these conflicts, he was not able to dissolve them; in fact, he made some of them worse. His successor, Count Leopold Joseph von Lamberg, arrived to Rome with the task “to put water on the fire”. But it was not an easy task, especially on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession.

Keywords: Habsburg – diplomacy – Rome – Papal Court – Martinitz

The last two decades of the seventeenth century were marked by three popes. Innocent XI is the best known of them: he symbolized the organization of the Holy League and the beginnings of the Great Turkish War (1683–1699). His papacy is still one of the most researched from the post-Westphalia period. The relationship between Innocent XI and the Habsburg Court in Vienna was examined by Vilmos Fraknóí, whose work is still required reading for the period, mostly in regard to the Great Turkish War. Innocent’s successor Alexander VIII reigned only one and a half years, but his period and particularly his relations with the Habsburgs were well researched (although a century ago). Sigismund von Bischoffshausen wrote about the relations between Rome and Vienna during Alexander VIII on the basis of Viennese sources, namely the reports

1 A new volume recently published about Innocent XI: Richard BÖSEL et al. (cura di), Innocenzo XI Odescalchi. Papa, politico, committente, Roma 2014.
2 Vilmos FRAKNÓI, Papst Innocenz XI. (Benedikt Odescalchi) und Ungarns Befreiung von der Türkenherrschaft, Freiburg im Breisgau 1902.
of the imperial envoy to Rome.\(^3\) A decade after Bischoffshausen's work, János Scheffler examined the same topic, but he used the sources of the Vatican Secret Archives.\(^4\) The volumes of Bischoffshausen and Scheffler complete each other and show us the two sides of the diplomatic relations between the Roman Curia and the Habsburg Court.

Contrary to those of his predecessors, the decade-long reign (1691–1700) of the last pope of the seventeenth century, Innocent XII, received less interest.\(^5\) Particularly in terms of his relationship to the Viennese Court, we should mention the article of Elizabeth Garms-Cornides, who examined the pope's decade from the side of the imperial ambassadors’ protocol activity in Rome. Garms-Cornides focused on two ambassadors, Anton Florian Liechtenstein and this paper's protagonist, Georg Adam von Martinitz.\(^6\) Another valuable viewpoint on diplomatic relations between Vienna and Rome is provided by Friedrich Polleroß, who researched the activity and career of Leopold Joseph Lamberg, the imperial ambassador to Rome in the last months of Pope Innocent XII’s life. Polleroß examined Lamberg as a diplomat and an art patron, but had a retrospective narrative on Lamberg's predecessors in office, i.e. Liechtenstein and Martinitz.\(^7\)

We can interpret the period of Innocent XII as the prelude to the War of the Spanish Succession as well as the end of the Great Turkish War. Over this decade of his pontificate, the post-Westphalian system of the European powers began to change. From that point of view, it is necessary to examine how the relations between Vienna and Rome changed on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession. As part of broader research, which aims at the examination of those diplomatic relations during Innocent XII, we will shed a little light on a crucial moment of this period, the fall and recall of the imperial ambassador Georg Adam von Martinitz.

During the last decade of the 17\(^{th}\) century, Emperor Leopold I was represented by three ambassadors in Rome. Prince Anton Florian von Liechtenstein arrived to Rome

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4 János SCHEFFLER, VIII. Sándor pápa és a bécsi udvar (1689–1691) [Pope Alexander VIII and the Viennese Court], Ungvár 1914.

5 Bruno PELLEGRINO (cura di), Riforme, religione e politica durante il pontificato di Innocenzo XII (1691–1700), Lecce 1994.


as an imperial envoy in 1689 for the conclave that elected Alexander VIII. Due to the worsening of diplomatic relations, the Viennese Court planned to recall Liechtenstein, but as Alexander VIII died in early 1691, they decided to leave the prince there for the new conclave. Moreover, Liechtenstein was appointed as imperial ambassador. Leopold I at last recalled his ambassador in February 1693, after he nominated Liechtenstein as the tutor (ayo) of his younger son, Archduke Charles. But the Viennese ministers struggled so long to find a suitable new ambassador to Rome that Liechtenstein only left his post in September 1694—and still without a successor in the embassy.

Finally, the Emperor appointed the Bohemian aristocrat Count Georg Adam von Martinitz as his new ambassador in December 1694. Martinitz was a member of the Imperial Court from 1675. His first significant diplomatic mission was accomplished in 1682–1683 to Italy, then in 1685 to England. In 1692 he was sent to the Polish Diet. After spending years in Rome he had a career in the Viennese Court, but in 1707 he returned once again to Italy as Viceroy of Naples.

Martinitz began his journey to Rome only in the autumn of 1695, one year after his appointment as ambassador. Although Martinitz arrived to Rome already 19 November 1695, he was not able officially to begin his activity until early 1696. After four years of service, Count Martinitz left Rome 25 April 1700. His successor, Count Leopold

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12 Archivio Segreto Vaticano (= ASV), Segretaria di Stato (= Seegr. Stato), Germania, vol. 227, fol. 529r–530r. Vienna, 4. 12. 1694. Nuncio Sebastiano Antonio Tanara reports to Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada that Count Martinitz was appointed by Emperor Leopold as ambassador to Rome on 3 December; Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (= ÖStA), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (= HHStA), Staatenabteilungen (= StAbt), Rom, Hofkorrespondenz, Kart. 15, Ebersdorf, 5. 10. 1695. The letter of credence of Count Georg Adam von Martinitz by Emperor Leopold I to Pope Innocent XII. The same day other letters of credence were issued to various cardinals of the Roman Curia.
Joseph von Lamberg, arrived in Rome 13 January 1700, and was recalled during the War of the Spanish Succession in 1705.15 Beside the three ambassadors we should mention as well Cardinal Johannes von Goëss, who had lived in Rome since the conclave of 1689. Although he steadily asked permission of the emperor to return into his diocese of Gurk, finally he died in Rome 19 October 1696, aged 85.16 The role of Cardinal Goëss was quite important for Vienna, as he participated in the work of several congregations of the Roman Curia.17 As the Cardinal Protector of the Habsburg countries and the Holy Roman Empire (Francesco Maria de Medici) resided in Florence, Goëss became one of the most important supporters and defenders of the imperial interests in Rome.18 After the departure of Liechtenstein, Cardinal Goëss became the temporary imperial chargé d'affaires, together with secretary Francois Chassignet.19

In this article we will examine the main causes of the fall of Count Martinitz and how his recall happened, a process which includes the search for a suitable position for him in the Viennese Court. In a broader context, we will explore to place the failure of the imperial ambassador in the diplomatic relationship between Rome and Vienna.

**A scandalous procession**

Precedence was always a hot issue in court life, even more so when it had diplomatic undertones. Martinitz was not shy to cause offense in such issues. Just a few weeks after his very first papal audience, on 2 February 1696 in the *cappella papale*, he entered in a dispute...
over the precedence with Filippo Colonna, the Gran Contestabile of Naples.\footnote{Ibidem, pp. 156–157.} A few months later, Martinitz prepared for the next dispute. He emphasized his precedence over the Roman governor Ranuccio Pallavicino in the order of the Corpus Christi procession. He stated that the governor at the time of Prince Liechtenstein demanded to be in the procession in the same line with the royal ambassadors, who refused it. The pope then ordered the governor to be rather at his side, in the case of being commanded by the pontiff.\footnote{ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Rom, Korrespondenz, Kart. 76, fol. 100r–108v. Rome, 2. 6. 1696. Count Georg Adam von Martinitz to Emperor Leopold I. For a general overview of the Corpus Christi procession, see: Maria Antonietta VISCEGLIA, \textit{Tra liturgia e politica: il Corpus Domini a Roma (XV – XVIII secolo)}, in: R. Bösel et al. (Hg.), Kaiserhof – Papsthof, pp. 125–146.} As Cardinal Goëss wrote to Prince Liechtenstein, Governor Pallavicino wanted to march between the ambassadors and the deacon cardinals, which made Martinitz angry.\footnote{HAL, FA, Kart. 144. Rome, 2. 6. 1696. Cardinal Goëss to Prince Liechtenstein.} Hence, weeks before the procession, Count Martinitz summarily demanded a change of the order, which caused a storm of indignation in the Sacred College of the Cardinals. After the papal consistory held on 18 June 1696, the cardinals organized a separate meeting over the issue of precedence. The Spanish Cardinal Protector Francesco del Giudice warned both Cardinal Goëss, who was confined to bed, and Count Martinitz that the further demands would not remain without consequences.\footnote{ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Rom, Korrespondenz, Kart. 76, fol. 116r–123r. Rome, 23. 6. 1696. Count Georg Adam von Martinitz to Emperor Leopold I.}

In the end, the governor stayed away from the procession due to a minor illness, which seems to be have befallen him at the request of the pope and after an intensive intervention by the Carmelite Karl Felix Slavata, a close relative of the new ambassador. But these secret moves in the background did not prevent a major scandal.\footnote{E. GARMS-CORNIDES, \textit{Scene e attori}, p. 527.} Martinitz marched so slowly in the procession by way of protest that it caused almost two hours’ delay of the Corpus Christi procession on 21 June 1696. The outcry of the cardinals was deafening. The Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada sent a report to Nuncio Andrea Santacroce in Vienna on 23 June. Cardinal Spada informed the nuncio about the scandal at the procession, and asked Santacroce to express the indignation of the Holy See to
Emperor Leopold I. According to the rumors, Innocent XII was also outraged: he said, “Never again a Bohemian!”

Santacroce was not in a good situation, as he had literally been dropped into the middle of the conflict, having arrived only a few days before to Vienna. As he answered Cardinal Spada on 14 July, the report about the scandalous procession was the first letter from Rome which he received in the imperial capital. This means that Santacroce had not yet even been able to gain his first audience with the emperor in these weeks. He had also not yet been visited by the ministers of the Habsburg Court, but the Venetian ambassador advised him to break protocol and visit the ministers, given that the affair was so urgent. But the court was busy in these days, as they prepared for the funeral commemorations for Mariana of Austria, Queen Mother of Spain and sister of the emperor. But the nuncio had the information that the Viennese Court explained the behavior of Martinitz with two arguments: they claimed first that because of his gout, he was able only to march slowly, and second, the deacon cardinals had gone slowly to account for keeping enough space for the absent governor. In short, they claimed that the cardinals were liable for the delay of the service.

Martinitz worsened the situation with his argumentation. He stated that the governor – even if he was a prelate – was still just a member of the secular government of Rome, and so his power descended from the power of the emperor. He argued that the governor of Rome is simply the same position as the burgomaster of Vienna. It seems that Martinitz did not realize how far he had gone, as he did not report the case to Cardinal Goëss. The next day, Pope Innocent XII sent Giuseppe Gozzadini, the secretary of the Segretaria dei memoriali to the cardinal, who welcomed Gozzadini (knowing nothing of the affair). Cardinal Goëss tried to defend the situation and Count Martinitz, but the Sacred College demanded satisfaction. They protested with their absence from the procession held at the church of the German nation, Santa Maria dell’Anima on 26 June.

25 Archivio di Stato di Roma (= ASR), Archivio Santacroce, Busta 1168. Rome, 23. 6. 1696. Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada to Nuncio Andrea Santacroce. We know from a letter of Francois Chassignet to Prince Liechtenstein that the deacon cardinals went with such a distance after the ambassadors, which showed apparently where would be the reserved place of the governor: HAL, FA, Kart. 133. Rome, 30. 6. 1696. Secretary Francois Chassignet to Prince Anton Florian von Liechtenstein. About the scandalous procession see also: Joseph SCHMIDLIN, Geschichte der deutschen Nationalkirche in Rom S. Maria dell’Anima, Freiburg im Breisgau – Wien 1906, pp. 545–551.

26 Tomáš PARMA, František kardinál Dietrichstein a jeho vztahy k římské kurii [Cardinal Franz von Dietrichstein and his Relations to Roman Curia], Brno 2011, p. 137.


1696. The ‘chronicler’ of the pontificate of Pope Innocent XII, Giovanni Battista Campello wrote in his diary such an absence of the cardinals from the procession of the Santa Maria dell’Anima had never happened in memory. The most humiliating aspect for Martinitz was that the same cardinals not long thereafter appeared decidedly healthy in the San Lorenzo in Damaso at the invitation of Cardinal Pietro Ottoboni, nephew of the late Pope Alexander VIII.

Cardinal Goëss wrote to Liechtenstein that he knew about this plan of the cardinals but did not believe it. He complained to some of his confidants in the Sacred College that it was why they did not want to pray together against the Ottomans for new Christian victories. As Martinitz was not able to negotiate or moderate the issue concerning the procession, the Viennese Court again counted on the old Cardinal Goëss. The prelate tried to calm down the feelings against Martinitz inside the Roman Court. Although Pope Innocent XII did not deny Martinitz audiences, they were no longer than half an hour and confined only to pure formality. The conflict between the two courts undermined the health of the 85-year-old Cardinal Johannes von Goëss, who finally died in autumn of the same year.

After the death of Cardinal Goëss, Martinitz remained alone with his tough manner in Rome. In autumn of 1696, he wrote to the Emperor that he suspected the absence of the cardinals from the Santa Maria dell’Anima concealed French influence and diplomacy. While Martinitz was not able to let the affair go, the Holy See wanted to close it down. They argued that already during Gregory XIV (1590–1591), the governor marched on the right hand of the imperial ambassador.

In Vienna the ministers wanted to validate the compromise between Liechtenstein and the former governor. They stated that this compromise allowed the governor to go

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29 A. KERMAUNER, Johann Freiherr von Goess, pp. 158–159.
30 Paolo CAMPELLO DELLA SPINA, Pontificato di Innocenzo XII. Diario del Conte Gio. Battista Campello, Studi e documenti di storia e diritto 10, 1889, p. 460. “La mattina si fece la tanto decantata processione della chiesa dell’Anima della natione tedesca; v’intervenne l’ambasciatore Cesareo, ma nessun cardinale benche da lui invitati, il che non si ricorda mai. La causa furono le precedenze straordinarie pretese da detto ambasciatore nella processione pontificia.”
31 E. GARMS-CORNIDES, Scene e attori, p. 527.
33 A. KERMAUNER, Johann Freiherr von Goess, pp. 159–161.
34 ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Rom, Korrespondenz, Kart. 76, fol. 77r–84v.
35 ASR, Archivio Santacroce, Busta 1168. Rome, 11. 8. 1696. Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada to Nuncio Andrea Santacroce. The Cardinal Secretary cited the work of Gasparo Alveri, who described a cavalcade on the occasion of the possesso of Gregory XIV. The then-Governor of Rome, Girolamo Matteucci, marched on the right side of the imperial ambassador, Guido di Romberg, see: Gasparo ALVERI, Roma in ogni stato, Roma 1664, Parte prima, p. 387.
behind the deacon cardinals and near the pope, to serve him. The origin of the problem was that before Liechtenstein there had been no secular imperial ambassador for a long time in Rome, so the old traditions had faded from memory. The governor and the ambassador reached the mentioned compromise most probably in 1694. But as we can see, this agreement was quite fragile, mainly because in the next year there still was no secular imperial ambassador in Rome.

On the other hand, Emperor Leopold expressed to the nuncio that they recognize the immunity of the church and also maintain respect toward the pope. It seems then that the core of the controversy was a different interpretation of this mentioned compromise of Prince Liechtenstein. In an audience on 13 November 1696, Nuncio Andrea Santacroce and the emperor tried to find a solution to these misinterpretations ahead of the coming Christmas holidays. Leopold I promised the nuncio that he would review all the documents he received and then issue an instruction to Martinitz.

It appears the holidays and services of Christmas took place without any further trouble. We know only that in the spring of 1697 Martinitz still protested against the absence of the Sacred College from the service in the Santa Maria dell'Anima, but without any consequences. The Corpus Christi procession of 1697 came off without incident, although it should be noted that Innocent XII absolved the nobility, the ambassadors and the cardinals from participation in the procession. Martinitz was again informed through Slavata that the governor would not participate, so at last the imperial ambassador marched in the procession. In 1698 Martinitz was absent from Rome, as he was in Vienna to get the Golden Fleece. During these years the relations between the two courts were determined by other political issues, though this did not mean that the conflicts over precedence had been resolved. In 1710, some sources discussed a dispute in precedence, this time between the imperial ambassador Marquis du Prié and the governor Francesco Caffarelli. They referred again to the compromise of Prince Liechtenstein, although these sources stated that the agreement was officially drawn up by Cardinal Goëss and the Cardinal Secretary

37 E. GARMS-CORNIDES, Scene e attori, pp. 521–522.
41 E. GARMS-CORNIDES, Scene e attori, p. 532.
Fabrizio Spada.\textsuperscript{42} In 1710 they also referred back to the work of the German lawyer Johann Theodor Sprenger. Sprenger, in his work \textit{Roma nova} (1660), gave the list of precedence, where the first five follow one another in the following order: 1. Cardinals; 2. Governor; 3. Imperial ambassador; 4. Roman senators; 5. Royal ambassadors.\textsuperscript{43}

**The imperial feuds in the Papal States**

In the days of the Corpus Christi procession of 1697, Martinitz corresponded about a completely different issue with the Viennese Court, as he waited impatiently an imperial edict. After Louis XIV’s France had negotiated successfully with some North Italian principalities (Mantua, Parma, Toscany, Modena) in 1692 during the Nine Years’ War, the Habsburgs were a step behind. Emperor Leopold I had to reinforce his weakened positions with the Italian states. One approach was to dust off and to revitalize the rights connected to the imperial feuds in Italy.\textsuperscript{44} The new Italian policy of Vienna already started after 1683 in the wake of the liberation of the imperial capital and the eruption of the Great Turkish War. As the Spanish monarchy decayed, Emperor Leopold and his circle again revived the old imperial dreams of Charles V. An early manifestation of this policy was the rethink of the relationship with the North Italian states.\textsuperscript{45}

This question was of vital importance during the Nine Years’ War, as North Italy again became a buffer zone between France and the Habsburg monarchy. Vienna would have to address the quartering and movement of her armies in that area as well. The Imperial Court demanded greater contribution to the war from the little states of this region, and therefore Vienna tried to refer back to imperial vassal connections of the early Middle Ages. When new papal nuncio Sebastiano Antonio Tanara was appointed to Vienna in 1692, he received in his instruction important orders on how to deal with the ministers of the Habsburg Court regarding the North Italian question. One disputed region was Parma, where the Imperial Army wanted quarters, while the Holy See claimed the principality as a papal vassal. In the North Italian territories like the Diocese of Novara,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana (= BAV), Vat. Lat. 12.431, fol. 140–187.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Johann Theodor SPRENGER, \textit{Roma nova}, Francofurti 1660, p. 155 (Liber IV. Caput VII. Ordo Praecedentiae Ecclesiasticarum et secularium dignitatum).
\item \textsuperscript{44} Daniela FRIGO, \textit{Gli stati italiani, l’Impero e la guerra di successione spagnola}, in: Matthias Schnettger – Marcello Verga (Hg.), Das Reich und Italien in der Frühen Neuzeit, Bologna – Berlin 2006, pp. 88–89.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Cinzia CREMONINI, \textit{La mediazione degli interessi imperiali in Italia tra Cinque e Settecento}, in: Cinzia Cremonini – Riccardo Musso (a cura di), I feudi imperiali in Italia fra XV e XVIII secolo, Roma 2010, pp. 31–48, here 47.
\end{itemize}
the Imperial Army wanted to levy war taxes and other contributions, while the Holy See claimed them as papal feuds. The most problematic point was the feud of Farnese, which was situated in the Papal States. The feud was originally possessed by a collateral branch of the famous Farnese family of Pope Paul III. The members of this branch bore the title of Prince of Latera, but by the middle of the seventeenth century, they had gradually become impoverished: the last members of the family sold Farnese to the Chigi family, relatives of the then-reigning pope, Alexander VII (1655–1667). The pope elevated the possession to the rank of principality, meaning his relatives were granted the title of Prince of Farnese. Almost simultaneously, Emperor Leopold I donated the Imperial Prince title to the Chigi family in recognition of the papal support against the Ottomans. This simultaneous elevation of rank resulted in a serious misunderstanding a few decades later. In 1693 the predecessor of Martinitz, Prince Liechtenstein, demanded the obligatory visit from Prince Agostino Chigi, who was the owner of the Farnese feud. That should have been a symbolic act when the vassal of the emperor visits the representative of the emperor, i.e. the imperial ambassador; however, Prince Chigi refused that visit. Moreover, imperial taxation of the Farnese feud also emerged as a possibility. The affair became really unpleasant because the cousin of Agostino, Cardinal Flavio Chigi, was one of the most influential supporters of the imperial policy in Rome. Finally the cardinal successfully settled the question with the help of the Italian-born Antonio Caraffa, general of the Imperial Army.

The above-mentioned imperial edict, which was impatiently awaited by Georg Adam von Martinitz in 1697, was a general order of Emperor Leopold about the imperial feuds in Italy. The edict is dated 29 April 1697 and can be interpreted as a consequence of the new Italian policy of Vienna. Leopold I ordered his Italian vassals to renew their oath in front of the general war commissioner (commissarius generalis), Count Maximilian Breuner or the imperial ambassador in Rome, Count Georg Adam von Martinitz. The vassals were obligated to hand in requests for the imperial confirmation of their feuds within three months after the publication of the edict. In case of failure to take the oath or submit the request, they would be pronounced traitors and their feuds confiscated. Martinitz complained to the Jesuit Pietro Giuseppe Ederi in early June that he had

47 BAV, Vat. Lat. 14.137, fol. 252r–269r.
48 ASR, Archivio Santacroce, busta 1169. Vienna, 29. 4. 1697. The copy of the imperial edict as an attachment of the letter of the Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada on 17. 6. 1697.
informally (from Ederi) and not yet officially received the edict. Finally, Martinitz got the edict a week later – just a day after the Corpus Christi procession of 1697. A few days later, on 11 June, the ambassador displayed the imperial edict in two places at his residence in Rome. Moreover, he ordered his hajduks to guard the displayed edicts. Pope Innocent XII flew into a rage, feeling himself offended not just in the Papal States, but now in his capital as well. As an answer, several days later, the pope accepted the suggestions of the Congregazione di Stato, and ordered the Cardinal Camerlengo Paluzzo Altieri to issue a contraedict. This warned all the landlords in the Papal States obeying the imperial order in any form would result in confiscation their possessions because of disloyalty to the Holy See.

It seems that the imperial edict and the papal contraedict were in close connection with the case of the feud of Albano. That was possessed by the family Savelli, one of the most supportive Roman aristocratic families in imperial politics. Generations of the family represented emperors in Rome in the first half of the 17th century. By the end of the century they had run into debts, according to contemporary sources, which reached 617,000 scudi. The creditors of Prince Giulio Savelli turned to Pope Innocent XII, who then warned the prince that it may cause further serious consequences. The prince therefore turned for help to the emperor and handed over some old documents to prove that Albano was an imperial feud. Through an auction he sold the estate for 440,000 scudi to Prince Livio Odescalchi, nephew of the late Pope Innocent XI and prominent figure of the imperial party in Rome. This transaction threatened the Holy See with an immediate investiture of Prince Odescalchi by the emperor into the possession of Albano. The Apostolic Chamber quickly intervened and citing their pre-emptive right, acquired Albano. No wonder, then, that both sides felt their rights threatened after the confusing case of Albano, one which demonstrates a more general conflict over feuds in Italy.

50 ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Rom, Korrespondenz, Kart. 78, fol. 7r–11v. Rome, 8. 6. 1697. Georg Adam von Martinitz to Pietro Giuseppe Ederi SJ.
53 Irene FOSI, La famiglia Savelli e la rappresentanza imperiale a Roma nella prima metà del Seicento, in: R. Bösel et al. (Hg.), Kaiserhof – Papsthof, pp. 67–76.
55 E. GARMS-CORNIDES, Scene e attori, p. 533; Gaetano MORONI ROMANO, Dizionario di erudizione storico-ecclesiastica, vol. 1, Venice 1840, pp. 187–188.
That the two courts avoided the final break in their relations is partly thanks to the famous Capuchin friar Marco d’Aviano. The old friar, who died one and a half years later in 1699, was urged by Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to mediate. D’Aviano’s intervention resulted in a mutual exchange of letters between the pope and the emperor. Leopold I expressed that he did not intend to offend Innocent XII or his sovereignty, an argument which satisfied the pontiff (if not completely). Although they did not solve the conflict, the two courts tried to cover the affair of feuds with silence. The glorious victory of Eugene of Savoy over the Ottomans in Zenta on 11 September 1697 offered a good occasion for a partial reconciliation, as the pope gave an audience again to Martinitz in the autumn.\(^\text{56}\) Further progress was evident after the Treaty of Rijswijk in the autumn of 1697 when Pope Innocent XII seemed to be willing financially to support the Vienna’s war against the Ottomans again. After the peace between France and the Habsburgs was announced officially in Rome in February 1698, the pope contributed a support of 200,000 florin at the end of April.\(^\text{57}\)

Despite this thaw, the one who was not really content with the issue of the affairs about the feuds was Martinitz. As Venetian ambassador to Vienna Carlo Ruzzini reported to the Senate in early 1698, the imperial ambassador still tried to keep the feuds on the agenda. Martinitz wanted the Holy See to answer the latest letter of Leopold I, and brought up the issue from time to time at the Roman Curia.\(^\text{58}\) The Venetian Ruzzini was among those who expressed his dismay in a report after the affair broke out again: “\textit{After long time of sleeping and as it was believed almost extinct, the delicate matter with the Roman Court about the contraedict and the imperial feuds burst in flames again.}”\(^\text{59}\)

The Papal Court found the scapegoat in the person of Martinitz – not totally without cause. Martinitz arrived at the end of May 1698 and spent two weeks in Vienna, where he had received the Golden Fleece from the emperor.\(^\text{60}\) As the nuncio reported to the cardinal secretary, the ambassador had a suprisingly long three-hour audience with the emperor, and the next day another one. Andrea Santacroce was not able to learn completely of all the issues that Martinitz discussed with Leopold I, but he was informed

that the ambassador complained in general against the Roman Court, and in particular against the Gran Contestabile Colonna and the Prince of Farnese Agostino Chigi, who had neglected his obligatory visit. The nuncio learned also that the Viennese Court prepared to take measures against the Prince of Farnese, and had floated the idea to strip his title of Imperial Prince.\(^{61}\)

Martinitz arrived back to Rome on 1 July 1698.\(^{62}\) On 9 July, the Abbot Pietro Paolo Domenici, an imperial agent in Rome, carried a call of the emperor to Agostino Chigi. Chigi was urged to express his loyalty toward the emperor and confirm the imperial claim in the feud of Farnese. Chigi answered the abbot that he recognized only one lord (the pope) and he referred Domenici to the contraedict issued by the Holy See a year before. The prince immediately reported the imperial admonition to the pontiff, upon which Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada sent an extraordinary courier to Vienna to the nuncio, warning, that if they allow the imperial policy “to inflame a fire, blazing in the territories of the Church, it could be able to carry on into a great firestorm in the whole of Italy”. He ordered the nuncio to request an audience immediately with the emperor to express how upset the pontiff was due to the affair of Farnese, and how offended by this breach of his sovereignty in his own land. Cardinal Spada wrote that the nuncio should proceed with “strength and sweetness” toward the emperor. The cardinal secretary emphasized also, that even if Chigi is an Imperial Prince, it has not got any connection with the feud of Farnese.\(^{63}\)

Nuncio Santacroce, soon after he received the letter of the cardinal secretary, asked for an audience at the emperor. He presented to Leopold I the dismay of the pontiff and emphasized that the Holy See would under no circumstance renounce any of her rights. The nuncio suggested that the whole procedure of the ambassador was a secret, personal plot against Prince Chigi. Santacroce asked the emperor to appoint a minister with whom he could negotiate about the feuds. The emperor emphasized in his answer that his ambassador was acting under his own orders, and that, though he would keep respect for the Holy See, he would also defend the rights of the Holy Roman Empire.

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\(^{62}\) ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Rom, Korrespondenz, Kart. 78, fol. 128r. Rome, 5. 7. 1698. Georg Adam von Martinitz to Emperor Leopold.

\(^{63}\) ASR, Archivio Santacroce, busta 1230. Rome, 13. 7. 1698. Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada to Nuncio Andrea Santacroce. Spada attached to his instruction a short description about the history of Farnese from the 11th century on, and also a copy of the imperial admonition to the Prince Agostino Chigi. See also: ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Rom, Korrespondenz, Kart. 78, fol. 42–43. Rome, 12. 7. 1698. Abbot Domenici's report.
He did, however, appoint Imperial Vice-Chancellor Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz as a negotiating partner for the nuncio.\textsuperscript{64}

The nuncio and the vice-chancellor had a long meeting in early August. Kaunitz claimed that even in the Papal States many imperial feuds can be found, such as Castiglione. He proved it with the fact that during the previous war in Italy, these feuds contributed to the provision of the Imperial Army. Kaunitz emphasized that even if the Holy See claimed in the contraedict that no imperial feud exists in the Papal States: it is not true. Santacroce returned that even if some contribution had come from a feud in the Papal State, it might be only represent a forced taxation or the independent support of some landlords. The nuncio repeated again, that neither the pope nor his predecessors ever recognized any other lord in the territory of the Ecclesiastical States, and they always invigilated over the rights and privileges of the Holy State. Therefore, Pope Innocent XII could not permit any modification to the status of the feuds, said the nuncio.\textsuperscript{65}

In the light of that attitude of the Holy See, it is no wonder that in the meantime, Procamerlengo Cardinal Galeazzo Marescotti issued an order that Prince Chigi, according to the contraedict of 17 June 1697, must not obey the imperial admonition in any form.\textsuperscript{66} Both the answer of the emperor and of the vice-chancellor raised the anger of the Roman Curia. As Cardinal Secretary Spada wrote to the nuncio in mid-August, all these answers and arguments showed the intent of the Viennese Court was to continue the usurpation in the Papal States.\textsuperscript{67} Spada's opinion seemed to be confirmed by the conference of the Court Council in Vienna on 30 August 1698. The council ratified the previous measures and referred to the original edict of 1697 as a valid foundation of their policy. They ordered the collection of more documents that would support their rights and prove the existence of imperial feuds in the Papal States. These were then to be presented to the pontiff as testimonials of the Viennese demands.\textsuperscript{68}

The situation was clear: both sides claimed they were defending their own rights and blamed the other for usurping privileges. During this impasse, Martinitz painted himself into a corner. It seems that the ambassador tried to make the Roman Court believe that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} ASR, Archivio Santacroce, busta 1166, year of 1698, pag. 305–312. Vienna, 26. 7. 1698. Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Ibidem, pag. 337–345. Vienna, 2. 8. 1698. Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada.
\item \textsuperscript{66} ASR, Archivio Santacroce, busta 1230. Rome, 28. 7. 1698. The order of Cardinal Marescotti is together with the letters of the Cardinal Secretary on 9. 8. 1698.
\item \textsuperscript{67} ASR, Archivio Santacroce, busta 1230. Rome, 16. 8. 1698. Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada to Nuncio Andrea Santacroce.
\end{itemize}
he was simply the executor of the imperial order, which had been prepared months before his stay in Vienna and subsequent return to Rome. But Nuncio Santacroce reminded the cardinal secretary that Martinitz was one of the most influential accusers against Prince Chigi ever since the prince had declined to visit the ambassador. Santacroce supposed that it had been Martinitz’s suggestion to strip the title of Imperial Prince from the family Chigi, even though Martinitz prepared the above-mentioned imperial order on Prince Chigi with the help of some confidant Viennese ministers. According to the information of the nuncio, this imperial order was antedated to absolve Martinitz in case of any impropriety in the affair. Santacroce reported that these actions caused such confusion in the Viennese Court that they were completely helpless about how to deal with the conflict over the feuds. But others, called by the nuncio as instigators, suggested that the matter be submitted to the Imperial Diet in Regensburg.69

The controversy over the feuds extended for a long time, which essentially froze the relations between Rome and Vienna. When Fabrizio Paolucci, an extraordinary nuncio to Poland, stopped in Vienna for a short time in October 1698, he asked for an audience with the emperor. The meeting had begun cheerfully, until Paolucci started talk about the affair about the feuds. The atmosphere of the talks changed dramatically, and the emperor just answered coldly with the usual arguments, that he had to keep the privileges of the empire in view. Paolucci talked also with the Jesuit confessor of Leopold I, Francesco Menegatti. The confessor confided that he was not able to change anything about the mind of the emperor, as Leopold was unwilling to speak about the feuds.70

As mentioned above, the nuncio complained against Martinitz and alleged that he was the principal instigator of the conflicts. But it was yet another affair which caused Martinitz’s downfall. It can be said that the controversy about the feuds was the oil, but the spark flew out from somewhere else to cause the fire which consumed the Roman Curia’s patience with Martinitz for good.

Poisoned relations

On the afternoon of 7 April 1698, the nurse of Maria Anna, the newborn daughter of Martinitz, fell suddenly ill and showed immediately signs of poisoning. She had eaten a roasted apple with powdered sugar just before. The members of the household accused a servant whose wife had just been dismissed as a former nurse of the ambassador’s

70 Ibidem, fol. 271v. Vienna, 4. 10. 1698. Secret report of the Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada.
daughter. He admitted his act, and confessed that he bought the powder from a woman called Agnese Bracci. A member of the household informed Ranuccio Pallavicino, the Governor of Rome, about the crime which had occurred in the house of the ambassador. The governor ordered his men to capture Agnese Bracci, and asked a judge to interrogate the woman. The judge at first refused to interrogate her, as the confession of the servant had happened in the Martinitz house without the confirmation of any legal entities, and therefore the judge did not consider the interrogation of Agnese Bracci legally substantiated. Due to pressure by the governor, the woman was eventually interrogated. She confessed that the servant had requested of her a medicine which could stop the breast milk of the nurse who had taken his wife’s position. Bracci also emphasized that the powder was neither arsenic nor any other type of poison, but a medicine against fever which she had obtained a few months earlier from another woman, Anna Acquavitara. The governor’s men then captured Anna as well, and she confessed that she sold Bracci the powder which she had obtained from Sicily, where it is called the “powder of the devil” (“esser detta polvere Terra di Sicilia, detta del Diavolo”). The interrogations had just ended when a man of the Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada was sent to the governor to warn him that the ambassador was already complaining that the governor had not yet provided information about the captures and confessions. Martinitz also sent one of his cavaliers to the judge, who declined to tell him anything without the permission of the governor. They finally asked the ambassador to allow them to interrogate the servant themselves. The next day, Martinitz had already complained to the pontiff that Governor Ranuccio Pallavicino had refused to make a proper process.71

A week later Martinitz informed the Viennese Court that the culpable servant – owing to an attack of conscience – asked the ambassador to appoint some trustworthy men, because he wanted to amend his previous statement. The servant then told Abbot Domenici and the German secretary that he had brought two sacks from Agnese Bracci. One was for the powder to dry out the breast milk of the nurse, but in the other was arsenic to poison the ambassador. But the servant accidentally swapped the two sacks, and gave the arsenic to the nurse. Martinitz emphasized that he had never had any conflict with the servant which would cause such a murderous hatred. Moreover, two brothers of the servant were also the members of his household; therefore, it was suspected that somebody

71 ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Rom, Korrespondenz, Kart. 78, fol. 100r–107v. Rome, 12. 4. 1698. Georg Adam von Martinitz to Emperor Leopold. He attached a report about the “poisoning” act. Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada sent the same account to the nuncio in Vienna, and informed him that Martinitz complained against the governor, but he did not let the servant out from his house to be interrogated: ASR, Archivio Santacroce, busta 1230. Rome, 12. 4. 1698. Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada to Nuncio Andrea Santacroce.
else was the instigator. Martinitz evidently already has a suspicion, but he preferred not to write it but rather tell it personally to the emperor on his next trip to Vienna. A few weeks later, on the evening of 2 May, the servant somehow escaped from the coal cellar where he had been detained. He tried to get to the room of the ambassador, but he was stopped by others, and was taken back to the cellar. Although the servant claimed he only wanted to ask for the pardon of Martinitz, the ambassador reported to the emperor that in fact the servant had a metal tool in his hand, which suggested that he was again about to assassinate the ambassador.

Although Martinitz did not write his suspicion to the emperor about the real instigator, he wrote to one of his agents in Vienna that he suspected the governor behind the poisoning attempt. Nuncio Andrea Santacroce informed the Roman Court about it but did not believe the emperor would entertain such statements. But he did fear the influential supporters of Martinitz in the Habsburg Court might blow up the case. He reported also that he was informed by Cardinal Leopold Kollonich that the emperor was dissatisfied with the approach of Martinitz in this case, specifically his detention of the servant in his palace and accusations against the governor of improper investigation. Since Martinitz had arrived in Vienna to receive the Golden Fleece, the nuncio was able to add more details of the ambassador’s behavior. After the first audiences which Martinitz had with the emperor, the nuncio was able to describe the attitude of the ambassador to the Roman Curia more precisely. The ambassador made a general overview about the different factions of the Papal Court, but mostly about the ministers of the court, who proceeded with prejudice against the imperial policy. Martinitz tried to emphasize that he had made attempts to mitigate the trouble caused by the actions of the ministers of the Roman Curia. Martinitz also added the dangers and troubles suffered by him during his activity as ambassador. The nuncio wrote that all those speeches by Martinitz served only one purpose: to argue for compensation for his own financial expenses. But Santacroce reported that Martinitz had spoken with utmost veneration and respect about the pontiff and the cardinals, who were residing in their palaces and influenced by the malevolent disinformations. He particularly complained with anger against the governor, accusing him of being behind the poisoning. Martinitz stood by his opinion that he had

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72 ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Rom, Korrespondenz, Kart. 78, fol. 108r–110v. Rome, 19. 4. 1698. Georg Adam von Martinitz to Emperor Leopold. The ambassador sent also a testimony of two doctors, Vincenzo Antonio Gattucci and Giovanni Maria Lancisi. They verified that the poison was a corrosive one, most probably arsenic, see: ibidem, fol. 111r–112v.

73 ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Rom, Korrespondenz, Kart. 78, fol. 119r. Rome, 3. 5. 1698. Georg Adam von Martinitz to Emperor Leopold.

74 ASV, Segr. Stato, Germania, vol. 222, fol. 89r–90r. Vienna, 10. 5. 1698. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Santacroce.
the right to detain his servant in his residence because the ambassadors judges in their own households, particularly if a crime is committed in their residences. Martinitz told the emperor that the French and Spanish ambassadors proceed the same way in such cases. He denied that the servant was mistreated, and insisted he received daily wine, bread and meat. Martinitz castigated the governor both privately to the emperor and publically as well.

After Martinitz returned from Vienna to Rome, the next weeks passed with the controversy about the feud of Farnese. In early August, the pope sent to him the secretary of the Segretaria dei memoriali, Giuseppe Gozzadini. According to the contemporary diary of Giovanni Battista Campello, the purpose of Gozzadini’s visit was to discuss the feuds. But despite of the note of Campello, it seems that the meeting touched rather more on the poisoning affair. Due to later reports it became known that Martinitz gave a memorandum to Gozzadini of his complaints on 3 August.

It seems that Martinitz promised Gozzadini to hand the servant over to the Roman authorities. But a few days later the ambassador changed his mind, and came out with further demands. He wanted the permission of Pope Innocent XII to hold the trial of the servant in his residence. In an audience on 29 August 1698, Martinitz told his his demands to the pontiff, accused Governor Pallavicino of being the instigator of the poisoning affair and pressed for an investigation against the governor. The old pope at last lost his patience, and furiously demanded an explanation of Martinitz’s behaviour: who does he think he is, ordering the prince of Rome – the pope! – to upset the inner order of and justice in the Papal State. According to the reports from Rome, Martinitz, frowning, without bowing or bidding goodbye, simply walked out on Innocent XII.

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77 Paolo CAMPELLO DELLA SPINA, Pontificato di Innocenzo XII. Diario del Conte Gio. Battista Campello, Studi e documenti di storia e diritto 12, 1891, p. 389, see the note about 3. 8. 1698.
78 ÖStA, HHStA, StAbt, Rom, Korrespondenz, Kart. 78, fol. 140r–147v. Rome, 16. 8. 1698. Georg Adam von Martinitz to Emperor Leopold I. From that report we know that Martinitz informed the emperor in detail about his meeting with Gozzadini in his previous letter of 3. 8., but unfortunately that relation is missing from the Rom. Korrespondenz. We did not find it in the register of Martinitz’s letters that was prepared for his successor in Rome, Count Leopold Joseph von Lamberg: NÖLA, HA Lamberg, Kart. 70, nr. 381, Register of the letters of Georg Adam von Martinitz, nr. 10. Here only extracts of the letters of 2. 8. and 30. 8. could be found. Martinitz wrote to the emperor that he sent a copy of his memorandum to the Imperial Vice-Chancellor Dominik Andreas Kaunitz, but we have not found that copy yet.
Secretary Fabrizio Spada informed the nuncio with indignation that Martinitz behaved towards the pope in a way that even Protestants would not dream of doing. He ordered Andrea Santacroce to inform the emperor in detail about the audience, and let him know that the pope will no longer stand the presence of the ambassador.

Predictably, Martinitz wrote in another tone about the audience. At the beginning, he wrote, they started to talk about the feud of Farnese, but the pope interrupted that, and asked the ambassador in fury about his demands against the governor. According to Martinitz, the pope told him that even a Turk would not dare to make such accusations, and his accusations against Pallavicino are only his personal suspicion without any foundation. Martinitz answered that the confession of the servant and the memorandum he had given to Gozzadini made everything clear. The pope then asked the ambassador to hand over the servant, and although Martinitz refused it, he was open for a process and investigation to be held in his residence, without the actual extradition of the delinquent. He stated that the ambassadors have the right for it, and nuncios proceed in the same way as well. The pope lost his patience after these arguments, and started shouting with passion how dare he keep a prisoner in his house and demand justice in Rome, where the pope is the lord. Martinitz tried to explain that this happens everywhere, that ambassadors have absolute right over their household without any interference from the local sovereigns. He emphasized that he recognizes the supremacy of the pontiff, and therefore he does not want to proceed on his own, but asks the pope to administer justice. The pope shouted at him after that, “Who are you, what are you? We are the pope, we are the monarch, we command, do not make any trouble, do not disturb us!” Martinitz answered him, “Holy Father, I am the imperial ambassador, and Your Holiness acknowledged me as that one, and therefore I do not have to and I cannot suffer all these injustices, and I would like to leave in order not to hear all that, and not to be forced to harm my own respect toward Your Holiness, but I will report and complain it to His Majesty, my most majestic lord!” After that, Martinitz kissed the shoes of the pope and left the audience.80

Of course, Martinitz wanted to leave only the audience, not Rome – even if it is what the Roman Curia expected. It had become clear by the end of the year in Vienna as well that Pope Innocent XII really did not want to suffer any longer the imperial ambassador in his presence.81 There were only two questions, but they were hard ones: How can Vienna manage the recall of Martinitz without a clear loss of prestige (i.e. of the Imperial Court

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and of Martinitz as well)? And what would be a suitable position for a fallen ambassador? Both the family network of Martinitz and the papal diplomacy were set in motion.

**To put water on the fire**

In early August 1696, just two months after the scandalous procession, Nuncio Andrea Santacroce reported secretly to Rome that Emperor Leopold I told his ministers, that he “[got to] know that the Roman Court and especially the Cardinals are commiserating about a secular and German ambassador, and they would like a Cardinal without any character and dependence.” Santacroce wrote to the cardinal secretary that he would try to abolish these opinions in the Imperial Court because the pope would only like an imperial ambassador who would keep a good connection with the Holy See.\(^{82}\) Prince Ferdinand Joseph von Dietrichstein, the Obersthofmeister of the emperor, told the nuncio that some ministers had talked about removing Martinitz and sending back Prince Liechtenstein.\(^{83}\) But the nuncio had the opinion that Dietrichstein had only said it because he had wanted to soften the voices that had been saying the Imperial Court would be partial toward Martinitz.\(^{84}\) These letters show us that already half a year after Martinitz had begun his service in Rome, the Viennese Court was dealing with the disgust of Rome and the desire of the Papal Court to remove Martinitz. And even though that it seemed to be only a tactical consideration, influential members of the court suggested the removal of Martinitz from Rome.

Although both Count Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach, the Oberstallmeister of the Imperial Court, and the Jesuit Father Menegatti told the nuncio that the emperor disapproved of the behavior of Martinitz, they still doubted that to judge the ambassador more and more guilty would cause his recall. They suggested that all the expositions which were told by the nuncio to the emperor would more successfully open the emperor’s

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82 ASV, Segr. Stato, Germania, vol. 221, fol. 83r–v. Vienna, 4. 8. 1696. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada. A week later the nuncio reported to the cardinal secretary that the Grand Duke of Toscany and his brother Francesco Maria Medici, Protector Cardinal of the Empire, intervened in the affair of the Corpus Christi procession. It affirmed the opinion in Vienna that in Rome they did not want a secular German ambassador, but for example Cardinal Medici as the sole representative of the emperor. Ibidem, fol. 101r. Vienna, 11. 8. 1696. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.

83 Ibidem, fol. 111r. Vienna, 18. 8. 1696. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.

84 ASV, Segr. Stato, Germania, vol. 221, fol. 129r. Vienna, 8. 9. 1696. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
mind, especially after Cardinal Goëss also condemned the actions of the ambassador.\textsuperscript{85} Francois Chassignet, the secretary of the imperial embassy also sent letters to the emperor, to Prince Liechtenstein and to Father Pietro Giuseppe Ederi, all of which complained about how Martinitz treated him.\textsuperscript{86}

Even Martinitz seemed ready to give up his position, should anyone want to accept such an expensive position. But the nuncio reported that such a request previously was only a consideration suggested by the supporters of Martinitz. The Imperial Court had not wanted to recall the ambassador because they did not want to satisfy the Papal Court with such a quick removal of Martinitz. Therefore, any such plea from the ambassador would have strengthened the intention of the Viennese Court to retain Martinitz longer in his position. Andrea Santacroce wrote to the cardinal secretary in early November that the situation probably had changed, and that Martinitz really wished to return home from Rome because he felt that the Roman Curia was full of enemies of the emperor, and because he found it impossible to fulfill his duties. The nuncio believed that Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld, Prince of Fondi, would apply for the embassy in Rome, as he was already a candidate after the return of Liechtenstein. But Mansfeld did not have enough financial funds to carry out service in Rome.\textsuperscript{87}

Santacroce also discussed the situation with Cardinal Kollonitsch. The cardinal admitted that he talked with the confessor of the emperor, Francesco Menegatti, and they agreed that it would be not just useless but also harmful to retain Martinitz in Rome further. According to Kollonitsch, Menegatti had done everything to recall Martinitz from Rome, even without having an immediate successor in mind. But the nuncio told the cardinal that even in Rome they would not like such a step, because they know that the presence of the representatives of the monarchs give light to the Holy See as well. The pope’s only wish was that the main purpose of each ambassador should be to keep a good correspondence between the courts. Both Cardinal Kollonitsch and the nuncio praised the late Cardinal Carlo Pio di Savoia (the protector and the representative of the empire until his death in 1689) under whose watch the affairs of the emperor in Rome were managed to the satisfaction of both sides. Cardinal Kollonitsch promised that he and the imperial confessor would do everything to hasten the discharge of the ambassador.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibidem, fol. 142r–144r. Vienna, 22. 9. 1696. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
\textsuperscript{86} HAL, FA, Kart. 133. Rome, 1. 9. 1696. Letters of Francois Chassignet to the emperor, Prince Liechtenstein and the Jesuit Ederi, who was the councillor of the emperor in Italian affairs.
\textsuperscript{87} ASV, Segr. Stato, Germania, vol. 221, fol. 175r–v. Vienna, 3. 11. 1696. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
Still, Santacroce did not expect a quick solution as he knew that there was no suitable candidate for the embassy in Rome.88

Indeed Santacroce’s expectation was borne out, but the nuncio’s discussions with various ministers of Vienna show us the different factions of the Imperial Court and their attitudes toward Martinitz. A brief description about the Viennese Court written around 1701 with a retrospective review for the time of 1699 and 1700 gives us an exact insight into the factions.89 These parties and the balance of power between them determined the fate of Martinitz. The removal of Martinitz was mostly supported by the party around Cardinal Kollonitsch, Obersthofmeister Count Ferdinand Bonaventura Harrach90 and Court Chancellor Count Julius Friedrich von Buccelleni. According to the discussions and the reports of Nuncio Santacroce, both Count Harrach and Cardinal Kollonitsch seemed to be open-minded about a replacement for Martinitz already in autumn 1696.

Another faction had been organized around Heinrich Franz von Mansfeld, Prince of Fondi, who had applied previously for the embassy in Rome. He was allied by Prince Karl Theodor zu Salm, Obersthofmeister of the King of the Romans (Joseph I), and Prince Liechtenstein. Cardinal Grimani also belonged to that party, and was made cardinal by Pope Innocent XII on 22 July 1697, after a presentation by Emperor Leopold I.91 It caused a surprise in Vienna, since they did not expect really a cardinal to be created for the emperor, especially during the controversy about the feuds.92

The third party was marked by the Imperial Vice-Chancellor Dominik Andreas Kaunitz, a brother-in-law of Martinitz.93 His supporters were Oberstkämmerer Karl

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89 ASV, Segr. Stato, Germania, vol. 760, fol. 104r–113v. Breve relatione dello stato della Corte di Vienna con alcune particolarita seguite nel 1699 sino al 1700 nel Mese di Settembre. The memorandum was written by an anonymous author to a cardinal. The author was most probably Claudio Martelli, an Italian captain of an independent company (libera compagnia) in the Hungarian fortress Komárom. Independent companies appeared during the Great Turkish War and were independent from the regular army. Thanks to András Oross, the Hungarian Archivist Delegate at the Österreichische Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv for his help to identify the author of the memorandum. About Martelli and the independent companies: András OROSS, A Magyar Királyság törökellenes határvédelmi rendszerének felszámolása és átszervezése [Dissolution and Reorganization of the Border Defence System in Hungary], Budapest 2013, pp. 179–181, 249.
90 Harrach became Obersthofmeister in 1699, which also helped to dated the source.
91 ÖStA, HHSrA, StAbt, fol. 20r–21v. Rome, 22. 7. 1697. Georg Adam von Martinitz to Emperor Leopold I.
93 Both Martinitz and Kaunitz married the daughters of Ulrich Adolf Wratislaw von Sternberg, the Oberstburggraf of Prague (Martinitz married Maria Josefa, while the wife of Kaunitz was Maria Eleonore).
Ferdinand von Waldstein, and *Obersthofmeister* of Empress Eleonore Prince Ferdinand von Schwarzenberg. No wonder that this party supported most of all Martinitz. As to the affair of the feuds, in autumn 1697 Vice-Chancellor Kaunitz did his best to keep his brother-in-law in Rome, which resulted in the letter which was sent by the emperor to the pontiff.  

Martinitz needed their support, while in Rome the Curia waited for his recall. After the first months of the affair about the feuds, the cardinal secretary informed the nuncio that they were glad to hear of the imminent removal of the ambassador. But their expectations were too early. Although Marco d'Aviano also informed Santacroce about the displacement of Martinitz, the nuncio suspected that the information of the Capuchin father was only a presumption. However, Santacroce had also heard such rumours, in fact that the successor of Martinitz would be Livio Odescalchi, nephew of the late Pope Innocent XI. A possible nomination of Odescalchi was supported by Cardinal Kollonitsch. The main reason for the Italian prince was his good connection with the Sacred College of the Cardinals, while in Vienna it was expected that the appointment of Odescalchi would help also to satisfy the Roman Curia and the pope, thereby helping to secure further papal financial aid against the Ottomans. Beside Odescalchi, other candidates were mentioned in Vienna: Hermann Jacob Czernin (imperial envoy to the Polish Diet in 1695), Christoph Wenzel Nostitz (a previous imperial envoy to Poland in 1693) and Karl Ernst, the son of the *Oberstkämmerer* Karl Ferdinand von Waldstein. But the nuncio noted that Czernin and Waldstein were rather unwilling to go to Rome due to the costliness of that embassy.

Mansfeld and his circle tried to gain some position in the struggle for the embassy in Rome. Their biggest hope was Cardinal Grimani. It seems that the Viennese court had tapped him to replace the late Cardinal Goëss as a residing prelate in Rome to support imperial interests. Mansfeld supported Grimani, and an order was expected for Martinitz to share all secrets and essential information with the cardinal after his arrival in Rome.

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97 Ibidem, fol. 634v–635r. Vienna, 9. 11. 1697. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
98 Ibidem, fol. 640v–643r. Vienna, 23. 11. 1697. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
Even though Kaunitz tried to keep Martinitz longer in Rome, the circle of his relatives had begun to think about how to prepare for his recall. A good occasion for it would have been the reception of the Golden Fleece in 1698. Weeks before the arrival of Martinitz to Vienna, Cardinal Kollonitsch told the emperor that the actions of Martinitz in the poisoning affair are really injurious to the relations between the two courts. The cardinal suggested that his further stay in Rome would only increase discord with the Papal Court. But the emperor did not decide anything; he wanted to wait for Martinitz's arrival. Nuncio Santacroce learnt from some ministers that Martinitz had only permission from Leopold I for an absence of six weeks at longest, and they wanted him to return to Rome as soon as possible due to the possibly threatening news about the health of Charles II of Spain. Santacroce expected that after the ambassador received the Golden Fleece, he would not return to Rome. But he also knew that decisions were not made lightly in Vienna, and so they decided to play for time. They did not want to leave Rome without an ambassador. Santacroce also admitted that he did not see any suitable diplomat among the Germans in Vienna to replace Martinitz, and therefore did not expect an imminent amelioration in the diplomatic relationships.

Although Martinitz seemed to be really confident in his future, Santacroce learnt that he aspired to two other positions. One was the post of the general commissary residing in Milan, but for this position he competed with Mansfeld. Martinitz also aspired to the captaincy of the imperial guard. Therefore, the nuncio still held out hope that Martinitz would not return to Rome. The ambassador's name came up as a candidate for Obersthofmeister to Archduke Joseph's future wife Wilhelmina Amalia of Brunswick-Lüneburg. But the members of the future queen's court were selected mainly by Empress Eleonore, and she supported for Obersthofmeister Johann Jakob Hamilton, who was favored by the empress’ family, the Electors Palatinate. Also the captaincy of the imperial guard was dedicated by the emperor to Franz Sigismund von Thun und Hohenstein, brother of the Archbishop of Salzburg. The plans to establish an imperial general commissariat

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100 Ibidem, fol. 640r–643r. Vienna, 23. 11. 1697. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
101 ASV, Segr. Stato, Germania, vol. 222, fol. 84r–85r. Vienna, 3. 5. 1698. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
102 Ibidem, fol. 91r–v. Vienna, 17. 5. 1698. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
103 Ibidem, fol. 102r–103v. Vienna, 31. 5. 1698. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
in Milan provisionally were suspended as well. That meant that even in the case of the discharge of Martinitz, there was no suitable position for him in the Habsburg Court.  

The lack of an honourable position for Martinitz became a crucial question very soon after the final scandal and break with Rome in early autumn of 1698. In Vienna the supporters and relatives of Martinitz had to face the fact that they had no other choice than to recall him from Rome. In November 1698, already Imperial Vice-Chancellor Kaunitz, brother-in-law of Martinitz, admitted to the nuncio that Martinitz will be dismissed. But the list of the candidates was still long: the name of Hermann Jacob Czernin came up again along with Franz Sigismund von Thun and Leopold Joseph von Lamberg, the imperial plenipotentiary at the Imperial Diet in Regensburg.  

Kaunitz was in correspondence with Lamberg, and in January 1699 he wanted to know whether Lamberg would like to apply for the embassy to France or to Rome. Lamberg chose Rome, and finally the emperor appointed him as the new ambassador to Rome.

However the dismissal of Martinitz caused a family dispute, mostly because of the possibilities for the ambassador were quite few. His name came up again as a captain for the imperial guard, namely the trabant guards. But finally in March 1699, it was given to the Hungarian aristocrat Miklós Pälffy. In the end, Martinitz was appointed as the captain of the archery guards, but he was extremely disappointed by this position. Even his wife, Maria Josefa von Sternberg, complained loudly, because she feared that they would have to leave Rome before the Jubilee of 1700: “It is totally indecent and improper, that when everybody will come to Rome for the Holy Year, we should leave, like we were Lutheran or Calvinist.” The nuncio wrote to the cardinal secretary that even Vice-Chancellor Kaunitz seemed to be really tired of these affairs and all the complaints by the Martinitz family. Santacroce added that there was a real “war at home” for Kaunitz, since Maria Josefa von Sternberg wrote and complained constantly to her sister, Maria Eleonore von Sternberg, wife of Kaunitz. Maria Josefa accused her brother-in-law that he had done nothing to keep them in Rome. She brought up that “Prince Liechtenstein, who had not got any other supporters [other] than a simple father (the late Father Ederi), was always strongly

105 Ibidem, fol. 317v. Vienna, 8. 11. 1698. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
supported, while her husband, who is related to the Imperial Vice-Chancellor, remained abandoned with common, extreme shame.\textsuperscript{109}

At least Maria Josefa was compensated a little: Leopold Joseph von Lamberg arrived to Rome in 1700, so Martinitz and his wife left Rome only in spring. The papal diplomacy’s expectations of the new ambassador, Count Lamberg, were extremely high. It seems that he was conscious of it. Not long before his journey to Rome, he met Nuncio Santacroce for a final discussion. As the nuncio reported, Lamberg told him, “\textit{He knows it very well that his two predecessors brought fire; now he wants to put water on it.}”\textsuperscript{110}

The long shadow of Father Ederi?

The poisoning affair just topped the long process which had eroded the relationships between Rome and Vienna. From a certain perspective, this erosion had begun during the time of Martinitz’s predecessor, Prince Liechtenstein. The protocol scandals and the controversies with the Roman authorities and the political differences – especially the case of the feuds – were already on the carpet in the first half of the 1690s. Of course the roots of all these conflicts traced back decades or even centuries. Practically, Martinitz inherited these affairs; still, gradually but quickly, he lost his political space in Rome. His deep loyalty and the cramped adherence to defend the least interest of the emperor resulted in a tough inflexibility that caused both his failure and a grave deterioration between the two courts. Lamberg had only a short time to ameliorate these connections before the deaths of Pope Innocent XII (27 September 1700) and of King Charles II of Spain (1 November 1700).

The fall and recall of Martinitz is therefore most insightful. Liechtenstein had been appointed as the tutor of Archduke Charles in early 1693, but he left the Eternal City only in autumn 1694. Though in the meantime he had some serious conflicts with the Roman Curia, he did not lose the favour of the pontiff. On the other hand, Martinitz had to function in Rome for one and a half years without even having an audience with the pope: his political influence was strongly limited. The imperial diplomacy had to find other political channels to carry their interests (mostly through Spanish diplomats) but that was a tight compromise.

Although it necessitates further research, the fall of Martinitz probably ended a period in the Italian policy of the Austrian Habsburgs. That policy was marked by Father

\textsuperscript{110} Ibidem, fol. 569r–571v. Vienna, 7. 11. 1699. Secret report of Nuncio Andrea Santacroce to the Cardinal Secretary, Fabrizio Spada.
Ederi, who was almost almighty in Italian affairs until his death in 1697. That policy was characterized by an expansive imperial trend, whose most apparent symptom was the affair of the feuds. From a letter written by the Spanish ambassador in the Imperial Court and the Bishop of Solsona, Gaspar Alonso de Valeria, we know that the real author of the edict was supposedly Father Ederi. If we take in regard another letter written by Andrea Santacroce to his brother, Marquis Antonio Santacroce, the nuncio noted mockingly that the two best disciples of the Jesuit Father were Prince Liechtenstein and Count Martinitz. Then, the above-mentioned remark of Count Lamberg can be understood as his desire to end the period of the ambassadors from the circle of Ederi, to rake out the fire caused by Liechtenstein and Martinitz and open a new chapter in the history of diplomatic relations between Rome and Vienna.

Count Philip Kinsky, the British Ministers, and Society: Social and Political Networks of an Imperial Diplomat in London, 1728–1735

Abstract: This article analyses parts of the framework that determined the diplomatic mission of Count Philip Kinsky of Wchinitz and Tettau (1700–1749) in London from 1728 to 1736. In 1728, Emperor Charles VI decided to send Count Kinsky to the court of King George II of Great Britain to re-establish diplomatic relations. The aims of Kinsky’s mission to London were challenging, and his inexperience as well as the conflicting political aims of Charles VI and George II complicated matters at first. But over time, the count was able to establish himself and his household in the relevant social and political networks. The study presents the contacts of the imperial diplomat to the opposition, his acceptance into the Royal Society as well as the freemasons, and the use of his position and standing in London society especially during the War of the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1735).

Keywords: Philip(p) Kinsky – imperial – diplomat – network – freemasonry – Royal Society – London – Great Britain – Bohemia – eighteenth century

On September 1st, 1728, a new envoy arrived in London as diplomatic representative of the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire: Count Philip Kinsky.¹ But this was neither a normal exchange nor a change in diplomatic personnel. Rather, his arrival put an end to a period of marked discord between the imperial and British courts. Eighteen months earlier, Kinsky’s predecessor, the imperial resident Carl Joseph von Palm, had been declared persona non grata in London and had to leave Great Britain. In consequence, the British resident François-Louis de Pesme de Saint-Saphorin was told to depart from Vienna.² The rift was not due to any behaviour on part of the diplomats,

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¹ This article is based on the research for my doctoral thesis titled Vienna and London, 1727–1735. Factors of international relations in the early eighteenth century [written in German], defended at the University of Mainz in February 2017. It draws on ideas and sources elaborated in the thesis.

however. A tense atmosphere between the two courts had turned into a full-blown conflict after King George I had publicly accused Emperor Charles VI of supporting the British contested dynasty of the Catholic Stuarts in early 1727\(^3\) and the imperial court had reacted by publishing a counter statement in English.\(^4\) This had led to the termination of all diplomatic interaction between the Courts of Vienna and London.

But because of many unsolved problems in European relations at the time,\(^5\) constant points of contact at both courts proved to be necessary. Not even two months after the disruption of relations, George I was persuaded by his French allies\(^6\) to re-establish relations with the emperor;\(^7\) in the king’s instructions to the newly appointed British envoy to the Court of Vienna, the diplomat, James Waldegrave, the Earl of Waldegrave (1684–1741),\(^8\) was instructed not to draw attention to the disagreements of the past.\(^9\) The renewed exchange of diplomats, however, was delayed by George I’s death and the succession of his son as George II in June 1727 as well as some developments in European politics, so that the British envoy arrived in Vienna only a year after the so-called Palm

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4 Count Sinzendorff, Memorial presented, in Latin, to the King of Great Britain, by M. de Palm, the Imperial Resident, upon the Speech which his Britannic Majesty made to the two Houses of his Parliament, on the 17/28 of January, 1726–7, in: Richard CHANDLER (ed.), The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons […], volume 8, London 1742, attachment [pp. 357–362].

5 After the War of the Spanish Succession, various territorial, dynastic, and economic differences between the European powers had been left unsolved. A first general peace congress in Cambrai 1724–1725 had been unable to find a solution for problems touching the interests of several powers – like the guaranty for the emperor’s succession (the Pragmatic Sanction), the status of the Italian territories such as Parma and Piacenza or of Gibraltar, the imperial trading company to the East Indies from Ostend and generally the trade from and to the now Austrian Netherlands. Challenges were also disagreements in the Holy Roman Empire, wherever other European powers had an interest, for example in Eastern Frisia or in regard to confessional conflicts.

6 The British-French alliance of the 1720s was based on the need of and agreement about a general peace after the devastating economical effects of the War of the Spanish Succession; also, the British hoped to avoid a French backing for the deposed Catholic Stuarts and their Jacobite supporters. See Jeremy BLACK, Natural and Necessary Enemies: Anglo-French Relations in the Eighteenth Century, London 1986.

7 After the British and French had agreed upon a set of preliminaries which should be the basis for a general peace congress to solve all existing problems preventing a general peace of Europe, it became obvious that the emperor’s agreement could not be forced, and would only be forthcoming by negotiations. J. BLACK, Politics and Foreign Policy, pp. 234–236.

8 Today, the title is given as “Earl Waldegrave”; however, at the time, he was known as the “Earl of Waldegrave”, which is used in the following.

9 His first instructions were signed by King George I in summer 1727 (George I to Waldegrave, Instructions, London (St. James), 6. 6. 1727, National Archives, Kew (= NA), State Papers (= SP) 80, 62, fols. 9–16, here fol. 12v. All dates – unless otherwise indicated – are given in the new style.
affair. The Court of Vienna took even longer to decide on whom to send, in fact, it took them so long, that it caused some renewed tensions on the side of the British. But finally, on May 1st, 1728, Waldegrave as the British diplomat at the imperial court could report:

“[…] Prince Eugene and Count Stahremberg [!] then told me, that the Emperor had appointed Count [Philip] Kinsky for his Minister in England. They in Discourse told […] that it had been a thing resolved upon above these three Weeks, and that the Report which had been spread of the Emperor’s not intending to name a Minister so soon, was groundless. The Conference thereupon broke up, and We retired respectively with all the appearance of Friendship and good Humour.”

Prince Eugene (1663–1736), one of the leading ministers in Vienna, praised the newly appointed and said “[…] he did not doubt but this Gentleman [Kinsky] would be liked in England […].” The British diplomats at the imperial court, the envoy and his secretary, saw Count Kinsky as “a gentleman-like Sorts [!] of Man, […] a very good Figure, […]” and all in all “[…] well disposed for re-establishing a perfect good Understanding between the two Courts”.

The new imperial representative was expected to be successful in communicating the emperor’s sincerity of doing everything “to re-establish the former good relations” and his wish to have “friendship and good relations with the king [George II]” as well as to preserve “the balance [of power] in Europe.” At the same time, Count Kinsky was warned about “the ill-mindedness of the English ministry” regarding Charles VI and Habsburg-imperial politics. The friction of expectations and perceptions – which was reciprocated by the British – set the course for the following years in the relations between Vienna and London. At the same time, Kinsky was advised to keep respectful

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10 Waldegrave’s instructions had to be repeated after George II succeeded to the throne (George II to Waldegrave, Instructions, London (Kensington), 18. 8. 1727, NA, SP 80, 62, fols. 37–44). Waldegrave travelled via Paris and acted as chargé d’affaires while the British ambassador to the French court helped with the transition of power in Great Britain. George II to Louis XV, Credentials for Waldegrave to act as British envoy in Paris in absence of H[oratio] Walpole, London (St. James), 16. 12. 1727, NA, SP 78, 186, 90, fol. 169.
11 Waldegrave to Tilson, Ratisbon, 21. 4. 1728, NA, SP 80, 62, fol. 143.
12 Waldegrave to Townshend, Vienna, 5. 5. 1728, ibidem, fols. 166v–167.
13 Ibidem, fol. 169.
14 Waldegrave to Townshend, Vienna, 19. 5. 1728, ibidem, fol. 199v.
15 Harris to Tilson, Vienna, 23. 6. 1728, NA, SP 80, 63, fol. 12v.
16 Charles VI to [Philip] Kinsky, Instruction, Neustadt, 20. 6. 1728, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien (= ÖStA Wien), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (= HHStA), Staatenabteilung (= StA) England, Kart. 66, fol. 15v [original in German]. All translations are by the author.
17 Charles VI to Kinsky, Instruction, Neustadt, 20. 6. 1728, ibidem, fols. 17–17v [original in German].
18 Ibidem, fol. 17.
19 For more information on imperial-British relations during these years see my doctoral thesis; Jeremy Black drew attention to this important period with two articles from the British perspective, published in the 1980s, see Jeremy BLACK, When ‘natural allies’ fall out: Anglo-Austrian Relations, 1725–1740,
and courtly relations with all foreign diplomats in London, as the emperor was not at war with anyone at the time.20

This article analyses the diplomatic mission of Count Philip Kinsky of Wchinitz and Tettau (1700–1749) in London from 1728 to 1736. The time frame covered is the Count’s official posting to London – the only time he worked as an imperial diplomat as well as a crucial period in the relations between Emperor Charles VI and King George II of Great Britain. It ranges from a deliberate new start with the exchange of envoys, over years of tension until a formal treaty of peace and alliance was signed in 1731, and to a renewed alienation due to the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1735/38). It will present how the imperial diplomat managed to get settled in London society and how he developed his political and social network.

**Count Kinsky’s background**

In the early eighteenth century, there were still no formal requirements of how to become an imperial diplomat.21 For many younger sons of the high nobility, a military or diplomatic post was just one of the steps in their career in the service of the emperor. A successful time as envoy or ambassador could increase their own honour and status; afterwards, more profitable posts in the government should be their rewards. To get a suitable appointment, the prospective diplomat or his family employed the help of a patron, if possible one of the principal ministers.22 Count Kinsky is a prime example for this policy.

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20 Charles VI to Kinsky, Instruction, Neustadt, 20. 6. 1728, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA England, Kart. 66, fols. 45, 46.
21 K. MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, pp. 180–252. The British diplomats had at least to be knowledgeable in French and some other European language, and to have a good understanding of European relations; see for example Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 27. 10. 1731, British Library (= BL), Add. Mss. 32687, fol. 431.
Philip Kinsky was born into one of the most prestigious and wealthiest families of Bohemia. Most male members held high Bohemian or imperial posts either in government, the military, and the court system or were successful businessmen. His uncle, his father, his elder brother, and he himself became high chancellors of Bohemia, the highest possible position in the kingdom. After studying law in Prague, Philip Kinsky went on a Grand Tour through continental Europe. In 1721, he started his career at the Prague court of appeal and continued it as a treasurer for the Bohemian chancellery. There, he had his first proven contact with a British citizen. A distributor for cloth or linen wanted to expand his commercial activities to Bohemia, and Philip Kinsky not only approved it in an official report, but also invested himself quite heavily in the business. After his marriage to Countess Maria Carolina Martinitz (1701–1785), Kinsky’s house in Prague was known as a meeting place for foreigners, so much that after the count left the city for his diplomatic post a visitor complained:

“The city of Prague lost much due to his absence; he lived there with éclat; his house was open for everyone, but especially for foreigners. There, I have received such pleasantries, which I cannot remember to have had anywhere else.”

For some biographical information see Constantin von WURZBACH, Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich, volume 11, Vienna 1864, pp. 300–301, and Aleš VALENTA, Dějiny rodu Kinských [History of the Kinsky Family], České Budějovice 2004, pp. 86–98. There is, however, no monograph about the count's life, even though he held the post of (high) chancellor of Bohemia for over ten years (from 1736, resp. 1738, to 1749) and was one of the leading ministers of Queen Maria Theresa and Emperor Francis Stephen during the War of the Austrian Succession. My dissertation provides a first assessment of Count Philip Kinsky’s role as imperial diplomat.

For the history of the Kinsky family, two monographs of the nineteenth century, a short study from the 1960s, and the recent one by Valenta offer analyses of the family’s development, achievements, and status in Bohemia as well as in the Habsburg territories: Josef Erwin FOLKMANN, Die gefürstete Linie des uralten und edlen Geschlechts Kinsky: Ein geschichtlicher Versuch, Prague 1861; Wilhelm Johann Albert Freiherr von TETTAU, Urkundliche Geschichte der Tettauischen Familie in den Zweigen Tettau und Kinsky, Berlin 1878; Otto SEGER, Überblick über die Geschichte des Hauses Kinsky, s. l. 1968; A. VALENTA, Dějiny rodu Kinských.

These were the counts Franz Ulrich (1634–1699), Wenzel Oktavian Norbert (1642–1719), and Franz Ferdinand (1678–1741).

Jiří KUBEŠ, Kavalírské cesty české a rakouské šlechtý (1620–1750) [The Grand Tour of the Czech and Austrian Nobility (1620–1750)], Pardubice 2011, pp. 107, 343.


Philip Kinsky to Maria Carolina Martinitz, declaration of engagement, Prague, 22. 5. 1721, ÖStA Wien, Family Archive (= FA) Kinsky, Kart. 51, d), 1, s. f.; Count Philip Kinsky and Maria Carolina, Countess of Martinitz, marriage contract, Prague, 25. 11. 1721, ibidem, Kart. 51, d), 5, s. f.

Karl Ludwig von PÖLLNITZ, Mémoires de Charles-Louis Baron de Pöllnitz, contenant les Observations qu’il a faites dans ses Voyages et le Caractère des Personnes qui composent les principales Cours de l’Europe, Volume 1, Liège 1734, p. 281 [own translation, original in French].
To further continue his career in the imperial service, Count Kinsky successfully applied to his patron, Prince Eugene.\(^{30}\) His advancement was probably supported by Countess Batthyány, who was the mother-in-law of one of Kinsky’s sisters and a very close personal friend of the prince.\(^{31}\) The appointment was delayed by a conflict between two imperial ministers, Prince Eugene and Count Sinzendorff (1671–1742), the high court chancellor, who wanted the post for his own son-in-law.\(^{32}\) Even after the official announcement, the British envoy in Vienna reported to his superior:

“Monsieur Kinski is under a good deal of Uneasiness and meets with all possible obstructions in his Commission. Your Lordship knows what Interest He was preferred by, and Who was set aside to make room for Him. He fears the Consequences, and undoubtedly it will make his Commission much less agreeable: He is tied down to the Character of Envoy, whereas the Other would have been appointed Ambassador.”\(^{33}\)

But in the end, Count Philip Kinsky’s and his family’s networks proved effective: Prince Eugene’s patronage, his own commercial contacts to Great Britain,\(^{34}\) and his family’s as well as his personal wealth seemed to destine him for the office at the Court of St James’s in the commercial heart of Great Britain in London.

**First contacts in London**

In the first two weeks after his arrival, Count Kinsky established contact with the two secretaries of state, Charles Townshend, Viscount Townshend (1674–1738),\(^{35}\) and Thomas Pelham-Holles, the first Duke of Newcastle (1693–1768),\(^{36}\) as well as with the master of ceremonies, Sir Clement Cottrell (1686–1758)\(^ {37}\). While the secretaries of state would be

\(^{30}\) Prince Eugene to Philip Kinsky, Vienna, 18. 2. 1728, ÖStA Wien, FA Kinsky, Kart. 2, b), 2, s. f.


\(^{32}\) Waldegrave to Townshend, Vienna, 5. 5. 1728, NA, SP 80, 62, fol. 169.

\(^{33}\) Waldegrave to Townshend, in cipher, Vienna, 5. 6. 1728, NA, SP 80, 63, fols. 2–2v.

\(^{34}\) These were explicitly noted in his instructions, Charles VI to Kinsky, Instruction on “how he should behave himself concerning commerce in regard to the Royal Bohemian hereditary territories”, Prague, 15. 8. 1728, ÖStA Wien, FA Kinsky, Kart. 4, d), s. f. [original in German]. Even though the commercial and financial relations and contacts played a huge role in Kinsky’s time in London, they will here not be discussed in detail because of reasons of space.


two of his most important political relations in the years to come, Sir Clement was more important for first impressions: The details of the public audience with the king, the queen, and the royal family were Cottrell’s responsibility. Kinsky was able to negotiate a better ceremonial protocol than what was to be expected from his status as envoy: the audience’s ceremony resembled that for an ambassador. The audience was held in Hampton Court. During the ceremony, he was first greeted by the master of ceremony, and then by the keeper of the Privy Purse, Baron Augustus Schutz (c. 1693–1757), one of the few influential persons with Hanoverian backgrounds at the court of George II. Count Kinsky met with the monarch and his family: King George II, Queen Caroline, and their seven children were all present. The audience itself was very complicated. Because of imperial language restrictions for public ceremonies, Kinsky spoke German, while the king, the queen, and the princes and princesses answered in English, which Kinsky did not understand at the time. Afterwards, at a dinner given by Baron Schutz, Kinsky was probably introduced to other ministers and court officials. For Kinsky, this was – despite the language barrier – a satisfactory start to his mission; but for some British officials, his behaviour – him expecting to be treated as ambassador rather than envoy – was irritating and raised concerns.

The first contacts to other foreign diplomats – then also called ministers – were a bit more complicated. To confirm the highest status of the emperor regarding all European monarchs, imperial diplomats had to insist on their high status vis-à-vis other diplomats as well. Count Kinsky, however, was only send with the rank of an envoy; nonetheless, he managed to secure himself a status similar to that of an ambassador. After he conducted informal visits to the ambassadors of royal houses, consequently, by diplomatic protocol, these had to make the first formal and ceremonial visit to the imperial envoy. Kinsky’s conduct did not diminish his contacts with those diplomats, rather by gaining a higher ceremonial standing than to be expected at the court, Kinsky also acquired a senior

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38 Audience of Count Kinsky, September 1728, NA, SP 100, 12, s. f.
40 Audience of Count Kinsky, September 1728, NA, SP 100, 12, s. f.
41 Kinsky to Charles VI, London, 18. 9. 1728, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA England, Kart. 65, fols. 1–4.
42 The British envoy to Vienna was asked for a statement regarding Kinsky’s conduct. Waldegrave to Tilson, Vienna, 16. 10. 1728, NA, SP 80, 63, fols. 162–162v. King George II seemed to have expected or accepted Kinsky’s behaviour, perhaps as his due as imperial diplomat; in any case, there were no negative ramifications on the part of the royal family or the British ministers.
43 Audience of Count Kinsky, September 1728, NA, SP 100, 12, s. f.; Kinsky to Charles VI, London, 29. 10. 1728, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA England, Kart. 65, fol. 7v.
44 Charles VI to Kinsky, Vienna, 24. 10. 1729, ibidem, Kart. 66, fol. 49.
position amongst his peers. His wife followed him in this ceremonial ascendancy and took the highest-ranking position with the other diplomatic wives. After four years, when a new Spanish ambassador seemed to threaten this strategy and would have had diplomatic precedence, Count Kinsky was finally elevated to the rank of imperial ambassador at the Court of St James’s.

At some point in the first months of his stay, Count Kinsky secured an adequate, representative house for his family and household, most likely by using his contacts at court. The location had to reflect his status and had to serve his need for further contacts in London society. For Kinsky’s growing family and a household of over 60 servants, a large house was a necessity. His status as representative of the emperor required it to be large enough to house, if needed, important guests, to be in a prestigious location and in a modern style. In the early eighteenth century, the latest development in architectural style was the building of terraced houses around small square gardens, which gave the whole urban pattern its name: “the squares”. Circa 2200 of these houses would be built until mid-century. A member of the Privy Council could offer Count Kinsky such a residence at Hanover Square, a short ride or walk north of St James’s Palace. Hanover Square was being built by the first Earl of Scarbrough since 1713. His son, Richard Lumley, the second Earl of Scarbrough, rented Count Kinsky one of the houses at the northern part of the square. The envoy’s neighbours were members of the highest levels of society, the Lord Chancellor, the Earl Cowper, the Dukes of Montrose and of Roxburgh as well as several military commanders. The local church, St George’s, was

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45 It is not clear what role the personal wealth and high nobility of the count played in his relations with other diplomats in London.
46 Kinsky to Charles VI, London 22. 11. 1728, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA England, Kart. 65, fol. 14v.
47 See Bartenstein, address of 23. 11. 1732, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Vorträge, Kart. 36, fols. 255v–256v, as well as the first attachment to the principal instruction for Kinsky of 1732, Vienna, 20. 11. 1732, ÖStA Wien, FA Kinsky, Kart. 6, a), 11, s. f.
49 Herbert KNITTLER, Die europäische Stadt in der frühen Neuzeit: Institutionen, Strukturen, Entwicklungen, Munich 2000, p. 88.
50 Hampton Court, October 15, The London Gazette Nr. 7030, 16. 10. 1731, p. 5. The distance is roughly 1250 m.
51 The development of Hanover Square is covered by John SUMMERSON, Georgian London, London 1988, pp. 73–75.
the parochial church of Georg Friedrich Händel, who sometimes also acted as organist. In Hanover Square, Count Kinsky consequently lived at the heart of political, social, and cultural networks of London.

**The Ministry and the Members of the Opposition**

Three days after his inaugural audience, the leading minister, Sir Robert Walpole (1676–1745), invited Count Kinsky to go hunting with him. Even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the sources, it is most likely that the other members of the ministry were present as well. Kinsky saw the invitation as a good first sign, especially as Walpole's "friendship and companionship [could prove to be] very helpful at several occasions." But in contrast to Kinsky's expectations, nearly no official talks took place during the next months. Partly this could be because of Kinsky's inexperience in diplomatic affairs and his relative youth. Some of the imperial ministers accused him of idleness and inactivity. Imperial high chancellor Count Sinzendorff was — according to the British envoy in Vienna — "quite out of patience with Kinsky".

But another reason was that, at the same time, a peace congress was held in Soissons in France. All essential negotiations between the Courts of St James's and of Vienna took place in France, and all efforts of the political elite in Great Britain were concentrated on those peace talks. The official negotiators in France were for the British side Horatio Walpole, brother and closest advisor of Sir Walpole, and for the emperor, Baron Fonseca.

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54 Parochial Church Council St George's Hanover Square (ed.), *Handel and St George's*, London 2013, URL: [http://www.stgeorgeshanoversquare.org/history/Handel-and-St-George.html](http://www.stgeorgeshanoversquare.org/history/Handel-and-St-George.html) [cit. 20. 10. 2014].
55 Kinsky to Charles VI, London, 18. 9. 1728, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA England, Kart. 65, fol. 3v [original in German].
56 This can be seen by his rather confusing first reports, which he did also not write regularly at first. Kinsky to Charles VI, London, 18. 9. 1728, ibidem, fols. 1–4. Kinsky to Prince Eugene, London, 14. 12. 1728, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Große Korrespondenz, Kart. 94 b, 1, fols. 13–14. His behaviour in London was criticised, too: it showed a "want of Jujdgment [!]" according to imperial officials cited by the British envoy to Vienna. Waldegrave to Townshend, in cipher, Vienna, 8. 1. 1729, NA, SP 80, 64, fol. 18v.
57 Prince Eugene excused some of Kinsky's mishaps, writing about him, Kinsky "is a good, but also still a very young man". Max BRAUBACH, *Die Geheimdiplomatie des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen*, Cologne 1962, p. 49, fn. 63, from: Prince Eugene to Seckendorff, 20. 7. 1729, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Große Korrespondenz, Kart. 109.
58 Waldegrave to Tilson, Kinsky's name in cipher, Vienna, 18. 6. 1729, NA, SP 80, 64, fol. 279v; see also Harris to Townshend, Vienna, 27. 8. 1729, NA, SP 80, 65, fol. 79v.
59 Kinsky to Charles VI, London, 29. 10. 1728, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA England, Kart. 65, fols. 5–6v.
and – since June 1729–Count Stephan Wilhelm Kinsky (1679–1749), Philip Kinsky’s elder brother. Even Count Sinzendorff came to Soissons to support the emperor’s positions at the peace congress in winter 1728/1729. But the emperor could not accept the terms demanded by the French and British sides. The Court of Vienna would not discuss the negotiated articles. The accepted opinion of the British ministers was that “this Silence on their part is an evident proof that the declarations so frequently made of their good Intentions, are but words, and that nothing but the hopes of some sort of an immediate distress will bring them to an explanation”.

In the summer of 1729, King George II visited his electorate of Brunswick-Luneburg in Germany. The Secretary of State Townshend and other British officials accompanied the king to use the time outside of the media focus of London to conduct negotiations with princes of the empire and of Europe in general. Count Kinsky was charged to follow the king and to try anew to negotiate with him and his ministers, but the count was challenged on several parts: by inadequate powers from his court, by a rival imperial diplomat sent by the emperor to Hanover to negotiate as well, and by the British king’s and minister’s

61 J. E. FOLKMANN, Die gefürstete Linie des uralten und edlen Geschlechtes Kinsky, pp. 54–55. Stephan and Philip Kinsky had a very close relationship, despite a difference of age of 21 years. After the death of their father, Stephan Kinsky became Philip’s official guardian and was therefore responsible for organising his Grand Tour as well as for getting him started in his career. Aleš VALENTA, Z korespondence české šlechty v 18. století: Listy Štěpána Kinského bratru Františku Ferdinandovi z let 1719–1720 [From the correspondence of Bohemian nobility in the 18th century: Letters of Stephen Kinsky to his brother Francis Ferdinand, 1719–1720], Sborník archivních prací 56, 2006, Nr. 2, pp. 508–546, here pp. 519–522. The brothers worked together closely, also to achieve a further ennoblement for their family; in 1746, Stephan Kinsky was raised to “prince”, based on his and his brother’s efforts and works for the Habsburg dynasty, especially Queen and Empress Maria Theresa and her husband, Emperor Francis Stephen. Stephan Kinsky to Philip Kinsky, Charta Bianca, 21. 11. 1746, ÖStA Wien, FA Kinsky, Kart. 39, a), 5a, s. f.; Stephan Kinsky to Maria Theresa, Petition for ennoblement and establishment of a entailed estate with an extract of the royal chart for Bohemia, 9. 12. 1746, ibidem, Kart. 39, a), 9a, s. f.; accepted by Maria Theresa, Vienna, 22. 12. 1746, ibidem, Kart. 39, a), 15a, s. f.; by Franz Stephan, Vienna, 1. 1. 1747, ibidem, Kart. 39, a), 22a, s. f.

62 Townshend to Waldegrave, London (Whitehall), 8. 2. 1729, NA, SP 80, 64, fol. 35–36.

63 Waldegrave to Townshend, in cipher, Vienna, 24. 4. 1729, ibidem, fol. 210. See also Waldegrave to Townshend, p. s., in cipher, Vienna, 30. 4. 1729, ibidem, fol. 221; Townshend to Waldegrave, in cipher, London (Whitehall), 10. 5. 1729, ibidem, fol. 213v. See also Harris to Townshend, Vienna, 27. 8. 1729, NA, SP 80, 65, fol. 79v.


65 Townshend refused to negotiate because of inadequate full powers, Kinsky to Charles VI, in cipher, Hannover, 26. 6. 1729, ÖStA Wien, HHSTA, StA England, Kart. 65, fol. 67–71. It took some weeks until the full powers arrived in Hanover, Kinsky to Charles VI, Hannover, 11. 8. 1729, ibidem, fol. 15–22.

66 Waldegrave to Townshend, Vienna, 2. 7. 1729, NA, SP 80, 65, fol. 12v.
reluctance to open another negotiation parallel to the one in France. It appeared to Kinsky as if “they [the British] have no inclination for it [the negotiation]”\(^6\). The only positive outcome of the stay in Hanover was a personal connection between Townshend, Kinsky, and the British envoy to the imperial court, the Earl of Waldegrave, who was also present at the electoral court.\(^6\) In spite of Kinsky’s efforts in London and Hanover as well as all other efforts in general, the Congress of Soissons ended as a failure on the part of the emperor, with the French, Spanish and British kings signing the Treaty of Seville – evidently against the emperor – in November 1729.\(^7\) Kinsky’s personal connections did not further his professional aims at this time; in addition, his efforts were probably not meant to succeed, as both governments tried to solve their problems in Soissons.

During his first years in London, Count Kinsky on the other hand tried to influence British politics through members of the parliamentary opposition. In his confidential reports to Prince Eugene, he named some members of the House of Lords: “Poltnes, Vilminton, Staie”,\(^7\) as well as Bolingbroke.\(^7\) Interestingly enough – and in concordance with the conflict between Eugene and Sinzendorff – the high chancellor wanted to know the names, but Kinsky only gave them to Prince Eugene, his patron and supporter in Vienna. There are no references to specific names in Kinsky’s official reports; apparently, the opposition politicians knew that every letter sent by Kinsky would be opened and asked him to keep their names secret.\(^7\) The parliamentarians were members of the gentry and the high nobility, and therefore probably regarded equals by Kinsky.\(^7\)

Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678–1751), was one of the most famous Tory politicians, authors, and publishers. He had held the office of secretary of state during the reign of Queen Anne (1710–1714), but had supported a Jacobite restitution and therefore had to go into exile after the accession of George I in 1714. After his pardon and return to England in 1723, he led the public campaign against Sir Robert Walpole and

\(^{67}\) Kinsky to Charles VI, in cipher, Hanover, 22. 8. 1729, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA England, Kart. 65, fol. 25–28.
\(^{68}\) Kinsky to Charles VI, Hanover, 9. 7. 1729, ibidem, fol. 4v.
\(^{69}\) Waldegrave to [Tilson], private, Hanover, 18. 9. 1729, NA, SP 80, 65, fol. 111v; Waldegrave to Townshend, in cipher, Vienna, 19. 11. 1729, ibidem, fol. 258.
\(^{70}\) Townshend to Waldegrave, London (Whitehall), 29. 11. 1729, ibidem, fol. 234.
\(^{71}\) Kinsky to Prince Eugene, London, 21. 3. 1729, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Große Korrespondenz, Kart. 94b, 1, fol. 103 [in his own hand].
\(^{73}\) Kinsky to Prince Eugene, London, 2. 5. 1730, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, Große Korrespondenz, Kart. 94b, 1, fol. 108 [in his own hand].
his ministry. William Pulteney (1684–1764) was the founder of the Patriot Whigs, the Whigs in opposition to Walpole, but in favour of the Hanoverian succession. Together, Pulteney and Bolingbroke founded the opposition newspaper _The Craftsman_. Spencer Compton (1674–1743), since 1730 the Earl of Wilmington, did not openly oppose Walpole and his government in parliamentary discussions, but was apparently speaking with Kinsky about a possible change of government. John Dalrymple (1673–1747), the second Earl of Stair, had had a military career and had been the British ambassador to the French king until 1720; since 1729, he was vice admiral for Scotland, but frequently articulated his opposition to Walpole.

The imperial diplomat hoped that by supporting the opposition, the supposedly hostile government could be changed, leading to a more positive British policy towards the emperor. Kinsky’s actions were according to the opinion of the Court of Vienna and were supported by Charles VI. The imperial ministers and the emperor himself did not understand the close and entangled relations between the dynasty, the leading Whig ministers, and “the king’s opposition”. For George II and Queen Caroline knew very well the benefits of a strong ministry. As long as they had a strong majority in both houses of parliament, the royal couple always supported the (Walpole) Whigs. Sir Robert Walpole and his friends were seen as able networkers as well as competent politicians and government officials. Accordingly, the queen was undiplomatically explicit and publicly reprimanded Kinsky for his contacts to the opposition. It is not clear if Kinsky

80 Charles VI to Kinsky, Laxenburg, 11. 5. 1729, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA England, Kart. 66, fols. 37–37v.
82 A. C. THOMPSON, _George II_ , p. 71; see also Jeremy BLACK, _George II: Puppet of the Politicians?_ , Exeter 2007, pp. 78–84.
and the Court of Vienna realised their misjudgement. In 1734, the count still hoped that
the government would lose the king’s support and British politics could be changed by
a change of government or ministers.\footnote{Kinsky to Sinzendorff, London, 19. 2. 1734, ÖStA Wien, FA Kinsky, Kart. 3 c), 16. s. f. This was during the Excise crisis of 1733, when Walpole nearly lost the majority in both houses of parliament.} One year later in 1735, he was officially instructed to work around Sir Robert Walpole, who was seen as the strongest opponent to a much needed British support for the emperor during the War of the Polish Succession.\footnote{Charles VI to Kinsky, Vienna, 10. 8. 1735, ibidem, Kart. 11 a), 5, s. f.}

**Freemasonry and the Royal Society**

In 1731, two events helped Kinsky to expand his political and social networks in London. The first had its origin in Vienna: on the 16th March, 1731, the imperial ministers Prince Eugene, Count Sinzendorff, and Count Starhemberg together with the new British envoy, Sir Thomas Robinson, signed the Second Treaty of Vienna.\footnote{Alfred Francis PRIBRAM (ed.), *Österreichische Staatsverträge England*, volume 1, 1526–1748, Innsbruck 1907, pp. 491–514.} It marked the temporary end to the dynastic, political, and economical differences in the relations between Charles VI and George II, aided by a separate agreement between the emperor and George II as prince elector.\footnote{Charles VI, Affirmation decree in favour of King George II of Great Britain as Prince Elector of Hanover, Vienna, 24. 4. 1731, Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover (= HStA H), Hann. 10, Nr. 170.1, s. f.} The much-improved relations between the courts relaxed matters and people and – with an established alliance – the courts and their representatives worked together for the following years.

The second event was based on the renewed dynastic relations between the Habsburgs in Vienna and the Brunswick-Luneburg Guelphs in London. Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter and heir apparent of the imperial couple, was to become engaged to the Duke of Lorraine and Bar, Francis Stephan.\footnote{Waldegrave to Townshend, Vienna, 30. 4. 1729, NA, SP 80, 64, fols. 216–217; Waldegrave to Tilson, Vienna, 12. 11. 1729, NA, SP 80, 65, fols. 252–252v.} As the situation in the duke’s hereditary lands became possibly dangerous because of the likely threat of a French invasion,\footnote{Renate ZEDINGER, *Flucht oder adelige Kavalierstour? Zur Reise des Herzogs Franz III. (Anton) Stephan von Lothringen in den Jahren 1731/32*, Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert und Österreich 7/8, 1992/93, pp. 51–69, here p. 55–56.} Charles VI and Prince Eugene advised him to tour Europe and to visit the emperor’s and his own allies.\footnote{Renate ZEDINGER, *Franz Stephan von Lothringen (1708–1765): Monarch – Manager – Mäzen*, Vienna 2008, p. 53.} One of the aims of a visit to Great Britain was the acceptance and support of the British royals for the dynastic marriage of the Habsburg heir. In October 1731, Francis
Stephan arrived in London. During his stay, he lived with the imperial envoy,\textsuperscript{91} which he probably knew beforehand from visits to the Kinsky families’ estates with the emperor.\textsuperscript{92} During his stay in London – and after King George II and Queen Caroline had shown their approval to the match with Maria Theresa\textsuperscript{93} – the duke was accepted into two different, but interconnected types of networks: the Royal Society and the freemasons. And Count Kinsky, as the duke’s host and companion through London society, was invited to become part of these networks as well.

In the eighteenth century, London was known as the nucleus of voluntary, but organised societies, clubs, and meeting places.\textsuperscript{94} Regular meetings of those “voluntary associations” were attended by a defined membership, who followed a clear set of rules, while new members were voted in by the others.\textsuperscript{95} The aim was the collective progress of each individual, through instructions, ceremonies, and discussions.\textsuperscript{96} Some of the associations were established by royal consent, which was shown in their name. The \textit{Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge} was founded in 1660 and served as a meeting place for discussions concerning every field of knowledge from physics, chemistry, biology, to economy or agronomy.\textsuperscript{97} Intellectuals, and scientifically inclined persons, would come together to discuss and assess experiments and theories about nature.\textsuperscript{98} By accepting high aristocrats into the Royal Society, it and the knowledge it produced gained publicity and strengthened the networks that supported it.\textsuperscript{99} Therefore, the Duke of Richmond, a member of the British king’s Privy Council, recommended Duke Francis Stephan and

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{91} \textit{London}, 26. October, Wienerisches Diarium Nr. 91, 14. 11. 1731, p. 2.
\bibitem{92} R. ZEDINGER, \textit{Flucht oder adelige Kavalierstour?}, pp. 59–60.
\bibitem{93} Harrington to Robinson, Whitehall, 12. 11. 1731, NA, SP 80, 81, s. f.
\bibitem{94} Prominent examples are the so-called gentlemen’s clubs, such as White’s – a long-standing institution as a meeting place for men of the upper levels of society to this day – or the Kit-Cat Club, one of the earliest clubs for Whigs. William Biggs BOULTON, \textit{The History of White’s with the Betting Book from 1743 to 1878 and A List of Members from 1736 to 1892}, 2 volumes, London 1892; Ophelia FIELD, \textit{The Kit-Cat Club: Friends Who Imagined a Nation}, London 2008. See for an in-depth analysis of the evolvement of voluntary associations in Great Britain the monograph by Peter CLARK, \textit{British Clubs and Societies, 1580–1800: The Origins of an Associational World}, Oxford 2000.
\bibitem{96} Ibidem, pp. 1–3, 10.
\bibitem{97} The voluntary associations – e.g. clubs, companies, etc. – set the example for the Royal Societies in Great Britain, making them distinctly different to the continental scientific academies. Ibidem, pp. 16, 19.
\end{thebibliography}
Count Kinsky as new members, who were accordingly accepted in late 1731. Kinsky in turn sponsored the duke's secretary as a new member in January 1732; the fellow sponsors were the Duke of Montagu, who was the king's Master of the Great Wardrobe, and Martin Folkes, a mathematician: “Baron Futschner [!] Privy Counsellor of his Royal Highness the Duke of Lorrain, and Director of Experimental Philosophy at Nancy & in the University of Pont-a Mousson, being a great promoter of Natural Philosophy & other usefull and Polite Learning, is desirous to be a member of this Society, and is accordingly proposed by us.”

All of these men named above were or became freemasons as well. The origins of freemasonry in Great Britain are unknown, but the first Great Lodge was founded in London in 1717. The freemasons operated as any other voluntary association, with the election of new members, fixed rules, regular meetings, and ceremonies. In contrast to continental Europe, freemasons were neither suppressed nor persecuted in Great Britain, but operated parallel to other clubs and societies. In London, members were often part of the higher echelons of society, from the peerage or gentry, and held positions in court and parliamentary politics, the financial sector or trade. Many were freemasons as well as members of the Royal Society, White’s, and other similar associations. They openly met in inns and pubs in London or at country estates of landed members. Count Kinsky was initiated during an extraordinary lodge meeting at Houghton Hall, Walpole’s country seat in Norfolk. At the same time, the Duke of Lorraine and the secretary of state, the Duke of Newcastle, were raised to master status, while Sir Robert Walpole as well as other members of the British ministry were present. As a freemason, Kinsky


102 P. CLARK, British Clubs and Societies, p. 312.

103 Ibidem, p. 328.

104 Bruce HOGG – Diane CLEMENTS, Freemasons and the Royal Society: Alphabetical List of Fellows of the Royal Society who were Freemasons, London 2012.

105 P. CLARK, British Clubs and Societies, pp. 325–328.

106 B. HOGG – D. CLEMENTS, Freemasons and the Royal Society, pp. 46, 70, 90.
therefore gained access to a close network, which included members of the government, court officials, and parliamentarians.

The Imperial Ambassador

Even before his initiation into freemasonry and his election to become a member of the Royal Society, Kinsky enjoyed the social possibilities London had to offer. Because cultural entertainments were commercialised and not solely centred on the court in London, everyone able to pay for them could gain access. Theatres, music halls, and operas were socially acceptable places to mingle, and the pricier establishments were entertaining the high society: peerage, gentry, politicians, directors of banks and trading companies, and even the members of the royal family paid for their diversions in public.¹⁰⁷

Kinsky never reported any specific activities in this regard, but some sources have survived. Together with the Duke of Lorraine, he visited the sword fighting at a known sports club, Figg’s.¹⁰⁸ And latest in 1733, after Count Kinsky was finally raised to ambassador, he also bought a season ticket for Vauxhall Gardens,¹⁰⁹ the famous pleasure gardens with many sought-after activities and foods in southern London.¹¹⁰

In addition, like everywhere in Europe, high society invited each other for receptions, dinners, balls, or hunting. In the summer of 1730, Kinsky and his wife visited Tunbridge Wells, one of the spas of the eighteenth century:

"Monsieur and Madame Kinski, accompanied by Mr. Davenant and a troop of foreigners, have spent some days here in great mirth; they all danced at the ball all sorts of dances, though some had never performed in that way before. They dined with the Duchess of Marlborough yesterday, who was in the mind to be mighty civil to them. They spent fourscore pounds in presents and raffles, and departed for London this morning [...]."¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ St James’s Palace had neither theatre nor concert hall; because of that, George II, his family and court had to use commercial offers. Wolf BURCHARD, St James’s Palace: George II’s and Queen Caroline’s Principal London Residence, Court Historian 16, 2011, pp. 177–203, here p. 183.
¹⁰⁹ William Biggs BOULTON, The Amusements of Old London; Being a Survey of the Sports and Pastimes, Tea gardens and Parks, Playhouses and other Diversions of the People of London from the 17th to the beginning of the 19th Century, volume 1, London 1901, p. 28. Figg’s “was the first of the London schools-of-arms, a place of tuition in the ‘noble science of self-defence’” (ibidem, p. 27). It was frequented by males of the higher society and offered shows by professional fighters as well as instructions by Figg, himself a highly praised sword-fighter.
¹¹¹ Mary Chamber to Henrietta Howard, Tunbridge Wells, 7. 8. 1730, in: John Wilson CROKER (ed.), Letters to and from Henrietta, Countess of Suffolk, and her Second Husband, the Hon. George Berkeley:
Dinners and receptions were also an expected part of the diplomatic business, and Count Kinsky had to regularly invite the other foreign diplomats as well as the British politicians. In the later years of his stay, the invitees and persons attending some of his known invitations also show his integration into the political and social networks. In 1734, during the War of the Polish Succession, when the British king and government were allied to the emperor, but would not commit to military aid to defend the emperor’s positions in Italy or in the Empire against French and Spanish attacks, Kinsky celebrated Charles VI’s Saint’s day with a dinner invitation. At the same date, the Spanish ambassador had an invitation to celebrate the Infante Don Carlos Saint’s day. Because Don Carlos was leading the attack on imperial positions in Italy, accepting one or the other invitation was noted as support for the emperor or the allied kings of France and Spain. Kinsky triumphed by hosting all the British ministers, and every foreign diplomat whose monarch was not at war with the emperor.¹¹² Some months later, for the celebration of Maria Theresa’s and Francis Stephen’s wedding in 1736, a dinner and following masque hosted by Kinsky was even attended by King George II, Crown Prince Frederick, as well as the older two Princesses Amalie and Caroline, and Prince William.¹¹³

Conclusion

Count Philip Kinsky’s appointment as imperial envoy and minister plenipotentiary of Emperor Charles VI at the Court of St James’s in London can be seen as a symbol for the re-established relations between Vienna and London. But, as this was his first diplomatic post, the decision was most probably due to his knowledge of English economy and his financial skills, to his family and patronage network, as well as to him being a high-ranking noble of the Habsburg hereditary kingdoms. His personal social, economical, and eventually ceremonial high status, for which he was partly responsible, could not balance his inexperience or his misjudgements, for examples in contacting members of the Whig and Tory opposition against Sir Robert Walpole’s and his colleagues’ ministry in the hope of a change in government.

Even though the political aims of Kinsky’s stay in London were difficult to meet, on another level, the place of his employment helped to overcome some challenges. The commercial entertainments in the capital city and its vacation destinations were open to everyone with enough money for tickets and appropriate clothing, which broadened the

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¹¹² Kinsky to Charles VI, London, 2. 11. 1734, ÖStA Wien, HHStA, StA England, Kart. 70, fols. 3v–4.
social circle of the imperial household. But the count was also successful in using chance events such as the visit of the expected future husband of Maria Theresa, the Duke of Lorraine. The access to the Royal Society as well as to freemasonry came alongside the high guest, who was potentially accepted as a member to both networks as a favour to King George II and Queen Caroline. Over time, Kinsky’s long stay in London and the fact that he was able to establish himself and his household rather well in the social and political networks of London overcame some of the difficulties in the relations between the courts, making his time in Great Britain, together with some other events not discussed here, a probably unexpectedly fruitful one.

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114 Kinsky was also expected to negotiate for Charles VI to borrow money from the Bank of England or other public or private sources. In 1735, during the War of the Polish Succession, he was responsible for arranging a loan of £250,000. Kinsky to Harrach (Bruxelles), London, 28. 1. 1735, ÖStA Wien, FA Kinsky, Kart. 3 d), 7, s. f.; Minutes of the Court of Directors of the Bank of England, Thursday, 6th March 1734, London, 17. 3. 1735, Bank of England Archive, London, G4, 15, p. 165; Kinsky to Hilleprand, London, 22. 4. 1735, ÖStA Wien, FA Kinsky, Kart. 3 d), 59, s. f.; Kinsky to Hilleprand, London, 23. 4. 1735, ibidem, Kart. 3 d), 62, s. f.

At the turn of September and October 2016 the Clam-Gallas Palace in Prague hosted the fifth annual international conference that specifically focussed on diplomacy and diplomats during the Early Modern period. This meeting of historians joined in the Premodern Diplomats Network (http://www.premoderndiplomats.org) that was initiated by the British historian Roberta Anderson from Bath Spa University in Southern England together with Anna Kalinowska from the Polish Academy of Sciences in 2013. After conferences that took place in Warsaw, Bath, Florence and Budapest, European historians from 11 different countries headed to the heart of Europe to present over thirty contributions there during three days. The organisation of the entire event was under the auspices of a team from the Institute of Historical Sciences of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Pardubice, that was headed by Jiří Kubeš, who also leads the research project entitled *Bohemian and Moravian Nobility in the Diplomatic Service of the Austrian Habsburgs (1640–1740)*. This event was organised in cooperation with the Prague City Archive. The organisers deserve a big Thank You for both the smooth course of the event and their professional approach to it.

The event opened with a speech by the Spanish Ambassador in Prague Pedro Calvo-Sotelo, which was followed by one from the Spanish historian Bernardo García García, whose initial contribution about the men who remained in the background at the Court of Spanish King Philip II initiated the first day of the International Conference that took place in Clam-Gallas Palace. In his presentation he introduced the Spanish King’s favourite who was named Francisco Gomez de Sandoval, Duque de Lerma. In Spanish history this person represents an interesting combination of the personal skills of a single nobleman, who was able to dominate and specifically to control all the affairs of the Spanish Empire. Following the example of the Duque de Lerma García García demonstrated to the audience how it was possible to achieve such great success during a career at the Court. After the Spanish historian’s introductory lecture Dante Fedele and Stephan Mai each presented their papers that were both concerned with theories related to diplomacy. In his presentation the former historian who is now working in Belgium introduced the work of the French Jurist and Humanist Pierre Ayrault (1536–1601), whose work was focussed on the criminal responsibility of diplomats and on the establishing of diplomatic immunity. On the other
hand, the Viennese historian Mai based his presentation on the works of Abraham de Wicquefort (1606–1682), which he contextualised and he specifically took into account his failed diplomatic missions.

During the second panel, first Christof Muigg (from Vienna) presented a contribution about the General and Diplomat Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609–1680), in which he explained how significant his military experience was for the success of his diplomatic work in Sweden. Subsequently Zsuzsanna Cziráki (from Szeged) gave her presentation, in which she charted the wide range of Imperial diplomacy that was taking place in Istanbul during the mid-17th Century. The Hungarian historian approached the issue of how Simon Reniger could have become a key figure in regard to the relations between Leopold I and the Ottoman Empire without, in the first place, having had any diplomatic experience. She also stressed the need for the continuance of the Imperial diplomatic representation, in regard to which the previous envoy was crucial as a patron of his successor. In this instance it was Johann Rudolf Schmid who, from 1629 to 1643, worked in Constantinople as the Ambassador. Subsequently David Coast (from Bath) analysed the status of the English King James I's diplomats and their influence on the current politics of the time in England.

After the lunch break, which the conference participants used for familiarising themselves with Czech cuisine, the conference programme continued in accordance with the planned schedule. The authors dedicated the third block exclusively to the Austrian Habsburgs’ Ambassadors. First Jiří Kubeš (from Pardubice) presented the rather negative personal experiences of three diplomats, who, in the 1670’s and the 1680’s had to represent their sovereign in an English Court. Charlotte Backerra (Mainz/Stuttgart) followed up on his contribution, by supplementing the Czech historian’s previous contribution with other Ambassadors’ experiences of the Austrian Habsburgs in England during the 1720’s and the 1730’s. Mostly she discussed the life of Philipp Kinsky. At this time the historical sources actually referred to the English Court as being “almost the most important in Europe”. Juliane Märker (Mainz) gave her presentation as the last of the trio, in which she focused on Maria Theresa’s diplomats and their mission to Venice during the 1740’s and the 1750’s and their influence within the context of the differences between the ceremonies at her Court and those in the Venetian Republic.

For the first day, the organisers had prepared an accompanying programme that included an hour-long tour of the Clam-Gallas Palace. Under the guidance of Martin Krummholz, an art historian from the Czech Academy of Sciences, many of the guests found their way into the bowels of this monumental architectural structure. Others took advantage of their free time at a nearby cafe in the historic centre of Prague to become closer mutual acquaintances. After the break, the fourth and final panel of the first day began, which also brought together a diversity of contributions. First, Julia Gebke (Vienna) began the
last session with her synthetic paper on Habsburg women’s role in diplomacy. The three remaining posts were all linked by their mutual bond to Spain. The Polish historian Matilda Uryasz-Raczko from Warsaw presented the role played by Spanish Diplomats during the election of the Polish King at the end of the 16th Century. She especially emphasised the problems that were related to cultural diversity, which led to the Spaniards’ complete misunderstanding of the situation. After her Conchi Gutiérrez (from Madrid) compared the theoretical works dating from the first half of the 17th Century of a Spanish (Juan Antonio de Vera) and of two French diplomats (Phlipp de Béthune and Henri de Rohan) and their focus on strengthening the powers of the state through learning about national interests. The first day ended with Marisol Garcia (from Madrid), who brought attention to the life story of the Spanish Nobleman Gómez IV Suárez de Figueroa, the third Duke of Feria, and his mission during the first quarter of the 17th Century in Rome and in Paris.

The second day started with contributions from historians at Spanish universities, whose presentations José Miguel de Lara Toledo, the Councilor for Cultural and Consular Affairs from the Spanish Embassy in Prague came to see. In that block Cristina Bravo Lozano, Roberto Quirós Rosado and Ondřej Stolička focussed on the role in Spanish diplomacy that was played by finances during the second half of the 17th Century. The former historian (Sevilla) introduced the activities of the Spanish Ambassador Chapels located in the Protestant World of Northern Europe, while the other two were both focusing on the diplomacy that was taking place during the period of Juan José de Austria. Roberto Quirós (Madrid) first based on the example of Navarra, stressed the importance of regional diplomacy within the framework of the Spanish monarchy. On the other hand, in the 17th Century, Ondřej Stolička (Madrid) introduced the relationship between the Spanish Monarchy and Brandenburg-Prussia in association with the diplomatic missions of Melchior von Ruck (1676–1681), who tried unsuccessfully to recover the amount due for the assistance of the Brandenburg soldiers.

A short break for refreshments was followed by two very interesting presentations – one by Béla Vilmos Mihalik (from Budapest) and the other by Michaela Buriáňková representing the University of Pardubice. The former focussed on the everyday life of the Papal Nuncio Andrea Santacroce during the period of his mission to Vienna (1696–1700). This contribution provided some very interesting factual information about accommodation, catering and the diseases that the Papal Nuncio had depicted both openly and in detail in private letters to his brother. On the other hand the Czech historian dedicated her part to the mission of Wenzel Ferdinand Popel von Lobkowicz in Madrid (1689–1697) from the perspective of the ceremonial conflicts that his work at the Spanish Royal Court had initiated. She demonstrated how this Austrian Habsburg Ambassador perceived his honour only as representing the honour of his function, which was at that moment in time was directly connected with his name.
During the afternoon session the two Czech historians Jiří Hrbek and Jiří Havlík (both from Prague) presented their contributions. The first-mentioned, a member of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic approached the mission of Ferdinand Ernst von Waldstein during the Westphalian Peace Congress (1645–1648) as the representative of the Bohemian King (not the Emperor). During the papal elections in the years 1655–1740 Jiří Havlík again concentrated on the issue of Imperial Ambassadors and he specifically compared the missions of Cardinal Harrach, Prince Anton Florian von Liechtenstein and Antonio Rambaldi the Count of Collalto. The pair of domestic historians were accompanied by Lena Oetzel (Bonn/Salzburg), who was following-up on the issue of the Westphalia Congress. From her gripping presentation about the deaths of prominent people in the 1640’s and their influence on the course of diplomatic negotiations she deserved the considerable attention that she received from the audience.

After a short break, the Conference continued with the last block of the second day’s contributions. First Ekaterina Domnina (Moscow) introduced the family strategy of the Spinelli brothers, who utilised a combination of diplomacy and business for their own promotion during the 16th and the 17th Centuries. Subsequently Gennaro Cassiano (Rome) introduced the life of Vincenzo Badalocchio (1529–1593) and his work as the Secretary to the French Ambassador in Rome. Then the Spanish Historian, Bernardo Garcia, spoke again, who this time discussed the network of agents of Archduke Albert who were present at the Spanish Court during the years 1595–1622. In contrast to him, Alberto Mariano Rodríguez Martínez (Sevilla) introduced the Dutch diplomat Theodore Rodenburgh, who operated from 1611 to 1613 in Madrid in person. After an interesting discussion the Conference Organisers had prepared a guided tour of Prague’s Lesser Town and Hradčany under the leadership of Martin Krummholz that ended by sitting in the evening in a traditional Czech Restaurant in which the participants were able to strengthen their friendly relations.

Although the last day of the conference was on a Saturday, nevertheless the participation in the event did not diminish. During the first series of contributions the speakers focussed on Russian themes dating from the 17th Century. Marta Jaworska (from Warsaw) introduced the manner of functioning of the institution that was known as Posolsky Prikaz and that was in charge of receiving foreign diplomats and of determining Russian foreign policy during the 16th and the 17th Centuries. In particular she stressed the key role played by the superior of this office, who was defined as a Posolsky Dyak, a status that can be compared with that of a State Secretary. Based on the example of the Dyak, Ivan Gramotin, she demonstrated the difficulty of the Dyak’s position during the first third of the 17th Century. Additionally, Tatyana Zhukova (from Nottingham) analysed the degree of activity and the change of status of the English merchants, Anthony Jenkinson and John Merrick, who had served as English Ambassadors in Moscow at the cusp of the 16th and the 17th Centuries. The first Saturday session was complemented by two Czech authors, Monika Konrádová
and Rostislav Smíšek (from České Budějovice), with their paper regarding the difficulties of the missions of diplomats of Austrian Habsburgs in Russia during the mid-17th Century.

In the last block after the break other participants at the Conference also discussed what were defined as being “Eastern” topics. First Marius Sirutavičius (Kaunas) focused on the issues of cronyism and patronage and their role in filling the diplomatic posts in Lithuania during the second half of the 16th Century. He conclusively proved that most of the Ambassadors had close ties to the Lithuanian Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor, who at that time were from Radziwiłł and later from Sapieha families. Maria Telegina (Budapest) then analysed the mission of the Ottoman Diplomat Thomas Kantakouzenos in Moscow (1621–1637) in terms of transmitted and received gifts (pominki and zhalovanie). Gábor Kármán (Budapest) then focused his speech on the selection and the composition of the diplomatic corps during the first half of the 17th Century in the Principality of Transylvania, by means of the prosopography of this group of men. The last post of the conference was presented by Phillipa Woodcock (Warwick/Paris) who disrupted a series of posts with Eastern European subjects and focused her presentation on the Venetian Embassy’s issues in Paris during the 17th Century. She specifically analysed both the changes in its location and the composition of the Court of Ambassadors.

The conference was concluded by Robert Anderson and Jiří Kubeš, who thanked the participants and invited them to attend the next conference that will be organised by the Premodern Diplomats Network Platform and will be held in Lisbon in September 2017. They also invited them to send contributions to the newly established open source online magazine entitled Legatio: The Journal for Renaissance and Early Modern Diplomatic Studies that focuses on diplomacy during the Early Modern Period (see http://legatio-ihpan.edu.pl). The audience that was present in the Clam-Gallas Palace applauded and also especially thanked the organisational team for a very well-prepared conference. Following this came the last and originally unplanned high-point of the conference, i.e. a guided tour of Troja Castle under the traditional leadership of Martin Krummholz.

Ondřej Stolička

Commemoration in Baroque culture

Old Polish funeral culture era is increasingly becoming an interdisciplinary subject of analysis, using the tools of the humanities as well as the natural sciences which allows a more complete understanding of its multidimensionality.¹ The study Not All Will Die

¹ See also: Anna DRĄŻKOWSKA, Odzież grobowa w Rzeczypospolitej w XVII i XVIII wieku, Toruń 2008;
in the Memory of the Culture of Old Poland, edited by Alexander Jankowski and Andrzej Klonder, is an attempt to explore the specifics of Old Polish artis moriendi, which so strongly defined noble reality. The monograph addresses death from the perspective of three areas – the customs of preparing wills (Part 1: The Foresight of the Departing), the theatre of the funeral (Part 2: Splendour at the Threshold of Eternity (rites and ceremonies) and the literary perspective (Part 3: Memory in Perpetual Words). Several articles have attempted to re-interpret the sepulchral sources bringing new research problems through the application of methodologies from the field of various disciplines of the humanities. This research widens our understanding of an individual's values in the Baroque era, because it is the memory of one's own past, understood always then in the context of the memory of the family, and one which shaped one's identity and function in society. More and more often this raises the question of the awareness of shaping individual memory, creating one's own history, the awareness of its transience and finally the method of ensuring that it perpetuates. This study develops our understanding of the problems of memory, as well as in regard to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and thus of a period far less studied in this respect, as it is the eighteenth century which brings a gradual development of autobiographical memory.

The first part consists of five articles in which the authors focus primarily on two major sources which refer to inheritance proceedings, i.e. post-mortem inventories and wills. The wills were analysed through the prism of their respect and enforcement. In this context, the authors show issues connected to memory; the memory of the past and the memory of the deceased. By analysing the issue of respecting the decision of the testators, Jacek Pielas in the text Decisions of Noble Testators and their Respect by the Heirs of their Worldly Goods in the Crown in the Seventeenth Century tries to show the “noble memory of the dead”.

By analysing various sources, Pielas shows that the nobility rarely left their worldly assets

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2 Alexander JANKOWSKI – Andrzej KLONDER (red.), The Civilization the Old Polish Republic’s Noble Provinces Cycle II: Not All Will Die in the Memory of the Culture of Old Poland, Bydgoszcz 2015, p. 295.

3 For more context on the topic of memory during the Saksi era see also: Agnieszka SŁABY, Kategoria pamięci i formy jej utrwalania we wczesnych czasach saskich, in: Bożena Popiołek – Agnieszka Chłosta-Sikorska – Agnieszka Słaby (red.), Historia – Pamięć – Tożsamość w edukacji humanistycznej, t. 3: Pamięć człowieka, pamięć miejsca, miejsca pamięci. Studium historyczno-antropologiczne, Kraków 2015, pp. 73–82.
if they were bound with protected sums of money. The studies found that only around fifteen percent of wills contained information regarding the testator’s expectations about the property they would leave behind. The author rightly points out that this situation could have resulted from legal conditions, well-known to the nobility, which guaranteed inheritance to the legitimate successors. A similar group of testators asked for the heir’s approval as to the decisions taken about their assets. Only in exceptional circumstances, such as records of people outside the circle of successors, was consent required and only then when these transactions had not been certified (p. 27). The text is an important contribution to the analysis of respecting wills, although one would only expect perhaps a broader analysis of the proposed issues to anchor the “memory of the dead” as to deepen our knowledge about the mentality of the era as well as the functioning of memory. The author concludes that the heirs usually filled in the recommended instructions in the will. However, this was associated primarily with the nature of the document, which was a testament and obliged the nobility to complete it under the threat of God’s judgement and the nobility also had excellent knowledge of the law. In this context it is hard to see this as an expression of noble memory, and only a respect for the letter of the law.

In a much broader range of topics Katarzyna Justyniarską-Chojak looks at the tangible memory of bourgeois wills. The author, in the text *The Memory of the Dead in Seventeenth-Century Bourgeois Wills from Lesser Poland*, raises the question of the tangibility of memories and reflections about the past in the records of the last will. The author points out that testators mention the dead in several cases; if they had obligations to them (p. 42) and if they wanted to explain conflicts from the past (p. 43) in regard to the constraints of a legal nature such as the execution of wills or care of minors as well as in the background of current events (p. 45). In addition, the author mentions that the dead were mentioned in the context of the assets they left behind to spouses, parents, grandparents, less distant relatives. The author says that the wills of the bourgeois have no signs of a deeper attachment, and were the result of primarily taking care of assets. It seems that we can’t use inference in every case, because the binding of a thing with a particular person and the memory in their will can be read as a kind of manifestation of the memory of that person, and the rigid framework of the will did not allow for more reflective notes.

In his article, “What to God and What to the People.” Stanisław Łubieński – *The Last Record of a Seventeenth-century Bishop’s Will*, Waldemar Graczyk focusses on characterizing bishop Łubieński’s mindset using his recorded will. By looking at the bishop’s gifts and passed on inheritance it is possible to discuss Łubieński’s biography. As Graczyk points out he focused heavily on maintaining subordinate churches and for years collected valuable Church objects (vestments) such as liturgical vestments and vessels, which not only show him as a generous patron but also allows us to better know him as a historical and bibliophilic writer.
The next text is written by Magdalena Wilczek-Karczewska and Darius Karczewski – *For the Glory of the Architecture of the Church and the Church itself. The Pious Fund of Prince Fedor Ivanovich Jarosławicz Borowski, Lord of Pinsk*. The text discusses pious funds from the last of the Borowski princes who came from the Grand Duchy of Moscow, Fyodor Ivanovich Jarosławicz (d. 1521). The first part closes Michałowa Hrubá’s article, *Testament as a Study Source of the Memory of the Dead*, in which the author discusses strategies and ways of commemoration which, as an essential component of cultural values, sheds light on the problems of this particular period. Hrubá notes that it is commemoration and the memory of the dead that show the phenomenon of the remembrance of the era. By highlighting the importance of the will as a kind of storage media of the deceased, the author proves that apart from the sepulchral monuments of that time, people tried to maintain the memory after one’s death, and even a “continuous presence” in society in many different ways (p. 60).

Hrubá strongly emphasizes the commemorative audio and visual elements as one of the ways to show the presence of the dead. It seems that this type of research on these forms of Baroque culture are still undervalued, and the significant role of fraternities and the church choir as well as the recurrence of ordered bell ringing demonstrates the vital importance and prestige of this sphere. It is also worth emphasising the value of the mentioned wills: approximately 2,300 wills of burghers of Czech royal cities were analysed. Through this the author takes into account and underlines the cultural influences of Saxony to the area, including echoes of Lutheranism and the economic character of the region, as factors which shaped the contemporary consciousness of the Czech townspeople.

Hrubá’s text is a kind of introduction to the next section which is concerned with rites and ceremonies; *Splendor at the Threshold of Eternity* (*Rites and Ceremonies*). One of the elementary parts of the funeral ceremony were coffin portraits. Particular attention is given to this topic which examines the origins of this custom and its Egyptian (Piotr O. Scholz) and Roman (Magdalena Dlugosz) parallels.

In his text *The Genesis of the Portrait Coffin and the Travels of Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł “Orphans” to Egypt and the Holy Land (1582–1584) Researchers’ Remarks*, Piotr O. Scholz attempts to define the genesis of the coffin portrait and discuss it in the context of Mikołaj Radziwiłł’s travel to Egypt, which contributed to his knowledge of the aesthetics of Fajum portraits. The author verifies many of the existing beliefs through the use of an anthropological approach and takes into account aspects such as the anthropology of art, transcendental and social functions of visualization as well as the codification of iconic tradition. By embracing these issues we can extend the subject of the origin of the Sarmatian tradition of portraying the dead, which the author places in the broader context of ancient sources of this type. It’s important to recognise this as the greatest value of the article which
redefines the existing suppositions and points to new research perspectives and questions. Against this broad theoretical background the author discusses Mikołaj Radziwiłł's travels. However, there is an interesting addition about the spread of cultural innovations and the opportunities to transfer the portrait fashion at that time, because it was during the reign of Stefan Batory that the fashion of portraiture packing and labelling gained momentum.

Magdalena Długosz, in her text, *The Phenomenon of the Coffin Portrait In the Context of Ancient Parallel*, refers primarily to Roman conditions, as traditionally associated with the ideology of the Sarmatians. In the legacy of antiquity we therefore look for the origins of the full splendor and triumphant funeral theatre of the old Polish nobility, which constantly refers to ancient roots. Pointing to the findings of H. Betlinga, but using native source material, Długosz proves that the primary function of the Sarmatian coffin portrait was one of commemoration. It functioned independently of the body since its primary task was to replace the body rather than complement it. As a result these kind of portraits were “mental images”, taking into account the internal imitation. They served as a storage media, especially for the descendants, for whom the personal memory of the dead could survive thanks to this kind of perpetuation.

Marta Pieniążek-Samek also looks at the issue of the consolidation of memory through portraits by analyzing the pictures of the donors of the churches in Northern Lesser Poland in her text “Ante oculos Dei et posteritati.” *Remarks on Modern Portraits of Donors in the Churches of Northern Lesser Poland*. These portraits, donated by the subjects themselves or ordered after their death were, as the author argues, a dual “sign of memory”. They also immortalised the donors, both personally, but indirectly also their achievements and works.

Anna Sylwia Czyż, in her text, *The Pac “Pump Funebris” – The Memory of the Dead as Part of the Propaganda of the Family*, focuses on the organization of funerals in the Pac family, which was seen as one of the key elements in building family prestige over the years. The author analyses printed eulogies, accompanied by numerous graphics, in which the power of the family is visualized by references to symbolism and their coats of arms.

In the article *Funerals of the Lithuanian Magnate*, Dorota Piramidowicz discusses the double funeral of Kazimierz Leon Sapieha, the vice-chancellor of Lithuania, and the later moving of his corpse related to the cassation of the Carthusians Order monastery of which he was the founder. The history of the Sapieha burials does not only illustrate the widespread habit of postponing the funeral to a more opportune time due to various factors. The author also focuses on a number of later transferred burials of Sapieha which were caused by cassation and the demolition of post-monastery buildings. The result is that today the burial place of Sapieha is today unknown.

In her article *The Last Will of the Lithuanian Grand Marshal Paweł Karol Sanguszki (d. 1750) and its Execution*, Jolanta M. Marszalska examines the lesser-known sermon from the funeral of Paweł Karol Sanguszki, delivered by the Jesuit Antoni Czapski as well
as fragments of the will of the Lithuanian Grand Marshal. In the light of these texts the author shows the dispositions contained in the will, which recommended the omission of “World Pomp” which was ignored. The funeral was held with full splendour of the baroque funeral pomp which was also shown by earlier findings. In the final texts devoted to the last ceremonial farewell Bohdan Łazorak talks about the rituals of commemoration in the Orthodox Eparchy of Lviv’s fraternities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During this period the memory of the dead was closely associated with the activities of the fraternities, which meant the practice of commemoration became a mass event and took on an obligatory nature (p. 135).

The last and third part of the publication is devoted to the problem of memory in word and image. Leonid Tymoshenko opens the text with The Memory of the Dead in the Orthodox Brotherhoods of the Orthodox Archdiocese of Kiev in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century in which the author emphasizes the significant role of the Pomiankis in building a “specific databases of historical memory” (p. 156), thereby perpetuating the ancestral traditions of different social strata. Tymoshenko's studies indicate that the practice of the Orthodox community in continuing the memory of the deceased was part of the broad funeral tradition in European culture.

Jerzy Urwanowicz’s text “Piis Manibus.” Gravestone Inscriptions of the Żółkiewski Family in the Seventeenth Century highlights the value and potential of research into epitaphs and Elogia as sources of biographical study, the values system and intellectual horizons of both the authors and founders of these inscriptions. In discussing the fate of the epitaphs, the author demonstrates the significant circulation of these inscriptions, which have survived primarily on the pages of the epitaph collections.

In the study The Ukrainian Memory of the Dead. Gravestones from the Pen of Lazarus Baranovich, Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel discusses Baranovich’s creativity, pointing to the vividness and individuality of his language, which combined everyday language with elements of Ukrainian. The author’s opinion about the work of the Ukrainian poet, who wrote in Polish, is formed by this cultural drawing of community, whereas until now Baranovich’s achievements were assessed solely through the prism of artifice of used convention.

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Remembering the deceased in the texts of funeral speeches is the subject of analysis by Urszula Kicińska in *Funeral Oration as a Commemoration of The Deceased*. The author points to a number of elements of speeches, in which she makes reference to the commemoration of the life of the deceased. With men, mainly the virtues and achievements in the fields of politics and public life were stressed, in the case of women charity was the main focus. The author also points to passages that relate to the last moments of the lives of those who had passed away, showing commemorations included in the preparations for a good death. Funeral speeches should certainly be considered an indispensable source in researching these ceremonies and what is more, we should study them in the context of the separation of the sexes. This in itself brings interesting information on the attitudes and practices that were mandatory in this society.

Katarzyna Kolendo-Korczak's article *Historical Examples of Polish Sepulchral Art in the Baroque Era* was dedicated to a small group of monuments which are presented in Polish historical sepulchral art. The author analyses them according to their distribution in historical examples as well as those with scenes directly linked to the life of the deceased. The latter are particularly valuable; life events with both a fixed image and spoken speech. As K. Kolendo-Korczak highlights, this kind of commemoration was both a commemoration of the dead, and of the descendants who issued the monument.

Janusz Nowiński, in his text “*Tabula Memorialis of the Land* – An Original Example of the Memory of the Dead and Documentation of the History of the Cistercian Abbey in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century”, focuses on the unique work of the Tabula of Łądzka memorialis, exceptional in the context of Polish vanitas art and unknown from any other Cistercian monastery. An Analysis of the ideological content of the composition allows us to understand its commemorative nature and function in shaping the awareness of the past amongst the friars.

In her article *The Memory of the Tragically Deceased Princess Teresa Czartoryska (1765–1780)*, Małgorzata Ewa Kowalczyk highlights new forms of commemoration in the second half of the eighteenth century, which became possible thanks to the development and spreading of the printed press. The young age of the deceased princess and her tragic death concentrated Warsaw society’s attention and reverberated in the capital’s press. As shown by the author, the family meticulously took care of the memory *Princess Teresa* by organizing the anniversary of her death, her names day and birthday and by ordering appropriate songs for the occasions.

Michał Nowicki writes about the educational importance of the memory of the dead in his text *The Educational Significance of the Memory of the Dead in Secondary Education in Poznań in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. The author draws attention to the value of the funeral events in the educational process in Poznań schools, highlighting songs which showed the merits and glories of the lives of the deceased.
Wiesław Duży highlights the value of the memoirs from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in his text *Memories of Deceased Parents in Selected Memoir Records of the late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century*. Writing memoirs was considered as an important manifestation of social life and in the second half of the eighteenth century it reformulates itself mainly due to individualisation of memories, for example of the then French diaries. These diaries took on an autobiographical characteristic, bringing a record of personalized memories in which the authors mention a wider and wider family including the children, as well as parents and even grandparents. These memories of the parents, as the author argues, was “*a special manifestation of the desire to preserve the memory of the family and the functions of education, which were attributed to the older members of the family***”. Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz finishes the third part of the text, which is dedicated to creating the legend of Samuel Zborowski in literature and historiography between the sixteenth and twenty first centuries. In this, the author indicates the characteristic changes in highlighting various values depending on the time in which the Zborowski legend was created from scratch.

These monographs concerning the issue of commemoration and its accompanying various strategies allows for an in-depth analysis of related social issues during the Baroque era, in which death and the associated ceremony were one of the constant elements of temporality, and sometimes even the main points of reference. The publication of the subject of remembrance for these different cultural areas and social groups has great value and allows us to compare commemorative phenomena. It is also worth emphasising the visible and more frequent citing of visual and aural spheres of commemoration as permanent components of the strategy of commemoration. Thanks to this, the topic of memory in relation to the modern era can be seen in a broader sense and be expanded further. The authors strongly emphasize the cultural importance held in their research, pointing to a deepening understanding of the social problems thanks to the development of the knowledge of the culture and mentality of the era of specific groups. Such an approach should certainly continue and expand since the cultural aspect has not been fully appreciated so far in Polish historiography.

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Of great value is the inclusion in the publication of a bilingual introduction and table of contents as well as the abstracts of articles. However, there unfortunately is no bibliography, index or key words, which would improve the publication’s accessibility.

Agnieszka Słaby


Jiří M. Havlík is a Czech historian and lecturer dealing mainly with the early modern period (especially the Baroque period), focusing on the history of the Church and the history of nobility. He is also a co-investigator of the grant Bohemian and Moravian Nobility in the Diplomatic Service of the Austrian Habsburgs (1640−1740) at the Institute of Historical Sciences, the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, the University of Pardubice.

Despite the fact that Johann Friedrich von Waldstein (1642−1694), whose life Havlík’s book depicts, was not an entirely unknown personage of Czech history, this new monograph fills a significant gap in the current research into the Czech Baroque aristocracy. During the 20th century, several works concerning this topic were published, however, nowadays they are, for a variety of reasons, considered outdated. As early as in the 1930s, a brief Bělohlávek’s study, describing the fate of the sixteenth Archbishop of Prague, came out. In the 1970s, it was followed by the monograph of Václav Bartůněk. Both the works are, however, impacted by the period of origin and the fact that their authors were not historians by profession but Catholic priests (naturally, having a close relationship to the topic). Petra Vokáčová was the last to elaborate on the life of Johann Friedrich von Waldstein (in the form of a medallion in her adapted dissertation). But in fact, Havlík’s work is the first comprehensive look at the issue. The book is not merely a biography of a high clerical dignitary, but to some extent a fresco of the period when to be in a high position also meant to have the appropriate ability of representation.

The book is divided, like a classic biography, according to individual life stages of Johann Friedrich von Waldstein. Placing the topic in a broader context – the introduction
of the archbishop’s predecessors (in particular the two previous archbishops of Prague – Matthäus Ferdinand Sobek von Bilenberg and Cardinal Ernst Adalbert von Harrach) that he, to a certain extent, followed – I find very appropriate. According to his own words, the author found inspiration in Alessandro Catalano and Tomáš Parma, prominent historians, who both deal with religious history of the 17th century; however, he could also rely on his own rich research. Johann Friedrich von Waldstein was, indisputably, an important personality. In his youth, during the stays in the Eternal City, he made contacts with many important people from high ecclesiastical circles (cardinals, nuncios, some of whom later became the Popes). To all of this, a deep piety and a sharp mind, which Count Waldstein, without a doubt, abounded in, have to be added. No wonder, when being 25 years old, he was thought to become a successor of Prague archbishop Ernst Adalbert von Harrach. Then he had not been nominated to this highest ecclesiastical post in the country yet, however, a year later he was appointed the Bishop of Hradec Králové. The archbishop’s rank he reached a little later, in 1675, at the age of 33. His life, as apparent from the foregoing explanation, was very dynamic; already at a very young age, he gained a lot of high ecclesiastical benefices, which many clerics strived to get at much later age, or did not obtain at all. However, as it usually applies to such kind of people, his life was not long enough to realize all his ambitious plans. Johann Friedrich von Waldstein died in Duchcov, in 1694, aged 52. In the present book, his disputes with state power, which due to the constant wars in the 1670s and 1680s more and more often turned to clergymen to ask for financial aid, are captured very nicely. It was just Waldstein that was willing to give money to the army, but only after getting the consent of the Pope. Thus he firmly stood for the protection of the Church and its immunity against the interference of secular power. The fact that he did not always succeed was not entirely his fault.

The sources of the mentioned work are another thing that should be pointed out in a positive sense. The author studied countless amounts of archive material – the documents deposited in the Vatican Archives, the Archive of the Society of Jesus in Rome, in the Vienna archives, in the Archdiocesan Archive in Wrocław, Poland, and, within the Czech Republic, at the National Archive in Prague, the Royal Canonry of Premonstratensians at

4 Alessandro CATALANO, Zápas o svědomí: Kardinál Arnošt Vojtěch z Harrachu (1598–1667) a protireformace v Čechách, Prague 2008; Tomáš PARMA, František kardinál Dietrichstein a jeho vztahy k římské kurii: Prostředky a metody politické komunikace ve službách moravské církve, Brno 2011.
Strahov and the State District Archive in Hradec Králové. Besides other things, the fact that on a user-friendly 242 pages of the original text there are almost eight hundred footnotes which denotes the gargantuan range of the used archival documents and the necessity to cite them in corresponding places properly.

I would also like to draw attention to minor excursuses and digressions (e.g. the treatise on Johann Tanner and the fundamental effects of his teaching on the young count can be found on pages 27–34). Thanks to them, the text is not just a boring list of the archbishop’s personal data. Often, however, the author goes into too much detail and, in an effort to support his statements as much as possible, breaks the otherwise compact and readable text (see, for example, p. 141 where, in the subchapter on plague, he gives a lengthy list of the priests designated to serve in the contaminated Prague towns). This is obviously a sovereign right of the author how to divide the text; however, even an ardent reader would prefer to see enumerations of this type in a footnote. Likewise, in some places of the book, the text is somewhat illogically put together. In the second chapter, devoted to the youth and adolescence of Johann Friedrich von Waldstein, it is most noticeable. Throughout the chapter, it is hinted that Count Waldstein became (or, according to the current context, will only become) the Bishop of Hradec Králové. Nowhere, however, it is said explicitly that it happened, and certainly not when. Only in the very last sentence, the author writes: “Until Sobek’s death, the bishopric of Hradec Králové remained the only, not very welcome post of the ambitious Duchcov nobleman.” It is true that the entire next chapter is then devoted to the episcopate of Hradec Králové. Nevertheless, it would not have been off-topic if, at least, one sentence had pointed this fact out in the previous text; especially, if the author operates with the idea.

However, the biggest difficulty (of the otherwise good work) I can see is a certain disproportion between the title of the book and its contents. The title of the study, as mentioned above, sounds: Johann Friedrich von Waldstein: Archbishop and Patron of the Baroque Period. The book really deals with Waldstein and his life journey, but I miss a more elaborated part concerning his patronage. Although the author, throughout the book, occasionally refers to architect Jean Baptiste Mathey and his work in Waldstein’s service, considering the importance of the topic (as the author himself states), the question of the patronage and representation would deserve, at least, a separate subchapter, i.e. to summarize the issue in a compact, complete form. Instead of that, we find hints of the archbishop’s patronage scattered throughout the book. They are primarily concentrated in two subchapters.

The first one is called The Holy Scripture, pious books and missions (Písmo, zbožné knížky a misie) and is dedicated to the foundation known as the Heritage of St. Wenceslas. This foundation was initiated by a certain burgheress from the New Town of Prague and its main activity was to print and distribute religious literature to the public. Waldstein contributed
significantly to the publication of the Catholic translation of the New Testament and many other minor printings. The second subchapter whose topic is connected with the Waldstein’s patronage is called *Residence and summer residence* (*Rezidence a letní sídlo*). Here, just on one and a half page (!), there is information on the two most important buildings (more precisely reconstructions) commissioned by Johann Friedrich. They are, naturally, Prague Archbishop’s Palace in Hradčany Square and the Count’s summer residence in Duchcov. Although the author tries to point out to some other Waldstein’s construction works (e.g. churches in Duchcov estate in Northern Bohemia), he still does not give the reader an image of Johann Friedrich von Waldstein as a great patron who carried out huge building activities (employing architects, painters and other artists) how it could be, considering high Waldstein’s position, expected. For example, there is the question if we could find some preserved written sources of accounting nature, from which it would be possible to determine the amount of spent funds. Unfortunately, the mentioned book does not answer this or similar questions. Also, the analogy between the building activities of Waldstein and his contemporary, Olomouc bishop Karl von Liechtenstein-Castelkorn, suggests itself. However, comparing the two noblemen’s construction work, the archbishop’s one fades entirely. Nevertheless, I do not want, in any way, to undermine the clear evidence of Johann Friedrich von Waldstein’s patron activity, about which there is no doubt. I am just trying to point out the fact that, in the book, this issue, which (also with regard to the name of the book) is considered important and stimulating, is solved rather chaotically.

In conclusion, it is possible to say that the book, despite its occasional chaotic interpretation, is a high-quality, well written and very well source-based, original monograph, which, as well with respect to the wide sources, will enrich not only Czech research on the Czech Baroque aristocracy.

Filip Vávra

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